Rethinking the roots of terrorism: Beyond orthodox terrorism theory - A critical research agenda

Global Society

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 153-176

  Franks, Jason ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK; CRITICAL ANALYSIS; SOCIAL THEORY; TERRORISM; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 67650138537     PISSN: 13600826     EISSN: 1469798X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13600820902766219     Document Type: Article

References (125)

1. See Rohan Gunaratna, Inside al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (London: Hurst Press, 2002).
2. See M. Carr, Unknown Soldiers: How Terrorism Transformed the Modern World (London: Profile Books, 2006).
3. See Omar Malik, Enough of the Definition of Terrorism (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000).
4. This article uses a number of key texts in terrorism studies within the field of international relations; these include: Bruce Hoffman, InsideTerrorism, 2nd edn (London: Indigo, 1999)
5. Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response (London: Frank Cass, 2000)
6. and Walter Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987). The author would like to point out that these texts relate particularly to the discipline of international relations.
7. The argument in this paper is focused on the problems inherent in the state understanding of terrorism in international relations. It is important to point out that terrorism is also studied in different social science disciplines, such as psychology, sociology and anthropology, and in these fields the orthodox approach is not so dominant.
8. See Jason Franks, Rethinking the Roots of Terrorism (London: Palgrave, 2006).
9. Hoffman, op. cit., pp. 185-196
10. and Wilkinson, op. cit., pp. 62-69.
11. G. O'sullivan and E. Herman, "Terrorism as Ideology and Cultural Industry", in Alexander George, Western State Terrorism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), p. 44.
12. See fn. 5.
13. The United States Department of Defense definition. See Hoffman, op. cit., p. 30.
14. The United Nations defines terrorism in relation to international conventions. See 〈www.un.org.〉
15. Terrorism is defined as violence against civilians. See Wilkinson, op. cit., p. 17.
16. Although the UN High-level Panel did come up with a definition of terrorism it was not adopted in the World Summit document. See UN High-level Panel report, available: 〈www.un.org/secureworld/.〉
17. See Franks, op. cit.
18. J. Bowyer Bell, A Time of Terror (New York: Basic Books, 1978), p. 50.
19. Ibid., p. 51.
20. R.E. Rubenstein, Alchemists of Revolution: Terrorism in the Modern World (New York: Basic Books, 1987), p. 161.
21. See Laqueur, op. cit., pp. 25-27.
22. Pisacane suggested that ideas result from deeds and that violence was necessary not only to draw attention to, or generate publicity for, a cause but also ultimately to inform, educate and rally the masses. Hoffman, op. cit., p. 17.
23. Paul Wilkinson, The Liberal State (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 46.
24. Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963).
25. B.M. Jenkins, quoted in Hoffman, op. cit., p. 132.
26. Much of the literature on orthodox terrorism theory suggests that the historical roots of terrorism existed in the French Revolution of 1789 when the ideology of the French Revolution and the power of the new government was enforced and consolidated by the so-called "reign of terror", which was enacted on the population. Hoffman, op. cit., p. 15.
27. Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy, op. cit., p. 15
28. see also Hoffman, op. cit., ch. 6, p. 67.
29. Yonah Alexander and Richard Latter (eds.), Terrorism and the Media (McLean, VA: Brassey's, 1990)
30. Hoffman, op. cit., ch. 5, p. 131
31. and Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy, op. cit., ch. 9, p. 174.
32. Guerrilla warfare is defined as "a series of operations by irregular forces, depending on mobility and surprise aimed at harassing a regular army". Gerard Chaliand, Terrorism from Popular Struggle to Media Spectacle (London: Saqi Books, 1987), p. 12.
33. "Mao developed a strategy of protracted war in three stages: The enemy's strategic offensive and the revolutionaries' strategic defensive; the enemies strategic consolidation and the revolutionaries' preparation for counter offensive: And the revolutionaries' strategic retreat." Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy, op. cit., p. 11.
34. Marighela's strategy was to convert a political crisis into an armed struggle by violent acts that force the government to transform the political situation into a military one. Chaliand, op. cit., p. 87.
35. Also see Carlos Marighela, For the Liberation of Brazil (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971).
36. Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, Political Terrorism: A Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature (Oxford: North Holland, 1988), p. 7.
37. Insurgency can be defined as "a rebellion or rising against the government in power or civil authorities". Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy, op. cit., p. 2.
38. Martha Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behaviour as a Product of Strategic Choice", in W. Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 8
39. and M. Crenshaw, "How Terrorists Think: What Psychology can Contribute to Understanding Terrorism", in Lawrence Howard (ed.), Terrorism; Roots, Impact and Responses (New York: Praeger, 1992), p. 71.
