Their brothers' keeper: Global buyers and the legal duty to protect suppliers' employees

Rutgers Law Review

Volumn 61, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 333-379

  Phillips, Joe ^a   Lim, Suk Jun ^b  

^a Pusan National University   (South Korea)

^b Dong A University   (South Korea)

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EID: 67650707076     PISSN: 00360465     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (226)

1. l. See BOB HEPPLE, LABOUR LAWS AND GLOBAL TRADE 158-64 (2005); JENNIFER A. ZERK, MULTINATIONALS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 198-242, 305 (2006);
2. Gregory T. Euteneier, Towards a Corporate "Law of Nations": Multinational Enterprises' Contributions to Customary International Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 757 (2007);
3. Carol Glinski, Self-Regulation of Transnational Corporations: Neither Meaningless in Law nor Voluntary, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE VOLUME 2: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, at 197, 197-220 (Sorcha MacLeod ed., 2006);
4. Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, Enforcing International Labor Standards: The Potential for the Alien Tort Claims Act, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 203 (2004);
5. Halina Ward, Governing Multinationals: The Role of Foreign Direct Liability, BRIEFING PAPER (Royal Inst. of Int'l Affairs, London), Feb. 2001; see also Joe Slawotsky, International Product Liability Claims Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 16 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 157, 174-87 (2007).
6. See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002);
7. Doe v. Unocal Corp., Nos. BC 237980 & 237679 (Super. Ct. Cal. L.A. County June 7, 2002), earthrights.org/files/Legal%20Docs/Unocal/ PlaintiffMSARuling.pdf; SEAN D. MURPHY, UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW VOLUME 2: 2002-2004, at 209-n (2006) (discussing the Unocal cases); Erin Geiger Smith, Case Study: Does I v. The Gap, Inc.: Can a Sweatshop Suit Settlement Saue Saipan?, 23 REV. LlTlG. 737, 743-63 (2004). A recent and ongoing case is Doe ?. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., where foreign workers allege that Wal-Mart failed to enforce its code of conduct causing personal injury and economic damages. Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. CV 05-7307 AG (MANx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98102, at *6 (CD. Cal. Mar. 30, 2007). The trial court dismissed the claims, id. at *2-3, and the matter is before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The plaintiffs' initial appeal (Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 07-55560 (9th Cir. 2007)) was voluntarily dismissed because the trial court's decision was not a final order. The appeal was refiled. Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 08-55706 (9th Cir. 2008).
8. Several unsuccessful legislative proposals have sought to regulate transnational corporations' handling of overseas workers. The McKinney Bill would have governed American corporations' treatment of overseas workers including those "employed" through foreign subcontractors. Corporate Code of Conduct Act, H.R. 2782, 107th Cong. (2001). An Australian Corporate Code of Conduct, proposed to the Senate but never enacted, intended to establish environmental and workplace standards for Australian corporations or their related companies employing overseas workers. Corporate Code of Conduct Bill (Austl. 2000), http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/bill/ccocb20002002248. In Britain, the proposed Corporate Responsibility Bill extended directors' duties to the consideration of overseas social and environmental impacts. ZERK, supra note 1, at 164-71;
9. see also Glinski, supra note 1, at 201-20 (discussing companies' potential liability under European Union advertising and sales laws for misleading statements about corporate social responsibility compliance).
10. "The common law of torts, including the concept of duty, must evolve in light of the changing conditions and circumstances of society." 70 TEX. JUR. 3D Tort Liability § 3 (2008); see also 86 C.J.S. Torts § 3 (2008). The development of contract law reveals a similar expansion: As contract and social theory evolved, recognition of social duty and societal interdependence crept into the jurisprudence of contracts. The modern neoclassical contract model imports community standards of decency and fairness into contractual obligations. . . . Promissory estoppel is an illustrative example of how contract theory has evolved from a strict interpretation of the agreed-upon terms of the contract to one that encompasses moral and social norms of what is just and fair. Abby Morrow Richardson, Note, Applying 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to Claims of Consumer Discrimination, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 119, 143-44 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
11. See Habibullah Khan & Shaidul Islam, Outsourcing, Migration, and Brain Drain in the Global Economy: Issues and Evidence 2-6 (Ü21 Global, Working Paper No. 004/2006, 2006), available at http://www.u21global.edu.sg/PartnerAdmin/ViewContent?module=DOCUMENT LIBRARY&oid=157296.
12. Victoria Louise Carty, Emerging Post-Industrial, Postmodern Trends and Implications for Social Change: A Case-Study of Nike Corporation (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of New Mexico) (on file with University of New Mexico).
13. Heather White, Disturbing Trends in Global Production, USA TODAY, May 1, 2000 (Magazine), at 26-28. 8. Bernard D'Mello, Reebok and the Global Footwear Sweatshop, MONTHLY REV., Feb. 2003, at 26, 38. One researcher described Vietnam's trade unions as "an arm of management, rather than represent[tative of] workers' interests." Hong-zen Wang, Asian Transnational Corporations and Labor Rights: Vietnamese Trade Unions in Taiwan-invested Companies, 56 J. Bus. ETHICS 43, 51 (2005). Apparel factory owners in Nicaragua once threatened a capital strike to extract government and union compliance. ROBERT J. S. ROSS, SLAVES TO FASHION: POVERTY AND ABUSE IN THE NEW SWEATSHOPS (2004). China's PRC leadership historically has not allowed the free association of workers outside state-run trade unions. Felicia Pullman, Corporate Responsibility as China Strategy, CHINA BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 2006, at 34.
