Environmental justice and rawls' difference principle

Environmental Ethics

Volumn 26, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 287-306

  Bell, Derek ^a  

^a NEWCASTLE UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 6944243803     PISSN: 01634275     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/enviroethics200426317     Document Type: Review

References (96)

1. Carolyn Stephens, Simon Bullock, and Alister Scott, Environmental Justice: Rights and Means to a Healthy Environment for All, ESRC Briefing Paper No. 7 (London: Economic and Social Research Council, 2001).
2. See, for example, Russ Manning, "Environmental Ethics and John Rawls' Theory of Justice," Environmental Ethics 3 (1981): 155-66; Brent Singer, "An Extension of Rawls' Theory of Justice to Environmental Ethics," Environmental Ethics 10 (1988): 217-31; Peter Wenz, Environmental Justice (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), pp. 232-53; Daniel Thero, "Rawls and Environmental Ethics: A Critical Examination of the Literature," Environmental Ethics 17 (1995): 93-106 (which provides a useful review of previous attempts to develop Rawls' work); Andrew Dobson, Justice and the Environment: Conceptions of Environmental Sustainability and Theories of Distributive Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). pp. 166-72.
3. See, for example, Russ Manning, "Environmental Ethics and John Rawls' Theory of Justice," Environmental Ethics 3 (1981): 155-66; Brent Singer, "An Extension of Rawls' Theory of Justice to Environmental Ethics," Environmental Ethics 10 (1988): 217-31; Peter Wenz, Environmental Justice (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), pp. 232-53; Daniel Thero, "Rawls and Environmental Ethics: A Critical Examination of the Literature," Environmental Ethics 17 (1995): 93-106 (which provides a useful review of previous attempts to develop Rawls' work); Andrew Dobson, Justice and the Environment: Conceptions of Environmental Sustainability and Theories of Distributive Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). pp. 166-72.
4. See, for example, Russ Manning, "Environmental Ethics and John Rawls' Theory of Justice," Environmental Ethics 3 (1981): 155-66; Brent Singer, "An Extension of Rawls' Theory of Justice to Environmental Ethics," Environmental Ethics 10 (1988): 217-31; Peter Wenz, Environmental Justice (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), pp. 232-53; Daniel Thero, "Rawls and Environmental Ethics: A Critical Examination of the Literature," Environmental Ethics 17 (1995): 93-106 (which provides a useful review of previous attempts to develop Rawls' work); Andrew Dobson, Justice and the Environment: Conceptions of Environmental Sustainability and Theories of Distributive Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). pp. 166-72.
5. See, for example, Russ Manning, "Environmental Ethics and John Rawls' Theory of Justice," Environmental Ethics 3 (1981): 155-66; Brent Singer, "An Extension of Rawls' Theory of Justice to Environmental Ethics," Environmental Ethics 10 (1988): 217-31; Peter Wenz, Environmental Justice (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), pp. 232-53; Daniel Thero, "Rawls and Environmental Ethics: A Critical Examination of the Literature," Environmental Ethics 17 (1995): 93-106 (which provides a useful review of previous attempts to develop Rawls' work); Andrew Dobson, Justice and the Environment: Conceptions of Environmental Sustainability and Theories of Distributive Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). pp. 166-72.
6. See, for example, Russ Manning, "Environmental Ethics and John Rawls' Theory of Justice," Environmental Ethics 3 (1981): 155-66; Brent Singer, "An Extension of Rawls' Theory of Justice to Environmental Ethics," Environmental Ethics 10 (1988): 217-31; Peter Wenz, Environmental Justice (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), pp. 232-53; Daniel Thero, "Rawls and Environmental Ethics: A Critical Examination of the Literature," Environmental Ethics 17 (1995): 93-106 (which provides a useful review of previous attempts to develop Rawls' work); Andrew Dobson, Justice and the Environment: Conceptions of Environmental Sustainability and Theories of Distributive Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). pp. 166-72.
7. There are many respects in which these accounts diverge from Rawls' idea of political liberalism - typically, by extending the "community of justice" beyond citizens to include nonhumans. Indeed, many of these accounts are concerned with something closer to "ecological justice" (rather than "environmental justice") or with "intergenerational justice" (rather than "intragenerational justice"). See the text below for explanation and discussion of these distinctions.
8. See, for example, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Office of Federal Activities, Final Guidance for Incorporating Environmental Justice Concerns in EPA's NEPA Compliance Analysis (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998), p. 2; Richard Hofrichter, "Introduction" in Richard Hofrichter, ed., Toxic Struggles: The Theory and Practice of Environmental Justice (Philadelphia: New Society Publishers, 1993), p. 5.
