Ecosystem health

Environmental Ethics

Volumn 26, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 227-245

  McShane, Katie ^a  

^a NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 6944250797     PISSN: 01634275     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/enviroethics200426314     Document Type: Review

References (64)

1. Compare, e.g., T. E. Kolb, M. R. Wagner, and W. W. Covington, "Concepts of Forest Health," Journal of Forestry 92, no. 7 (1994): 10-15; Paul A. Mistretta, "Managing for Forest Health," Journal of Forestry 100, no. 7 (2002): 24-27; David J. Rapport, "Ecosystem Health: Exploring the Territory," Ecosystem Health 1 (1995): 5-13; USDA Forest Service, Healthy Forests for America's Future (Washington, D.C.: USDA Forest Service, 1993); and USDA Forest Service, "General Information: Location and Setting for the Targhee National Forest," 13 May 1997 (cited 4 December 2002), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/r4/caribou/Targhee/general.htm.
2. Compare, e.g., T. E. Kolb, M. R. Wagner, and W. W. Covington, "Concepts of Forest Health," Journal of Forestry 92, no. 7 (1994): 10-15; Paul A. Mistretta, "Managing for Forest Health," Journal of Forestry 100, no. 7 (2002): 24-27; David J. Rapport, "Ecosystem Health: Exploring the Territory," Ecosystem Health 1 (1995): 5-13; USDA Forest Service, Healthy Forests for America's Future (Washington, D.C.: USDA Forest Service, 1993); and USDA Forest Service, "General Information: Location and Setting for the Targhee National Forest," 13 May 1997 (cited 4 December 2002), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/r4/caribou/Targhee/general.htm.
3. Compare, e.g., T. E. Kolb, M. R. Wagner, and W. W. Covington, "Concepts of Forest Health," Journal of Forestry 92, no. 7 (1994): 10-15; Paul A. Mistretta, "Managing for Forest Health," Journal of Forestry 100, no. 7 (2002): 24-27; David J. Rapport, "Ecosystem Health: Exploring the Territory," Ecosystem Health 1 (1995): 5-13; USDA Forest Service, Healthy Forests for America's Future (Washington, D.C.: USDA Forest Service, 1993); and USDA Forest Service, "General Information: Location and Setting for the Targhee National Forest," 13 May 1997 (cited 4 December 2002), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/r4/caribou/Targhee/general.htm.
4. Compare, e.g., T. E. Kolb, M. R. Wagner, and W. W. Covington, "Concepts of Forest Health," Journal of Forestry 92, no. 7 (1994): 10-15; Paul A. Mistretta, "Managing for Forest Health," Journal of Forestry 100, no. 7 (2002): 24-27; David J. Rapport, "Ecosystem Health: Exploring the Territory," Ecosystem Health 1 (1995): 5-13; USDA Forest Service, Healthy Forests for America's Future (Washington, D.C.: USDA Forest Service, 1993); and USDA Forest Service, "General Information: Location and Setting for the Targhee National Forest," 13 May 1997 (cited 4 December 2002), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/r4/caribou/Targhee/general.htm.
5. Compare, e.g., T. E. Kolb, M. R. Wagner, and W. W. Covington, "Concepts of Forest Health," Journal of Forestry 92, no. 7 (1994): 10-15; Paul A. Mistretta, "Managing for Forest Health," Journal of Forestry 100, no. 7 (2002): 24-27; David J. Rapport, "Ecosystem Health: Exploring the Territory," Ecosystem Health 1 (1995): 5-13; USDA Forest Service, Healthy Forests for America's Future (Washington, D.C.: USDA Forest Service, 1993); and USDA Forest Service, "General Information: Location and Setting for the Targhee National Forest," 13 May 1997 (cited 4 December 2002), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/r4/caribou/Targhee/general.htm.
6. Although they do not consider the question directly, Laura Westra, James Karr, and Ellen Chu do use the term ecosystem health (which they take to be a necessary condition for ecosystem integrity) in its literal sense. See Laura Westra, An Environmental Proposal for Ethics: The Principle of Integrity (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1994), pp. 24-25; James R. Karr and Ellen W. Chu, Restoring Life in Running Waters: Better Biological Monitoring (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1999), pp. 16-19. See also Robert Costanza, "Toward an Operational Definition of Ecosystem Health," in Ecosystem Health: New Goals for Environmental Management, ed. Robert Costanza, Bryan G. Norton, and Benjamin D. Haskell (Washington D.C.: Island Press, 1992), pp. 239-56. I thank Peter Miller for bringing these passages to my attention.
