Gettier and factivity in Indo-Tibetan epistemology

Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 57, Issue 228, 2007, Pages 394-415

  Stoltz, Jonathan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ST THOMAS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 67651216241     PISSN: 00318094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.493.x     Document Type: Article

References (19)

1. T. Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits (Oxford UP, 2000)
2. Two good examples are B.K. Matilal, Perception: an Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 103-5, 135-40
3. G. Dreyfus, Recognizing Reality: Dharmakīrti's Philosophy and its Tibetan Interpretations (SUNY Press, 1997), pp. 292-3
4. This view is not universally accepted. For one dissenting voice, see K Potter, 'Does Indian Epistemology Concern Justified True Belief?', Journal of Indian Philosophy, 12 (1984), pp. 307-27
5. In S. Phillips and N.S. Tatacharya, Epistemology of Perception (New York: American Institute of Buddhist Studies, 2004), pp. 8-10, it is claimed that in the later Navya-Nyāya (New Logic) tradition of Indian philosophy, not all pramā are generated by pramāna. In this tradition it is not the case that all pramā are events of knowing. Nevertheless, in the Buddhist tradition, since no distinction is made between pramā and pramāna, all pramā/pram̄na are episodes of knowing
6. See Matilal, Perception, ch. 4
7. Potter, 'Does Indian Epistemology Concern Justified True Belief?', pp. 309-10
8. See H. Putnam, 'The Meaning of "Meaning" ', repr. in his Mind, Language, and Reality (Cambridge UP, 1975), pp. 215-71
9. T. Burge, 'Individualism and the Mental', Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 4 (1979), pp. 73-121
10. Mark Siderits has voiced his agreement that Yogācāra- Sautrāntika Buddhists appear to be externalists about thought content. See M. Siderits, 'Perceiving Particulars: a Buddhist Defense', Philosophy East & West, 54 (2004), pp. 367-82
11. This issue is also discussed in S. Phillips, 'Perceiving Particulars Blindly: Remarks on a Nyāya-Buddhist Controversy', Philosophy East & West, 54 (2004), pp. 389-403, at pp. 391-2
12. Sa skya pandi ta kun dga' rgyal mtshan, Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi rtsa ba dang 'grel pa (Qinghai: Tibet People's Press, 1989), p. 60
13. This argument is found in Bcom ldan rigs pa'i ral gri, Tshad ma sde bdun rgyan gyi me tog (Qinghai: Tibet People's Press, 1991), p. 37
14. Phywa pa chos kyi seng ge, Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel (unpublished), p. 10b
15. Klong chen rab 'byams, Tshad ma'i de kho na nyid bsdus pa (Chengdu: Sichuan People's Press, 2000), p. 58
16. The latter text is attributed to the fourteenth-century Tibetan Longchenpa (klong chen rab 'byams). It is quite clear, however, that this attribution is incorrect. For more on the authorship of this text, see L. van der Kuijp, 'A Treatise on Buddhist Epistemology and Logic Attributed to klong chen rab 'byams pa (1308-1364) and its Place in Indo-Tibetan Intellectual History', Journal of Indian Philosophy, 31 (2003), pp. 381-437
17. A. Goldman, 'A Causal Theory of Knowing', Journal of Philosophy, 64 (1967), pp. 357-72
18. Goldman, 'Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge', Journal of Philosophy, 73 (1976), pp. 771-91
19. See K. Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge (Boulder: Westview, 1991), pp. 169-71