Democratic legitimation of delegated legislation - A comparative view on the American, British and German law

International and Comparative Law Quarterly

Volumn 58, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 353-378

  Pünder, Hermann ^a  

^a BUCERIUS LAW SCHOOL   (Germany)

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EID: 67849106302     PISSN: 00205893     EISSN: 14716895     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020589309001079     Document Type: Article

References (409)

1. For a broader comparison of the American and German law see H Pünder, Exekutive Normsetzung in den Vereinigten Staaten und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1995) with a summary in English.
2. This article treats delegated, subordinate and secondary legislation as synonymous. The study does not, however, cover executive norms which are directed primarily toward the internal affairs of the agency as such internal rules may not need specific legislative delegation. Furthermore, the comparison is restricted to rule-making by the executive branch, and does not include the delegation of legislative powers to parliamentary institutions like the Scottish parliament. Compare in this context McHarg, 'What is delegated legislation?' (2006) PL 539 ff.
3. In the US the terminology is 'neither consistent nor scientific'. See Schwartz, Administrative Law (3rd edn, 1991) 143. A rule may be a decision, a decision may be an order, an order may be a rule. The most significant attempt to define basic administrative law terms was made in 1946 when Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act. The following study, therefore, will follow its terminology.
4. In the UK there is also a 'bewildering variety' of names for delegated legislation. See Craig, Administrative Law (5th edn 2003) 370-371. The term 'statutory instruments' refers to rules governed by the Statutory Instruments Act 1946.
5. For the classification of primary and delegated legislation (esp to Acts of the Scottish Parliament) see McHarg (n 2).
6. German terminology in contrast is clear. 'Rechtsverordnungen' have the same legal effect as 'Gesetze' but are made by a part of the executive branch.
7. J Locke Two Treaties of Government (1690) Second Treatise, Ch XI §141.
8. Compare BVerfGE (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsentscheidungen) 7, 267, 274; 8, 274, 311, 321; 42, 191, 203; 55, 207, 228, 241.
9. Mistretta v US (1989) 488 US 361, 371-372.
10. Compare eg Craig (n 4) 369-370
11. Griffith 'The Place of Parliament in the Legislative Process' (1951) 14 Mod. L Rev 279, 292 ff
12. O Hood Phillips, P Jackson and P Leopold, Constitutional and Administrative Law (8th edn 2001) 668 f
13. I Loveland, Constitutional Law, Administrative Law and Human Rights (3rd edn, OUP, Oxford, 2003) 132 ff
14. EC Page, Governing by Numbers (2001) ch 2.
15. See also Donoughmore Committee on Ministers' Powers, Report Presented by the Lord High Chancellor to Parliament by Command of His Majesty (1932) Cmd. 4060
16. and the compilation of the justifications of delegated legislation in the Sixth Report form the Select Committee on Procedure, HC 539 of 1966-7, Appendix 8: Memorandum by Mr Speaker's Counsel, para 6.
17. See also the Council Dec 99/468 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission as amended by Council Dec 2006/512/EC.
18. Compare PP Craig and G de Búrca, EU Law (4th edn 2007) 118 ff;
19. S Smismans, 'Functional Participation in EU Delegated Regulation: Lessons from the US at the EU's "Constitutional Moment"'(2005) 12 Ind J Gobal Legal Stud 599 ff.
20. Compare the compilations of primary and secondary legislation in the US (http://www.gpoaccess.gov/legislative.html),
21. UK (http://www.opsi.gov.uk/legislation/uk.htm)
22. and Germany (http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de). Note that while the statistics are indicative of overall proportions, the definition of secondary legislation to an extent varies between the compared jurisdictions.
23. The term refers to the Statute of Proclamations 1539, giving Henry VIII extensive powers to legislate by proclamation. Compare to the nomenclature in Loveland (n 9) 135 f.
24. Charles de Montesquieu, De l'esprit des lois (1748) Livre XI, Ch. VI.
25. Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765) as cited by Phillips, Jackson and Leopold (n 9) 12: 'In all tyrannical Governments ... the right of making and of enforcing the laws is vested in one and the same man, or the same body of men; and wheresoever these two powers are united together there can be no liberty.'
26. Lord Hewart, The New Despotism (1929).
27. Compare for an early response Donoughmore Committee on Ministers' Powers (n 9).
28. See also Griffith (n 9) 279, 294 f;
29. J Kersell Parliamentary Supervision of Delegated Legislation - The United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Canada (1960) 2.
30. Craig (n 4) 368.
31. Compare A Bonfield, State Administrative Rule Making (1986) 145
32. J Kersell (n 16) 2 ff.
33. Compare for a broad view on the legitimacy D Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (1991).
34. Dahrendorf, 'Effectiveness and Legitimacy' (1980) 51 Political Quarterly, 393, 409, warns, that 'the response to a crisis of legitimacy will be authoritarianism and illiberty'.
35. See for the US eg Bowen v Georgetown University Hospital (1988) 488 US, 204, 471
36. and for the German law BVerfGE 34, 52, 59-60.