7. Although they do not consider the question directly, Laura Westra, James Karr, and Ellen Chu do use the term ecosystem health (which they take to be a necessary condition for ecosystem integrity) in its literal sense. See Laura Westra, An Environmental Proposal for Ethics: The Principle of Integrity (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1994), pp. 24-25; James R. Karr and Ellen W. Chu, Restoring Life in Running Waters: Better Biological Monitoring (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1999), pp. 16-19. See also Robert Costanza, "Toward an Operational Definition of Ecosystem Health," in Ecosystem Health: New Goals for Environmental Management, ed. Robert Costanza, Bryan G. Norton, and Benjamin D. Haskell (Washington D.C.: Island Press, 1992), pp. 239-56. I thank Peter Miller for bringing these passages to my attention.
8. Although they do not consider the question directly, Laura Westra, James Karr, and Ellen Chu do use the term ecosystem health (which they take to be a necessary condition for ecosystem integrity) in its literal sense. See Laura Westra, An Environmental Proposal for Ethics: The Principle of Integrity (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1994), pp. 24-25; James R. Karr and Ellen W. Chu, Restoring Life in Running Waters: Better Biological Monitoring (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1999), pp. 16-19. See also Robert Costanza, "Toward an Operational Definition of Ecosystem Health," in Ecosystem Health: New Goals for Environmental Management, ed. Robert Costanza, Bryan G. Norton, and Benjamin D. Haskell (Washington D.C.: Island Press, 1992), pp. 239-56. I thank Peter Miller for bringing these passages to my attention.
9. See, e.g., "Antibiotics Are Harming Streams," Chemical Week, 14 August 2002, p. 7; Gale A. Norton, Editorial, "A Better Plan for the Forests," Washington Post, 17 September 2002, p. A21; and Carol Kaesuk Yoon, "New Studies Reassess Importance of Biodiversity," New York Times, 2 September 1997, p. C4.
10. See, e.g., "Antibiotics Are Harming Streams," Chemical Week, 14 August 2002, p. 7; Gale A. Norton, Editorial, "A Better Plan for the Forests," Washington Post, 17 September 2002, p. A21; and Carol Kaesuk Yoon, "New Studies Reassess Importance of Biodiversity," New York Times, 2 September 1997, p. C4.
11. See, e.g., "Antibiotics Are Harming Streams," Chemical Week, 14 August 2002, p. 7; Gale A. Norton, Editorial, "A Better Plan for the Forests," Washington Post, 17 September 2002, p. A21; and Carol Kaesuk Yoon, "New Studies Reassess Importance of Biodiversity," New York Times, 2 September 1997, p. C4.
12. Those who claim that ecosystems can only be healthy metaphorically include J. Baird Callicott, "The Value of Ecosystem Health," Environmental Values 4 (1995): 345-61; Peter Calow, "Can Ecosystems Be Healthy? Critical Consideration of Concepts," Journal of Aquatic Ecosystem Health 1 (1992): 1-5; Nancy Ross et al., "The Ecosystem Health Metaphor in Science and Policy," The Canadian Geographer 41 (1997): 114-27; Glenn W. Suter, II, "A Critique of Ecosystem Health Concepts and Indexes," Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry 13 (1993): 1533-39; and D. Wicklum and Ronald W. Davies, "Ecosystem Health and Integrity?" Canadian Journal of Botany 73 (1995): 997-1000. At one point, Suter suggests an even narrower scope for the literal meaning of health, claiming that "all uses of the term health refer to the root concept of human health" (p. 1534, emphasis omitted). Calow seems to assume this narrower alternative )as well (p. 1). Wicklum and Davies imply that all uses of health are best seen as analogies to mammalian health (p. 997). Others criticize even the metaphorical attribution of health to ecosystems. See, e.g., Dale Jamieson, "Ecosystem Health: Some Preventive Medicine. "Environmental Values 4 (1995): 333-44.
13. Those who claim that ecosystems can only be healthy metaphorically include J. Baird Callicott, "The Value of Ecosystem Health," Environmental Values 4 (1995): 345-61; Peter Calow, "Can Ecosystems Be Healthy? Critical Consideration of Concepts," Journal of Aquatic Ecosystem Health 1 (1992): 1-5; Nancy Ross et al., "The Ecosystem Health Metaphor in Science and Policy," The Canadian Geographer 41 (1997): 114-27; Glenn W. Suter, II, "A Critique of Ecosystem Health Concepts and Indexes," Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry 13 (1993): 1533-39; and D. Wicklum and Ronald W. Davies, "Ecosystem Health and Integrity?" Canadian Journal of Botany 73 (1995): 997-1000. At one point, Suter suggests an even narrower scope for the literal meaning of health, claiming that "all uses of the term health refer to the root concept of human health" (p. 1534, emphasis omitted). Calow seems to assume this narrower alternative )as well (p. 1). Wicklum and Davies imply that all uses of health are best seen as analogies to mammalian health (p. 997). Others criticize even the metaphorical attribution of health to ecosystems. See, e.g., Dale Jamieson, "Ecosystem Health: Some Preventive Medicine. "Environmental Values 4 (1995): 333-44.
