Jackpot justice: verdict variability and the mass tort class action

Temple Law Review

Volumn 80, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 1013-1066

  Stier, Byron G ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 67649770302     PISSN: 08998086     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (306)

1. o. 2d 1246 (Ha. 2006), cert, denied, 128 S. Ct. 96 (2007).
2. Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1254-55.
3. Rick Bragg, Tobacco Lawsuit in Florida Yields Record Damages, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2000, at Al (noting that tobacco companies claimed verdict would force them into bankruptcy).
4. Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1254-55.
5. Unofficial Transcript of Oral Argument, Engle, 945 So. 2d 1246 (No. SC03-1856), http://www.wfsu.org/gavel2gavel/transcript/03-1856.htm (last visited Aug. 1,2008).
6. As Judge Posner has noted, a defendant facing a class certification that will adjudicate the liability in an entire mass tort "may not wish to roll these dice" and instead may settle under pressure that has been likened to judicial blackmail. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995).
7. E.g., Verdict Report, Schwartz v. Liggett Group, Inc., at *1, No. CA 03-02078-AA (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 13, 2006), 2006 WL 986357 [hereinafter Schwartz Verdict Report] (finding that Liggett was not responsible for Leila Schwartz's death). See infra Part III for a discussion of "jackpot justice" in class action verdicts and the results of other Florida tobacco verdicts.
8. An additional issue to be explored is the proper role of collateral estoppel. The same concerns of jury verdict variability that infect a class action based on a single jury verdict also apply to using a single jury to resolve a mass tort issue through collateral estoppel. Nevertheless, the application of collateral estoppel has been subject to different doctrinal considerations than class actions, and therefore its treatment is beyond the scope of this Article.
9. See infra notes 72-85 and accompanying text for evidence that the judicial management of such verdicts does not eliminate such pronounced variability. Through the devices of remittitur and additur, judges have the power to reduce or enlarge verdicts by a jury. Despite each method, however, significant verdict variability remains.
10. See, e.g., Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort Class Action, 115 HARV. L. REV. 747,817 (2002) (noting unpredictable punitive damage awards in mass tort class actions).
11. See infra Part IV.A for a discussion of scholarly approaches to applying multiple jury statistical sampling in class actions.
12. See infra notes 200-23 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of approaches to trying samples of claims grouped by injury similarity before multiple juries.
13. See infra notes 204-05 and accompanying text for an explanation of how the resulting verdicts of statistical samples may be averaged and applied to the same injury group.
14. See infra notes 224-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of legal problems with applying statistical results in class actions.
15. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring "that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy" for certification of class under Rule 23(b)(3)).
16. This Article also raises the possibility that, in addition to using actual individual trials to further claim valuation, mass tort litigants could develop claim valuation through alternate dispute resolution methods such as nonbinding arbitration and summary jury trials. Indeed, litigants' participation in such methods might be encouraged by multidistrict litigation courts seeking to further global management of the mass tort.
17. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012,1020 (7th Cir. 2002) ("The central planning model-one case, one court, one set of rules, one settlement price for all involved-suppresses information that is vital to accurate resolution.... One suit is an all-or-none affair, with high risk even if the parties supply all the information at their disposal. . . . When courts think of efficiency, they should think of market models ....").
18. While Rule 23(b)(3) class actions provide notice and opt-out rights to classes, class members in classes certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) are not allowed to exclude themselves from the class, and notice is only required to be sent prior to a proposed settlement. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (noting that for Rule 23(b)(3) classes, "the court must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort" and "notice must clearly and concisely state ... that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion"); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A) ("For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2), the court may direct appropriate notice to the class." (emphasis added)); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1) ("The court must direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound by the proposal."). Moreover, even issued notice may not actually be effective in reaching and informing all class members of the disposition of their rights.
19. See, e.g., Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 69, 77 (observing that reasonable juries may reach different conclusions in individual mass-tort trials, even when evaluating similar evidence).
20. See, e.g., David Baldus et al., Improving Judicial Oversight of Jury Damages Assessments: A Proposal for the Comparative Additur/Remittitur Review of Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive Damages, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1109,1115-16 (1995) ("[C]ommon experience suggests that among a given class of basically comparable cases, some proportion of awards-known as outliers-are likely to deviate significantly from the median award."); Michael J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815, 833 (1992) ("Every verdict is itself merely a sample from the large population of potential verdicts."); id. at 834 ("The fact that we normally obtain only one award from one trial of each case obscures the population of possible awards from which that one was drawn."); id. at 839 ("We already have noted one flaw in the imagery of the archetypal civil trial: The verdict appears precise and individualized, but in reality it is only a sample of one from a wider population of possible outcomes.").
21. See Saks & Blanck, supra note 20, at 833 ("That 'population of verdicts' consists of all the awards that would result from trying the same case repeatedly for an infinite number of times."); id. at 834 ("Imagine a case were tried 100 times. Then the verdicts are arrayed on a frequency distribution. ... It should be apparent that any single verdict is just one from among those.").
22. See Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World of Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REV. 561, 577 (1993) ("[I]f the same case were tried to a jury over and over again, one should expect the damages verdicts to fall on a normal (that is, bell-shaped) distribution curve clustering more or less closely about a mean equal to the correct damages award."); David A. Moran, Jury Uncertainty, Elemental Independence and the Conjunction Paradox: A Response to Allen and Jehl, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 945, 948 (noting that after trying hundreds or thousands of mock trials and assessing likelihood of prevailing on each element, "[t]his distribution of answers from the mock juries would almost certainly produce a 'normal' or near-normal distribution, the familiar bell curve, around the median value").
23. See Moran, supra note 22, at 948 (maintaining that result from individual jury trials does not indicate likelihood of same result in repeated trial).
24. Id. ("[T]o determine the plaintiffs probability of success at trial, the research firm would need to stage hundreds or thousands of mock trials in which all of the evidence is presented and argued to hundreds or thousands of mock juries, each of which is then asked to assess the probability that defendant was negligent and the probability that the defendant caused plaintiff's injuries.").
25. As Professors Kenneth Bordens and Irwin Horowitz have noted: [R]esearch has shown that when [sic] different juries hearing precisely the same evidence may arrive at widely differing verdicts. The damage awards made by any one of those juries cannot be used to predict what another jury (hearing exactly the same evidence) will do. We certainly cannot predict what any hypothetical jury would do based on the verdicts of one or two juries in allegedly "similar" cases. Kenneth S. Bordens & Irwin A. Horowitz, The Limits of Sampling and Consolidation in Mass Tort Trials: Justice Improved or Justice Altered?, 22 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 43, 65 (1998) (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Bordens & Horowitz, Limits of Sampling and Consolidation]; see also Kenneth S. Bordens & Irwin A. Horowitz, Mass Tort Civil Litigation: The Impact of Procedural Changes on Jury Decisions, 73 JUDICATURE 22,24 (1989) [hereinafter Bordens & Horowitz, Mass Tort Civil Litigation] ("[T]here was a rather significant amount of inter-jury disagreement. Juries exposed to precisely the same evidence and experimental manipulations rendered highly divergent decisions.").
26. Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Judgments About Liability and Damages: Sources of Variability and Ways to Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 301, 304-05 (1998); Stephan Landsman et al., Be Careful What You Wish for: The Paradoxical Effects of Bifurcating Claims for Punitive Damages, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 297,315-16.
27. Diamond et al., supra note 26, at 305.
28. Id. at 317.
29. Landsman et al., supra note 26, at 322.
30. Bordens & Horowitz, Mass Tort Civil Litigation, supra note 25, at 26.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See David W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 256, 310 (1989) ("[T]he empirical data explored in this Article strongly support tort law's poorly kept secret: that similarly injured plaintiffs who experience similar pain and endure similar suffering are often awarded vastly differing amounts of damages.").
34. Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and Suffering," 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908, 920, 923, 941 n.156 (1989); Joseph Sanders, Why Do Proposals Designed to Control Variability in General Damages (Generally) Fall on Deaf Ears? (And Why This Is Too Bad), 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 489,493 (2006).
35. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 34, at 923,941 n.156; Sanders, supra note 34, at 493.
36. Sanders, supra note 34, at 495; Roselle L. Wissler et al., Decisionmaking About General Damages: A Comparison of Jurors, Judges, and Lawyers, 98 MICH. L. REV. 751,794 (1999).