37. Art. 34, 37 of French Constitution. Compare eg Favoreu et al. Droit constitutionnel (10th edn, 2007) 197 ff, 777 ff
38. Chapus, Droit administratif general, vol I (15th edn, 2001) 209, 652 ff
39. Gaudemet, Droit administratif (18th edn, 2005) 252 ff
40. and Schwartz, Administrative Law and the Common Law World (1954) 89 ff
41. O HoodPhillips, P Jackson and P Leopold (n 9) 11
42. LN Brown and J Bell, French Administrative Law (5th edn, 1998) 11
43. P Lindseth, 'The Paradox of Parliamentary Supremacy: Delegation, Democracy, and Dictatorship in Germany and France, 1920s-1950s' (2003-2004) 13 Yale L J 1341, 1404 ff.
44. The room for inherent legislation, however, is rather limited. Compare to the 'decretosleyes' eg JJ Gomes Canotilho, Direito Constitucional (4th edn 1989) 649 ff.
45. See for instance O Hood Phillips, P Jackson and P Leopold (n 9) 318 ff;
46. C Turpin, The British Government and the Constitution (5th edn, 2002) 415 ff.
47. Compare on the 'decretazione d'urgenza' eg P Caretti and U de Sievo, Instituzione di diritto pubblico (1992) 273 ff;
48. Baschiera, 'Introduction to the Italian Legal System: The Allocation of Normative Powers' (2006) 34 Int'l J Legal Info 279, 289 ff.
49. Compare on the 'decretos-leyes' Santamaría Pasto, Fundamentos de Derecho Administrativo, vol I (1988/1991) 627 ff.
50. C Carr, Delegated Legislation: Three Lectures (1921) 2.
51. See Pünder (n 1) 53 ff.
52. EW Böckenförde, Gesetz und gesetzgebende Gewalt (2nd edn, 1981) 381.
53. Compare the decision of the Swiss Bundesgericht (1978) BGE 104 Ia, 305, 310-311.
54. See also U Häfelin and W Haller, Schweizerisches Bundesstaatsrecht (3rd edn, 1993) 449, 450 ff.
55. cp to Art 202, 211 ECT - ECJ (1970), C-25/70 (Köster) ECR, 1161, 1172
56. ECJ (1979), C-230/78 (Eridana), ECR, 2749, 2765
57. ECJ (1992), C-240/90 (Germany/Commission), ECR, I-5383, 5434
58. ECJ (1995), C-417/93 (Parliament/Council), ECR, I-1185, 1219
59. ECJ (1996), C-303/94 (Parliament/Council), ECR, I-2943, 2969. Note, however, that the ECJ has never annulled so far a measure on these grounds.
60. Compare Craig and de Búrca (n 10) 139 f
61. Smismans (n 10) 623 ff.
62. Compare eg BVerfGE 7, 282, 302; 33, 125, 158 ff; 40, 237, 249; 49, 89, 126 f; 58, 257, 278; 80, 1, 20; 85, 97, 105.
63. See also Cremer 'Art 80 und Parlamentsvorbehalt' (1997) 122 AöR, 248 ff; Lindseth (n 22) 1395 ff.
64. See for examples in the constitutional judicature Rubel, 'Art 80' in Umbach and Clemens (eds) Grundgesetz vol. 2 (2002) 25 ff.
65. Compare BVerfGE 8, 155, 171
66. Ramsauer, 'Art 80' in Denninger et al. (eds) Grundgesetz (3rd edn, 2001) 41.
67. Compare BVerfGE 8, 155, 163.
68. It should, however, be recognised that the accountability of government and ministers is limited due to the governmental dominance of the legislature.
69. Compare Wayman v Southard (1825) 23 US, 1 ff
70. Field v Clark (1892) 143 US, 649 ff
71. Consolidated Coal Co. v Illinois (1902) 185 US, 203 ff
72. Grimaud v US (1911) 220 US, 506 ff
73. J.W. Hampton Co. v US (1928) 276 US, 394 ff
74. US v Chicago M St P & P R Co (1931) 282 US, 311 ff
75. Panama Refining Co. v Ryan (1934) 293 US, 388 ff
76. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Co. v US (1935) 295 US, 495 ff.
77. Compare Mössle, Inhalt, Zweck und Ausmaß (1990) 42 ff
78. B Wolff, 'Ermächtigung zum Erlass von Rechtsverordnungen' (1952-3) 78 AöR, 194, 197
79. Tilman Pünder, Das Bizonale Interregnum (1966) 223 ff
80. Lindseth (n 22) 1392 ff.
81. See eg Yakus v US (1944) 321 US, 414 ff
82. Lichter v US (1948) 334 US, 742 ff
83. American Trucking Assn v Atchison (1967) 387 US, 397 ff
84. NAACP v Federal Power Commission (1976) 425 US, 662 ff
85. Industrial Department AFL-CIO v American Petroleum Institute (1980) 448 US, 607 ff
86. American Textile Manufacturers Institute v Donovan (1981) 452 US, 490 ff
87. Mistretta v US (n 8) 361 ff
88. Touby v US (1991) 111 Sup Ct, 1752 ff.
89. Compare generally Aman and Mayton, Administrative Law (2nd 2001) 9 ff.
90. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise (2nd edn 1978) 27.