14. Those who claim that ecosystems can only be healthy metaphorically include J. Baird Callicott, "The Value of Ecosystem Health," Environmental Values 4 (1995): 345-61; Peter Calow, "Can Ecosystems Be Healthy? Critical Consideration of Concepts," Journal of Aquatic Ecosystem Health 1 (1992): 1-5; Nancy Ross et al., "The Ecosystem Health Metaphor in Science and Policy," The Canadian Geographer 41 (1997): 114-27; Glenn W. Suter, II, "A Critique of Ecosystem Health Concepts and Indexes," Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry 13 (1993): 1533-39; and D. Wicklum and Ronald W. Davies, "Ecosystem Health and Integrity?" Canadian Journal of Botany 73 (1995): 997-1000. At one point, Suter suggests an even narrower scope for the literal meaning of health, claiming that "all uses of the term health refer to the root concept of human health" (p. 1534, emphasis omitted). Calow seems to assume this narrower alternative )as well (p. 1). Wicklum and Davies imply that all uses of health are best seen as analogies to mammalian health (p. 997). Others criticize even the metaphorical attribution of health to ecosystems. See, e.g., Dale Jamieson, "Ecosystem Health: Some Preventive Medicine. "Environmental Values 4 (1995): 333-44.
15. Those who claim that ecosystems can only be healthy metaphorically include J. Baird Callicott, "The Value of Ecosystem Health," Environmental Values 4 (1995): 345-61; Peter Calow, "Can Ecosystems Be Healthy? Critical Consideration of Concepts," Journal of Aquatic Ecosystem Health 1 (1992): 1-5; Nancy Ross et al., "The Ecosystem Health Metaphor in Science and Policy," The Canadian Geographer 41 (1997): 114-27; Glenn W. Suter, II, "A Critique of Ecosystem Health Concepts and Indexes," Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry 13 (1993): 1533-39; and D. Wicklum and Ronald W. Davies, "Ecosystem Health and Integrity?" Canadian Journal of Botany 73 (1995): 997-1000. At one point, Suter suggests an even narrower scope for the literal meaning of health, claiming that "all uses of the term health refer to the root concept of human health" (p. 1534, emphasis omitted). Calow seems to assume this narrower alternative )as well (p. 1). Wicklum and Davies imply that all uses of health are best seen as analogies to mammalian health (p. 997). Others criticize even the metaphorical attribution of health to ecosystems. See, e.g., Dale Jamieson, "Ecosystem Health: Some Preventive Medicine. "Environmental Values 4 (1995): 333-44.
16. Those who claim that ecosystems can only be healthy metaphorically include J. Baird Callicott, "The Value of Ecosystem Health," Environmental Values 4 (1995): 345-61; Peter Calow, "Can Ecosystems Be Healthy? Critical Consideration of Concepts," Journal of Aquatic Ecosystem Health 1 (1992): 1-5; Nancy Ross et al., "The Ecosystem Health Metaphor in Science and Policy," The Canadian Geographer 41 (1997): 114-27; Glenn W. Suter, II, "A Critique of Ecosystem Health Concepts and Indexes," Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry 13 (1993): 1533-39; and D. Wicklum and Ronald W. Davies, "Ecosystem Health and Integrity?" Canadian Journal of Botany 73 (1995): 997-1000. At one point, Suter suggests an even narrower scope for the literal meaning of health, claiming that "all uses of the term health refer to the root concept of human health" (p. 1534, emphasis omitted). Calow seems to assume this narrower alternative )as well (p. 1). Wicklum and Davies imply that all uses of health are best seen as analogies to mammalian health (p. 997). Others criticize even the metaphorical attribution of health to ecosystems. See, e.g., Dale Jamieson, "Ecosystem Health: Some Preventive Medicine. "Environmental Values 4 (1995): 333-44.
17. Those who claim that ecosystems can only be healthy metaphorically include J. Baird Callicott, "The Value of Ecosystem Health," Environmental Values 4 (1995): 345-61; Peter Calow, "Can Ecosystems Be Healthy? Critical Consideration of Concepts," Journal of Aquatic Ecosystem Health 1 (1992): 1-5; Nancy Ross et al., "The Ecosystem Health Metaphor in Science and Policy," The Canadian Geographer 41 (1997): 114-27; Glenn W. Suter, II, "A Critique of Ecosystem Health Concepts and Indexes," Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry 13 (1993): 1533-39; and D. Wicklum and Ronald W. Davies, "Ecosystem Health and Integrity?" Canadian Journal of Botany 73 (1995): 997-1000. At one point, Suter suggests an even narrower scope for the literal meaning of health, claiming that "all uses of the term health refer to the root concept of human health" (p. 1534, emphasis omitted). Calow seems to assume this narrower alternative )as well (p. 1). Wicklum and Davies imply that all uses of health are best seen as analogies to mammalian health (p. 997). Others criticize even the metaphorical attribution of health to ecosystems. See, e.g., Dale Jamieson, "Ecosystem Health: Some Preventive Medicine. "Environmental Values 4 (1995): 333-44.