37. Leebron, supra note 33, at 309-10.
38. See W. KIP VISCUSI, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 99-107 (1991) (discussing jury difficulty and inconsistency in determining noneconomic damages, particularly for pain and suffering, because of absence of clear criteria); Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CAL. L. REV. 773,777 (1995) ("Studies have shown that jury awards for pain and suffering vary widely for injuries that appear to be equally severe."); Sanders, supra note 34, at 493 ("Within each category of damages, pain and suffering awards exhibit considerable variance."); David Schkade et al., Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1139, 1142-43 (2000) ("[T]he unbounded dollar scale contributes to evidently erratic monetary judgments in many areas of the law, including not only punitive damages but also compensatory awards in cases involving . . . pain and suffering!] and intentional infliction of emotional distress." (footnote omitted)); Wissler et al., supra note 36, at 756 ("[T]he findings suggest that the differences between jurors' awards and those of the other groups do not reflect fundamental differences in decisionmaking, but rather a loss of consistency in translating perceptions of severity into damages awards."). Because of problems of uniformity and predictability, courts in England have ruled that personal injury cases should be tried by a judge, rather than a jury. Ronen Avraham, Putting a Price on Pain-and-Suffering Damages: A Critique of the Current Approaches and a Preliminary Proposal for Change, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 87, 91 n.22 (2006) (citing Ward v. James, [1966] 1 Q.B. 273); see also Scott Brister, The Decline in Jury Trials: What Would Wal-Mart Do?, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 191, 201-02 (2005) (identifying unpredictability of jury awards as argument endorsed both domestically and abroad for limiting jury trials).
39. Landsman et al., supra note 26, at 318.
40. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 34, at 921, 936-37; Sanders, supra note 34, at 493-94.
41. 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998).
42. See Bordens & Horowitz, Limits of Sampling and Consolidation, supra note 25, at 65 ("Clearly, the two juries were operating under different decision schemes, producing different award patterns.").
43. Wissler et al., supra note 36, at 769.
44. Avraham, supra note 38, at 94 n.35; Aaron J. Broder, Judges, Juries and Verdict Awards, N.Y. L.J.,Jan.3,1994, at 3.
45. See Avraham, supra note 38, at 94 ("[T]here is a lack of horizontal equity, measured by the extent of variation within a single category."); Bovbjerg et al., supra note 34, at 924 (calling attention to problem of horizontal inequity); Leebron, supra note 33, at 324-25 (concluding that "jury system, coupled with deferential judicial review, produces an unacceptable degree of variation in the awards"); Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should) Make Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 45 (1997) (noting "a great deal of horizontal mequity-that is, large unexplained differences in awards for apparently similar injuries").
46. See Avraham, supra note 38, at 94 (noting empirical basis that "the tort system is vertically fair (the median and the mean awards in a given category are reasonable)"); see also Geistfeld, supra note 38, at 784 (observing that "[t]he system currently achieves some degree of vertical equity but fails to achieve horizontal equity"); Saks, supra note 45, at 45 (noting existence of '"vertical equity' (that is, the finding that jurors award less compensation to people with smaller losses and more to those with larger losses)").
47. S. 559 (1996).
48. BMW, 517 U.S. at 563-65; see also George L. Priest, Introduction: The Problem and Efforts to Understand It, in CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUN gamma;π VE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE 1, 2 (2002) (discussing background and jury award against BMW in Alabama case later appealed to Supreme Court).
49. Priest, supra note 48, at 2-3. But see id. at 3 ("There are so few identical cases . . . that this example constitutes no more than an anecdote, leaving significant dispute over the extent of jury variability.").
50. Landsman et al., supra note 26, at 328.
51. Bordens & Horowitz, Limits of Sampling and Consolidation, supra note 25, at 59.
52. Id.
53. Schkade et al., supra note 38, at 1158.
54. Id. at 1158-59.
55. See Wissler et al., supra note 36, at 806 ("Men and wealthier jurors awarded more than women and poorer jurors."). But see Shari Seidman Diamond, Beyond Fantasy and Nightmare: A Portrait of the Jury, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 717,737 (2006) ("Demographic characteristics like gender, race, and age generally account for very little of the variation in response.").
56. See Saks & Blanck, supra note 20, at 834 ("[T]he case could have been tried using different permutations of the same facts or different facts and arguments that could have been assembled out of the same basic case. Clearly, any given trial of a case is but a single instance from among thousands of possible trials of that same basic case.").
57. See Sanders, supra note 34, at 495-96 ("[M]ost explanations of the variability we observe in general damage awards place particular emphasis on how anchoring effects influence decisionmaking. Whenever people are asked to make numerical estimates, initial values tend to 'anchor' their final estimate by changing the standard of reference that they use when making their numerical judgment." (footnote omitted)). In one study, one group of jurors was asked by plaintiff's counsel to award for punitive damages a figure three times higher than that asked by the plaintiffs' counsel of another group of jurors. SUNSTElNETAL.,s«pra note 48, at 22-23 tbl.1.1. The jurors receiving the larger request for damages then awarded 2.5 times more than the jurors who received the lower request. Id.
58. Sanders, supra note 34, at 495 n.40 ("Asking the jury to 'make the plaintiff whole' is one such frame, which is different from a 'selling price' frame that asks the jury to imagine how much the plaintiff 'would have to be paid to subject herself to the injury in the first place.'" (quoting Edward J. McCaffery et al.. Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341,1342(1995))).
59. See Saks & Blanck, supra note 20, at 836 & n.145 (noting biases, including racism).
60. For example, juries adjudicating punitive damages are often given minimal instruction about how much punitive damages are to be awarded. In California, a jury is informed that '"[i]n arriving at any award of punitive damages, you are to consider the following: 1. The reprehensibility of the conduct of the defendant. 2. The amount of punitive damages which will have a deterrent effect on the defendant in the light of the defendant's financial condition.'" Priest, supra note 48, at 13 (quoting COMM. ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL, SUPERIOR COURT OF L.A. COUNTY, CAL., CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL: BOOK OF APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS [BAJI] Part 14.71 (Paul G. Breckenridge ed., West Publ'g Co. 8th ed. 1994)); see also Diamond, supra note 55, at 750 ("[T]here is . . . evidence that legal instructions as they are typically given often fail to provide jurors with helpful legal guidance."). Typically, jury instructions may also state, '"[t]he law provides no fixed standards as to the amount of such punitive damages, but leaves the amount to the jury's sound discretion, exercised without passion or prejudice.'" Priest, supra note 48, at 13. With that scant instruction, the jury then proceeds to award a dollar amount for punitive damages. Id. ("That is it. Those phrases constitute in the entirety the 'training' of the jury with respect to the award of punitive damages. The judge tells the jury no more.").
61. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 48, at 21 ("[W]e were surprised by how rarely jurors mentioned judicial instructions when thinking about their individual decisions and even when deliberating as juries.").
62. Id. at 23 tbl.1.1. Interestingly, one study showed that the more time a jury focused on the judge's instructions, the less likely that jury was to grant punitive damages. Id.
63. See id. at 21 ("[J]urors did not have accurate memories of the instructions, even when tested a few minutes after making their decisions.").
64. See id. at 31 ("In evaluating cases on a bounded numerical scale, people demonstrate a remarkably high level of moral agreement. At least in the personal injury cases we study, this moral consensus, on what might be called outrage and punitive intent, cuts across differences in gender, race, income, age, and education.").
65. See Schkade et al., supra note 38, at 1141-42 ("That study . . . found that with respect to the underlying moral evaluation, groups of different (non-deliberating) jurors are likely to reach similar conclusions about the relative severity of different cases. ... At the same time, the study found that assessment of cases in terms of dollars produces great unpredictability." (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted)); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071,2078 (1998) ("Even when there is a consensus on punitive intent, there is no consensus about how much in the way of dollars is necessary to produce appropriate suffering in a defendant. . . . [W]idely shared and reasonably predictable judgments about punitive intent become highly erratic judgments about appropriate dollar punishment.").
66. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 48, at 31-32 ("A basic source of arbitrariness in the existing system of punitive damages (and a problem not limited to the area of punitive damages) is the difficulty of expressing a moral judgment as a dollar amount."); id. at 42 ("When juries produce unpredictable dollar awards ... a central reason is that jurors are asked to scale without a modulus - to come up with dollar figures for punishment without being given guidance about the meaning or consequence of different choices on the unbounded dollar scale.").
67. See Schkade et al., supra note 38, at 1143 ("[A]s compared with the median of individual predeliberation judgments, deliberation significantly increases high dollar awards, increases high punishment ratings, decreases low punishment ratings, and modestly increases low dollar awards. . . . [I]t follows that deliberating juries produce even more unpredictability than was observed for statistical juries." (emphasis omitted)).
68. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 48, at 40-41; cf. Theodore Eisenberg, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Martin T. Wells, Reconciling Experimental Incoherence with Real-World Coherence in Punitive Damages, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1239, 1245, 1247 (2002) (noting that "[m]uch concern about punitive awards focuses on actual or perceived outliers-the occasional crazy jury" but that "[I]eft unreported are the mass of sensible awards").
69. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (stating standard for granting summary judgment); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,322 (1986) (interpreting Rule 56(c) standard for summary judgment as involving inquiry into presence of genuine issue of material fact); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (concluding that summary judgment inquiry as to existence of genuine issue of material fact is whether jury could reasonably find for either party); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,587 (1986) (observing that there is no genuine issue of material fact where record "could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party").
70. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b) (providing standard for judgment as matter of law after jury returned verdict); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1) ("If a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue, the court may: (A) resolve the issue against the party; and (B) grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or defeated only with a favorable finding on that issue.").
71. Although issues of collateral estoppel loom, most jury instructions in mass tort litigation are artfully constructed to combine liability issues with fact-specific findings so as to avoid triggering collateral estoppel. The use of collateral estoppel in mass tort litigation is beyond the scope of this Article.
72. Irene Deaville Sann, Remittiturs (and Additurs) in the Federal Courts: An Evaluation with Suggested Alternatives, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 157, 160-64 (1987); Suja A. Thomas, Re-Examining the Constitutionality of Remittitur Under the Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 731,736-39 (2003).
73. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 34, at 915 ("Judicial oversight only marginally curbs jury discretion."); cf. Stephan Landsman, Appellate Courts and Civil Juries, 70 U. ClN. L. REV. 873, 893 (2002) ("[T]here are simply too many reasons justifying new trials to attempt an enumeration, but at the heart of the rule is a concern for the avoidance of serious injustice and a desire to insure that verdicts bear some reasonable relation to the weight of the evidence.").
74. Leebron, supra note 33, at 297; see also Sanders, supra note 34, at 494 (summarizing results of Professor Leebron's study comparing awards made to drowning victims).
75. Leebron, supra note 33, at 297; Sanders, supra note 34, at 494; see also Bovbjerg et al., supra note 34, at 915-16 ("[Ajppellate judges are also required to defer to damage findings below and lack objective standards for altering awards." (footnote omitted)). Interestingly, "New York is apparently the only state that has a statute directing the appellate division to 'determine that an award is excessive or inadequate if it deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation'-judged in large part by awards in other similar cases." Sanders, supra note 34, at 503 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c) (McKinney 1995)). One study in Texas found a statewide jury verdict reversal rate of twenty-five percent of cases. Lynne Liberato & Kent Rutter, Reasons for Reversal in the Texas Courts of Appeals, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 431,440 (2003). Notably, however, appellate courts reversed thirty percent of jury verdict judgments in tort and under the state Deceptive Trade Practices Act, with a forty-nine percent rate for defendants appealing a plaintiff jury verdict and a ten percent rate for plaintiffs appealing a defendant jury verdict. Id. at 455-56. In personal injury cases only, defendants prevailed in appeals of thirty-eight percent of plaintiff jury verdicts, and plaintiffs succeeded in appeals of six percent of defendant jury verdicts. Id. at 456. Sixty percent of the statewide reversals derived from legal insufficiency of evidence pertaining to causation, damages, or another element (sometimes due to expert testimony that should have been excluded). Id. at 440. Only four percent of the reversals were based on challenges that the jury verdict was contrary to the great weight or preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 442. In addition, appellate courts increased jury involvement by reversing twenty-four percent of directed verdicts and fifty-eight percent of grants of judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Liberato & Rutter, supra, at 443. Appellate courts also reversed thirty-three percent of awards of summary judgment, of which fifty-eight percent of the reversals were based on the existence of fact issues for the jury. Id. at 446-47.
76. See Mark A. Behrens & Andrew W. Crouse, The Evolving Civil Justice Reform Movement: Procedural Reforms Have Gained Steam, but Critics Still Focus on Arguments of the Past, 31 U. DAYTON L. REV. 173, 186 (2006) ("Absent a finding that the award shocks the conscience, courts often uphold such awards with little more than cursory review."); Paul DeCamp, Beyond State Farm: Due Process Constraints on Noneconomic Compensatory Damages, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 231. 267 (2003) (stating that "the 'passion or prejudice' and 'shocks the conscience' standards for evaluating excessiveness are simply no standards at all" and that they can "lead[] to both arbitrary results and the perception that the process is unprincipled"); id. at 292 (noting that "arbitrariness . . . currently infects the trial process"); Leebron, supra note 33, at 324-25 ("As currently applied ... the jury system, coupled with deferential judicial review, produces an unacceptable degree of variation in the awards."); Sann, supra note 72, at 186-87 & nn.l 13-14 (noting that most courts follow conscience-shocking standard for remittitur, but others grant remittitur where judge disagrees with verdict); David Fink, Note, Best v. Taylor Machine Works, the Remittitur Doctrine, and the Implications for Tort Reform, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 227, 243 (1999) ("While remittitur is widely recognized, it is used sparingly." (footnote omitted)); Douglas B. Keane, Commentary, Problems with the Administration of Remittitur in Medical Malpractice Cases: Does a Solution Exist?, 25 J. LEGAL MED. 63, 73 (2004) ("If courts can widely disagree on whether awards are so excessive as to shock the conscience, factually analogous claims can result in disparate outcomes."). But see Eric Schnapper, Judges Against Juries- Appellate Review of Federal Civil Jury Verdicts, 1989 WlS. L. REV. 237, 246-47, 354 (noting that, of 208 published federal appeals of jury verdicts from 1984 to 1985,102 were overturned for lack of sufficient evidence, and stating that "a large number of appellate judges simply cannot resist acting like superjurors, reviewing and revising civil verdicts to assure that the result is precisely the verdict they would have returned had they been in the jury box"); Neil Vidmar, Medical Malpractice Lawsuits: An Essay on Patient Interests, the Contingency Fee System, Juries, and Social Policy, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1217,1244-45,1247 (2005) (arguing that high "outlier awards" in medical malpractice are frequently settled for less before appeal, or reduced via remittitur by trial judge or appellate court, but noting possibility that "fear of large jury awards ... caused defendants to settle").
77. DeCamp, supra note 76, at 292 (positing that due process requires courts to supply juries with information sufficient to reach verdicts based on reasoned judgment and relevant data).
78. See Sann, supra note 72, at 190-91 (urging that deference by judge to jury "is especially applicable [where] . . . damages are allocated to pain and suffering .... In these areas the jury performs one of its most important functions-bringing the collective experiences of the group to bear on the consideration of the damages to be awarded for such a loss").
79. See Baldus et al., supra note 20, at 1120 (pointing to skepticism regarding efficacy of additur and remittitur review as reason for its infrequent use); Bovbjerg et al., supra note 34, at 915 ("[S]uch changes occur infrequently; the law disfavors judicial intervention and calls for change only in cases of egregious error."). One study examining medical malpractice cases found that after 210 jury verdicts for plaintiff in Florida, there were three remittiturs, one judgment as a matter of law, and no additurs; out of 112 jury verdicts for plaintiff in New York, there were twenty-three remittiturs, four instances of judgment as a matter of law, and one additur; and out of 179 jury verdicts for plaintiff in California, there were no instances of remittitur, one judgment as a matter of law, and one additur, but twenty-four cases were adjusted downward because of statutory caps on general damages. Neil Vidmar et al., Jury Awards for Medical Malpractice and Post-Verdict Adjustments of Those Awards, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 265, 285, 292, 294 (1998); see also Leebron, supra note 33, at 309 (finding that in cases examined from 1980 to 1987, less than twenty percent of cases received remittitur for pain and suffering damages).
80. See Baldus et al., supra note 20, at 1120 (arguing that judges are no better equipped than juries to make awards); Bovbjerg et al., supra note 34, at 915 ("[T]rial judges, like juries, lack objective standards for deciding when to apply these powers or what award levels to deem adequate and not excessive."); Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763, 765 (1995) ("Reviewing courts are free (as jurors are not) to use information about prior awards in similar cases, but they too are hampered by lack of information and lack of commonly accepted principle." (footnote omitted)); Sann, supra note 72, at 206-09 (arguing that such courts "usurp[] the function of the jury" and giving examples of basing remittitur on selected past awards); Thomas, supra note 72, at 738 ("[C]riticisms are advanced that in determining the maximum reasonable verdict, judges compare damages in cases which are in fact dissimilar, and that the set of cases is incomplete because it includes only those cases in which verdicts are challenged and reported.").
