Chinese capitalism in the OECD mirror

New Political Economy

Volumn 14, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 71-99

  Carney, Richard W ^a  

^a NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY   (Singapore)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CAPITALISM; DEVELOPING WORLD; ECONOMIC GROWTH; GLOBALIZATION; OECD; POLITICAL ECONOMY;

ASIA; CHINA; EURASIA; FAR EAST;

EID: 67650133574     PISSN: 13563467     EISSN: 14699923     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13563460802673309     Document Type: Article

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68. Ibid., p. 90.
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76. André Philip's report was published by the Parti Socialiste, Pour la Rénovation de la République, and entitled Les Reformes de Structure.
77. Kuisel, Capitalism and the State, p. 171.
78. For information on the formulation and effect of this banking legislation, see David Alhadeff, Competition and Controls in Banking (University of California Press, 1968).
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81. and P. C. Dupont, Le Contrôle des Banques et la Direction du Crédit en France (Dunod, 1952). 461 out of 494 representatives from mainland France voted for the law.
82. 442 from the left and centre, and 19 from the right; 33 on the right voted against.
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84. Diana Farrell, Susan Lund, Jaeson Rosenfeld, Fabrice Morin, Niyati Gupta & Ezra Greenberg, Putting China's Capital to Work: The Value of Financial System Reform (McKinsey, 2006).
85. Ibid.
86. For example, Bank of America and Goldman Sachs inverted over $3 bullion each to very small 10 per cent stakes in two of the big four Chinese banks.
87. Nicholas Lardy, China's Unfinished Economic Revolution (Brookings Institution, 1998).
88. Jonathan Watts, 'Democracy in China: Civil Rights: Protests Surge as Reforms Fail to Match Rising Hopes', Guardian International, 11 October 2005, p. 17.
89. Farrell et al., Putting China's Capital to Work.
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91. Friedrich Wu, 'What Could Brake China's Rapid Ascent in the World Economy?', World Economics, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2006), pp. 63-87.
92. Farrell et al., Putting China's Capital to Work, p. 36.
93. Matthias M. Bekier, Richard Huang & Gregory P. Wilson 'How to Fix China's Banking System?', McKinsey Quarterly, No. 1 (2005).
94. Wu, 'What Could Brake China's'.
95. Peter S. Goodman, 'China's Unyielding Banking Crisis; Corruption and Cronyism often Thwart Efforts to Eradicate Bad Debts', Washington Post, 6 June 2005, Section A01.
96. The 25 per cent cap was increased from the 15 per cent limit that was set in 2003.
97. China's scores on the World Bank's 'Rule of Law' index slid from -0.22 in 1998 to -0.47 in 2004. Scores for the World Bank's 'Governance Indicators' range from -2.5 to -2.5 with a mean of zero. Higher negative scores correspond to poorer governance.
98. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower.
99. Ekkehard Ernst, 'Financial Systems, Industrial Relations, and Industry Specialization: An Econometric Analysis of Institutional Complementarities', in Helene Schubert (ed.), The Transformation of the European Financial System: Where do we go? Proceedings of the 1st OeNB Workshop, Vienna, 2004, pp. 60-95.