40. United States Departments of the Army and the Air Force, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet, 3-20 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army and Air Force, 1990), quoted in Hoffman, op. cit., p. 38.
41. Schmid and Jongman, op. cit., p. 2.
42. Michel Foucault, Power and Knowledge (London: Wheatsheaf, 1985), p. 122.
43. See Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars (London: Zed Books, 2001).
44. Hoffman, op. cit., pp. 41-44.
45. Ibid., p. 211.
46. Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy, op. cit., p. 49.
47. Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism, 3rd edn (Oxford: Phoenix Press, 2001), p. 274.
48. Aum Shrinrikyo released sarin nerve gas in the Tokyo subway system, killing a dozen people and injuring 5,000. See Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy, op. cit., pp. 50-51.
49. Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) are nuclear, biological and chemicalweapons. This debate suggests that if terrorists are in fact prepared to kill asmany as possible then theywill not be afraid to use such weapons, thereby contradicting the arguments of orthodox terrorism theory discussed above.
50. B.M. Jenkins, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, P-5541, November 1975), pp. 6-7.
51. Franks, op. cit.
52. See Oliver Richmond, Maintaining Order, Making Peace (London: Palgrave, 2002).
53. See Oliver Richmond, Transformations of Peace (London: Palgrave, 2005).
54. Franks, op. cit., pp. 48-86.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid., pp. 86-120.
57. Ibid., pp. 87-93.
58. E.V. Walter, Terror and Resistance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 340.
59. Orthodox terrorism theory explains state-sponsored terrorism as international terrorism sponsored by donor states. However, only a few countries are actually listed and others are mentioned brieflyfor "supporting" terrorist activity.Therefore, the actual role of the state in thegenerationof terrorism is not directly questioned as a root cause. Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy, op. cit., p. 62.
60. Richmond argues for reform of the international system as it is failing to provide the tools to resolve conflict because it is constructed by state-centric actors in a predominantly state-centric environment. Oliver Richmond, "Ethnic Security in the International System", Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 3, No. I (March 2000), pp. 24-46.
61. For the functional effects of orthodox terrorism theory see section above. See also Rubenstein, op. cit., p. 161.
62. "The Freedom Paradox", The Economist (2 September 2006), p. 22.
63. This can be seen in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; see Franks, op. cit., p. 168.
64. States using orthodox terrorism theory and the positivist approach see terrorism as always originating from another state and consequentially fail to understand terrorism from non-state actors.
65. Hoffman, op. cit., p. 28.
66. Bowyer Bell, op. cit., p. 14.
67. Martha Crenshaw, quoted in Charles W. Kegley (ed.), International Terrorism (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), p. 58.
68. R. Vayrynen, New Directions in Conflict Theory (London: Sage Publications, 1991), p. 1.
69. J. Burton, Deviance, Terrorism and War (Oxford, Martin Robertson, 1979), p. 48.
70. Ibid., p. 78
71. see also John Burton (ed.), Conflict: Human Needs Theory (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990).
72. Ibid., p. 83.
73. Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).
74. Ibid., p. 42.
75. Ibid., p. 8.
76. Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, op. cit., p. 96.
77. Vivienne Jabri, Discourses of Violence (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 4.
78. Wilkinson points out that, almost without exception, leaders of insurgent groups have espoused ideologies of Marxist revolutionism, such as the IRA, ETA, PFLP, DFLP and FLNC. Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy, op. cit., p. 28.
79. Crenshaw argues that "Terrorism as a general phenomenon cannot be adequately explained without situating it in its particular social, political and economic context" (M. Crenshaw (ed.), Terrorism in Context (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), p. I).
80. Johan Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means (Oslo: Sage, 1996), p. 71.
81. Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 5th edn (London: Penguin, 2001).
82. Bowyer Bell, op. cit., p. 28.
83. G. Shabad and F. Ramo, "Basque Terrorism in Spain", in Crenshaw, Terrorism in Context, op. cit., p. 415.
84. See Margaret Mead and Rhoda Metraux, "Anthropology of Human Conflict", in E.B. McNeil (ed.), The Nature of Human Conflict (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1965), pp. 116-128.
85. Franks, op. cit., p. 72.
86. Galtung, op. cit.
87. C.R. Mitchell, The Structure of International Conflict (London: Macmillan, 1981), p. 35.
88. Galtung, op. cit., p. 72.
89. See R.E. Rubenstein, Alchemists of Revolution: Terrorism in the Modern World (New York: Basic Books, 1987), p. 108
90. Laqueur, New Terrorism, op. cit., p. 105.
91. A.B. Krueger and J. Maleckova, "Does Poverty Cause Terrorism? The Economics and the Education of Suicide Bombers", The New Republic Vol. 24 (2002), pp. 27-36.
92. Edward Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict Theory and Cases (Hampshire: Dartmouth, 1990), p. 16.