81. See Thomas, supra note 72, at 736 ("[U]nder a static (or fixed) approach to the re-examination clause, remittitur is unconstitutional. Moreover, even if one accepts the conception of an evolving common law, remittitur is unconstitutional because remittitur effectively eliminates the plaintiff's right to have damages determined by a jury.").
82. See Sanders, supra note 34, at 510-11 (exploring rationale for use of caps in light of common criticisms of caps).
83. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,418 (2003) (setting forth three "guideposts" to be applied by trial courts, and reiterating necessity of appellate courts conducting de novo review of such application); see also DeCamp, supra note 76, at 268 (discussing application of Supreme Court's three "guideposts" to determine whether punitive awards are excessive).
84. DeCamp, supra note 76, at 268.
85. See, e.g., Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding thirty-seven-to-one ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages).
86. For example, Professors Saks and Blanck state: [J]uries are not so reliable as to justify using one or a few of them to decide a large number of cases. Take the extreme situation: If one jury is used and it tends to be much too high or too low in its estimations-compared with the population of juries from which it was drawn-then the verdicts in the tried cases would under- or overstate the damage amounts for the tried cases. Those systematic inaccuracies would then be extrapolated to the untried cases as well. Saks & Blanck, supra note 20, at 848.
87. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995) ("This jury, jury number fourteen, may disagree with twelve of the previous thirteen juries-and hurl the industry into bankruptcy."); Glen O. Robinson & Kenneth S. Abraham, Collective Justice in Tort Law, 78 VA. L. REV. 1481,1516 (1992) ("Determinations that would be made dozens, hundreds, or thousands of times under a heavily individualized system may be made only once when decisions are collective. . . . Because they apply to large groups of claims, such findings will either treat all the claims correctly or all the claims incorrectly.").
88. See Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1300 ("One jury, consisting of six persons ... will hold the fate of an industry in the palm of its
89. in re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1020 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, " Sweetheart" and "Blackmail" Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377,1404 (2000) ("[Sjuppose that the odds are fifty percent that a given jury will return a verdict for the defendant and fifty percent that it will return a verdict for the class; and suppose that if the verdict is for the class, the expected damages will be $200 million. ... In such a setting, a single class trial is a highly risky proposition for both sides.").
90. See Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1299 (discussing concern that defendants may settle even in absence of legal liability due to fear of risk of bankruptcy); Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 89, at 1391-92 (discussing possibility that defendant would pay "handsome premium to avoid going to trial, even if its chances of winning at trial are strong" and that "[p]laintiffs' recovery thus reflects not the merit of their claims, but rather the defendant's fear of staking everything on a single trial"); Trangsrud, supra note 19, at 85 (stating that in Las Vegas MGM Hotel fire litigation, "[m]any of the bystander defendants' willingness to settle . . . had more to do with the enormous transaction costs and risks created by the mass trial than it had to do with the merits of the claims against them").
91. George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537,538 (1972).
92. Richard A. Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 165 (1974); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 152 (1973). As has been noted, Richard Epstein has subsequently moved to a utilitarian approach to law that draws heavily on economics and efficiency. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE? (1997) (arguing that potential rights should be evaluated in terms of "net social advantage" that would be gained from their recognition and positing that rights should only be created if corresponding gain outweighs loss); Richard A. Epstein, The Tort/Crime Distinction: A Generation Later, 76 B.U. L. REV. 1,4 (1996) (expressing view that legal rules should be conceptualized in terms of incentives created for individual conduct); see also Christopher J. Robinette, Can There Be a Unified Theory of Torts? A Pluralist Suggestion from History and Doctrine, 43 BRANDEIS L.J. 369, 387 n.126 (2005) (recognizing role of economic analysis in Epstein's work); Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1802 n.7 (1997) (observing that, over time, Epstein has adopted more utilitarian perspective).
93. Schwartz, supra note 92, at 1802. More recent corrective justice tort scholars include Alan Calnan, Jules Coleman, Gregory Keating, Stephen Perry, Ernest Weinrib, and Richard Wright. See generally ALAN CALNAN, JUSTICE AND TORT LAW (1997) (emphasizing distributive nature of tort law); ALAN CALNAN, A REVISIONIST HISTORY OF TORT LAW: FROM HOLMESIAN REALISM TO NEOCLASSICAL RATIONALISM (2005) (tracing historical development of tort law and criticizing Oliver Wendell Holmes's influential tort historiography); JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992) (emphasizing importance of market forces, providing outline of corrective-justice model, and examining relationship of corrective justice to American tort law system); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995) (discussing Aristotle's role in development of moral norms and arguing that such norms are more important than market forces in driving development of tort law); Richard W. Wright, The Standards of Care in Negligence Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 249 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) (emphasizing Aristotle's importance in defining normative foundations driving development of current negligence theory); Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1996) (developing conception of due care based on social contract theory, and arguing that that model more accurately describes current tort law than law-and-economics theories); Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449 (1992) (proposing model of reparative justice that takes corrective justice theories into account).
94. Schwartz, supra note 92, at 1802 n.5.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1803-04.
97. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 26-27 (1970); see Schwartz, supra note 92, at 1805 (noting Calabresi's evolving acceptance of tort law, rather than alternate system, as repository of economic principles).
98. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 9-14 (1987) (discussing criticisms of positive economic theory of tort law in context of deterrence); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 30 (1972) (explaining that "a negligence standard of liability, properly administered, is broadly consistent with an optimum investment in accident prevention by the enterprises subject to the standard").
99. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 92, at 1805 ("In Calabresi's 1970 view, tort rules were filled with a range of moralisms that were entirely inappropriate from a deterrence perspective."); see also Priest, supra note 48, at 15 ("Our legal system has made punitive damages part of a set of legal commands aimed at optimal balancing of safety and cost - that is, deterring behavior that is too risky, but not discouraging valuable innovation and production.").
100. The formula originally proposed by Learned Hand sets forth the basic efficiency approach to tort law. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169,173 (2d Cir. 1947): see also CALABRESI, supra note 97, at 263 (referring to "Learned Hand's classic negligence calculus"); Geistfeld, supra note 38, at 786 (explaining that tort law promotes deterrence through liability because of individual's incentive to weigh costs of precautions that might decrease injury against liability costs that might be incurred without safety precautions); Leebron, supra note 33, at 272 ("[T]he tort system acts as a kind of 'shadow pricing' mechanism, determining the cost of certain inputs (injuries), so that correct cost/benefit decisions may be made both by the relevant enterprise and the consumer." (footnote omitted)); Posner, supra note 98, at 73 (arguing that liability rules were designed to foster economically efficient levels of safety); Schwartz, supra note 92, at 1819 (stating that, in addition to its economic implications, Learned Hand's formula "is also conducive to an ethical explanation of the negligence liability standard"). Under Learned Hand's famous approach, a party should only be found negligent if the cost of precautions to prevent an accident (the "Burden" or "B"), is less than the cost of the resulting injury (the "Loss" or "L") discounted by the likelihood that injury would have occurred (the "Probability" or "P"). Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173. Thus, negligence should be imposed only where B < PL. Id. Interestingly, a defendant's spending more than PL to prevent an accident is not economically desirable in that the cost of precautions would exceed the cost of injuries. Indeed, if the only precaution available to defendant costs more than PL, economic efficiency would counsel the defendant against undertaking the precaution and simply letting the harm occur.
101. See James F. Blumstein, Making the System Work Better: Improving the Process for Determination of Noneconomic Loss, 35 N.M. L. REV. 401, 411 (2005) (contending that award variability undermines tort system's ability to function optimally as deterrent); Bovbjerg et al., supra note 34, at 909 (positing that greater predictability of outcomes would promote tort law's deterrent function); Sanders, supra note 34, at 496 n.43 ("[T]he ad hoc and unpredictable nature of [jury] awards arguably threatens insurance systems . . . and hinders the efficient operation of tort law's deterrence function.").
102. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 34, at 925 ("To send more effective-and efficient-deterrent signals to defendants, the system should focus primarily on consistency [and] predictability . . . ."); Leebron, supra note 33, at 311 ("From an economic perspective, a defendant who faces an unduly risky profile of potential tort judgments will likely invest in an inefficient level of safety and production.").