14. See Bruce London & Robert J. S. Ross, The Political Sociology of Foreign Direct Investment: Global Capitalism and Capital Mobility, 1965-1980, 36 INT'L J. COMP. SOC. 198, 198 (1995).
15. The WTO's 1996 Singapore ministerial meeting rejected including labor standards in trade agreements. BENEDICTE BULL & DESMOND MCNEILL, DEVELOPMENT ISSUES IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AND MARKET MULTILATERALISM (2007); HEPPLE, supra note l, at 130. The International Labor Organization (ILO) rejected express trade linkages for its Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. Id. at 61-62. Though the United States has sometimes conditioned bilateral trade agreements on labor standards, the bar and remedies are low. Typically they require that the trading partner enforce domestic labor laws, not international standards; permit sanctions only for sustained failures to enforce domestic laws in a manner affecting trade; and provide relatively small monetary penalties. Id. at 113-14. There are voluntary international codes such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development for Multinational Enterprises (OECD) Guidelines on Corporate Responsibility; the ILO's Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy; the U.N.'s Global Compact; and the U.N.'s Norms and Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights. Id. at 72, 78; United Nations Global Compact, http://www.globalcompact. org; see also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ESCOR], Sub-Comm'n on Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003).
16. 28 U.S.C § 1350 (2006).
17. Id. 13. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712-14, 720-21, 725-27, 729, 732 & n.20 (2004) (limiting the applicability of the ATCA); Joshua M. Chanin, "The Regulatory Grass is Greener": A Comparative Analysis of the Alien Tort Claims Act and the European Union's Green Paper on Corporate Social Responsibility, 12 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 745, 754-58 (2005) (discussing causes of action under the ATCA). Notably, the plaintiffs in Doe ?. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. did not appeal the district court's dismissal of their ATCA claim. Appellants' Opening Brief at 4 n.l, Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 08-55706 (9th Cir. Oct. 6, 2008) [hereinafter Doe Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief].
18. See, e.g., RANDY SHAW, RECLAIMING AMERICA: NIKE, CLEAN AIR, AND THE NEW NATIONAL ACTIVISM (1999);
19. George H. Sage, Justice Do It! The Nike Transnational Advocacy Network: Organization, Collective Actions, and Outcomes, 16 SOC. SPORTS J. 206 (1999).
20. See DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (2005);
21. Debora L. Spar & Lane T. La Mure, The Power of Activism: Assessing the Impact of NGOs on Global Business, 45 CAL. MGMT. REV. 78 (2003).
22. In 2000, Liz Claiborne, Inc. was accused of sourcing products from a factory with poor working conditions. Anita Chan & Hong-zen Wang, Raising Labor Standards, Corporate Social Responsibility and Missing Links - Vietnam and China Compared (Draft) 3 n.4 (Mar. 21-22, 2003) (unpublished paper presented at the conference The Labor of Reform: Employment, Worker's Rights, and Labor Law in China, University of Michigan), www.global-standards.com/Resources/ ChinaVietnam-ChanHongZen.doc. As pressure mounted from antisweatshop campaigns in the United States, the brand allowed an independent NGO to evaluate the factory. Id. The NGO later claimed that, because the American campaign subsided, nothing changed on the shop floor. Id. 17. Rhys Jenkins, The Political Economy of Codes of Conduct, in CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND LABOUR RIGHTS: CODES OF CONDUCT IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 13, 19-23 (Rhys Jenkins et al. eds., 2002);
23. see also D. Eric Boyd, Robert E. Spekman, John Kamauff & Patricia Werhane, Corporate Social Responsibility in Global Supply Chains: A Procedural Justice Perspective, 40 LONG RANGE PLAN. 341, 345 (2007).
24. Rhys Jenkins, Corporate Codes of Conduct: Self-Regulation in a Global Economy, in VOLUNTARY APPROACHES TO CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY: READINGS AND RESOURCE GUIDE 1, 43-44 (2002).
25. Suk-Jun Lim & Joe Phillips, Embedding CSR Values: The Global Footwear Industry's Evolving Governance Structure, 81 J. Bus. ETHICS 143, 152 (2008).
26. Interview with Assistant Dir. of Corporate Responsibility, Changshin (Korean-owned footwear factory), in Vietnam (Jan. 2005).