9. See, for example, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Office of Federal Activities, Final Guidance for Incorporating Environmental Justice Concerns in EPA's NEPA Compliance Analysis (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998), p. 2; Richard Hofrichter, "Introduction" in Richard Hofrichter, ed., Toxic Struggles: The Theory and Practice of Environmental Justice (Philadelphia: New Society Publishers, 1993), p. 5.
10. EPA, Final Guidance, p. 2.
11. This is the assumption behind the "Aarhus Convention," the recent United Nations Economic Council for Europe (UNECE) Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Brussels: UNECE, 1998), art. 1 (available at http://www.unece.org/env/pp/documents/cep43e/pdf).
12. For discussion of procedural environmental justice, see Derek R. Bell, "Sustainability through Democratization? The Aarhus Convention and the Future of Environmental Decision Making in Europe," in John Barry, Brian Baxter, and Richard Dunphy, eds, Europe, Globalization and Sustainable Development (London: Routledge, 2004).
13. See Dobson, Justice, p. 63. One aspect of the environmental justice debate that is not captured by this approach is the question of intent - i.e., is the disproportionate distribution of environmental hazards intentional? This is an issue that has been much discussed in the context of legal argument and discussions of racial discrimination in the U.S. but increasingly environmental justice advocates have rejected the focus on intent. See, for example, Robert Bullard, "Decision Making," in Laura Westra and Peter Wenz, eds., Faces of Environmental Racism (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995), p. 18; Laura Pulido, "A Critical Review of the Methodology of Environmental Racism Research," Antipode 28, no. 2 (1996): 142-59, pp. 146-48; Julian Agyeman, "Constructing Environmental (In)Justice: Transatlantic Tales," Environmental Politics 11, no. 3 (2002): 31-53, pp. 40-41. Instead, they argue that the distribution is unjust whether or not it is the outcome of intentional discrimination. It is this kind of pure distributive concern that interests me (and which, I argue, can be accommodated by Rawlsian liberalism).
14. See Dobson, Justice, p. 63. One aspect of the environmental justice debate that is not captured by this approach is the question of intent - i.e., is the disproportionate distribution of environmental hazards intentional? This is an issue that has been much discussed in the context of legal argument and discussions of racial discrimination in the U.S. but increasingly environmental justice advocates have rejected the focus on intent. See, for example, Robert Bullard, "Decision Making," in Laura Westra and Peter Wenz, eds., Faces of Environmental Racism (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995), p. 18; Laura Pulido, "A Critical Review of the Methodology of Environmental Racism Research," Antipode 28, no. 2 (1996): 142-59, pp. 146-48; Julian Agyeman, "Constructing Environmental (In)Justice: Transatlantic Tales," Environmental Politics 11, no. 3 (2002): 31-53, pp. 40-41. Instead, they argue that the distribution is unjust whether or not it is the outcome of intentional discrimination. It is this kind of pure distributive concern that interests me (and which, I argue, can be accommodated by Rawlsian liberalism).
15. See Dobson, Justice, p. 63. One aspect of the environmental justice debate that is not captured by this approach is the question of intent - i.e., is the disproportionate distribution of environmental hazards intentional? This is an issue that has been much discussed in the context of legal argument and discussions of racial discrimination in the U.S. but increasingly environmental justice advocates have rejected the focus on intent. See, for example, Robert Bullard, "Decision Making," in Laura Westra and Peter Wenz, eds., Faces of Environmental Racism (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995), p. 18; Laura Pulido, "A Critical Review of the Methodology of Environmental Racism Research," Antipode 28, no. 2 (1996): 142-59, pp. 146-48; Julian Agyeman, "Constructing Environmental (In)Justice: Transatlantic Tales," Environmental Politics 11, no. 3 (2002): 31-53, pp. 40-41. Instead, they argue that the distribution is unjust whether or not it is the outcome of intentional discrimination. It is this kind of pure distributive concern that interests me (and which, I argue, can be accommodated by Rawlsian liberalism).