103. See Avraham, supra note 38, at 96 n.43 ("Another case where a wide distribution of awards is problematic [for optimal deterrence] is where defendants are risk averse."); Baldus et al., supra note 20, at 1117 ("Inadequate notice of the limits of potential liability may impair planning for risk-producing activities and induce over- or under-compliance. "); Bovbjerg et al., supra note 34, at 925 ("[E]rrors in valuation may cause overdeterrence-the taking of too many costly precautions, or withdrawal from risky activity altogether."); Chase, supra note 80, at 769 ("Unpredictability . . . leads to inefficiencies because of over- or under-precautions by affected industries and insurers."); Geistfeld, supra note 38, at 786 (arguing that unpredictability of awards in tort system keeps industries from making accurate cost-benefit analysis with regard to accident prevention); Leebron, supra note 33, at 272 ("If the tort system overvalues injuries, then business will invest too much in accident prevention. If, on the other hand, the tort system undervalues injuries, then there will be too little investment and hence too many injuries."); Schkade et al., supra note 38, at 1142 ("[T]he same case, presented to different jurors, will elicit similar ratings but quite different dollar awards, producing a situation where the similarly situated are not treated similarly. This unpredictability may well produce overdeterrence in risk-averse defendants or in any case muffled and confusing signals."). But see Tom Baker et al., The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental Approach, 89 IOWA L. REV. 443,485, 487 (2004) (noting concerns of Polinsky and Shavell about overdeterrence, but arguing that "uncertainty could indeed be manipulated in order to increase deterrence").
104. See, e.g.. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293,1300 (7th Cir. 1995) (positing that one jury determination could cripple entire industry).
105. See Trangsrud, supra note 19, at 76 ("Many arguments have been offered for these exceptional trials, but the principal factor driving recent experimentation with mass trials is the desire to conserve scarce judicial resources."); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (stating that rules of civil procedure "should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding" (emphasis added)).
106. As Professor Trangsrud has noted: Mass trials also introduce substantial additional complications, delays, and costs that would not exist if factually related claims were tried individually. To assemble all or most plaintiffs in a single venue, to resolve questions of representation and proof at a mass trial, and to decide the host of satellite issues and motions that such an extraordinary procedure creates requires a substantial amount of judicial and attorney time that would be unnecessary if the claims were tried individually in appropriate venues. It is difficult to quantify the extent to which the inefficiencies of mass trials offset the asserted efficiencies of such proceedings, but the frequent interlocutory appeals and reversals in cases litigated to date suggest that the offset is substantial. Trangsrud, supra note 19, at 78.
107. See David Friedman, More Justice for Less Money, 39 J.L. & ECON. 211,222 (1996) ("With more at stake, we would expect both parties to spend more on trying to win.").
108. See, e.g., Steven Garber, Product Liability, Punitive Damages, Business Decisions and Economic Outcomes, 1998 WlS. L. REV. 237, 257-70 (examining role tort system plays in economic decision making in pharmaceutical, medical device, and consumer product fields through mass tort litigation and punitive damages).
109. See infra Part IV.B for a discussion of multiple adjudications of individual cases as a viable approach to developing settlement values.
110. See, e.g., Jeffrey O'Connell & Christopher J. Robίnette, The Role of Compensation in Personal Injury Tort Law: A Response to the Opposite Concerns of Gary Schwartz and Patrick Atiyah, 32 CONN. L. REV. 137, 139 (1999) ("[W]e would extend the mixed theory of tort law beyond deterrence and corrective justice to include compensation. We argue compensation is not only a plausible goal of the tort system, it is a desirable-and indeed an essential-goal.").
111. o. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006), cert, denied, 128 S. Ct. 96 (2007).
112. As Florida's Third District Court of Appeal in Engle noted. "Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.220[] is based upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, [and] federal precedents are persuasive authority in . . . construction of Florida's class action rules." Liggett Group Inc. v. Engle (Engle I), 853 So. 2d 434, 444 n.5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003), approved in part, quashed in part, 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 96 (2007).
113. Engle II, 945 So. 2d at 1256. The original class definition was "[a]ll United States citizens and residents, and their survivors, who have suffered, presently suffer or who have died from diseases and medical conditions caused by their addiction to cigarettes that contain nicotine." Id. Defendants included cigarette companies "R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company; RJR Nabisco, Inc.; Philip Morris Incorporated (Philip Morris U.S.A.); Philip Morris Companies, Inc.; Lorillard Tobacco Company; Lorillard, Inc.; Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, individually and as successor by merger to The American Tobacco Company; Liggett Group Inc.; Brooke Group Holding Inc., and Dosal Tobacco Corp. The industry organizations are The Council for Tobacco Research-U.S.A.. Inc. and The Tobacco Institute, Inc." Id. at 1256 n.3. When Engle was certified, it "was the first smokers' case to be certified as a class action anywhere in the country." Engle I, 853 So. 2d at 442.
114. Engle II, 945 So. 2d at 1256.
115. Id.
116. Jury decision-making reliability decreases with smaller size. See Saks & Blanck, supra note 20, at 850 ("As the size of the jury decreases, the error variation in awards increases.").
117. Engle II, 945 So.2d at l256.
118. Id. at 1256-57. According to the Florida Supreme Court, the Phase I findings were: (1) that cigarettes cause some of the diseases at issue; (2) that nicotine is addictive; (3) that the defendants placed cigarettes on the market that were defective and unreasonably dangerous; (4) that the defendants made a false or misleading statement of material fact with the intention of misleading smokers; (4)(a) that the defendants concealed or omitted material information not otherwise known or available knowing that the material was false or misleading or failed to disclose a material fact concerning the health effects or addictive nature of smoking cigarettes or both; (5) that all of the defendants agreed to misrepresent information relating to the health effects of cigarettes or the addictive nature of cigarettes with the intention that smokers and the public would rely on this information to their detriment; (5)(a) that the defendants agreed to conceal or omit information regarding the health effects of cigarettes or their addictive nature with the intention that smokers and the public would rely on this information to their detriment; (6) that all of the defendants sold or supplied cigarettes that were defective; (7) that all of the defendants sold or supplied cigarettes that at the time of the sale or supply did not conform to representations of fact made by the defendants; (8) that all of the defendants were negligent; (9) that all of the defendants engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct or with reckless disregard relating to cigarettes sold or supplied to Florida smokers with the intent to inflict severe emotional distress; and (10) that all of the defendants' conduct rose to a level that would permit an award of punitive damages. Id. at 1257 n.4.
119. Id.. at 1257.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1254-56; see also Compensatory Damages in Engle Class Action Total $12.7 Million, MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: TOBACCO, Apr. 20,2000, at 4,4 (reporting distribution of total compensatory damages to each class representative); 7 Tobacco Firms Liable in First Class Action Trial; Damage Phase Begins Sept 7 in Cancer Cases, MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: TOBACCO, July 21, 1999, at 3, 3-4 (discussing jury verdict before damage phase began). Class representatives' damages were offset by their comparative fault. Engle II, 945 So. 2d at 1257. The trial court subsequently granted defendants' motion for a directed verdict as to class representative Frank Amodeo on statutes of limitations grounds for several claims, and the Florida Supreme Court held Mr. Amodeo's entire award to be barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 1254,1276.
122. Engle II, 945 So. 2d at 1257.
123. Id. at 1258. Under the trial plan, class members who were successful in Phase III would be entitled to an equal share of the punitive damages. Id.
124. Liggett Group Inc. v. Engle (Engle I), 853 So. 2d 434, 440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003), approved in part, quashed in part, 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 96 (2007).
125. Id. at 446-47 ("Because each class member had unique and different experiences that will require the litigation of substantially separate issues, class representation is not 'superior' to individual suits."). Such individualized issues included reliance, medical causation, affirmative defenses, damages, and choice of law. Id. at 446-48; see also id. at 450 ("As now demonstrated by the two-year trial, even though there is a common nucleus of facts concerning the defendants' conduct, this case presents a multitude of individualized issues which make it particularly unsuitable for class treatment."); id. ("Florida's class action rules, substantive tort law, and state and federal guarantees of due process and a fair trial, require class decertification.").
126. Engle I, 853 So. 2d at 450. The court noted that by determining class punitive damages before determining liability and compensatory damages for class members, "the class-wide punitive damages award improperly places the proverbial 'cart before the horse.'" Id. at 456. In addition, the court reversed the punitive damages award because the award was excessive under state and federal law, id., because improper race-based arguments by plaintiffs' counsel resulted in a "'runaway' jury award," id. at 458, and because the punitive damages verdict was barred by the tobacco settlement reached by the Florida Attorney General, id. at 467.
127. Engle I, 853 So. 2d at 455 & n.24 ("No statistical authority would condone an extrapolation of findings from three handpicked individuals to a population of 700,000."). The court noted that "[e]xtrapolation is not theoretically permissible in this case because of the absence of essential information concerning actual class size, class composition, and the amounts of compensatory damages ultimately recoverable by class members." Id. at 455. Here, "[e]ssentially, the compensatory damages awarded to the three Phase 2 plaintiffs proved nothing about the amounts of compensatory damages potentially recoverable by the hundreds of thousands of class members whose claims have not yet been tried." Id.