18. Elizabeth Martin and Robert S. Hine, eds., A Dictionary of Biology, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Callicott, "The Value of Ecosystem Health"; Peter Calow, "Ecosystem Health: A Critical Analysis of Concepts," in Evaluating and Monitoring the Health of Large-Scale Ecosystems, ed. David J. Rapport, Connie L. Gaudet, and Peter Calow (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1995), pp. 33-41; John R. Kelly and Mark A. Harwell, "Indicators of Ecosystem Response and Recovery," in Ecotoxicology: Problems and Approaches, ed. Simon A. Levin et al. (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1989), pp. 9-35; David J. Rapport, "Ecosystem Health: More Than a Metaphor?" Environmental Values 4 (1995): 287-309; David J. Rapport, "Defining Ecosystem Health" in Ecosystem Health, ed. David Rapport et al. (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Science, 1998), pp. 18-33; Ross et al., "The Ecosystem Health Metaphor in Science and Policy"; Suter, "A Critique of Ecosystem Health Concepts and Indexes." Many of these requirements are quite vague, but none of the authors who insist on their importance makes an effort to explain them any further.
19. Elizabeth Martin and Robert S. Hine, eds., A Dictionary of Biology, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Callicott, "The Value of Ecosystem Health"; Peter Calow, "Ecosystem Health: A Critical Analysis of Concepts," in Evaluating and Monitoring the Health of Large-Scale Ecosystems, ed. David J. Rapport, Connie L. Gaudet, and Peter Calow (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1995), pp. 33-41; John R. Kelly and Mark A. Harwell, "Indicators of Ecosystem Response and Recovery," in Ecotoxicology: Problems and Approaches, ed. Simon A. Levin et al. (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1989), pp. 9-35; David J. Rapport, "Ecosystem Health: More Than a Metaphor?" Environmental Values 4 (1995): 287-309; David J. Rapport, "Defining Ecosystem Health" in Ecosystem Health, ed. David Rapport et al. (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Science, 1998), pp. 18-33; Ross et al., "The Ecosystem Health Metaphor in Science and Policy"; Suter, "A Critique of Ecosystem Health Concepts and Indexes." Many of these requirements are quite vague, but none of the authors who insist on their importance makes an effort to explain them any further.
20. Elizabeth Martin and Robert S. Hine, eds., A Dictionary of Biology, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Callicott, "The Value of Ecosystem Health"; Peter Calow, "Ecosystem Health: A Critical Analysis of Concepts," in Evaluating and Monitoring the Health of Large-Scale Ecosystems, ed. David J. Rapport, Connie L. Gaudet, and Peter Calow (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1995), pp. 33-41; John R. Kelly and Mark A. Harwell, "Indicators of Ecosystem Response and Recovery," in Ecotoxicology: Problems and Approaches, ed. Simon A. Levin et al. (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1989), pp. 9-35; David J. Rapport, "Ecosystem Health: More Than a Metaphor?" Environmental Values 4 (1995): 287-309; David J. Rapport, "Defining Ecosystem Health" in Ecosystem Health, ed. David Rapport et al. (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Science, 1998), pp. 18-33; Ross et al., "The Ecosystem Health Metaphor in Science and Policy"; Suter, "A Critique of Ecosystem Health Concepts and Indexes." Many of these requirements are quite vague, but none of the authors who insist on their importance makes an effort to explain them any further.
21. Elizabeth Martin and Robert S. Hine, eds., A Dictionary of Biology, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Callicott, "The Value of Ecosystem Health"; Peter Calow, "Ecosystem Health: A Critical Analysis of Concepts," in Evaluating and Monitoring the Health of Large-Scale Ecosystems, ed. David J. Rapport, Connie L. Gaudet, and Peter Calow (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1995), pp. 33-41; John R. Kelly and Mark A. Harwell, "Indicators of Ecosystem Response and Recovery," in Ecotoxicology: Problems and Approaches, ed. Simon A. Levin et al. (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1989), pp. 9-35; David J. Rapport, "Ecosystem Health: More Than a Metaphor?" Environmental Values 4 (1995): 287-309; David J. Rapport, "Defining Ecosystem Health" in Ecosystem Health, ed. David Rapport et al. (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Science, 1998), pp. 18-33; Ross et al., "The Ecosystem Health Metaphor in Science and Policy"; Suter, "A Critique of Ecosystem Health Concepts and Indexes." Many of these requirements are quite vague, but none of the authors who insist on their importance makes an effort to explain them any further.
