Fitting in: Group effects and the evolution of fundamentalism

Journal of Policy Modeling

Volumn 31, Issue 5, 2009, Pages 739-757

  Arce, Daniel G ^a   Sandler, Todd ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS   (United States)

Author keywords

Assortative matching; Asymmetric game; Evolution games; Fundamentalism; Nonassortative matching; Open society; Social control; Terrorism

Indexed keywords

EID: 69349102331     PISSN: 01618938     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpolmod.2008.07.002     Document Type: Article

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