128. Engle II,945 So. 2d at 1254-55.
129. See id. at 1276-77 (stating "that smoking cigarettes causes aortic aneurysm, bladder cancer, cerebrovascular disease, cervical cancer, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, coronary heart disease, esophageal cancer, kidney cancer, laryngeal cancer, lung cancer (specifically, adenocarinoma [sic], large cell carcinoma, small cell carcinoma, and squamous cell carcinoma), complications of pregnancy, oral cavity/tongue cancer, pancreatic cancer, peripheral vascular disease, pharyngeal cancer, and stomach cancer"); see also Verdict Form for Phase I at 1-2, Engle v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-08273 CA-22 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 13,1999) (asking "[d]oes smoking cigarettes cause one or more of the following diseases or medical conditions?" and listing conditions).
130. See Engle II, 945 So. 2d at 1277 (describing Jury Question 2 finding as "that nicotine in cigarettes is addictive"); see also Verdict Form for Phase I, supra note 129, at 2 (containing title "Addiction/Dependence" and asking "[a]re cigarettes that contain nicotine addictive or dependence producing?").
131. See Engle II, 945 So. 2d at 1277 (describing Jury Question 3 finding as "that the defendants placed cigarettes on the market that were defective and unreasonably dangerous"); see also Verdict Form for Phase I, supra note 129, at 2 (containing title "Strict Liability" and asking "[d]id one or more of the Defendant Tobacco Companies place cigarettes on the market that were defective and unreasonably dangerous?").
132. See Engle II, 945 So. 2d at 1277 (describing Jury Question 4(a) finding as "that the defendants concealed or omitted material information not otherwise known or available knowing that the material was false or misleading or failed to disclose a material fact concerning the health effects or addictive nature of smoking cigarettes or both"); see also Verdict Form for Phase I, supra note 129, at 5 (containing title "Fraud by Concealment" and asking "[d]id one or more of the Defendants conceal or omit material information, not otherwise known or available, knowing the material was false and misleading, or failed to disclose a material fact concerning or proving the health effects and/or addictive nature of smoking cigarettes?").
133. See Engle II, 945 So. 2d at 1277 (describing Jury Question 5(a) finding as "that the defendants agreed to conceal or omit information regarding the health effects of cigarettes or their addictive nature with the intention that smokers and the public would rely on this information to their detriment"); see also Verdict Form for Phase I, supra note 129, at 7 (containing title "Civil Conspiracy-Concealment" and asking "[d]id two or more of the Defendants enter into an agreement to conceal or omit information regarding the health effects of cigarette smoking, or the addictive nature of smoking cigarettes, with the intention that smokers and members of the public rely to their detriment?").
134. See Engle II, 945 So. 2d at 1277 (describing Jury Question 6 finding as "that all of the defendants sold or supplied cigarettes that were defective"); see also Verdict Form for Phase I, supra note 129, at 8-9 (containing title "Breach of Implied Warranty," asking "[d]id one or more of the Defendant Tobacco Companies sell or supply cigarettes that were defective in that they were not reasonably fit for the uses intended?" and finding each defendant liable for all periods, except for Brooke Group, Ltd., Inc. prior to 1974).
135. See Engle II, 945 So. 2d at 1277 (describing Jury Question 7 as "that all of the defendants sold or supplied cigarettes that, at the time of sale or supply, did not conform to representations of fact made by said defendants"); see also Verdict Form for Phase I, supra note 129, at 9-10 (containing title "Breach of Express Warranty," asking "[d]id one or more of the Defendant Tobacco Companies sell or supply cigarettes that, at the time of sale or supply, did not conform to representations of fact made by said Defendant(s), either orally or in writing?" and answering affirmatively as to all defendants except as to Brooke Group Ltd., Inc. before July 1,1974).
136. See Engle II, 945 So. 2d at 1277 (stating Jury Question 8 finding "that all of the defendants were negligent"); see also Verdict Form for Phase I, supra note 129, at 10-11 (containing title "Negligence," asking "[h]ave Plaintiffs proven that one or more of the Defendant Tobacco Companies failed to exercise the degree of care which a reasonable cigarette manufacturer would exercise under like circumstances?" and answering affirmatively as to all defendants for all periods, except for Brooke before 1969).
137. Engle II, 945 So. 2d at 1255. The court, however, also found that jury findings against the defendants on fraud and misrepresentation, and on intentional infliction of emotional distress, were "inadequate to allow a subsequent jury to consider individual questions of reliance and legal cause" and therefore could not be applied to the rest of the class. Id. In addition, the finding of civil conspiracy for misrepresentation was not upheld, because it relied on the underlying misrepresentation finding. Id.
138. Id. at 1277 (noting that such claims must be "filed within one year of the mandate in this case").
139. Id. at 1268 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4)).
140. Engle II, 945 So. 2d at 1269. One problem with this approach is that to determine comparative fault, subsequent juries in class members' suits would have to compare the conduct of the plaintiff with that of the defendants, requiring a reexamination of the earlier Engle jury's finding on the defendants' conduct. See id. at 1270-71 (discussing possibility of reexamination and determining that it does not violate Florida Constitution). Such a reexamination could infringe the defendants' right to a jury trial under article I, section 22, of the Florida Constitution. Id. The Florida Supreme Court brushed off this criticism, noting that the second jury would only need to decide the extent to which the fault found by the prior jury caused harm, in proportion to the causation of any fault by plaintiff for his or her injury. Id. at 1270 (stating that '"in considering comparative negligence, the phase two jury would not be reconsidering the first jury's findings of whether Treasure Chest's conduct was negligent or the [vessel] unseaworthy, but only the degree to which those conditions were the sole or contributing cause of the class member's injury'" (quoting Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 628-29 (5th Cir. 1999)) (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted)). In dissent, however, Justices Wells and Bell vigorously rejected this analysis: "At a bare minimum, a second jury will rehear evidence of the defendant's conduct. There is a risk that in apportioning fault, the second jury could reevaluate the defendant's fault, determine that the defendant was not at fault, and apportion 100% of the fault to the plaintiff. In such a situation, the second jury would be impermissibly reconsidering the findings of a first jury." Id. at 1287 (Wells, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734,751 (5th Cir. 1996)).
141. See Engle II, 945 So. 2d at 1263 (majority opinion) ("[H]ad the jury found for Tobacco on the legal cause and reliance issues during Phase II, there would have been no opportunity for the jury to award the named plaintiffs damages of any type.").
142. Id. Addressing the recent United States Supreme Court opinion in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), the Florida Supreme Court also noted that "the amount of compensatory damages must be determined in advance of a determination of the amount of punitive damages awardable, if any, so that the relationship between the two may be reviewed for reasonableness." Engle II, 945 So. 2d at 1265. In addition, the Florida Supreme Court disagreed with Florida's Third District Court of Appeal and found that plaintiffs' counsel's improper racial comments did not require reversal. Id. at 1255. The Florida Supreme Court also held that the settlement agreement with tobacco defendants entered by the state in the attorney general litigation did not bar private punitive damages claims. Id. at 1261.
143. Jury Verdict, Lukacs v. Philip Morris Inc., No. 01-03822 CA 23 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 17, 2002) [hereinafter Lukacs Jury Verdict]; see also $12.5 Million Loss of Consortium Claim Reduced to $125,000, MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: TOBACCO, May 12,2003, at 4,4 (noting that "[t]he Lukacs case was the first individual tobacco case to go to trial after a previous Miami jury reached a historic verdict in Engle").
144. Jay Weaver, Jury Awards Smoker $37.5 Million, MIAMI HERALD, June 12, 2002, at 1A ("[Tobacco company] lawyers argue[d] that no class member - including Lukacs - should have been allowed to file an individual compensatory claim until [the Engle] appeal was resolved. But Miami-Dade Circuit Judge Amy Steele Donner disagreed, saying Lukacs' case was exceptional because the 76-year-old [was] dying.").
145. While the Lukacs court allowed plaintiff to rely on the Phase I finding on fraud, the Florida Supreme Court refused to allow subsequent plaintiffs to rely on this verdict because of the need to tie individual reliance to a particular fraudulent statement. Engle II, 945 So. 2d at 1255.
146. See Lukacs Jury Verdict, supra note 143, at 1-3 (including questions as to causation and reliance).
147. $12.5 Million Loss of Consortium Claim Reduced to $125,000, supra note 143, at 4 (noting that trial "lasted two weeks" and "[t]he jury deliberated for one day"). The court was to reduce the award by plaintiffs comparative fault. See Lukacs Jury Verdict, supra note 143, at 3 ("In awarding damages, do not make any reduction on account of any negligence or other fault you may have found on the part of JOHN LUKACS. The Court after trial will make any necessary reduction.").