27. See Modern-Day Slavery: Spotlight on the 2006 "Trafficking in Persons Report," Forced Labor, and Sex Trafficking at the World Cup: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Afr., Global Human Rights and Int'l Operations of the H. Comm. on Int'l Relations, 109th Cong. 57 (2006) (statement of Charles Kerndghan, Director, Nat'l Labor Comm.), www.internationalrelations. house.gov/archives/109/28104.pdf (detailing the ongoing struggle of the Jordanian Government to "emerge as a model of fair labor standards, the rule of law and respect for human, women's and workers rights");
28. Stephanie Barrientos, Catherine Dolan & Anne Tallontire, A Gendered Value Chain Approach to Codes of Conduct in African Horticulture, 31 WORLD DEV. 1511, 1511 (2003) (discussing whether codes of conduct in African horticulture have the ability "to address the specific problems linked to informal and feminized employment"); Niklas Egels-Zandén & Peter Hyllman, Evaluating Strategies for Negotiating Workers' Rights in Transnational Corporations: The Effects of Codes of Conduct and Global Agreements on Workplace Democracy, 76 J. Bus. ETHICS 207, 207 (2007) (finding, based on a qualitative analysis of "Sri Lankan operations of a Swedish [transnational corporation]" and various interviews of union and nongovernmental organization officials, that global agreements are a superior approach to codes of conduct);
29. Xiaomin Yu, Impacts of Corporate Code of Conduct on Labor Standards: A Case Study of Reebok's Athletic Footwear Supplier Factory in China, 81 J. BUS. ETHICS 513, 513 (2008) ("[E]mployee-elected trade union installed through codes .. . operated more like a 'company union' rather than . . . representing workers' interests."); TIM CONNOR & KELLY DENT, OXFAM INT'L, OFFSIDE! LABOR RIGHTS AND SPORTSWEAR PRODUCTION IN ASIA, Executive Summary (2006), www.oxfam.org/files/Offside.pdf ("Transnational corporations . . . in sportswear and other industries cannot, on their own, create the conditions where trade union rights are fully respected."); GRUPO DE MONITOREO INDEPENDIENTE DE EL SALVADOR, VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH LABOR LAWS AND THE CODE OF CONDUCT OF LIZ CLAIBORNE, INC., IN THREE PLANTS OF A COMPANY IN EL SALVADOR (2001), http://www.nlcnet.org/ admin/media/document/elsalvador/ GMIES-report-0901.pdf (finding Liz Claiborne factories did not fully comply with Salvadoran codes of conduct); DUNCAN PRUETT, CLEAN CLOTHES CAMPAIGN, LOOKING FOB A QUICK FIX: HOW WEAK SOCIAL AUDITING IS KEEPING WORKERS IN SWEATSHOPS 16 (2005), http://www.cleanclothes.org/ftp/05-quick-fix.pdf ("Systematic problems at both the point of production and of consumption can only be successfully addressed through an industry-wide approach."); VERITÉ, EXCESSIVE OVERTIME IN CHINESE SUPPLIER FACTORIES: CAUSES, IMPACTS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION (2004), http://www.verite.org/research/ Excessive%200vertime%20in%20Chinese%20Factories. pdf (recommending China ought to "[i]nvest in compliance with occupational safety and health standards").
30. Richard Locke, Thomas Kochan, Monica Romis & Fei Qin, Beyond Corporate Codes of Conduct: Work Organization and Labour Standards at Nike's Suppliers, 146 INT'L LABOUR REV. l, 31 (2007).
31. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006)) (granting the right to self-organize and the right to strike).
32. See, e.g., id. § 187 (providing workers who were injured as a result of an unfair labor practice with a right to sue and receive damages).
33. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. 26. Adelle Blackett, Codes of Corporate Conduct and the Labour Regulatory State in Developing Countries, in HARD CHOICES, SOFT LAW: VOLUNTARY STANDARDS IN GLOBAL TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL GOVERNANCE 121, 128 (John J. Kirton & Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2004).
34. Jill Esbenshade, The Social Accountability Contract: Private Monitoring from Los Angeles to the Global Apparel Industry, 26 LAB. STUD. J. 98, 98-99 (2001).
35. Id. at 115.
36. John Gerard Ruggie, Reconstituting the Global Public Domain: Issues, Actors, and Practices, 10 EUR. J. INT'L REL. 499, 502-03 (2004) (quoting A. Claire Cutler, Private International Regimes and Interfirm Cooperation, in THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 23, 32-33 (Rodney Hall Bruce & Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002)).
37. See, e.g., Levi Strauss & Co. Global Sourcing and Operating Guidelines, http://levistrauss.com/Downloads/GSOG.pdf. 31. See, e.g., Adidas Group Workplace Standards Enforcement Guidelines, http://adidas-group. com/en/sustainability/suppliers-and-workers/ enforcing-compliance/default.asp (last visited Feb. 20, 2009).
38. We have identified at least five buyers that include the code in their supply contracts: Adidas, Mountain Equipment Co-op., Levi's, and two buyers that we are keeping anonymous. In Doe ?. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the buyer appeared to admit that the code was part of the supplier contract. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint at 7, Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 05-CV-7307 AG (MANx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98102 (CD. Cal. Mar. 30, 2007) [hereinafter Wal-Mart's Dismissal Motion], 33. Adidas Group Supply Chain, http://adidas-group.com/en/sustainability/ suppliers-and-workers/ default.asp (last visited Feb. 20, 2009). Data are taken from the various categories listed on this Adidas Web site on corporate "citizenship" and from our interviews.
39. Levi Strauss & Co. Product Sourcing Practices, http://levistrauss. com/Citizenship/ProductSourcing.aspx Oast visited Feb. 20, 2009). 35. Lim & Phillips, supra note 19, at 149-52; Interview with Manager, Corporate Responsibility Compliance, Nike, in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam (May 14, 2007). 36. Mountain Equipment Co-op Ethical Sourcing: What It Means To Us, http://mec.ca (follow "Sustainability" tab; then follow "Ethical Sourcing" tab on the left-hand tool bar) (last visited Feb. 20, 2009); Interview with Dir., Ethical Sourcing, Mountain Equip. Co-op, in H.K. (May 11, 2007) and Seoul, S. Korea (Jan. 2008).
40. WAL-MART STORES, INC., 2006 REPORT ON ETHICAL SOURCING 26 (2006), http://walmartfacts.com/reports/2006/ethical-standards/documents/ 2006ReportonEthic alSourcing.pdf. 38. Interview with Vice President, Youngone (Korean-owned apparel factory), in Hanoi, Vietnam (May 14, 2007).