16. See Dobson, Justice, p. 63. One aspect of the environmental justice debate that is not captured by this approach is the question of intent - i.e., is the disproportionate distribution of environmental hazards intentional? This is an issue that has been much discussed in the context of legal argument and discussions of racial discrimination in the U.S. but increasingly environmental justice advocates have rejected the focus on intent. See, for example, Robert Bullard, "Decision Making," in Laura Westra and Peter Wenz, eds., Faces of Environmental Racism (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995), p. 18; Laura Pulido, "A Critical Review of the Methodology of Environmental Racism Research," Antipode 28, no. 2 (1996): 142-59, pp. 146-48; Julian Agyeman, "Constructing Environmental (In)Justice: Transatlantic Tales," Environmental Politics 11, no. 3 (2002): 31-53, pp. 40-41. Instead, they argue that the distribution is unjust whether or not it is the outcome of intentional discrimination. It is this kind of pure distributive concern that interests me (and which, I argue, can be accommodated by Rawlsian liberalism).
17. See Dobson, Justice, p. 63.
18. See Stephens et al., Environmental Justice, sec. 1. The "narrow" focus of the U.S. literature is clear in William Bowen's recent critical discussion of environmental justice research. See William Bowen, Environmental Justice through Research-Based Decision Making (New York: Garland Publishing, 2001). Of course, there are exceptions - ie., for example, First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit, Principles of Environmental Justice, principles 10, 13, 14, and 17, in Hofrichter, Toxic Struggles.
19. See Stephens et al., Environmental Justice, sec. 1. The "narrow" focus of the U.S. literature is clear in William Bowen's recent critical discussion of environmental justice research. See William Bowen, Environmental Justice through Research-Based Decision Making (New York: Garland Publishing, 2001). Of course, there are exceptions - ie., for example, First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit, Principles of Environmental Justice, principles 10, 13, 14, and 17, in Hofrichter, Toxic Struggles.
20. See Stephens et al., Environmental Justice, sec. 1. The "narrow" focus of the U.S. literature is clear in William Bowen's recent critical discussion of environmental justice research. See William Bowen, Environmental Justice through Research-Based Decision Making (New York: Garland Publishing, 2001). Of course, there are exceptions - ie., for example, First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit, Principles of Environmental Justice, principles 10, 13, 14, and 17, in Hofrichter, Toxic Struggles.
21. See Stephens et al., Environmental Justice, sec. 1. The "narrow" focus of the U.S. literature is clear in William Bowen's recent critical discussion of environmental justice research. See William Bowen, Environmental Justice through Research-Based Decision Making (New York: Garland Publishing, 2001). Of course, there are exceptions - ie., for example, First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit, Principles of Environmental Justice, principles 10, 13, 14, and 17, in Hofrichter, Toxic Struggles.
22. See EPA, Final Guidance, p. 2; The White House, Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations: Executive Order 12898 (1994); available at http://www.epa.gov/ swerosps/ej/html-doc/execordr.htm.
23. See EPA, Final Guidance, p. 2; The White House, Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations: Executive Order 12898 (1994); available at http://www.epa.gov/ swerosps/ej/html-doc/execordr.htm.
24. See, for example, Westra and Wenz, Faces of Environmental Racism, pt. 3; Hofrichter, Toxic Struggles, chapters 19-23; Stephens et al., Environmental Justice, sec. 1.
25. See, for example, Westra and Wenz, Faces of Environmental Racism, pt. 3; Hofrichter, Toxic Struggles, chapters 19-23; Stephens et al., Environmental Justice, sec. 1.
26. See, for example, Westra and Wenz, Faces of Environmental Racism, pt. 3; Hofrichter, Toxic Struggles, chapters 19-23; Stephens et al., Environmental Justice, sec. 1.
27. I have discussed international environmental justice in Derek R. Bell, "Environmental Refugees: What Rights? Which Duties?" Res Publica (forthcoming, 2004) and intergenerational environmental justice in Derek Bell, "How can Political Liberals be Environmentalists?" Political Studies 50 (2002): 703-24.
28. I have discussed international environmental justice in Derek R. Bell, "Environmental Refugees: What Rights? Which Duties?" Res Publica (forthcoming, 2004) and intergenerational environmental justice in Derek Bell, "How can Political Liberals be Environmentalists?" Political Studies 50 (2002): 703-24.
29. See, for example, P. Stretsky and M. Hogan, "Environmental Justice: An Analysis of Superfund Sites in Florida," Social Problems 45, no. 2 (1998): 268-87, p. 268; Hofrichter, Toxic Struggles; Robert Bullard, "Introduction" in Robert Bullard, ed., Unequal Protection: Environmental Justice and Communities of Color (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1994), pp. xv-xvi.