91. Similarly Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980) 132 ('Find the problems in this area and solve them')
92. Central Forwarding, Inc v Interstate Commerce Commission (1983) 698 F 2d, 1283 (5th Cir: 'Go forth and do good').
93. Marshall in Federal Power Commission v New England Power Co (1974) 415 US, 352.
94. But note the application of the non-delegation doctrine in South Dakota v Department of Interior (1995) 69 F3d 878 (8th Cir). Furthermore in the states the non-delegation doctrine is used rather extensively so that 'there has never been a suspicion of its death'.
95. See Aman and Mayton (n 40) 27.
96. Compare Pierce, Shapiro and Verkuil, Administrative Law and Process (3rd edn, 1999) 60 ff.
97. See Synar v US (1986) 626 F Supp 1374, 1398 (D C Cir).
98. Aranson, Gellhorn and Robinson, 'A Theory of Legislative Delegation' (1982) 68 Cornell L Rev 1, 25.
99. The ideological foundations were laid by Woodrow Wilson, 'The Study of Administration' 2 (1887) Pol Sci. Q 197 ff.
100. Commodity Futures Trading Com'n v Schor (1986) 478 US, 833.
101. Compare in this context for example Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Study on Federal Regulations (1977-1979) Doc No 26, 95th Cong, 1st Sess, vol I, 95 ff.
102. Humphrey's Executor v US (1935) 295 US, 602 ff.
103. Wiener v US (1958) 57 US, 349, 358.
104. McGarity, 'Regulatory Reform in the Reagan Era' (1986) 45 Md L Rev, 253, 254 (providing for further references).
105. Compare eg C Schmitt, 'Vergleichender Überblick über die neueste Entwicklung des Problems der gesetzgeberischen Ermächtigungen' (1936) VI ZaöR, 252 ff
106. Jellinek, Gesetz und Verordnung (1887) 333, 338
107. Lindseth (n 22)1357 ff.
108. Compare Report of the Hansard Society Commission on the Legislative Process ('Rippon Commission') Making the Law (1993) 89.
109. See also Hayhurst and Wallington 'The Parliamentary Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation' 1988 P L, 547 ff
110. Wade and Forsyth, Administrative Law (9th edn, 2004) 860 ff
111. Page (n 9) 35 ff
112. McHarg (n 2) 556-557.
113. Craig (n 4) 370.
114. See also Ganz, 'Delegated Legislation: A Necessary Evil or a Constitutional Outrage?' in Leyland and Woods (eds) Administrative Law Facing the Future: Old Constraints and New Horizons (1997) 63-64.
115. The use of such clauses has increased as of late. Compare eg Lord Rippon, 'Henry VIII Clauses' (1989) 10 Stat L Rev 205
116. Barber and Young, 'The Rise of Prospective Henry VIII Clauses and Their Implications for Sovereignty' (2003) P L, 112 ff. The Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994 and the Regulatory Reform Act 2001 are notorious in this context.
117. See Ganz (n 53) 65-66
118. McHarg (n 2) 539 ff
119. Freedland, 'Privatising Carltona: Part II of the Deregulation and Contracting Out Act' (1995) P L 21, 21-22. Note, however, that courts have indicated that a power to modify the provisions of a statute by delegated legislation should be narrowly and strictly construed.
120. See for references Hood Phillips, Jackson and Leopold (n 9) 671.
121. See eg Magiera, 'Allgemeine Regelungsgewalt zwischen Parlament und Regierung' (1974) 13 Der Staat, 1, 22 (with further references).
122. See Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1962) 111 ff;
123. Stewart, 'The Reformation of American Administrative Law', 88 (1975) Harv L Rev 1669, 1696 ff;
124. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process (1980) 123 ff;
125. Sargentich, 'The Delegation Debate and Competing Ideals of the Administrative Process' (1987) (1987) Am U L Rev 419, 430.
126. See Wright, 'Beyond Discretionary Justice' (1972) 81 Yale L J, 575 ff
127. Jaffe, 'The Illusion of Ideal Administration', 86 (1973) Harv L Rev, 1183 ff
128. McGowan, 'Congress, Court, and Delegated Power', 1977 Colum L Rev, 1119, 1132 ff
129. Freedman, Crises and Legitimacy (1978) 6-7
130. Lowi, The End of Liberalism (2nd edn, 1979) 92 ff
131. Harter, 'Negotiating Regulations - A Cure for Malaise', 71 (1982) Geo L J 1, 17 ff
132. Aranson, Gellhorn and Robinson (n 44) 1
133. Schoenbrod, 'The Delegation Doctrine - Could the Court give it Substance?' (1985) 83 Mich L Rev 1223
134. Mayton, 'The Possibilities of Collective Choice: Arrow's Theorem, Art I and the Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative Agencies' 1986 Duke L J, 948, 962-3
135. Gellhorn, 'Delegation of Powers to Administrative Agencies - Returning to First Principles' (1987) 36 Am U L Rev 347 ff