22. Elizabeth Martin and Robert S. Hine, eds., A Dictionary of Biology, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Callicott, "The Value of Ecosystem Health"; Peter Calow, "Ecosystem Health: A Critical Analysis of Concepts," in Evaluating and Monitoring the Health of Large-Scale Ecosystems, ed. David J. Rapport, Connie L. Gaudet, and Peter Calow (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1995), pp. 33-41; John R. Kelly and Mark A. Harwell, "Indicators of Ecosystem Response and Recovery," in Ecotoxicology: Problems and Approaches, ed. Simon A. Levin et al. (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1989), pp. 9-35; David J. Rapport, "Ecosystem Health: More Than a Metaphor?" Environmental Values 4 (1995): 287-309; David J. Rapport, "Defining Ecosystem Health" in Ecosystem Health, ed. David Rapport et al. (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Science, 1998), pp. 18-33; Ross et al., "The Ecosystem Health Metaphor in Science and Policy"; Suter, "A Critique of Ecosystem Health Concepts and Indexes." Many of these requirements are quite vague, but none of the authors who insist on their importance makes an effort to explain them any further.
23. Elizabeth Martin and Robert S. Hine, eds., A Dictionary of Biology, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Callicott, "The Value of Ecosystem Health"; Peter Calow, "Ecosystem Health: A Critical Analysis of Concepts," in Evaluating and Monitoring the Health of Large-Scale Ecosystems, ed. David J. Rapport, Connie L. Gaudet, and Peter Calow (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1995), pp. 33-41; John R. Kelly and Mark A. Harwell, "Indicators of Ecosystem Response and Recovery," in Ecotoxicology: Problems and Approaches, ed. Simon A. Levin et al. (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1989), pp. 9-35; David J. Rapport, "Ecosystem Health: More Than a Metaphor?" Environmental Values 4 (1995): 287-309; David J. Rapport, "Defining Ecosystem Health" in Ecosystem Health, ed. David Rapport et al. (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Science, 1998), pp. 18-33; Ross et al., "The Ecosystem Health Metaphor in Science and Policy"; Suter, "A Critique of Ecosystem Health Concepts and Indexes." Many of these requirements are quite vague, but none of the authors who insist on their importance makes an effort to explain them any further.
24. Elizabeth Martin and Robert S. Hine, eds., A Dictionary of Biology, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Callicott, "The Value of Ecosystem Health"; Peter Calow, "Ecosystem Health: A Critical Analysis of Concepts," in Evaluating and Monitoring the Health of Large-Scale Ecosystems, ed. David J. Rapport, Connie L. Gaudet, and Peter Calow (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1995), pp. 33-41; John R. Kelly and Mark A. Harwell, "Indicators of Ecosystem Response and Recovery," in Ecotoxicology: Problems and Approaches, ed. Simon A. Levin et al. (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1989), pp. 9-35; David J. Rapport, "Ecosystem Health: More Than a Metaphor?" Environmental Values 4 (1995): 287-309; David J. Rapport, "Defining Ecosystem Health" in Ecosystem Health, ed. David Rapport et al. (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Science, 1998), pp. 18-33; Ross et al., "The Ecosystem Health Metaphor in Science and Policy"; Suter, "A Critique of Ecosystem Health Concepts and Indexes." Many of these requirements are quite vague, but none of the authors who insist on their importance makes an effort to explain them any further.
25. Elizabeth Martin and Robert S. Hine, eds., A Dictionary of Biology, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Callicott, "The Value of Ecosystem Health"; Peter Calow, "Ecosystem Health: A Critical Analysis of Concepts," in Evaluating and Monitoring the Health of Large-Scale Ecosystems, ed. David J. Rapport, Connie L. Gaudet, and Peter Calow (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1995), pp. 33-41; John R. Kelly and Mark A. Harwell, "Indicators of Ecosystem Response and Recovery," in Ecotoxicology: Problems and Approaches, ed. Simon A. Levin et al. (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1989), pp. 9-35; David J. Rapport, "Ecosystem Health: More Than a Metaphor?" Environmental Values 4 (1995): 287-309; David J. Rapport, "Defining Ecosystem Health" in Ecosystem Health, ed. David Rapport et al. (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Science, 1998), pp. 18-33; Ross et al., "The Ecosystem Health Metaphor in Science and Policy"; Suter, "A Critique of Ecosystem Health Concepts and Indexes." Many of these requirements are quite vague, but none of the authors who insist on their importance makes an effort to explain them any further.
26. An organism is phenotypically plastic if it is such that the same genotype can produce varying phenotypes under different environmental conditions. That is to say, the more phenotypically plastic an organism is, the more the environment will matter in determining its phenotypes.
27. Also sometimes mentioned as a criterion of organismhood is being the subject of genetic selection and evolution. However, it is not clear that anything that we count as an organism meets this requirement. On the face of it anyway, it is genes or traits, not individual organisms that are selected for/against by natural selection. Likewise, it isn't individual organisms that evolve, but rather species or gene lines.
28. To be a bearer of health is just to be the kind of thing that can be healthy or unhealthy, i.e., to be the sort of thing for which evaluations of health are appropriate.