148. $12.5 Million Loss of Consortium Claim Reduced to $125,000, supra note 143, at 5.
149. Recent post-Engle Florida tobacco plaintiffs have urged the Lukacs approach on Florida courts. See Posí-Engle Suit Wrongly Joins Local Defendants, Cigarette Companies Argue, MEALEY's LITIG. REP.: TOBACCO, Dec. 2006, at 9, 9-10 ("According to [the plaintiff] Pummer, the findings made by the Engle jury - including findings as to the health hazards and addictive propensities of cigarettes, the defendants' placement on the market of cigarettes that were defective and unreasonably dangerous, the defendants' concealment and misrepresentation of these material facts, and the defendants' negligence - are res judicata in the instant case." (emphasis omitted)); see also Engle Progeny Case Teeters Between State, Federal Courts, MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: TOBACCO, June 2007, at 13, 14 (noting that same argument as that made by plaintiff Pummer was made by plaintiff Brown); Supermarket's Status Key to Jurisdiction in Florida Tobacco Suit, MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: TOBACCO, Apr. 2007, at 16, 16 (recognizing that plaintiff Bonenfant made same argument as that made by plaintiff Pummer).
150. In Jones v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for $200,028.57. 830 So. 2d 854, 855 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002). The trial court, however, granted a new trial to the defendant on the grounds of erroneous admission of evidence, and the appellate court affirmed. Id. Similarly, in Widdick v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the jury returned a plaintiff verdict for $52,249 for medical expenses, $500,000 for the spouse's loss of her husband's companionship and pain and suffering, and $450,000 in punitive damages. Verdict Report, Widdick v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., No. 97-03522-CA, 1998 WL 933419, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 10, 1998). The First District Court of Appeal, however, reversed the judgment below, finding that the trial court impermissibly denied the defendants' motion to transfer venue. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Widdick, 717 So. 2d 572,573-74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
151. The eight verdicts for defendants were: Allen v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 01-4319-CIV-KING/O'SULLIVAN (S.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Allen Jury Verdict]; Verdict Form, Schwartz v. Liggett Group Inc., No. CA 03-2078-AA (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 2, 2006) [hereinafter Schwartz Verdict Form]; Verdict, Beckum v. Philip Morris USA Inc., No. 02-01836 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Apr. 29, 2005) [hereinafter Beckum Verdict]; Jury Verdict, Martinez v. Liggett Group, Inc., No. 02-20943-CA-15 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 11, 2005) [hereinafter Martinez Jury Verdict]; Verdict, Hall v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 00-1061 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Hall Verdict]; Verdict, Tune v. Philip Morris Inc., No. 97-4678-CI-11 (Fla. Cir. Ct. May 24, 2002) [hereinafter Tune Verdict]; Karbiwnyk v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 95-4697-CA (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 31, 1997) [hereinafter Karbiwnyk Jury Verdict]; Raulerson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 95-01820-CA (Fla. Cir. Ct. May 5, 1997) [hereinafter Raulerson Jury Verdict]. The plaintiff-verdict tobacco cases were: Verdict Form, Arnitz v. Philip Morris USA Inc., No. 00-4208-Div. H (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 2, 2004) [hereinafter Arnitz Verdict Form]; Verdict Form, Davis v. Liggett Group Inc., No. 02-18944(05) (Fla. Cir. Ct. Apr. 28, 2004) [hereinafter Davis Verdict Form]; Jury Verdict, Eastman v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., No. 97-5968-CI-11 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Apr. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Eastman Jury Verdict]: Verdict Form, Kenyon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 00-05401 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 12, 2001) [hereinafter Kenyon Verdict Form]; Jury Verdict, Carter v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., No. 95-00934-CA (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 9,1996) [hereinafter Carter Jury Verdict].
152. Allen Jury Verdict, supra note 151, at 1; Schwartz Verdict Form, supra note 151, at 1: Martinez Jury Verdict, supra note 151, at 1-2; Hall Verdict, supra note 151, at 2: Tune Verdict, supra note 151, at 1; Karbiwnyk Jury Verdict, supra note 151, at 1; Raulerson Jury Verdict, supra note 151, at 1.
153. Allen Jury Verdict, supra note 151, at 1; Schwartz Verdict Form, supra note 151, at 1; Martinez Jury Verdict, supra note 151, at 1; Hall Verdict, supra note 151, at 2; Tune Verdict, supra note 151, at 1; Karbiwnyk Jury Verdict, supra note 151, at 1; Raulerson Jury Verdict, supra note 151, at 1.
154. Allen Jury Verdict, supra note 151, at 2; Hall Verdict, supra note 151, at 2; Tune Verdict, supra note 151, at 1; Karbiwnyk Jury Verdict, supra note 151, at 1 (reporting jury finding with regard to "unreasonably dangerous and defective").
155. Allen Jury Verdict, supra note 151, at 2; Martinez Jury Verdict, supra note 151, at 2; Tune Verdict, supra note 151, at 2.
156. Martinez Jury Verdict, supra note 151, at 3; Tune Verdict, supra note 151, at 2.
157. See Schwartz Verdict Report, supra note 7, at *2 ("Plaintiff's counsel argued that she died from lung cancer caused by the
158. See Florida Jury Finds RJR, B&W Not Liable in Smoker's Injury Case, supra note 157, at 6 (noting jury finding of no liability for COPD of smoker Emmett Hall).
159. See Martinez v. Liggett Group, Inc., FLA. JURY VERDICT REP., July 2005, at 27, 27-28 (reporting jury verdict of no liability where repeated exposure to tobacco smoke gave plaintiff laryngeal cancer).
160. Carter Jury Verdict, supra note 151, at 1; Davis v. Liggett Group, Inc., FLA. JURY VERDICT REP., Aug. 2004, at 6, 6 (noting that jury found negligence for failure to warn of possible health risks from smoking).
161. Carter Jury Verdict, supra note 151, at 1.
162. Davis v. Liggett Group, Inc., supra note 160, at 6 ("The jury also found that the cigarettes manufactured by Liggett were defectively designed ....").
163. See id. at 6 (noting lung cancer diagnosis and $545,000 award); Kenyon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., VERDICTS, SETTLEMENTS & TACTICS, Dec. 12,2001 (noting $165,000 verdict awarded to plaintiff with COPD and lung cancer); Nick Ravo, Smoker's Suit Brings Award of $750,000 in Florida, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1996, § 4, at 8 ("[A] Florida jury yesterday awarded $750,000 to a Jacksonville man [Grady Carter] who smoked for 44 years before he was stricken with lung cancer ....").
164. See Kenyon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., supra note 163 (noting $165,000 verdict awarded to plaintiff with COPD and lung cancer).
165. See Lukacs Jury Verdict, supra note 143, at 1 (finding cigarettes manufactured by defendants caused plaintiff's tongue cancer).
166. See id. at 2 (finding defendants' cigarettes caused plaintiff's bladder cancer).
167. See, e.g., Martinez Jury Verdict, supra note 151, at 1 ("Was there negligence on the part of the Defendant in designing its products, resulting in a defect that was a legal cause of damage to Plaintiff ANGEL MARTINEZ?" (emphasis added)).
168. See, e.g., Florida Jury Awards Smoker $600,000 in Damages, Finds Smoker 40 Percent Liable, MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: TOBACCO, Oct. 2004, at 11, 11 (noting that defendant in Arnitz contended that harms from smoking were publicly known and that cigarettes were not defective); Florida Jury Rejects Smoker's Design Defect Claims, supra note 157, at 21 (characterizing defense's position in Beckum as arguing that "[r]elative safety of cigarette does not constitute defect"). For example, in Beckum, the defense offered numerous arguments challenging the defectiveness of the cigarettes at issue: [J]ust because a cigarette is not safe, does not make it defective. Philip Morris defended against Plaintiffs' defect claims by demonstrating that additives are common in many products and that none of the additives in cigarettes make them any more dangerous than they otherwise would be. It is the burning of tobacco, not the additives, that makes smoking dangerous. In addition, people expect cigarettes to have the very properties that Plaintiffs claim make[] them defective - they expect cigarettes to taste good, to contain nicotine, to contain additives and to be inhalable. Moreover, neither the government, the public-health community nor any company in the competitive tobacco industry has endorsed or accepted Plaintiffs' defect allegations. Beckum v. Philip Morris USA Inc., VERDICTS, SETTLEMENTS & TACTICS, Apr. 29, 2005, at 1. Defendants also contested product defect in cases they lost. See, e.g., Carter Awarded $750,000 in Tobacco Case Against Brown & Williamson Corp., MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: TOBACCO, Aug. 15, 1996, at 4,5 (detailing defense's argument that "[t]he company had a duty to warn only when the hazards of using the product were not reasonably obvious" or "if the manufacturers knew more than the consumers about the product's risks").