136. Sarvis, 'Legislative Delegation and Two Conceptions of the Legislative Power' (2005-2006) 4 Pierce L Rev 317 ff.
137. For a summary of the debate, compare Sunstein, 'Nondelegation Canons' 67 (2000) U Chi L Rev 315, 317 ff.
138. Justice Douglas, cited after Dolzer, 'Verwaltungskontrolle in den Vereinigten Staaten' (1982) DÖV, 578, 579.
139. See above all the Symposium on 'The Uneasy Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies' (1987) 36 Am U L Rev.
140. The President's Committee on Administrative Management: Report with Special Studies, 'Brownlow Report' (1937) 39.
141. See Humphrey's Executor v US (n 48) 602,
142. and Schwartz (n 3) 22.
143. Starr, 'Tribute to Bernard Schwartz' (1988) Annual Surv Am L, XIII.
144. Pierce, Shapiro and Verkuil (n 42) 103.
145. So quoted by Schwartz (n 3) 22.
146. See Staupe, Parlamentsvorbehalt und Delegationsbefugnis (1986) 322
147. Staats, 'Die Formelermächtigung' in Kindermann (ed) Studien zu einer Theorie der Gesetzgebung (1982) 192 ff.
148. See also Cutler and Johnson, 'Regulation and Political Process' 84 (1975) Yale L J, 1395, 1400
149. Woll, American Bureaucracy (2nd edn, 1977) 173
150. Ely (n 41) 3; Fiorina, 'Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms - Legal Process or Administrative Process' 39 (1982) Public Choice, 33, 46 ff, 53 ff
151. Dripps, 'Delegation and Due Process' (1988) Duke L J, 657, 668
152. Lowi, 'Delegation of Powers to Administrative Agencies - Two Roads to Serfdom: Liberalism, Conservativism and Administrative Power' (1987) 36 Am U L Rev, 295, 318
153. Sargentich (n 56)
154. See Schoenbrod (n 57) 1225.
155. Separate opinion in Industrial Department AFL-CIO v American Petroleum Institute (n 40) 687 ff;
156. dissenting opinion in American Textile Manufacturers Institute v Donovan (n 40) 490 ff.
157. Craig (n 4) 370. Compare also Turpin (n 24) 404 ff.
158. Fourth Report (1995-6) HC 152, para 14.
159. Compare also Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use of Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions (1996) HC 115 ('Scott Report'); Rippon Commission (n 52) 89-90.
160. Compare eg Sunkin, 'Grounds for Judicial Review: Illegality in the Strict Sense' in Feldman (ed) English Public Law (2004) 745 ff.
161. Compare Himsworth, 'The delegated powers scrutiny committee' (1995) P L 34 ff.
162. See McAuslan and McEldowney, Law, Legitimacy and the Constitution (1995) 23.
163. Compare for similar arguments in the US Wright (n 57) 575 ff; Jaffe (n 57) 1183 ff;
164. McGowan (n 57) 1128 ff;
165. Freedman (n 57) 78 ff
166. Ely (n 41) 131 ff
167. Aranson, Gellhorn and Robinson (n 44) 67
168. Bardach and Kagan, Going by the Book (1982) 46 ff
169. Dill, 'Scope of Review of Rulemaking after Chadha - A Case for the Delegation Doctrine?', 33 (1984) Emory L. J., 953 ff
170. Garland, 'Deregulation and Judicial Review' (1985) 98 Harv L Rev, 507, 568 ff
171. Mayton (n 57) 965
172. Gellhorn (n 57) 352-3
173. Dripps (n 66) 662 ff.
174. Stewart, 'Beyond Delegation Doctrine' (1987)
175. Am U L Rev, 323, 324, asserts, however, that there are no 'judicially manageable and defensible criteria to distinguish permissible from impermissible delegations'. Similarly Pierce, 'Delegation of Powers to Administrative Agencies - Political Accountability and Delegated Power' 36 (1987) Am U L Rev, 391, 403 ff.
176. Compare Anschütz Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reiches (14th edn 1933) Art 48
177. März, Die Diktaturgewalt des Reichspräsidenten (1997)
178. Lindseth (n 22) 1361 ff.
179. Reichsgesetz zur Behebung der Not von Volk und Reich, 24.3.1933, RGBl. I, 141.
180. Compare Mössle (n 37) 28 ff;
181. Lindseth (n 22) 1370 f.
182. See Lindseth (n 2) 1387 ff;
183. Ossenbühl 'Gesetz und Verordnung im gegenwärtigen Staatsrecht' (1997) ZG, 305, 307 ff.
184. Compare Schmitt Glaeser, 'Partizipation an Verwaltungsentscheidungen' (1973) 31 VVDStRL, 179, 199.
185. Schoenbrod, 'Separation of Powers and the Powers that Be - The Constitutional Purposes of the Delegation Doctrine' (1987) 36 Am U L Rev 355, 386.