29. Naturally, the converse is also true. When something is unhealthy, it is in this regard worse off than it would be if it were healthy. For the remainder of the paper, I focus on what it takes to be the kind of thing that can be healthy, but my assumption is that these arguments also apply to unhealthiness.
30. To be normative is to contain or imply an evaluation or an "ought."
31. I think this approach involves a conceptual mistake. Even if pollutant-induced growth deformities in frogs were to become so pervasive that they occur in the vast majority of individuals, we wouldn't think of such deformities as constituting a frog's health. See Ruth Macklin, "Mental Health and Mental Illness: Some Problems of Definition and Concept Formation," in Concepts of Health and Disease: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Arthur L. Caplan, Tristam Engelhardt, Jr., and James J. McCartney (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1981), pp. 391-418; and James G. Lennox, "Health as an Objective Value," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 20 (1995): 499-511. While it might be the case that we often try to determine which structures are healthy ones by looking at which structures are normal or typical in a population, the conclusion that should be drawn isn't that to be a healthy structure is just to be a typical structure. What it shows, rather, is that we treat what's typical as evidence of what's healthy, but in doing so are conceptually committed to taking into account other evidence that what's typical is not, in fact, what's unhealthy.
32. I think this approach involves a conceptual mistake. Even if pollutant-induced growth deformities in frogs were to become so pervasive that they occur in the vast majority of individuals, we wouldn't think of such deformities as constituting a frog's health. See Ruth Macklin, "Mental Health and Mental Illness: Some Problems of Definition and Concept Formation," in Concepts of Health and Disease: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Arthur L. Caplan, Tristam Engelhardt, Jr., and James J. McCartney (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1981), pp. 391-418; and James G. Lennox, "Health as an Objective Value," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 20 (1995): 499-511. While it might be the case that we often try to determine which structures are healthy ones by looking at which structures are normal or typical in a population, the conclusion that should be drawn isn't that to be a healthy structure is just to be a typical structure. What it shows, rather, is that we treat what's typical as evidence of what's healthy, but in doing so are conceptually committed to taking into account other evidence that what's typical is not, in fact, what's unhealthy.
33. Larry Wright, "Functions," Philosophical Review 82 (1973): 139-68; p. 161.
34. Of course, this example only works in places where dairy cattle and beef cattle are separate breeds, since presumably only there would the unprofitability of milk render dairy cattle obsolete.
35. The story for beef cattle: making tasty hamburgers is an effect of their reproduction (no reproduction, no tasty hamburgers), and their reproduction occurs because it results in their making tasty hamburgers. (Beef cattle have been bred for taste - they wouldn't exist, and thus be in a position to reproduce, if parts of them didn't taste good.) The story for dying: dying is an effect of living (no living, no dying), and living occurs because it results in dying. (It's only because things that came before us died that there's enough room, food, etc. for us living things here now.) See Jonathan Bennett, Linguistic Behavior (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 45. For problem cases similar to these, see Christopher Boorse, "Wright on Functions," The Philosophical Review 85 (1976): 70-86; and Peter Godfrey-Smith, "Functions: Consensus without Unity," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1993): 196-208.
36. The story for beef cattle: making tasty hamburgers is an effect of their reproduction (no reproduction, no tasty hamburgers), and their reproduction occurs because it results in their making tasty hamburgers. (Beef cattle have been bred for taste - they wouldn't exist, and thus be in a position to reproduce, if parts of them didn't taste good.) The story for dying: dying is an effect of living (no living, no dying), and living occurs because it results in dying. (It's only because things that came before us died that there's enough room, food, etc. for us living things here now.) See Jonathan Bennett, Linguistic Behavior (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 45. For problem cases similar to these, see Christopher Boorse, "Wright on Functions," The Philosophical Review 85 (1976): 70-86; and Peter Godfrey-Smith, "Functions: Consensus without Unity," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1993): 196-208.
37. The story for beef cattle: making tasty hamburgers is an effect of their reproduction (no reproduction, no tasty hamburgers), and their reproduction occurs because it results in their making tasty hamburgers. (Beef cattle have been bred for taste - they wouldn't exist, and thus be in a position to reproduce, if parts of them didn't taste good.) The story for dying: dying is an effect of living (no living, no dying), and living occurs because it results in dying. (It's only because things that came before us died that there's enough room, food, etc. for us living things here now.) See Jonathan Bennett, Linguistic Behavior (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 45. For problem cases similar to these, see Christopher Boorse, "Wright on Functions," The Philosophical Review 85 (1976): 70-86; and Peter Godfrey-Smith, "Functions: Consensus without Unity," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1993): 196-208.
38. Even if market prices were good, many would argue that it isn't healthy for dairy cows to lactate at economically optimal levels. See, e.g., Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, new rev. ed. (New York: Avon, 1990), pp. 136-39.