41. Interview with Manager, Corporate Responsibility Compliance, Nike, supra note 35.
42. Interview with Union Leader, Youngone (Korean-owned apparel factory), in Hanoi, Vietnam (May 2007).
43. Interview with Manager, Soc. & Envtl. Affairs, Adidas, in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam (May 17, 2007).
44. Interview with Manager, Corporate Responsibility Compliance, Nike, supra note 35.
45. Interview with Gen. Manager, Nike, in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam (Jan. 2005 & May 15, 2007); Interview with Manager, Soc. & Envtl. Affairs, Adidas, in H.K. (May 11, 2007).
46. Levi Strauss & Co. Product Sourcing Practices, Our Approach: The Government Level-Country Assessment, Trade/Labor Policy and Advocacy, http://levistrauss.com/citizenship/productsourcing/ourapproach/ thegovernmentlevel.as px (last visited Feb. 20, 2009).
47. Levi Strauss & Co., Case Study: Child Labor in Bangladesh, http://levistrauss.com/Downloads/CaseStudyBangladesh.pdf.
48. Id.
49. See KARL SCHOENBERGER, LEVI'S CHILDREN 218-20 (2001). 48. Adidas Group Vision and Governance, http://adidas-group.com/en/ sustainability/mission- and-values/default.asp (last visited Feb. 20, 2009).
50. See infra p. 348 tbl.3. 50. See infra p. 348 tbl.4. The percentages total more than 100% because many workers believe that compliance resulted from multiparty efforts. 51. See infra p. 349 tbl.5.
51. Interview with Manager, Soc. & Envtl. Affairs, Adidas, supra note 41.
52. Interview with Union Leader, Youngone, supra note 40.
53. Interview with Union Deputy Chairperson, Pungkook Corp., in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam (May 17, 2007).
54. Interview with Union Leader, Minh Hoang Garment (Vietnamese-owned apparel factory), in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam (May 16, 2007).
55. See id.; Interview with Deputy Gen. Dir., Garco 10 (Vietnamese state-owned factory), in Hanoi, Vietnam (May 15, 2007); Interview with Vice President, Youngone, supra note 38. 57. Interview with Gen. Manager, Changshin (Korean-owned footwear factory), in Vietnam (Jan. 2005); see Interview with Dir. of Bus. & Dev., Changshin (Korean-owned footwear factory), in Vietnam (Jan. 2005).
56. Interview with CEO, Minh Hoang Garment (Vietnamese-owned apparel factory), in Ho Chi Min City, Vietnam (May 16, 2007); Interview with Dir., Dep't of SOE & HRM, Pungkook Corp., in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam (May 17, 2007); Interview with Production Manager, Pungkook Corp., in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam (May 17, 2007).
57. Interview with Production Manager, supra note 58.
58. Interview with Dir., Dep't of SOE & HRM, Pungkook Corp., supra note 58.
59. Interview with CEO, Protrade Garment (State-owned apparel factory), in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam (May 18, 2007).
60. See Blackett, supra note 26, at 128; Esbenshade, supra note 27, at 105; Ruggie, supra note 29, at 499-504. 63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM §§ 42-43 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
61. Sections 42 and 43 carry over without substantive change the Good Samaritan duties expressed in the Second Restatement of Torts sections 323 and 324A, respectively. RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 323-324A (1965). Courts have widely accepted these duties. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 43 reporter's notes to cmt. c (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). Though cases we cite refer to sections 323 and 324A, we use the new designations throughout. See also 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence §§ 193-94 (2004). European legal scholars recently recommended harmonizing European tort law to include a Good Samaritan duty. EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW 89-90 (2005).
62. PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at 378 (5th ed. 1984) [hereafter PROSSER & KEETON ].
63. Osuna v. S. Pac. R.R., 641 S.W.2d 229, 230 (Tex. 1982).
64. See Andrew J. Natale, Expansion of Parent Corporate Shareholder Liability Through the Good Samaritan Doctrine-A Parent Corporation's Duty to Provide a Safe Workplace for Employees of Its Subsidiary, 57 U. ClN. L. REV. 717, 729-37 (1988);
65. see also Ralph G. Wellington & Vance G. Camisa, The Trade Association and Product Safety Standards: Of Good Samaritans and Liability, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 37 (1988);
66. Annette Crawley, Note, Environmental Auditing and the "Good Samaritan" Doctrine: Implications for Parent Corporations, 28 GA. L. REV. 223, 234-35 (1993);
67. Kathryn Michele Glegg, Note, Negligent Inspection: Texas Expressly Adopts the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 324A in Seay v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 41 Sw. L.J. 1041 (1987);
68. Kimberly J. Todd, Note, Snyder v. American Association of Blood Banks: Expansion of Trade Association Liability-Does It Reach Medical Societies?, 29 U. TOL. L. REV. 149 (1997);
69. see generally 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 355 (2004). 68. Gaines v. Excel Indus., Inc., 667 P. Supp. 569, 570, 572-73 (M.D. Tenn. 1987).
70. Kohr v. Johns-Manville Corp., 534 F. Supp. 256, 257-59 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
71. Arnstein v. Mfg. Chemists Ass'n, 414 F. Supp. 12, 14-15 (E.D. Pa. 1976);
72. King v. Nat'l Spa & Pool Inst, 570 So. 2d 612, 614-18 (Ala. 1990) (swimming pool design standards); FNS Mortgage Serv. Corp. v. Pac. Gen. Group, Inc., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916, 920 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (nonprofit trade association inspecting pipe manufacturers);
73. Meneely v. S.R. Smith, Inc., 5 P.3d 49, 56-57 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (diving board's risk).