186. The term 'dilemma' is used to describe the problem in German and American scholarship. See eg Ossenbühl (n 77) 314
187. and Schoenbrod (n 57) 1227.
188. Eichenberger, 'Gesetzgebung im Rechtsstaat' (1982) 40 VVDStRL 7, 29-30.
189. Compare BVerfGE 8, 274, 326; 11, 234, 237; 21, 1, 4; 28, 175, 183; 58, 257, 278
190. and v Danwitz, Die Gestaltungsfreiheit des Verordnungsgebers (1989) 128-129.
191. See eg Mashaw, 'Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions' (1985) 1 J L Econ & Org. 1 ff
192. Pierce (n 74) 391 ff.
193. cp Pünder (n 1) 150 ff.
194. See, for the time before 1919 G. Jellinek (n 51) 99 ff, 366 ff
195. Reich-Erkelenz, Das Verordnungsrecht des Monarchen im deutschen konstitutionellen Staat (1966)
196. and, for the Weimar republic, Huber, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte seit 1789, vol. VI (1981) 440.
197. See §2 II of the 'Gesetz betreffend Rechtsverordnungen der Bundesregierung zur Durchführung von EG-Richtlinien'. Compare with British Law eg Craig (n 4) 379-380.
198. See BVerfGE 8, 271, 319 ff; 8, 274, 321; 59, 48, 49 ff.
199. Some federal and state constitutional norms even provide explicitly for the participation. Compare Art. 109 paragraph 4 Basic Law, Art. 9 paragraph 2 Bavarian Constitution, Art. 47 paragraph 1 Constitution of Berlin.
200. BVerfGE 4, 193, 203.
201. See also for a comparative perspective Kersell (n 16)
202. Lindseth (n 22) 1352.
203. See Craig (n 4) 374 ff.
204. Compare also Hood Phillips, Jackson and Leopold (n 9) 672 ff
205. Wade and Forsyth (n 52) 898 ff
206. Allen, Law and Order (3rd edn, 1965) 122 ff
207. Campbell 'Statutory Instruments - Laying and Legislation by Reference' (1987) P L 328 ff
208. Hayhurst and Wallington (n 52) 547 ff.
209. Turpin (n 24) 414
210. Loveland (n 9) 134.
211. Kersell (n 16) 82, notes that the affirmative procedure is, of course, less popular with Governments as it requires parliamentary time in every case and provides the Opposition with more chances to be obstructive if that is its inclination.
212. See Turpin (n 24) 496
213. Craig (n 4) 376. Compare also Beatson, 'Legislative Control of Administrative Rulemaking: Lessons from the British Experience' (1979) 12 Corn I L J 199, 213-215. Compare for suggestions of improvement Rippon Commission (n 52) 91-93, 149.
214. It is the duty of the 'Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments' which was formed 1973 from the committees of the Commons and Lords to examine every subordinate legislation laid before Parliament in order to determine whether the attention of the House should be drawn to an instrument. See for details Craig (n 4) 377 ff, 395-396
215. Hayhurst and Wallington (n 52) 547 ff
216. Hood Phillips, Jackson and Leopold (n 9) 676 ff
217. Wade and Forsyth (n 52) 901 ff.
218. For a comparative perspective on the UK, Australia, New Zealand and Canada see Kersell (n 16) 43 ff.
219. See, for a comparative study of Anglo-American law, Schwartz and Wade, Legal Control of Government: Administrative Law in Britain and the United States (1972) 90.
220. An inventory of these statutes as of 1983 appears as an appendix to the dissenting opinion of Justice White in Immigration and Naturalization Service v Chadha (1983) 462 US 919, 1003.
221. Immigration and Naturalization Service v Chadha (n 95) 919 ff with a dissenting opinion of Justice White (967 ff).
222. See also Process Gas Consumers Group v Consumer Energy Council of America (1983) 463 US 1216 ff.
223. Compare generally Strauss, 'Was there a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme Court's Legislative Veto Decision' (1983) Duke L J 789 ff.
224. See eg Alexandria v US (1984) 737 F 2d 1002 (Fed. Cir.).
225. Generally Aman and Mayton (n 40) 626 ff
226. Pierce and Shapiro and Verkuil (n 42) 67 f.
227. See Schwartz (n 3) 217 (with further references).
228. Compare for objections Staupe (n 65) 317 ff
229. v Danwitz (n 82) 112 ff
230. Sommermann, 'Verordnungsrechtnächtigung und Demokratieprinzip' JZ 1997, 434, 438 ff.
231. Compare Brohm, 'Die Dogmatik des Verwaltungsrechts vor den Gegenwartsaufgaben der Verwaltung' (1972) 30 VVDStRL 245, 269-270
232. Klein, 'Die Kompetenz- und Rechtskompensation' (1981) DVBl, 661, 662
233. Novak, 'Gesetzgebung im Rechtsstaat' (1982) 40 VVDStRL, 40, 52.
234. See eg Bäumlin 'Die Kontrolle des Parlaments über Regierung und Verwaltung' (1966) ZSR 165, 241 ff.
235. Compare Craig and de Búrca (n 10) 118 ff
236. Smismans (n 10) 601 ff.
237. See Craig (n 4) 376.
238. Compare also in a comparative perspective Kersell (n 16) 81.
239. Second Report of the Joint Committee on Delegated Legislation (1972-1973) H L 204
240. (1972-1973) H.C. 408. Compare also Rippon Commission (n 52) 31.
