Stock market reaction to CEO certification: The signaling role of CEO background

Strategic Management Journal

Volumn 30, Issue 7, 2009, Pages 693-710

  Zhang, Yan ^a   Wiersema, Margarethe F ^b  

^a RICE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

CEO certification; Ceo credibility; Sarbanes oxley act; Signaling; Upper echelons

Indexed keywords

ABNORMAL RETURNS; CEO CERTIFICATION; CEO CREDIBILITY; CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER; CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICERS; CORPORATE SCANDALS; FINANCIAL MARKET; FINANCIAL RESTATEMENTS; FINANCIAL STATEMENTS; INVESTMENT COMMUNITY; SARBANES-OXLEY ACT; SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION; SHAREHOLDINGS; SIGNALING THEORY; STOCK MARKET; UPPER ECHELONS;

COMMERCE; SIGNALING;

FINANCE;

EID: 67650829269     PISSN: 01432095     EISSN: 10970266     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/smj.772     Document Type: Article

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