93. A survey found that major armed conflict was more likely in countries low down on the UN development programme and UNDP Human Development Index. A.J. Jongman and A.P. Schmid, "Contemporary Armed Conflicts", quoted in H. Miall, O. Ramsbottom and Tom Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), p. 86.
94. Jabri, op. cit., p. 22.
95. Crenshaw examines the role of the individual, especially within the political and socio-economic context. See Crenshaw, Terrorism in Context, op. cit., p. 67.
96. Bowyer Bell, op. cit., p. 6.
97. Violence caused by religious groups is an expression of political power, which is mandated by god. Mark Juergensmeyer, "Terror Mandated by God", Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1997 , pp. 16-23.
98. Although Ranstorp does argue that religious terrorism is motivated largely by religion (which he sees as specifically the threat to religion and religious identity from secularism) and the practical political considerations of the context-specific environment, he does suggest the existence of social, political and economic factors that exacerbate the religious crisis from which religious terrorism emerges. Nevertheless, he roots the causes of religious terrorism firmly in religion and politics. Magnus Ranstorp, "Terrorism in the Name of Religion", Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 1 (1996), pp. 41-50.
99. Jabri highlights this theory by questioning the composition of the unique construction of the individual and suggesting that the nature of individual identity makes it exclusionist and thus conflict can ensue fromthe friction between inclusion and exclusion in wider social groups. Jabri, op. cit., p. 121.
100. Social identity theory is the link between individual identity and group identity, which is based on achieving a secure and positively valued sense of self. Group formation, differentiation, self-categorisation, social judgements and perceptions can all emanate from social identity. Jeffrey R. Seul, "Ours is the Way of God: Religion, Identity and Intergroup Conflict", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 36, No. 5 (1999), p. 58.
101. Hans Mol described the chief function of religion as the stabilisation of individual and group identity. Hans Mol, Identity and the Sacred: A Sketch for a New Social-scientific Theory of Religion (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1976).
102. Statistics of armed conflict for the period 1985-1994 suggest 44.1% were ethnonationalist in nature. Christian Scherrer, Ethno-Nationalismus im Weltsystem (Munster: Agenda, 1997),
103. quoted in Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy, op. cit., p. 6.
104. Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Revival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
105. T.H. Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism Anthropological Perspectives (London: Pluto Press, 1993), p. 12.
106. Ignatieff argues that no human difference matters until it becomes a privilege. He suggests that individuals under threat look for protection and security in groups comprised of individuals with similar identities who form a single identity-based ethnic group. Michael Ignatieff, Warriors Honour (London: Polity Press), p. 51.
107. Foucault, op cit., p. 122.
108. Wilkinson defines single-issue terrorism as violence committed with the desire to change a specific policy or practice within a target society. Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy, op. cit., p. 20.
109. Wilkinson calls it vincorrigible" terrorism. P. Wilkinson, "Future of Terrorism", Valedictory lecture, University of St Andrews, 29 April 2002.
110. Consensual issues are values sought such as territory and resources. Jabri, op. cit., p. 16.
111. See Bowyer Bell, op. cit.
112. and Donatella Della Porta, International Social Movement Research (Greenwich, CT: Jai Press, 1992).
113. Crenshaw suggests that small-group dynamics in conditions of isolation generate feelings of self-righteousness, trust, identity and loyalty. Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism", in Kegley, op. cit., p. 124.
114. Displacement is violence committed by group members for group leaders, and so members therefore absolve themselves from blame. Diffusion is acts of violence committed by all members by group decision, and therefore everyone and no one is responsible. A. Bandura, "The Mechanics of Moral Disengagement", in Reich (ed.), op. cit., p. 181.
115. Martin A Miller, "Intellectual Origins of Modern Terrorism in Europe", in Crenshaw, Terrorism in Context, op. cit., p. 55.
116. J.M. Post, "Terrorist Psycho-logic: Terrorist Behaviour as a Product of Psychological Forces", in Reich (ed.), op. cit., p. 36.
117. Galtung, op. cit., p. 72.
118. Mitchell suggests a number of factors for consideration when examining the cognitive process; these are selective perception, selective recall and group identification. Mitchell, op. cit., p. 77.
119. McNeil (ed.), op. cit., p. 50.
120. Mitchell argues that the causes and effects of conflict are a search for group identification and a subsequent polarisation of the in-group and out-group. Mitchell, op. cit., p. 85.
121. See also McNeil (ed.), op. cit., p. 60.
122. Ian S. Lustick, "Terrorism in the Arab Israeli Conflict: Targets and Audiences", in Crenshaw, Terrorism in Context, op. cit., p. 552.
123. Jean-Paul Sartre, "Critique de la raison dialectique", in Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 5th edn (London: Penguin, 2001), p. 27.
124. "Five Years On", The Economist (2 September 2006), pp. 9-10.
125. Franks, op. cit., pp. 120-159.