Accountability, control and independence: The case of European agencies

European Law Journal

Volumn 15, Issue 5, 2009, Pages 599-615

  Busuioc, Madalina ^a  

^a UTRECHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 69249122519     PISSN: 13515993     EISSN: 14680386     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0386.2009.00480.x     Document Type: Article

References (61)

1. See, further, D. Curtin, 'Delegation to EU Non-Majoritarian Agencies and Emerging Practices of Public Accountability', in D. Geradin etal (eds), Regulation through Agencies in the EU. A New Paradigm of European Governance (Edward Elgar, 2005), 88-119.
2. R. Van Ooik, 'The Growing Importance of Agencies in the EU: Shifting Governance and the Institutional Balance', in D. Curtin et al (eds), Good Governance and the European Union. Reflections on concepts, Institutions and Substance (Intersentia, 2005), 145
3. Geradin et al, op cit n 1 supra.
4. M. Shapiro, 'The Problems of Independent Agencies in the United States and the European Union', (1997) 4(2) Journal of European Public Policy 279.
5. D. Gerardin and N. Petit, The Development of Agencies at EU and National Levels: Conceptual Analysis and Proposal for Reform, Jean Monnet Working Paper (2004), 4
6. See, further, G. Majone, 'Functional Interests: European Agencies', in M. Shackleton (ed.), The Institutions of the European Union (Oxford University Press, 2002) and M. Everson et al, The Role of Specialised Agencies in Decentralising EU Governance, Report to the Commission (1999).
7. See, further, Shapiro, op cit n 4 supra; M. Everson, 'Independent Agencies: Hierarchy Beaters?', (1995) 1(2) European Law Journal 180; E. Vos, 'Reforming the European Commission: What Role to Play for EU Agencies?', (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 1113; M. Flinders, 'Distributed Public Governance in the European Union', (2004) 11(3) Journal of European Public Policy 520; Curtin, op cit n 1 supra; P. Craig, EU Administrative Law (Oxford University Press, 2006); S. Puntscher Riekmann, 'In Search of Lost Norms: Is Accountability the Solution to the Legitimacy Problems in the European Union?', (2007) 5(1) Comparative European Politics 121.
8. Commission of the European Communities, 'Explanatory Memorandum. Draft Interstitutional Agreement on the Operating Framework for the European Regulatory Agencies', COM (2005) 59 final, 2.
9. Van Ooik, op cit n 2 supra.
10. D. Geradin, 'The Development of European Regulatory Agencies: Lessons from the American Experience', in Geradin et al, op cit n 1 supra, at 231.
11. See, further, G. Majone, 'The Credibility Crisis of Community Regulation', (2002) 38(2) Journal of Common Market Studies 284 and Vos, op cit n 7 supra.
12. A. Kreher (ed.), The EC Agencies Between Community Institutions and Constituents: Autonomy, Control and Accountability, Second RSC Conference on EC Agencies, Conference Report (EUI, 1998), 5; Everson, op cit n 7 supra, at 183; P. Magnette, 'The Politics of Regulation in the European Union', in Geradin et al, op cit n 1 supra, at 3-22; M. Groenleer, ' The European Commission and Agencies', in D. Spence (ed.), The European Commission (John Harper Publishing, 2006), 156.
13. Shapiro, op cit n 4 supra; Everson, op cit n 7 supra; Vos, op cit n 7 supra; Van Ooik, op cit n 2 supra; M. Szapiro, The Framework for European Regulatory Agencies: A Balance between Accountability and Autonomy, Third ECPR Conference (2005). European Law Journal Volume 15
14. Shapiro, op cit n 4 supra, at 289.
15. M. Thatcher, 'Regulation after Delegation: Independent Regulatory Agencies in Europe', (2002) 9(6) Journal of European Public Policy 954, at 955.
16. C. Pollitt et al, Agencies. How Governments Do Things Through Semi-Autonomous Organisations (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 34-38.
17. ibid, at 36.
18. F. Gilardi, 'Policy Credibility and Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Comparative Empirical Analysis', (2002) 9(6) Journal of European Public Policy 873
19. See, further, K. Verhoest et al, 'The Study of Organisational Autonomy: A Conceptual Review', (2004) 24 Public Administration and Development 101; K. Yesilkagit, 'Bureaucratic Autonomy, Organisational Culture, and Habituation. Politicians and Independent Administrative Bodies in the Netherlands', (2004) 36(5) Administration and Society 528, at 531.
20. Yesilkagit, ibid, at 532.
21. See, further, Verhoest et al, op cit n 19 supra.
22. Szapiro, op cit n 13 supra, at 4.
23. Everson, op cit n 7 supra, at 183.
24. ibid, at 190.
25. Geradin, op cit n 10 supra, at 231
26. M. Bovens, Analysing and Assessing Public Accountability. A Conceptual Framework, European Governance Papers (C-06-011, 2006), 4.