30. See, for example, P. Stretsky and M. Hogan, "Environmental Justice: An Analysis of Superfund Sites in Florida," Social Problems 45, no. 2 (1998): 268-87, p. 268; Hofrichter, Toxic Struggles; Robert Bullard, "Introduction" in Robert Bullard, ed., Unequal Protection: Environmental Justice and Communities of Color (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1994), pp. xv-xvi.
31. See, for example, P. Stretsky and M. Hogan, "Environmental Justice: An Analysis of Superfund Sites in Florida," Social Problems 45, no. 2 (1998): 268-87, p. 268; Hofrichter, Toxic Struggles; Robert Bullard, "Introduction" in Robert Bullard, ed., Unequal Protection: Environmental Justice and Communities of Color (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1994), pp. xv-xvi.
32. Friends of the Earth, Pollution and Poverty: Breaking the Link (London: Friends of the Earth, 2001), p. 1.
33. Bullard, "Introduction," in Bullard, Unequal Protection, p. xv. Of course, a longer history brings with it more opportunity for dissent and debate. For a thorough - albeit skeptical and somewhat dubiously constructed - survey of U.S. environmental justice research see Bowen, Environmental Justice, chap. 6. For an alternative perspective on the debate see Benjamin Goldman, "What is the Future of Environmental Justice?" Antipode 28, no. 2 (1996): 122-41; pp. 131-37.
34. Bullard, "Introduction," in Bullard, Unequal Protection, p. xv. Of course, a longer history brings with it more opportunity for dissent and debate. For a thorough - albeit skeptical and somewhat dubiously constructed - survey of U.S. environmental justice research see Bowen, Environmental Justice, chap. 6. For an alternative perspective on the debate see Benjamin Goldman, "What is the Future of Environmental Justice?" Antipode 28, no. 2 (1996): 122-41; pp. 131-37.
35. Bullard, "Introduction," in Bullard, Unequal Protection, p. xv. Of course, a longer history brings with it more opportunity for dissent and debate. For a thorough - albeit skeptical and somewhat dubiously constructed - survey of U.S. environmental justice research see Bowen, Environmental Justice, chap. 6. For an alternative perspective on the debate see Benjamin Goldman, "What is the Future of Environmental Justice?" Antipode 28, no. 2 (1996): 122-41; pp. 131-37.
36. See Agyeman, "Constructing Environmental (In)Justice," p. 34.
37. Ibid., p. 34.
38. Kate Burningham and Diana Thrush, "Rainforests are a Long Way from Here": The Environmental Concerns of Disadvantaged Groups (York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2001), p.20.
39. Ibid., pp. 21-22.
40. Ibid., p. 20.
41. Agyeman, "Constructing Environmental (In)Justice," p. 38. He is quoting from I. Pollard, "Pastoral Interludes," Third Text: Third World Perspectives on Contemporary Art and Culture 7 (1989): 41-46.
42. Agyeman, "Constructing Environmental (In)Justice," p. 38. He is quoting from I. Pollard, "Pastoral Interludes," Third Text: Third World Perspectives on Contemporary Art and Culture 7 (1989): 41-46.
43. Agyeman, "Constructing Environmental (In)Justice," p. 38.
44. Stephens et al., Environmental Justice, sec. 2.
45. I b i d.
46. I b i d.
47. I b i d.
48. I b i d.
49. See, for example, Dobson, Justice, p. 63.
50. Stretsky and Hogan, "Environmental Justice," p. 268.
51. The first quotation is from Michael Heiman, "Race, Waste, and Class: New Perspectives on Environmental Justice," Antipode 28, no. 2 (1996): 111-21; p. 114. The second is from Stretsky and Hogan, "Environmental Justice," p. 268.
52. The first quotation is from Michael Heiman, "Race, Waste, and Class: New Perspectives on Environmental Justice," Antipode 28, no. 2 (1996): 111-21; p. 114. The second is from Stretsky and Hogan, "Environmental Justice," p. 268.
53. Agyeman, "Constructing Environmental (In)Justice," p. 38 (emphasis in the original).
54. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), pp. 42-43.
55. Ibid., p. 4.
56. Ibid., p. 43.
57. Ibid., pp. 57-59.
58. Ibid., p. 123.
59. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 244-45.
60. John Rawls, "The Law of Peoples," in John Rawls: Collected Papers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 531.
61. See, for example, Committee on Environmental Justice, Toward Environmental Justice: Research, Education, and Health Policy Needs (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1999).