39. There is some disagreement in the philosophical literature about how best to understand the term prima facie. For our purposes, we can just think of it as meaning "all other things being equal." Technically minded philosophers may grumble about this understanding, but our present purposes are not served by more precision on this matter.
40. Stephen Darwall, Welfare and Rational Care (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 9. Darwall distinguishes between caring for something and merely caring about it: "[C]are [or] concern for someone (or something) for his (its) sake can differ from other kinds of care or concern. There is a broad sense in which we can be said to care about anything just in case we value it. But something's being important or making a difference to one in this broad sense need not involve care or concern for any person or thing, whether we think it objectively important or just important to us. Someone might care intensely and wholeheartedly about whether his shirts are ironed without this involving any concern for anything for its sake, including the shirts. The kind of care that is involved in a rational care theory of welfare is concern for someone for the person's sake" (p. 13).
41. "One or two" is obviously an unlikely decision scenario, but I use it here for the sake of simplicity. Notice also that this way of framing the problem ignores the question of how to delimit ecosystems in time, which is also an important part of determining the boundaries of ecosystems.
42. Classifications of terrestrial ecosystems using both ecotope and vegetation classification models, for example, tend to focus primarily on species distribution, and that of flora in particular. See, e.g., Han J. Runhaar and Helias A. Udo de Haes, "The Use of Site Factors as Classification Characteristics for Ecotopes," in Ecosystem Classification for Environmental Management, ed. Frans Klijn (Boston: Kluwer, 1994), pp. 139-72.
43. See, e.g., R.L. Lindemann, "The Trophic-Dynamic Aspect of Ecology," Ecology 23 (1942): 399-418.
44. For an example of ecosystem classification based on nutrient flow, see Roman J. M. Lenz, "Ecosystem Classification by Budgets of Material: The Example of Forest Ecosystems Classified as Proton Budget Types," in Klijn, Ecosystem Classification for Environmental Management, pp. 117-37; for a model based on energy flow, see H. T. Odum, M. T. Brown, and S. Ulgiati, "Ecosystems as Energetic Systems," in Handbook of Ecosystem Theories and Management, ed. Sven E. Jørgensen and Felix Müller (Boca Raton: Lewis Publishers, 2000), pp. 281-302.
45. For an example of ecosystem classification based on nutrient flow, see Roman J. M. Lenz, "Ecosystem Classification by Budgets of Material: The Example of Forest Ecosystems Classified as Proton Budget Types," in Klijn, Ecosystem Classification for Environmental Management, pp. 117-37; for a model based on energy flow, see H. T. Odum, M. T. Brown, and S. Ulgiati, "Ecosystems as Energetic Systems," in Handbook of Ecosystem Theories and Management, ed. Sven E. Jørgensen and Felix Müller (Boca Raton: Lewis Publishers, 2000), pp. 281-302.
46. Gross geological and topological features often play an important role in "spatially nested" or "hierarchical" models of ecosystems, particularly in defining larger units - i.e., those closer to the top of the hierarchical scale. See, e.g., Frans Klijn, "Spatially Nested Ecosystems: Guidelines for Classification from a Hierarchical Perspective," in Klijn, Ecosystem Classification for Environmental Management, pp. 85-116; and Robert G. Bailey, Ecosystem Geography (New York: Springer Verlag, 1996).
47. Gross geological and topological features often play an important role in "spatially nested" or "hierarchical" models of ecosystems, particularly in defining larger units - i.e., those closer to the top of the hierarchical scale. See, e.g., Frans Klijn, "Spatially Nested Ecosystems: Guidelines for Classification from a Hierarchical Perspective," in Klijn, Ecosystem Classification for Environmental Management, pp. 85-116; and Robert G. Bailey, Ecosystem Geography (New York: Springer Verlag, 1996).
48. Exogamous species are those that breed outside their own population group.
49. See also Bryan G. Norton, "A New Paradigm for Environmental Management," in Costanza, Norton, and Haskell, Ecosystem Health, pp. 23-41.
50. E.g., Calow, "Can Ecosystems Be Healthy? Critical Consideration of Concepts," pp. 1-2; Calow, "Ecosystem Health: A Critical Analysis of Concepts," pp. 34-35; Wicklum and Davies, "Ecosystem Health and Integrity?" p. 998.
51. E.g., Calow, "Can Ecosystems Be Healthy? Critical Consideration of Concepts," pp. 1-2; Calow, "Ecosystem Health: A Critical Analysis of Concepts," pp. 34-35; Wicklum and Davies, "Ecosystem Health and Integrity?" p. 998.
52. E.g., Calow, "Can Ecosystems Be Healthy? Critical Consideration of Concepts," pp. 1-2; Calow, "Ecosystem Health: A Critical Analysis of Concepts," pp. 34-35; Wicklum and Davies, "Ecosystem Health and Integrity?" p. 998.
