Learning from crisis: NASA and the Challenger disaster

Governing after Crisis: The Politics of Investigation, Accountability and Learning

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 232-254

  Boin, Arjen ^a,b  

^a Stephenson Disaster Management and Public Administration Institute   (United States)

^b LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 69149085716     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511756122.009     Document Type: Chapter

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