62. In his earlier work, Rawls had referred readers to the "Rawlsian" account of justice in health care developed at length by Norman Daniels (e.g., Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 184, n. 14). See Norman Daniels, Just Health Care (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), chaps. 1-3. In Justice as Fairness, Rawls continues to refer readers to Daniels' "instructive discussion" (p. 175, n. 58). In this paper, I try to develop a position that draws primarily on Rawls' account. Prima facie, there are some important differences between Rawls' approach and Daniels's approach. However, these differences may have little practical significance once Rawls' theory has been more fully worked out (see n. 60 below).
63. In his earlier work, Rawls had referred readers to the "Rawlsian" account of justice in health care developed at length by Norman Daniels (e.g., Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 184, n. 14). See Norman Daniels, Just Health Care (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), chaps. 1-3. In Justice as Fairness, Rawls continues to refer readers to Daniels' "instructive discussion" (p. 175, n. 58). In this paper, I try to develop a position that draws primarily on Rawls' account. Prima facie, there are some important differences between Rawls' approach and Daniels's approach. However, these differences may have little practical significance once Rawls' theory has been more fully worked out (see n. 60 below).
64. In his earlier work, Rawls had referred readers to the "Rawlsian" account of justice in health care developed at length by Norman Daniels (e.g., Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 184, n. 14). See Norman Daniels, Just Health Care (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), chaps. 1-3. In Justice as Fairness, Rawls continues to refer readers to Daniels' "instructive discussion" (p. 175, n. 58). In this paper, I try to develop a position that draws primarily on Rawls' account. Prima facie, there are some important differences between Rawls' approach and Daniels's approach. However, these differences may have little practical significance once Rawls' theory has been more fully worked out (see n. 60 below).
65. Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 172.
66. Ibid., pp. 171-72.
67. Ibid., p. 173. See also Daniels, Just Health Care, p. 32.
68. Ibid., p. 173. See also Daniels, Just Health Care, p. 32.
69. See Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 172; Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 245. See also Daniels, Just Health Care, p. 2.
70. See Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 172; Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 245. See also Daniels, Just Health Care, p. 2.
71. See Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 172; Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 245. See also Daniels, Just Health Care, p. 2.
72. Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 172.
73. Ibid. Rawls is not suggesting that "health" is a primary good. More accurately, he is not suggesting that health is a "social primary good" as opposed to a "natural primary good." See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 54. In this paper, I follow Rawls' common practice of using "primary goods" to mean "social primary goods." For Rawls, health is a natural primary good. While natural primary goods may be "influenced by the basic structure, they are not so directly under its control" (ibid.). Therefore, it cannot be health but only health care that is distributed by the state. In this respect, Russ Manning's attempt to derive environmental conclusions from Rawls' theory of justice by arguing that health should be conceived as a social primary good is misguided (Manning, "Environmental Ethics," pp. 158-60).
74. Ibid. Rawls is not suggesting that "health" is a primary good. More accurately, he is not suggesting that health is a "social primary good" as opposed to a "natural primary good." See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 54. In this paper, I follow Rawls' common practice of using "primary goods" to mean "social primary goods." For Rawls, health is a natural primary good. While natural primary goods may be "influenced by the basic structure, they are not so directly under its control" (ibid.). Therefore, it cannot be health but only health care that is distributed by the state. In this respect, Russ Manning's attempt to derive environmental conclusions from Rawls' theory of justice by arguing that health should be conceived as a social primary good is misguided (Manning, "Environmental Ethics," pp. 158-60).
75. Ibid. Rawls is not suggesting that "health" is a primary good. More accurately, he is not suggesting that health is a "social primary good" as opposed to a "natural primary good." See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 54. In this paper, I follow Rawls' common practice of using "primary goods" to mean "social primary goods." For Rawls, health is a natural primary good. While natural primary goods may be "influenced by the basic structure, they are not so directly under its control" (ibid.). Therefore, it cannot be health but only health care that is distributed by the state. In this respect, Russ Manning's attempt to derive environmental conclusions from Rawls' theory of justice by arguing that health should be conceived as a social primary good is misguided (Manning, "Environmental Ethics," pp. 158-60).
76. Rawls, Justice as Fairness, pp. 171-72.
77. Ibid., p. 19.
78. Rawls, Theory of Justice, p. 80.
79. I b i d.
80. I b i d.
81. I b i d.
82. Ibid., p. 84.
83. Contrast the interpretation of Rawls' position offered by Ralph Perhac, "Environmental Justice: The Issue of Disproportionality," Environmental Ethics 21 (1999): pp. 81-92; p. 90.