74. Heinrich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 532 F. Supp. 1348, 1351, 1354-56 (D. Md. 1982).
75. Johnson v. Abbe Eng'g Co., 749 F.2d 1131, 1132-34 (5th Cir. 1984).
76. Rawson v. United Steelworkers of Am., 726 P.2d 742, 745-50 (Idaho 1986), cert. granted and judgment vacated on other grounds, 482 U.S. 901 (1987).
77. Miller v. Bristol-Myers Co., 485 N.W.2d 31, 33-35, 39-41 (Wis. 1992).
78. Martin v. McDonald's Corp., 572 N.E.2d 1073, 1076-78 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991);
79. see also Crawley, supra note 67, at 229-32 (discussing liability risk when a corporation's environmental audit leads its contractor to forego a detection and compliance program).
80. Rodriguez-Olvera v. Salant Corp., No. 97-07-14605-CV (365th Dist. Ct. of Maverick County, Tex. 1999) (on file with author). The authors thank the law firm of Caddell & Chapman, P.C. for access to case archives. One of the authors was an attomey-of-record in this case and has personal knowledge of the factual allegations, legal arguments, and case results.
81. Id.
82. Plaintiffs' Sixth Amended Petition at 12-14, Rodriguez-Ol?era, No. 97-07-14605-CV [hereinafter Rodriguez Petition] (on file with author).
83. Id. at 17-18.
84. The plaintiffs additionally alleged that Salant impliedly warranted the condition of the bus and negligently entrusted it to the supplier. Rodriguez Petition, supra note 78, at 18-20. Though Salant was a minority shareholder in the subcontractor, plaintiffs' claims did not rely on that ownership, but endorsed the companies' legal separation to avoid a workers' compensation defense.
85. See, e.g., Bescoe v. Laborers' Union No. 334, 295 N.W.2d 892, 902 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980);
86. Brooks v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 405 A.2d 466, 468-74 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
87. See, e.g., Bailey v. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 719 N.E.2d 178, 181-85 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
88. No. CV 05-7307 AG (MANx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98102 (CD. Cal. Mar. 30, 2007), appeal filed, No. 08-55706 (9th Cir. 2008).
89. Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint at 5, 14-15, Doe, No. CV 05-7307 AG (MANx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98102 [hereinafter Doe Opposition].
90. Doe, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98102, at *2-3. 86. Id. at*15.
91. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 42 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
92. Id. § 43.
93. Id. § 42.
94. Id. §§ 42(a), 43(a) (emphasis added).
95. Id. §§ 42(b), 43(c).
96. Id.§ 43(b).
97. See id. §§ 42-43. 94. Id. § 42 cmt. g.
98. This is the Restatement's position. For example, if an insurer tells the insured that it will provide loss-prevention assistance, the insurer should know that it is acting to reduce risks regardless of its purpose. Id. §§ 42 cmt. d, 43 reporters' notes to cmt. h. Several courts adopt this view. See Miller v. Bristol-Myers Co., 485 N.W.2d 31, 39 (Wis. 1992). Other courts argue that the defendant must have intended to beneñt the plaintiff, and some decisions require that this be the sole motivation. See, e.g., Leroy v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 695 F. Supp. 1120, 1127 (D. Kan. 1988). The Reporters view those cases as inconsistent with the Restatement's rejection of "purpose" as the criterion for determining if an undertaking occurred. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 43, reporters' note cmt. d (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). The service may be on behalf of a specific individual or class of persons. Id. §§ 42 cmt. d, 43 cmt. f.
99. See VOGEL, supra note 15, at 102-03.
100. No. CV 05-7307 AG (MANx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98102 (CD. Cal. Mar. 30, 2007).
101. Wal-Mart's Dismissal Motion, supra note 32, at 5. 99. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM §§ 42 cmt. f, 43 cmt. d (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A illus. 1 (1965); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 43 cmt. d (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
103. Alder v. Bayer Corp., 61 P.3d 1068, 1078 (Utah 2002).
104. Turbe v. Virgin Islands, 938 F.2d 427, 432 (3d Cir. 1991).
105. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM §§ 42 cmt. f ("[R]eliance is merely a specific manner of increasing the risk of harm."), 43 cmt. e, reporters' notes to cmt. e (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A cmt. e, illus. 4 (1965).
106. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 43 cmt. e (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
107. Canipe v. Nat'l Loss Control Serv. Corp., 736 F.2d 1055, 1063-64 (5th Cir. 1984).
108. Rodriguez-Olvera v. Salant Corp., No. 97-07-14605-CV (365th Dist. Ct. of Maverick County, Tex. 1999) (on file with author). Because the case settled before verdict, the jury did not resolve the arguments.
109. See supra p. 348 tbls.3 & 4.
110. Interview with Assistant Dir. of Corporate Responsibility, Changshin, supra note 20; Interview with Dir. of Corporate Responsibility, Pou Chen (Taiwanese-owned footwear factory), in Vietnam (Jan. 2005).
111. See infra p. 358 tbl.6. 111. Lim & Phillips, supra note 19, at 149-50.
112. Johnson v. Abbe Eng'g, 749 F.2d 1131, 1133-34 (5th Cir. 1984) (affirming the jury verdict for subsidiary's employees who sued the parent corporation, where the subsidiary relied on the parent for accident prevention and safety training and followed its recommendations); Tillman v. Travelers Indem. Co., 506 F.2d 917, 921 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that insurance company that agrees to inspect for jobsite hazards may be liable to injured employee if the employer "so relied on the insurer's undertaking that it neglected its own safety inspection program").
113. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
114. See supra pp. 343-45 tbls.l & 2.
115. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. 116. Interview with Union Leader, Changshin (Korean-owned footwear factory), in Vietnam (Jan. 2005); Interview with Union Leader, Feng Tey (Taiwanese-owned footwear factory), in Vietnam (Jan. 2005); Interview with Union Leader, Pou Chen (Taiwanese-owned footwear factory), in Vietnam (Jan. 2005); Interview with Union Leader, Tae Kwang (Korean-owned footwear factory), in Vietnam (Jan. 2005).
116. FNS Mortgage Serv. Corp. v. Pac. Gen. Groups Inc., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916, 921 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
117. Interview with Manager, Corporate Responsibility Compliance, Nike, supra note 35.
118. Steven Greenhouse, Voluntary Rules on Apparel Labor Prove Hard to Set, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1997, at Al.
119. Lim & Phillips, supra note 19, at 147.
120. The Doe plaintiffs contend that Wal-Mart's code regime "has effectively reduced public outrage over the conditions in its supplier factories. This has derailed efforts by independent groups to themselves monitor and remedy conditions . . . ." Doe Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief, supra note 13, at 9. 122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 cmt. e (1965) (emphasis added); see also id. § 324A caveat 2.
121. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM §§ 42 cmt. f, cmt. f reporters' note, 43 cmt. e (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
122. See id. § 43(b), cmts. c, g.
123. See id. § 43 cmt. g, illus. 2.
124. Derosia v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 583 A.2d 881, 882-84 (Vt. 1990).
125. Id. at 882-85.
126. Id. at 885. 129. Miller v. Bristol-Myers Co., 485 N.W.2d 31, 40-41 (Wis. 1992).
127. Pratt v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 952 P.2d 667, 670-71 (2d Cir. 1992). The Arkansas Supreme Court reached similar conclusions when an injured employee sued the insurer and its consulting firm which were hired by the employer to make safety inspections and recommendations. Wilson v. Rebsamen Ins., Inc., 957 S.W.2d 678, 681-83 (Ark. 1997).
128. See Muniz v. Nat'l Can Corp., 737 F.2d 145, 148-49 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that the evidence did not establish a Good Samaritan duty even though the parent was concerned with safety conditions at a subsidiary and communicated on safety matters); Davis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 525 F.2d 1204, 1207-08 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that there was no evidence that the employer delegated any part of its direct and primary duty to discover unsafe conditions although the employer occasionally requested that its compensation insurer assist plant inspections and make safety recommendations).
129. Crawley, supra note 67, at 234-36.
130. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 43 cmt. g (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
131. Canipe v. Nat'l Loss Control Serv. Corp., 736 F.2d 1055, 1062-63 (5th Cir. 1984); accord Hill v. James Walker Mem'l Hosp., 407 F.2d 1036, 1041-42 (4th Cir. 1969);
132. Derosia v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 583 A.2d 881, 886 (Vt. 1990); Miller, 485 N.W.2d at 39-40;
133. see also Crawley, supra note 67, at 265.
134. Heinrich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 532 F. Supp. 1348, 1355 (D. Md. 1982);
135. Patton v. Simone, 626 A.2d 844, 851 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992). Gaines ?. Excel Industries, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 569, 573 (M.D. Tenn. 1987), describes the section 43(b) standard somewhat differently, requiring that the defendant act "primarily in its own interest and not primarily for the benefit of either [the employer] or . . . employees."
136. LABOR LAW arts. 23, 228-30 (Cambodia).
137. Id. arts. 212, 229-30.
138. Id. art. 230.
139. Id. arts. 229-30, 250.
140. See LABOUR CODE ch. IX (Vietnam).
141. See Pratt v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 667, 671 (2d Cir. 1992); 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence §§ 17, 19-20 (2008) ("[Questions relating to negligence are questions of fact for determination by the jury in all except the rarest and clearest instances."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LlAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 42 cmt. d (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
142. See Morris v. McDonald's Corp., 650 N.E.2d 1219, 1221-23 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a plaintiff injured at McDonald's could sue McDonald's, despite exculpatory and indemnity clauses in the franchise contract, because the plaintiff was not a contract party); 3 J. D. LEE & BARRY A. LlNDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 27:2 (2d ed. 2008) (stating that a disclaimer does not bar a negligence action by someone not in privity with the drafter of the disclaimer).
143. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. DeShazo, 845 So. 2d 766, 770-71 (Ala. 2002) (holding that because defendants' asbestos inspections were made for their benefit only, they owed no duty of care to plaintiffs).
144. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM §§ 42 cmt. d, g, 43 cmt. h (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005);
145. see also Smith v. Allandale Mut. Ins. Co., 303 N.W.2d 702, 716 & n.24 (Mich. 1981); 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 197 (2008).
146. Derosia v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 583 A.2d 881, 888 (Vt. 1990). 146. See Redinger v. Living, Inc., 689 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Tex. 1985).
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 (1965) (emphasis added).
148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(3) (1958).
149. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. C (2006).
150. See Read v. Scott Fetzer Co., 990 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. 1998).
151. See Hoffnagle v. McDonald's Corp., 522 N.W.2d 808 (Iowa 1994). Though the court applied section 414 to this relationship, the general contractor's control was insufficient. Id. at 815.
