The investment game with asymmetric information

Metroeconomica

Volumn 57, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 13-30

  Coricelli, Giorgio ^a   Morales, Luis González ^a   Mahlstedt, Amelie ^a  

^a HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 68249096842     PISSN: 00261386     EISSN: 1467999X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-999X.2006.00231.x     Document Type: Article

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