84. Rawls, Justice as Fairness, pp. 171-72.
85. Ibid., pp. 173 and 171-72.
86. The cost of acquiring and distributing information must be considered as part of the policy packages and its "effectiveness" assessed in terms of the two principles of justice.
87. See Committee on Environmental Justice, Toward Environmental Justice, p. 21. Few doubt that land and water contamination (e.g., at Love Canal), air pollution (e.g., in Southeast Asia), and nuclear radiation (e.g., from Chernobyl) can all have debilitating (and, indeed, lethal) health effects. See, for example, Center for Health, Environment and Justice, Love Canal: The Start of a Movement at http://www.chej.org/lovecanal.html; F. Pearce and R. Edwards, "Forest fires fuel pollution crisis," New Scientist, 17 August 2002, pp. 8-9; Kristin Shrader-Frechette, "Chernobyl, Global Environmental Injustice and Mutagenic Threats" in Nicholas Low, ed., Global Ethics and Environment (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 70-74.
88. See Committee on Environmental Justice, Toward Environmental Justice, p. 21. Few doubt that land and water contamination (e.g., at Love Canal), air pollution (e.g., in Southeast Asia), and nuclear radiation (e.g., from Chernobyl) can all have debilitating (and, indeed, lethal) health effects. See, for example, Center for Health, Environment and Justice, Love Canal: The Start of a Movement at http://www.chej.org/lovecanal.html; F. Pearce and R. Edwards, "Forest fires fuel pollution crisis," New Scientist, 17 August 2002, pp. 8-9; Kristin Shrader-Frechette, "Chernobyl, Global Environmental Injustice and Mutagenic Threats" in Nicholas Low, ed., Global Ethics and Environment (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 70-74.
89. See Committee on Environmental Justice, Toward Environmental Justice, p. 21. Few doubt that land and water contamination (e.g., at Love Canal), air pollution (e.g., in Southeast Asia), and nuclear radiation (e.g., from Chernobyl) can all have debilitating (and, indeed, lethal) health effects. See, for example, Center for Health, Environment and Justice, Love Canal: The Start of a Movement at http://www.chej.org/lovecanal.html; F. Pearce and R. Edwards, "Forest fires fuel pollution crisis," New Scientist, 17 August 2002, pp. 8-9; Kristin Shrader-Frechette, "Chernobyl, Global Environmental Injustice and Mutagenic Threats" in Nicholas Low, ed., Global Ethics and Environment (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 70-74.
90. See Committee on Environmental Justice, Toward Environmental Justice, p. 21. Few doubt that land and water contamination (e.g., at Love Canal), air pollution (e.g., in Southeast Asia), and nuclear radiation (e.g., from Chernobyl) can all have debilitating (and, indeed, lethal) health effects. See, for example, Center for Health, Environment and Justice, Love Canal: The Start of a Movement at http://www.chej.org/lovecanal.html; F. Pearce and R. Edwards, "Forest fires fuel pollution crisis," New Scientist, 17 August 2002, pp. 8-9; Kristin Shrader-Frechette, "Chernobyl, Global Environmental Injustice and Mutagenic Threats" in Nicholas Low, ed., Global Ethics and Environment (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 70-74.
91. It is at this point that the Rawlsian position appears to come close to Daniels' prima facie more demanding claim that we should seek to maintain and restore the "normal opportunity range" for citizens (Daniels, Just Health Care, p. 33). On Rawls' account, we are aiming to maintain and restore only the capacities necessary to be a fully cooperating member of society. One of those capacities is the capacity to revise and pursue one's conception of the good. If it is necessary to have the "normal opportunity range" - "the array of life plans reasonable persons in [a society] are likely to construct for themselves" - to have the capacity to revise one's conception of the good, Rawls' position may be equivalent to Daniels's position (ibid.). If one can be said to have the capacity to revise one's conception of the good with less than the "normal opportunity range" (but a "reasonable opportunity range"), Rawls' position may be less demanding than Daniels's position.
92. Preventing illness and the (temporary) loss of essential capacities seems preferable to treating illness to restore essential capacities. However, there will be limits to the claim that "prevention is better (i.e., more effective and efficient) than cure." For example, if a few vulnerable people can be protected from illness only by very expensive environmental improvements, we might reasonably choose to spend the money on other policies (perhaps, including treatment for them) that will do more to maintain or restore the essential capacities of more members of the least advantaged group.
93. Rawls, Justice as Fairness, pp. 171-72.
94. See Rawls on the "fact of reasonable pluralism." Ibid., pp. 33-34.
95. Stephens et al., Environmental Justice, sec. 2.
96. I b i d.