The size and influence of a criminal organization: A criminal achievement perspective

Global Crime

Volumn 10, Issue 1-2, 2009, Pages 24-40

  Tremblay, Pierre ^a   Bouchard, Martin ^b   Petit, Sévrine ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

^b SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Cannabis; Criminal organizations; Economic influence; Hells Angels; Illegal markets

Indexed keywords

EID: 68149170970     PISSN: 17440572     EISSN: 17440580     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/17440570902782428     Document Type: Article

References (85)

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4. F. Varese, The Russian Mafia: Private Protection in a New Market Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
5. P. Reuter, Disorganized Crime: The Economics of the Visible Hand (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1983).
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10. P. Tremblay, B. Talon and D. Hurley, 'Body Switching and Related Adaptations in the Resale of Stolen Vehicles: Script Elaborations and Aggregate Crime Learning Curves', British Journal of Criminology, 41 (2001): 561-79
11. C. Morselli and J. Roy, 'Brokerage Qualifications in Ringing Operations', Criminology 46 (2008): 71-98.
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13. M. Bouchard, 'A Capture-RecaptureModel to Estimate the Size of Criminal Populations and the Risks of Detection in a Cannabis Cultivation Industry', Journal of Quantitative Criminology 23 (2007): 221-41.
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15. In this paper, 'economic influence' and 'sphere of influence' are used interchangeably, and broadly refer to the same thing: The extent to which an organization has some control over other participants in a given market. Influence is measured specifically here as the number of offenders directly and indirectly depending on the organization to sell or obtain drug supplies. In other contexts, 'economic influence'' refers to the ability of an organization to influence market price, which is not the case here, although one can expect a strong association between different 'types' of market influence.
16. S. Levitt and S.A. Venkatesh, 'An Economic Analysis of a Drug-selling Gang's Finances', Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 (2000): 775-89. Membership of the particular gang investigated in this study reaches 1000 individuals. But this particular belongs to a federation of 10 gangs of about the same size.
17. P. Reuter, The Cartage Industry in New York, in Beyond the Law: Crime in Complex Organisations, ed. Michael Tonry and Albert J. Reiss (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 149-202.
18. Membership estimates are important concerns however for law enforcement and prosecutorial purposes.
19. P.J. Cook, L. Jens, S. Venkatesh and A.A. Braga, 'Underground Gun Markets', The Economic Journal 117 (2007): F1-F29.
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23. J. Riley, Crack, Powder Cocaine, and Heroin: Drug Purchase and Use Patterns in Six U.S. Cities (National Institute of Justice and Office of National Drug Control Policy, 1997).
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28. S. Jacques and R. Wright, 'Intimacy with Outlaws: The Role of Relational Distance in Recruiting, Paying and Interviewing Underworld Research Participants', Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 45 (2008): 22-38.
29. J.D. Wright and P.H. Rossi, Armed and Considered Dangerous: A Survey of Felons and Their Firearms (New York: Aldine de Greyer, 1994)
30. C. Morselli, P. Tremblay and B. McCarthy, 'Mentors and Criminal Achievement', Criminology 44 (2006): 17-43
31. P. Reuter, R. MacCoun and P. Murphy, Money from Crime: A Study of the Economics of Drug Dealing in Washington, D.C (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1990).
32. Many of these interviews were a source of additional information for the analysis of investigation files of professional networks of motor vehicle thefts (Tremblay et al., 'Body Switching and Related Adaptations in the Resale of Stolen Vehicles').
33. These growers cultivated, on average, 100 plants per site, most of which were soil-based (in three cases they were hydroponic sites). Many interviews were a source of additional information for an analysis of the cannabis cultivation industry.
34. M. Charest, 'Classe sociale et réussite criminelle' (PhD diss., School of Criminology, University of Montréal, 2007).
35. M. Bouchard and P. Tremblay, 'Risks of Arrest Across Drug Markets: A Capture-Recapture Analysis of "Hidden" Dealer and User Populations', The Journal of Drug Issues 35 (2005): 733-54.
36. The proportion of offenders in market offences was similar in interviews that provided no data on criminal earnings. They were also more likely to belong to the earlier cohorts of student when confidence in the ability of students to reach out for relevant offenders had yet to be proven. Many of these interviews had chosen to focus on other features of crime life such as crime scripts.
37. Morselli and Tremblay, 'Criminal Achievement and the Benefits of Low Self-control'.
38. When interviews did not mention whether or not the subject was still active in crime (10.9% of interviews), we assumed that they were.
39. A. Blumstein, J. Cohen, J.A. Roth and C.A. Visher, (eds), 'Criminal Careers and "Career Criminals"' (Washington, DC: National Academy of Science, 1986).
40. Biernacki and Waldorf, 'Snowball Sampling: Problems and Techniques of Chain Referral Sampling'
41. Heckathorn, 'Respondent-driven Sampling'
42. Wright et al., 'A Snowball's Chance in Hell'
43. Jacques and Wright, 'Intimacy with Outlaws'.
44. D. Zelterman, 'Robust Estimation in Truncated Discrete Distributions with Applications to Capture-Recapture Experiments', Journal of Statistical Planning and Inference 18 (1988): 225-37.
45. See Bouchard, 'A Capture-Recapture Model to Estimate the Size of Criminal Populations' for a detailed technical exposition.
46. See note 28.