152. See Morris v. Scotsman Indus., Inc., 106 S.W.3d 751, 753-56 (Tex. App. 2003) (holding that the parent company did not have a duty to subsidiary's employee because of insufficient control over subsidiary's safety program). 153. See Lavazzi v. McDonald's Corp., 606 N.E.2d 845, 850-52 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
153. Wal-Mart's Dismissal Motion, supra note 32, at 16; Appellee's Answering Brief at 29, Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 08-55706 (9th Cir. Dec. 5, 2008).
154. See G. Grant Dixon, General Contractors' Liability for Injury to Subcontractors' Workers: A Confusing Construct, 93 ILL. B.J. 248, 248 (2005).
155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 cmts. a, c (1965).
156. Id. § 414 cmt. a.
157. See, e.g., Howarton v. Minn. Mining & Mfg., Inc., 133 S.W.3d 820, 824 (Tex. App. 2004) (noting that premise owner must "retain some control over the work of the independent contractor" in order for a duty to exist in Texas).
158. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 cmt. c (1965); see also 41 AM. JUR. 2D Independent Contractors §§ 33-34 (2005).
159. Hooker v. Dep't of Transp., 38 P.3d 1081, 1089 n.3 (Cal. 2002).
160. Hoechst-Celanese Corp. v. Mendez, 967 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tex. 1998); accord Arias v. MHI P'ship, Ltd., 978 S.W.2d 660, 665 (Tex. App. 1998). 162. Signs v. Detroit Edison Co., 287 N.W.2d 292, 299-300 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979), abrogated on other grounds, Ormbsy v. Capital Welding, Inc., 684 N.W.2d 320 (Mich. 2004).
161. Summers v. Crown Constr. Co., 453 F.2d 998, 999-1000 (4th Cir. 1972).
162. Howarton v. Minn. Mining & Mfg., Inc. 133 S.W.3d 820, 827 (Tex. App. 2004).
163. Id. at 825; Bieruta v. Klein Creek Corp., 770 N.E.2d 1175, 1181-82 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
164. Hoffnagle v. McDonald's Corp., 522 N.W.2d 808, 814-15 (Iowa 1994).
165. Campbell v. Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc., 946 S.W.2d 617, 623 (Tex. App. 1997).
166. Coty v. U.S. Slicing Mach. Co., 373 N.E.2d 1371,1376 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
167. Koch Refining Co. v. Chapa, 11 S.W.3d 153, 156-57 (Tex. 1999); Howarton, 133 S.W.3d at 827; Arias v. MHI P'ship, Ltd., 978 S.W.2d 660, 663-65 (Tex. App. 1998). 170. Lee Lewis Constr., Inc. v. Harrison, 64 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. App. 1999), aff'd, 70 S.W.3d 778 (Tex. 2001).
168. Interview with anonymous CEO of footwear supplier, in Busan, S. Korea (June 24, 2008).
169. Interview with Dir., Ethical Sourcing, Mountain Equip. Co-op, supra note 36.
170. See Summers v. Crown Constr. Co., 453 F.2d 998, 999-1000 (4th Cir. 1972); Howarton, 133 S.W.3d at 826; Arias, 978 S.W.2d at 664-65.
171. See Ponder v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 685 F. Supp. 1359, 1366 & n.4 (E.D. Tex. 1988); Lee Lewis Constr., Inc. v. Harrison, 70 S.W.3d 778, 783 (Tex. 2001). 175. 16 AM. JUE. PROOF OF FACTS 2D Intent of Contracting Parties to Benefit Third Person § 55 (2008).
172. A recent article concluded that Wal-Mart's code probably does not constitute an agreement with its suppliers' employees. Katherine E. Kenny, Code or Contract: Whether Wal-Mart's Code of Conduct Creates a Contractual Obligation Between Wal-Mart and the Employees of Its Foreign Suppliers, 27 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 453 (2007). We, instead, evaluate whether the agreement between the buyer and supplier, not the supplier's employees, creates a contract claim for workers.
173. See supra note 32.
174. Wal-Mart's Dismissal Motion, supra note 32, at 8.
175. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 cmt. a (1981). 180. Id. § 302 cmt. c.
176. Id. § 302; see, e.g., Bowhead Info. Tech. Servs., L.L.C. v. Catapult Tech., Ltd., 377 F. Supp. 2d 166, 171-72 (D.D.C. 2005).
177. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 cmt. d, illus. 10,14 & 16 (1981).
178. Abato v. Millar Elevator Serv. Co, 690 N.Y.S.2d 806, 806-07 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
179. Brown v. All-Tech Inv. Group, Inc., 595 S.E.2d 517, 524 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
180. Cooper v. IBI Sec. Serv. of Fla., Inc., 281 So. 2d 524, 526 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
181. 17A AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D Intent of Contracting Parties to Benefit Third Person § 4 (2008). 187. 17A AM. JU¨R. PROOF OF FACTS 2D Intent of Contracting Parties to Benefit Third Person §§ 1, 5 (2008); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 reporters' notes (1981).
182. See E.B. Roberts Constr. Co. v. Concrete Contractors, Inc., 704 P.2d 859, 865 & n.7 (Colo. 1985) ("[CJircumstances surrounding the execution or performance of a contract can be sufficient alone, if substantial, to establish the existence of an intended beneficiary to the contract . . . ."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981) ("Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties . . . .").
183. See McDonald v. U.S. Die Casting & Dev. Co., 585 So. 2d 853, 855 (Ala. 1991).
184. Interview with Assistant Dir. of Corporate Responsibility, Changshin, supra note 20.
185. Interview with Gen. Manager, Nike, supra note 43; Interview with Dir. of Corporate Responsibility, Pou Chen, supra note 109; Interview with NOS Dir., Tae Kwang (Korean-owned footwear factory), in Vietnam (Jan. 2005).