241. Compare Himsworth (n 72) 41.
242. See for the 'super-affirmative procedure' pursuant to the Regulatory Reform Act 2001 Craig (n 4) 378-379
243. Hood Phillips, Jackson and Leopold (n 9) 678 ff
244. Turpin (n 24) 408 ff
245. Miers, 'The Deregulation Procedure: An Expanding Role' (1999) P L 477 ff.
246. See BVerfGE 2, 237 ff; 8, 274 (319, 323).
247. A different opinion is voiced by Ossenbühl (n 77) 315.
248. See v Danwitz (n 82) 130.
249. Compare concerning the American law eg Scalia, 'The Legislative Veto - A False Remedy for System Overload' (1979) 3 Regulation, 19, 22
250. Elliott, 'INS v Chadha - The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution and the Legislative Veto' (1983) Sup. Ct. Rev, 125, 150-151.
251. See Turpin (n 24) 496
252. Wade and Forsyth (n 52) 990.
253. Compare Sommermann (n 99) 438 ff.
254. See Craig (n 4) 376.
255. Compare also Beith, 'Prayers Unanswered: A Jaundiced View of the Parliamentary Scrutiny of Statutory Instruments' (1981) 34 Parliamentary Affairs 165, 170
256. Hayhurst and Wallington (n 52) 547 ff.
257. Compare Allen (n 90) 136.
258. See also Beatson (n 92) 213-215.
259. Beatson (n 92) 222.
260. Compare BVerfGE 8, 274, 323.
261. Compare for a British perspective eg Craig (n 4) 384-387
262. Garner, 'Consultation in Subordinate Legislation' (1964) P.L. 105, 122 ff;
263. Wade and Forsyth (n 52) 897.
264. See for details §553 (b) APA. Compare for the notice and the 'pre-notice part' of rule-making Aman and Mayton (n 40) 44 ff.
265. Fox, Understanding Administrative Law (1986) 128.
266. §553 (c) sentence 1 APA.
267. To secure public participation American courts force the rulemaking authorities to explicitly consider the 'significant comments'. See Aman and Mayton (n 40) 55 ff (with references to the judicature).
268. 5§53 (c) sentence 2 APA. See for example Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1983) 463 US, 29 ff.
269. Cp Ehlers, 'Die Klagebefugnis nach deutschem, europäischem Gemeinschafts- und US-amerikanischem Recht' (1993) VerwArch 139 ff
270. Brickman, Jasanoff and Ilgen, Controlling Chemicals: Politics of Regulation in Europe and the United States (1985) 108 ff.
271. See above all Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v Camp (1970) 197 US, 150 ff
272. US v Student Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (1973) 412 US, 669 ff.
273. Generally Aman and Mayton (n 40) 379 ff.
274. Brickman, Jasanoff and Ilgen (n 120) 108.
275. See above all Abbot Laboratories v Gardner (1967) 387 US, 136, 148-149
276. Lujan v National Wildlife Federation (1990) 110 S.Ct., 3177, 3190-3191.
277. Generally Aman and Mayton (n 40) 414 ff.
278. For the UK compare the concerns voiced by Craig (n 4) 386.
279. See Mintz and Miller, A Guide to Federal Agency Rulemaking (2nd edn, 1991) 323 (with reference to the judicature and legal scholarship).
280. Similarly Brickman, Jasanoff and Ilgen (n 120) 116 ff
281. Scharpf, Die politischen Kosten des Rechtsstaates (1970) 24.
282. See above all Schechter Poultry Co v US (n 38) 495 ff.
283. Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986) 177 ff, compares the political decision-making to roulette: 'Fairness in politics ... is now generally understood ... to mean procedures that give all citizens more or less equal influence in the decisions that govern them.'
284. Pierce, Shapiro and Verkuil (n 42) 454, explain: 'Obligations of fairness are seen as alternatives and supplements to political accountability as a method of bureaucratic control.'