27. P. Roness et al, Autonomy and Regulation of State Agencies: Reinforcement, Indifference or Compensation?, Paper Presented at the Fourth ECPR General Conference (Pisa, 6-8 September 2007), 5.
28. M. Bovens, 'Analysing and Assessing Public Accountability: A Conceptual Framework', (2007) 13(4) European Law Journal 447, at 452; See also R. Lastra and H. Shams, 'Public Accountability in the Financial Sector', in E. Ferran and C. Goodhart (eds), Regulating Financial Services and Markets in the 21st Century (Hart Publishing, 2001), 167; C. Turpin, 'Ministerial Responsibility', in J. Jowell and D. Oliver (eds), The Changing Constitution (Clarendon, 1994), 111-112.
29. C. Zilioli, 'Accountability and Independence: Irreconcilable Values or Complementary Instruments for Democracy? The Specific Case of the European Central Bank', in G. Vandersanden (ed.), Mélanges en hommage à Jean-Victor Louis (Editions de l'Universite de Bruxelles, 2003), 395-422, at 400.
30. R. Kiewiet and M. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation. Congressional Parties and the Appropriation Process (University of Chicago Press, 1991); K. Strom, 'Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies', (2000) 37 European Journal of Political Research 261.
31. R. Waterman and K. Meier, 'Principal - Agent Models: An Expansion?', (1998) 8(2) Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 173; R. Dehousse, Delegation of Powers in the European Union: The Need for aMulti-Principals Model, Connex Thematic Conference on Accountability (Florence, 29-30 June 2007).
32. D. Hawkins et al (eds), Delegation under Anarchy: States, International Organisations and Principal Agent Theory (Cambridge University Press, 2006), at 8.
33. A. Sweet Stone, 'Constitutional Courts and Parliamentary Democracy', (2002) 25(1) West European Politics 77, at 93.
34. Roness et al, op cit n 27 supra, at 5.
35. Bovens, op cit n 26 supra; Bovens, op cit n 28 supra.
36. J. Tallberg, 'Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How, and with What Consequences?', (2002) 25(1) West European Politics 23, at 29.
37. Zilioli, op cit n 29 supra, at 399.
38. T. Moe, 'Interests, Institutions and Positive Theory: The Politics of NLBM', (1987) 2 Studies in American Development 236.
39. Theoretically, there is a fourth scenario in which an agency is controlled but suffers from accountability deficits. This situation was not presented as a separate scenario given that, as explained in scenario 2, once an agency is controlled, accountability deficits of the agent become less problematic given the fact that ongoing control restricts or nullifies the level of originally mandated discretion.
40. This research is part of a broader research on the 'Accountability of European Agencies' fully funded by the NWO, the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research, under the Shifts in Governance programme.
41. There are some exceptions where, in some cases, the Commission has more votes; eg in the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products, the Commission has two representatives but in such cases the board itself tends to be larger than usually (ie in this case 35 members).
42. Respondent 1 (MB representative) of Agency 1 (R1 A1).
43. R2 (MB representative) of A2.
44. See Institute for European Environment Policy and European Institute for Public Administration, Evaluation of the European Environment Agency, An IEEP/EIPA Study, A Final Report to the DG Environment, Part A: Main Report (August, 2003), 61.
45. R3 (MB representative) of A3.
46. R4 (Director) of A4.
47. ibid.
48. ibid.
49. ibid.
50. R5 of A5.
51. R4 (Director) of A4, referring to information after a meeting with colleagues from other agencies.
52. R6 (MB representative) A6.
53. Zilioli, op cit n 29 supra, at 408.
54. Letter from the Chairman of the Management Board to Article 36 Committee, 12838/03, Brussels, 30 September 2003.
55. Statewatch, Unprecedented Complaint by the Europol Management Board about Informal Requests for Action by Council Working Parties Bypassing Legislative Process, available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/ oct/03europol.htm.
56. ibid.
57. European Commission, 'Communication from the Commission. The Operating Framework for European Regulatory Agencies', COM (2002) 718 final.
58. Turpin, op cit n 28 supra, at 111.
59. F. Gilardi, Principal Agent Models Go to Europe: Independent Regulatory Agencies as the Ultimate Step of Delegation, Paper presented at the ECPR General Conference (Canterbury, 6-8 September 2002).
60. Kreher, op cit n 12 supra.
61. S. Young, 'Reconceptualising Accountability in the Early Nineteenth Century: How the Tort of Negligence Appeared', (1989) 21 (2) Connecticut Law Review 202.