53. Of course, we could probably come up with definitions of ecosystems that don't have functioning parts - e.g., exclusively topological definitions such as "whatever happens to be above 14,000 feet on this mountain." In the absence of parts with functions, such ecosystems could not be bearers of health.
54. Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993). The term appropriate here means something like "warranted, given the evidence," not "the thing to do, all things considered." Of course, this definition isn't the only way one could understand what unifies the general rationality conditions. A realist subscribing to a correspondence theory of truth might claim that the conditions are unified by their tendency to produce correct desires/beliefs, where correctness amounts to being an accurate reflection of independent facts of the matter. It's unclear, however, that there are any independent facts of the matter about which things in the world it makes sense to care for; nor is it clear how we could discover these facts even if they do exist.
55. Considerations of space do not permit a discussion here of how this analysis applies to artifacts. This is, however, a very important issue - one which every account of health must face.
56. I should note here that the phrase "human interests" is ambiguous between what's good for us, and what we take an interest in. The objection assumes that the former is what's operative in delineating ecosystems. I grant this point for the sake of argument, though I'm not sure that it's right. But what I hope to show here is that even if it is right, this kind of worry is still unfounded.
57. Alan Holland, "The Use and Abuse of Ecological Concepts in Environmental Ethics," in Ecologists and Ecological Judgments, ed. N. S. Cooper and R. C. J. Carling (New York: Chapman and Hall, 1996), pp. 27-41, for example, refers to them as "scientific constructions," which he contrasts with being "real" (p. 34). Allan K. Fitzsimmons, Defending Illusions: Federal Protection of Ecosystems (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999) refers to them as "mental constructs" and "heuristic devices" (p. 28).
58. Alan Holland, "The Use and Abuse of Ecological Concepts in Environmental Ethics," in Ecologists and Ecological Judgments, ed. N. S. Cooper and R. C. J. Carling (New York: Chapman and Hall, 1996), pp. 27-41, for example, refers to them as "scientific constructions," which he contrasts with being "real" (p. 34). Allan K. Fitzsimmons, Defending Illusions: Federal Protection of Ecosystems (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999) refers to them as "mental constructs" and "heuristic devices" (p. 28).
59. It should be noted that not even those who have argued most forcefully for the view of nature as a social construction deny this point. See, e.g., Jane Bennett and William Chaloupka, "Introduction: TV Dinners and the Organic Brunch," in In the Nature of Things: Language, Politics and the Environment, ed. Jane Bennett and William Chaloupka (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), pp. vii-xvi; and William Cronon, "Introduction: In Search of Nature," and "Toward a Conclusion," in Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, ed. William Cronon (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1996), pp. 23-56, 457-58. But critics have not always been quick to notice this feature of the social constructionists' claims. David W. Kidner, "Fabricating Nature: A Critique of the Social Construction of Nature," Environmental Ethics 22(2000): 339-57, for example, takes the social constructionists' position to be that "there is no world 'out there' independent of human cognition and language" (p. 342).
60. It should be noted that not even those who have argued most forcefully for the view of nature as a social construction deny this point. See, e.g., Jane Bennett and William Chaloupka, "Introduction: TV Dinners and the Organic Brunch," in In the Nature of Things: Language, Politics and the Environment, ed. Jane Bennett and William Chaloupka (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), pp. vii-xvi; and William Cronon, "Introduction: In Search of Nature," and "Toward a Conclusion," in Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, ed. William Cronon (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1996), pp. 23-56, 457-58. But critics have not always been quick to notice this feature of the social constructionists' claims. David W. Kidner, "Fabricating Nature: A Critique of the Social Construction of Nature," Environmental Ethics 22(2000): 339-57, for example, takes the social constructionists' position to be that "there is no world 'out there' independent of human cognition and language" (p. 342).
61. It should be noted that not even those who have argued most forcefully for the view of nature as a social construction deny this point. See, e.g., Jane Bennett and William Chaloupka, "Introduction: TV Dinners and the Organic Brunch," in In the Nature of Things: Language, Politics and the Environment, ed. Jane Bennett and William Chaloupka (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), pp. vii-xvi; and William Cronon, "Introduction: In Search of Nature," and "Toward a Conclusion," in Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, ed. William Cronon (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1996), pp. 23-56, 457-58. But critics have not always been quick to notice this feature of the social constructionists' claims. David W. Kidner, "Fabricating Nature: A Critique of the Social Construction of Nature," Environmental Ethics 22(2000): 339-57, for example, takes the social constructionists' position to be that "there is no world 'out there' independent of human cognition and language" (p. 342).
62. Worries about individuation, though not discussed in terms of social construction, are raised by Andrew A. Brennan, "Ecological Theory and Value in Nature," in Environmental Ethics, ed. Robert Elliot (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 188-214.
63. See, e.g., Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), pt. 3.
64. Christine M. Korsgaard, "Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency," Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 (1989): 101-32.