285. See Pierce, Shapiro and Verkuil (n 42) 224
286. Bonfield (n 18) 151 ff.
287. Compare for different approaches Sunstein, 'Beyond the Republican Revival' (1988) 97 Yale L J, 1539 ff ('republicanism')
288. Colburn '"Democratic Experimentalism": A Separation of Powers For Our Times?' (2004) 37 Suffolk U L Rev 287 ff.
289. See Bonfield (n 18) 15-16
290. Stewart (n 56) 1669 ff
291. Garland (n 74) 510 ff, 576 ff, 581 ff
292. Breyer and Stewart, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy (1979) 34-35
293. Diver, 'Policy-making Paradigms in Administrative Law' (1981) 95 Harv L Rev, 393, 423-424.
294. See Black, The Theory of Committees and Elections (1958)
295. Buchanan and Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (1962)
296. Tullock, 'The Problems of Majority Voting' (1959) 67 J of Pol Ec 571 ff
297. Parsons, Sociological Theory and Modern Society (1967) 223 ff.
298. Compare also Pierce, Shapiro and Verkuil (n 42) 18 ff.
299. Bonfield (n 18) 15.
300. Aman and Mayton (n 40) 36.
301. See also Davis, 'A New Approach to Delegation' (1969) 36 U Chi L Rev 713 ff;
302. Stewart (n 74) 323-324
303. Sunstein, 'Interest Groups in American Public Law' (1985) 38 Stan L Rev 29, 60-62.
304. Lowi (n 66) 297.
305. See Lowi (n 57) 51
306. Bonfield (n 18) 146
307. Scalia, 'Two Wrongs Make a Right - The Judicalization of Standardless Rulemaking' (1977) 1 Regulation, 38 ff
308. Aman and Mayton (n 40) 41
309. Davis, Discretionary Justice (1969) 219
310. Fuchs, 'Development and Diversification in Administrative Rule Making' (1977) 71 Nw U LRev, 83, 105
311. Pierce, Shapiro and Verkuil (n 42) 24 ff (with further references).
312. On the importance of courts in the 'interest representation model' Garland (n 74) 510-511.
313. See also Batterton v Marshall (1980) 648 F 2d, 694 ff (DC Cir)
314. Starr, dissenting opinion in Community Nutrition Institute v Young (1987) 818 F 2d, 943, 951 (DC Cir)
315. Stewart (n 56) 1683.
316. Compare Pünder (n 1) 140 ff.
317. Compare Ramsauer (n 35) 74b.
318. See generally for examples Schneider, Gesetzgebung (1982) 150.
319. BVerfGE 42, 191 (205).
320. Critical of this assessment Pünder 'Verwaltungsverfahren', in Erichsen and Ehlers (eds) Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht (13th edn, 2006) §12, n 14.
321. Compare Staupe (n 65) 204 ff (with further references).
322. Ossenbühl, 'Rechtsverordnung' in Isensee and Kirchhof (eds) Handbuch des Staatsrechts (1988) 414.
323. Compare Kopp, 'Verfahrensregelungen zur Gewährleistung eines angemessenen Umweltschutzes' (1980) BayVBl., 97, 101 ff.
324. Compare BVerfGE 66, 82 ff; Ossenbühl (n 144) 414-415
325. Stern, Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (vol. II 1980) 667 ff.
326. See Böckenförde, 'Mittelbare/repräsentative Demokratie als eigentliche Form der Demokratie' in G. Müller et al (eds) FS Eichenberger (1982) 301 ff.
327. Compare also Hartisch, Verfassungsrechtliches Leistungsprinzip und Partizipationsverbot im Verwaltungsverfahren (1975) 90 ff (with further references).
328. See Craig (n 4) 381
329. Garner (n 114) 105 ff
330. Jergesen, 'The Legal Requirements of Consultation' (1978) P.L. 290 ff;
331. Turpin (n 24) 408 ff.
332. Note that a limited legal duty to consider objections was imposed by the provisions of the Rules Publication Act 1893 that the rule-making authority must consider any written representations made within the forty-day period of preliminary publicity. Wade and Forsyth (n 52) 896, assert that this produced so little benefit that it was repealed by the Act of 1946.
333. Compare Bates v Lord Hailsham (1972) 1 W.L.R. 1373, 1378.
334. See also R v Devon County Council, ex p Baker (1993) COD 138
335. R v Liverpool Corporation, ex p Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators' Association (1972) 2 QB 299, C.A.
336. The right to reasoned decisions under the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1992 is expressly excluded in the case of rules, order or schemes 'of a legislative and not an executive character.' See s 10 (5) (b).
337. See for details Craig (n 4) 381-383
338. Jergesen (n 148) 290 ff.
339. See for cases Craig (n 4) 380-381.
340. Compare also Wade and Forsyth (n 52) 884-885
341. Jergesen (n 148) 310 ff.
342. See R. v Brent London Borough Council, ex p. Gunning (1985) 84 LGR 168,
343. as cited by Craig (n 4) 381 with further examples.
344. Compare also Jergesen (n 148) 302 ff.
345. See eg Craig (n 4) 383-388.
346. Compare also Galligan, Due Process and Fair Procedures (1996) Ch 4
347. Rippon Commission (n 52).
348. www.cabinet-of.ce/service.rst/index/consultation.htm See Craig (n 4) 388
349. Turpin (n 24) 411.
350. Compare also Select Committee on Public Administration, First Report, Public Participation, Issues and Innovations (2001) HC 373-I.
