Coordination and control in corporate networks: United states and Germany in comparison, 18961938

European Sociological Review

Volumn 25, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 443-457

  Windolf, Paul ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TRIER   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 68349154442     PISSN: 02667215     EISSN: 14682672     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/esr/jcn059     Document Type: Article

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