186. 226 F. Supp. 2d 355, 363 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 193. Id.
187. See Black & White Cabs of St. Louis, Inc. v. Smith, 370 S.W.2d 669, 675 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963);
188. James Stewart & Co. v. Law, 233 S.W.2d 558, 561-62 (Tex. 1950).
189. See McDonald v. U.S. Die Casting & Dev. Co., 585 So. 2d 853, 855 (Ala. 1991); see also Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Local 2 v. Vista Inn Mgmt. Co., 393 F. Supp. 2d 972, 987 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
190. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (1981).
191. Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. CV 05-7307 AG (MANx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98102, at *8-12 (CD. Cal. Mar. 30, 2007).
192. See Interview with Dir., Ethical Sourcing, Mountain Equip. Co-op, supra note 36. 199. The Doe plaintiffs are attempting a version of this argument. Doe Opposition, supra note 83, at 6-11; Doe Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief, supra note 13, at 23. They also suggest that a supplier might seek promises of monitoring and enforcement to ensure that buyers are similarly binding other suppliers. Doe Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief, supra note 13, at 23-24. This, however, reflects the supplier's competitive concerns for itself-an intent to benefit itself, not the workers.
193. Interview with anonymous CEO of footwear supplier, supra note 171.
194. Id.
195. Interview with Executive Dir., Youngone (Korean-owned apparel factory), in Hanoi, Vietnam (May 14, 2007).
196. According to Lim and Phillips, CSR compliance is related to the supply chain's governance structure. Lim & Phillips, supra note 19, at 143-44. An arms-length · market model forces suppliers to focus on price and delivery as they compete for the buyer's business, rendering code observance secondary. Id. A collaborative partnership, where the buyer gives select contractors secure product orders and other benefits, removes market disincentives and adds incentives for supplier compliance. See id.
197. See generally 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts §§ 19, 113, 117 (2004 & Supp. 2008) (detailing the elements of a contract including consideration).
198. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 226 cmt. a (1981). However, at least one treatise states that third-party contracts are construed in favor of the promisor, which would be the buyer. 17A AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D Intent of Contracting Parties to Benefit Third Person § 1 (2008).
199. See Noel v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 805 P.2d 1244, 1251 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991) ("If . . . the promisee of the third-party agreement is responsible for the breach, jointly or alone, there is no legal theory that protects the promisee from liability for the breach.").
200. Id. at 1252.
201. See supra Part GV.A.3. 209. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 310 illus. l (1981);
202. see also District of Columbia v. Campbell, 580 A.2d 1295, 1302-03 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
203. See 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts §§ 21, 113, 117 (2008).
204. 226 F. Supp. 2d 355, 357-58, 362 (B.D.N.Y. 2002). For this reason, the Doe trial judge distinguished Chen. Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. CV 05-7307 AG (MANx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98102, at *12-13 (CD. Cal. Mar. 30, 2007).
205. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 311(3) (1981); see also Olson v. Etheridge, 686 N.E.2d 563, 568-70 (Ill. 1997).
206. See supra p. 345 tbl.2 and note 36.
207. See supra pp. 343-45 tbls.l & 2 and notes 33-37. 215. See 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 46 (2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a) cmts. a, b (1981). A third-party beneficiary has the same damage claims as do the contract parties. 16 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2d Intent of Contracting Parties to Benefit Third Persons § 1 (2008).
208. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 48 (2003).
209. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 307,359-60 (1981).
210. 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estoppel and Waiver § 55 (2000).
211. 4 WlLLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 8:5 (4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter WlLLISTON].
212. Id.
213. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. C (1981). 222. Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. CV 05-7307 AG (MANx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98102, at *6 (CD. Cal. Mar. 30, 2007).
214. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. c (1981). Promissory reliance by a third party is not recognized by every state. See, e.g., 6 STRONG'S NORTH CAROLINA INDEX 4TH Contracts § 22 (2008).
215. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. b (1981).
216. WlLLISTON, supra note 219, § 8:5. 226. Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1191, 1199, 1202-03, 1246 (1998).
217. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. d (1981).
218. Id. §§ 344(b) cmts. a, b, 349; see also 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 54 (2003).
219. C.C. Marvel, Annotation, Promissory Estoppel, 48 A.L.R.2d 1069, 1075-76 (1956).
220. Ruggie, supra note 29, at 512. 231. Thomas Mclnerney, Putting Regulation Before Responsibility: Towards Binding Norms of Corporate Social Responsibility, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 171, 173 (2007).
221. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l (2006).
222. 22 U.S.C. § 5034 (repealed 1994).
223. U.S. Department of Labor, Apparel Industry Partnership's Agreement (Apr. 14, 1997), http.//actrav.itcilo.org/actrav-english/telearn/global/ilo/guide/ apparell.htm.
224. There also have been government attempts to impose extraterritorial health and safety codes. See supra note 3.
225. Logan Michael Breed, Regulating Our 21st-century Ambassadors: A New Approach to Corporate Liability for Human Rights Violations Abroad, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 1005, 1026-28 (2002). 237. In Rodriguez-Ol?era ?. Salant Corp., the defendant twice approached the Texas Supreme Court but failed to have the case dismissed on forum non conviens grounds. Orders Denying the Defendant's Petitions for Writ of Mandamus, In re Salant Corp., C.A. 99-0662 (Tex. July 13, 1999 and July 23, 1999) (on file with author).
226. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 65, at 357-59; Slawotsky, supra note 1.