351. See Wade and Forsyth (n 52) 897
352. Garner (n 114) 105 ff
353. Jergesen (n 148) 290 ff
354. Griffith (n 9) 279, 288 ff.
355. Compare for the UK Craig (n 4) 383-387
356. for Germany Dienel, 'Partizipation an Planungsprozessen' (1971) 4 Verwaltung, 151, 152 ff
357. Hufen, Fehler im Verwaltungsverfahren (1986) 198
358. Lübbe-Wolff, 'Verfassungsrechtliche Fragen der Normsetzung im Umweltrecht' (1991) ZG, 218, 227 ff
359. Denninger, Verfassungsrechtliche Anforderungen an die Normsetzung (1990) 60 ff.
360. Scharpf (n 125) 62.
361. See Lübbe-Wolff (n 158) 235 ff.
362. Scharpf (n 125) 65.
363. Compare also Choper (n 56) 13.
364. Compare Black (n 131) 61 ff, 156 ff, 178 ff
365. Tullock (n 131) 571
366. Parsons (n 131) 231 ff
367. Hovenkamp, 'Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice' (1990) 57 U Chi L Rev, 63 ff
368. Hovenkamp, 'Arrow's Theorem: Ordination and Republican Government' (1990) 75 Iowa L Rev 949 ff
369. Critical Mashaw, 'The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law' (1989) 65 Chi-Kent L Rev, 123 ff
370. Sunstein (n 133) 29
371. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (3rd edn, 1986) 496 ff
372. and Pierce (n 74) 408 ff.
373. In Germany, 'Politikverdrossenheit' was 1992 the 'word of the year'. Compare for the UK Dunley and Weir, 'Public Response and Constitutional Significance' (1995) 48 Parliamentary Affairs, 602, 615
374. Trevor Smith, 'Citizenship, Community and Constitutionalism' (1996) 49 Parliamentary Affairs, 262 ff.
375. See also Schmitt Glaeser (n 78) 236
376. Lübbe-Wolff (n 158) 246-247.
377. (n 54) 897.
378. Compare Sunstein (n 133) 61 ff, from the German perspective Hoffmann-Riem, 'Selbstbindungen der Verwaltung' (1982) 40 VVDStRL, 187, 204 ff.
379. For scepticism about the agency capture thesis compare Posner, 'Theories of Economic Regulation' (1974) 5 Bell Jnl. of Econ. and Mgmt. Sci., 335, 342
380. for an empirical analysis, see Page (n 9) 129 ff.
381. See Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v Environmental Protection Agency (1983) 705 F 2d, 506 f (D C Cir)
382. Harter (n 57) 17 ff
383. Stewart (n 56) 1684-5.
384. Bonfield (n 18) 151.
385. Compare Luhmann, Legitimation durch Verfahren (1969) 210 ff.
386. Compare for Germany Pünder (n 1) 293 f
387. for the UK eg Garner (114) 105 ff.
388. Compare on the problem of apathy Schmitt Glaeser (n 78) 239-240, on the role of organised interest groups Leach in Mullard (ed) Policy-making in Britain (1995) 34-5
389. for Germany Dagtoglou, 'Partizipation an Verwaltungsentscheidungen' (1972) DVBl, 712, 714 ff.
390. The US Supreme Court stresses in Bowen v American Hospital Association (1986) 476 US, 610 ff: 'Our recognition of Congress' need to vest administrative agencies with ample power to assist in the difficult task of governing a vast and complex industrial nation carries with it the correlative responsibility of the agency to explain the rationale and factual basis for its judgment.'
391. Cp Craig (n 4) 384.
392. Cp Schmitt Glaeser (n 78) 189.
393. See Pünder (n 1) 202 ff, 219 ff, 233 ff, 271.
394. Cp eg Pietzcker, 'Verwaltungsverfahren zwischen Verwaltungseffizienz und Rechtsschutzauftrag' (1983) 41 VVDStRL, 193, 218 f
395. Hufen (n 158) 295 ff.
396. Craig (n 4) 384.
397. Cp Stewart (n 56) 1760 ff.
398. See above all Sargentich (n 56) 433 ff (with further references).
399. Similarly Brohm (n 105) 270
400. Schmitt Glaeser (n 78) 240 ff.
401. Cp Craig (n 4) 384 ff.
402. Scharpf (n 125) 38.
403. Scalia, 'Back to the Basics: Making Law Without Making Rules' (1981) Regulation, 25 ff.
404. Davis, quoted by McGarity, 'Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process' (1992) 1 Duke L J, 1385.
405. Cp DeLong, 'Informal Rulemaking and the Integration of Law and Policy' (1979) 65 Virginia Law Review, 257, 319 ff (with further references).
406. See Aman and Mayton (n 40) 61.
407. See for a detailed solution to this problem Pünder (n 1) 228 ff.
408. Craig (n 4) 386.
409. Bonfield (n 18) 448.