47. Kazemian Lila and David P. Farrington, 'Exploring Residual Career Length and Residual Number of Offences for Two Generations of Repeat Offenders', Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 43 (2006): 89-113.
48. Lacoste and Tremblay, 'Crime and Innovation'. See note 23.
49. MacCoun, R., & Reuter, P. (2001). Drug war heresies: Learning from other vices, times, and places. New York: Cambridge University Press.
50. Reuter, 'Disorganized Crime: The Economics of the Visible Hand'.
51. P. Tremblay, 'Searching for Suitable Co-offenders', in R.V. Clarke and M. Felson (eds) Routine Activities and Rational Choice. Advances in Criminological Theory, vol. 5 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Press, 1993), 17-36.
52. A limitation of this data is the possibility that respondents have exaggerated their 'associations' to criminal organizations. While we cannot rule out that possibility, we also cannot rule out the opposite possibility that some respondents failed (purposely or not) to mention an existing association. And others may not have been aware of the affiliations of their business partners.
53. The Hells Angels have 34 chapters in Canada, of which five are in the province of Québec.
54. Dominant group of a short-lived coalition of dissidents (the 'Alliance') who were briefly associated with the Bandidos during the 'war' that opposed them to the Hells Angels from 1994 to 2001: C. Morselli, D. Tanguay and A.-M. Labalette, 'Criminal Conflicts and Collective Violence: Biker-Related Account Settlements in Québec, 1994-2001', in D. Siegel and H. Nelen (eds) Organized Crime: Culture, Markets, and Policies (New York: Springer, 2008), 145-164. A number of these dissidents eventually joined the ranks of Hells Angels after the feud; this was also the case for some of the Outlaws who had defied the Hells Angels during the 1970s.
55. Many of the outlaw motorcycle gangs of the 1970s and 1980s have either disappeared or have been absorbed by the Hells Angels (Tremblay et al., 'Carrières criminelles collectives'). See note 10.
56. Affiliation is indirect because nearly all subjects interviewed mentioned working for another offender who belonged or acted on behalf of a member of a Hells Angels chapter or to one of their affiliated clubs. For the purpose of this article, the expression 'affiliation association' is defined as 'indirect affiliation'.
57. Reuter, 'Disorganized Crime: The Economics of the Visible Hand'.
58. Investigative material provides an illustration: 'Upon examination of Hells Angels accounting, we are stunned to see that they were able to dispose of their drugs with lightning speed. For example, a 350kg order of cocaine, valued at $14 million was disposed of in less than three weeks. In addition to the drug sold to other criminal organizations, the Nomads supplied their own dealers, as well as Hells Angels dealers, with more than 2000kg of cocaine annually and at least as much hashish'. Julian Sher and William Marsden, La route des Hells: Comment les motards ont bâti leur empire (Montréal: Les Éditions de l'Homme, 2003), 186.
59. Ibid., 431: 'With the Hells, there is no godfather, no singular chief who can be eliminated in order to topple the whole empire. The Hells function a bit like McDonalds: Even if you close a franchise, other franchises continue to prosper'.
60. Levitt and Venkatesh, 'An Economic Analysis of a Drug-selling Gang's Finances'.
61. M. Bouchard and C.B. Dion, 'Growers and Facilitators: Probing the Role of Entrepreneurs in the Development of the Cannabis Cultivation Industry', Journal of Small Business & Entrepreneurship 22 (2009): 25-38.
62. E.M. Adlaf, P. Begin and E. Sawka (eds), 'Canadian Addiction Survey: A National Survey of Canadians' Use of Alcohol and Other Drugs, Prevalence of Use and Related Harms: Detailed Report' (Ottawa: Canadian Centre on Substance Abuse, 2005)
63. G. Dubé, I. Traoré, and R. Tremblay, 'Recueil statistique sur le tabac, l'alcool, ladrogue et le jeu chez les élèves du secondaire de 1998 à 2004' (Québec: Institut de la Statistique du Québec, 2006).
64. For example, see D. Zaitch, Trafficking Cocaine: Columbian Drug Entrepreneurs in the Netherlands (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002).
65. R. Weisheit, Domestic Marijuana; A Neglected Industry (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992).
66. G. Ouellette and N. Lester, Mom (Montréal, Éditions les Intouchables, 2005).
67. Levitt and Venkatesh, 'An Economic Analysis of a Drug-selling Gang's Finances'.
68. M. Leduc, Patchwork: Le rationnel du système de promotion dans l'organisation des Hells Angels (Masters diss., School of Criminology, University of Montréal, 2005), ii, 31.
69. See note 52.
70. Bouchard, 'A Capture-Recapture Model to Estimate the Size of Criminal Populations'.
71. For details on the field study involving nine marijuana growers who were active in the province of Québec between 1993 and 2005, see note 9.
72. G. Cordeau, Les règlements de compte dans le milieu criminel québécois de 1970 à 1986 (Ph.D. diss., School of Criminology, University of Montréal, 1990), 50.
73. See note 39.
74. Leduc, Patchwork.
75. C. Deveault and R. Desmarais, Donald Lavoie, tueur à gages (Montréal: Édition du Club Québec-Loisirs, 1984)
76. R. Desmarais, Le clan des Dubois (Montréal: Stanké, 1976).
77. Y. Lavigne, Hell's Angels: Taking Care of Business (Toronto: Deneau and Wayne, 1988).
78. D. Tanguay, Récits motards: Examen d'un conflit en milieu criminel (Masters diss., School of Criminology, University of Montréal, 2003), 43.
79. See note 45.
80. Reuter, 'Disorganized Crime'.
81. Levitt and Venkatesh, 'An Economic Analysis of a Drug-selling Gang's Finances'.
82. Morselli et al., 'Mentors and Criminal Achievement'
83. Morselli and Tremblay, 'Criminal Achievement and the Benefits of Low Self-control'.
84. Montréal was the main location of most of the fatalities of the 1994-2001 biker conflict.
85. Despite a major law-enforcement crackdown in 2001, a majority of members were not arrested and quite a number were spared altogether: S. Petit, Hells Angels malgré tout (Working Paper, School of Criminology, University of Montréal, 2006), 35-7.