169. See, e.g., Davis v. Liggett Group, Inc., supra note 160, at 6 ("Defendants alleged that the dangers of smoking were well known, as far back as 1938.").
170. For example, in Beckum: Plaintiffs identified four alleged defects in Marlboro cigarettes: (1) that the tobacco was cured in a way that made it more carcinogenic than other means of curing; (2) that Philip Morris manipulated nicotine levels and additives to increase the likelihood of addiction; (3) that additives were used to make smoke more deeply inhalable (unlike pipe and cigar smoke), which increased the risk of lung cancer; and (4) that consumers did not expect cigarettes designed with filters to be as dangerous as they really were. Plaintiffs essentially maintained that a product is defective if it is not the safest product that can be made with the technology available at a given time. Accordingly, they argued that only the lowest-tar cigarette ever made was not defective. All other commercially available cigarettes are (and have always been) defective and unreasonably dangerous. Beckum v. Philip Morris USA Inc., supra note 168, at 1.
171. See id. (suggesting that jurors' questions showed their skepticism toward plaintiff's case). But see Martinez v. Liggett Group Inc., supra note 159, at 27 ("Defendant alleged that Plaintiff did not smoke its cigarettes."); Verdict Report, Schwartz v. Liggett Group, Inc., No. CA 03-02078-AA, 2006 WL 986357, at *2 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 13, 2006) (noting defense argument that plaintiff's death was not result of lung cancer, thereby obviating defendant's responsibility); Tune v. Philip Morris, Inc., FLA. JURY VERDICT REP., Mar. 2003, at 43, 43 (recognizing defense allegation that plaintiff's cancer may have come from regular use of alcohol, occupational exposure to harmful chemicals, and living in industrial state that posed increased cancer risk); Wilner Begins Third Assault on Tobacco, MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: TOBACCO, Oct. 9, 1997, at 12, 12 (noting defense contention that plaintiff's ailment was not caused by smoking).
172. Eastman Jury Verdict, supra note 151.
173. Id. at 1.
174. Id. at 2.
175. Kenyon Verdict Form, supra note 151.
176. Id. at 2-3; see also David Karp, Man Gets $165,000 in Tobacco Lawsuit, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 13, 2001, at 3B (noting defense lawyer Stephanie Parker's comment that "[w]e were very pleased that the jury found that our actions were reasonable").
177. Kenyon Verdict Form, supra note 151, at 2-3.
178. Id. at 4.
179. Davis Verdict Form, supra note 151.
180. Id. at 4.
181. Arnitz Verdict Form, supra note 151.
182. Id. at 2.
183. Carter Jury Verdict, supra note 151.
184. Id. at 2. No other damages were awarded. Id. After the removal of the upper lobe of his left lung in 1991, the plaintiff appeared to be free of cancer, but his doctor continued to monitor him. Jury Award to Ex-Smoker Rocks Tobacco Industry, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 10,19%, at News 1.
185. Eastman Jury Verdict, supra note 151, at 2-3. The jury also found the plaintiff fifty percent responsible under comparative fault. Id.
186. Lukacs Jury Verdict, supra note 143, at 4.
187. Id. at 3.
188. $12.5 Million Loss of Consortium Claim Reduced to $125,000, supra note 143, at 4 (describing judge's reduction in spouse's award for loss of consortium to $125,000).
189. Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc. (Engle II), 945 So. 2d 1246,1254 (Fla. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 96 (2007); Eastman Jury Verdict, supra note 151, at 3; Kenyon Verdict Form, supra note 151, at 5.
190. F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998).
191. Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 659-65; see also In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 839 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (approving class settlement and noting that "[i]f the claims are for one type of injury, a compensation schedule to calculate average loss could be developed based on sampling techniques"), aff'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
192. After the court completed Phase I of the Cimino trial plan, the jury found the defendants grossly negligent, Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 657, and also found that the defendants' products were defective for lack of an adequate warning, Cimino v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 304 (5th Cir. 1998). In addition, the jury found that punitive damages were warranted and assessed a punitive damages multiplier for actual damages awarded, the multiplier differing for each of the defendants. Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 657-58 (setting punitive damages multipliers of 1.5 times actual damages for two defendants, 2 times actual damages for one defendant, and 3 times damages for another defendant). The jury also addressed causation with regard to each of the ten named plaintiffs, awarded $3.5 million in actual damages, and apportioned the actual damages among defendants. Cimino, 151 F.3d at 304.
193. Based on a hearing in which the litigants presented expert testimony, the court held that the samples were in fact representative of the populations from which they were drawn. Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 664.
194. The court tried 15 mesothelioma sample plaintiffs out of 32 total plaintiffs, 25 lung cancer sample plaintiffs out of 186 total plaintiffs, 20 other cancer plaintiffs out of 58 total plaintiffs, 50 asbestosis plaintiffs out of 1050 total plaintiffs, and 50 pleural disease plaintiffs out of 972 total plaintiffs. Id. at 653. During these trials, defendants submitted evidence of plaintiffs' contributory negligence. Id. at 658-59.
195. Id. at 658,664-65.
196. Id. at 658-59,665.
197. Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 665. Two juries considered two damages questions for the 160 sample cases, including "(e) whether the Plaintiffs suffered from an asbestos-related injury or disease and, if so, (b) what damages the Plaintiffs incurred." Cimino, 151 F.3d at 303; see also Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 653 (explaining damages only awarded where asbestos exposure was "a producing cause of an asbestos-related injury or disease").
198. Remittiturs were issued in thirty-four of the pulmonary and pleural cases and in one mesothelioma case. Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 657.
199. Id. at 664-65.
200. Saks & Blanck, supra note 20, at 815.
201. To prevent a jury from unnaturally shaping its later verdicts to conform to its prior verdicts, Professors Saks and Blanck suggested that multiple juries be used to decide cases. Id. at 849 ("All measuring instruments change with use, perhaps especially humans. Thus, by the time a jury is hearing its 80th case on similar issues, it likely is not making decisions in the same way it did in its first decision of that series.").
202. See id. at 835-36 (discussing benefits of aggregation). Professors Saks and Blanck urge that the size of the sample required "depends in large part on the variability of the population. The more diverse the population, the larger the sample must be in order to reflect the population accurately." Id. at 842.
203. To conserve resources by having smaller sample groups, Saks and Blanck urged that subgroups of relative similarity be created. Id. ("The more homogenous the population, the fewer cases that need to be sampled. Thus, dividing the population of cases into homogenous subgroups not only serves the important goal of improving the accuracy of outcomes as required by distributive justice, but also allows for more efficient sampling." (footnote omitted)). Saks and Blanck noted that "[h]ow close a fit is close enough for the law's purposes is a legal judgment that eventually will have to be made by the courts or Congress, and requires a balancing of the costs of greater accuracy against the consequences of error." Saks & Blanck, supra note 20, at 844 (footnote omitted).
204. See id. at 835 (arguing that average award will better reflect damages than awards in individual cases). Notably, statistical sampling was only used for damages, not liability. See Bone, supra note 22, at 597 ("[U]sing sampling to measure liability ... would require a major change in tort law. Tort liability is binary: a defendant is either liable or not.... [S]ampling applied to liability can only provide an estimate of the probability that defendant is liable to any plaintiff in an arbitrarily chosen case."). Subsequently, Professor David Friedman sought to refine the proposals of Professors Saks and Blanck by making more accurate the amounts distributed to each plaintiff. Friedman, supra note 107, at 211-12. Under Professor Friedman's proposed procedure, the plaintiffs would submit estimates of each of their claims, the defendants would select a sample of those plaintiffs whose claims would be tried, and the ratio between estimate and real verdict would be applied to the remaining plaintiffs. Id. at 216-18. In situations with very large numbers of plaintiffs, Professor Friedman would allow the plaintiff to submit estimates for classes of plaintiffs, rather than individual plaintiffs; defendants would choose classes for trial; individual cases within the class would be selected at random; and again the resulting ratio between the plaintiff estimate and the litigated result would be applied to all remaining classes of plaintiffs. Id. at 218. Alternately, Professor Friedman suggested a more sophisticated approach in which the plaintiffs propose a statistical model to determine each plaintiff's recovery based on variables, the defendants put forth a sampling protocol, setting forth how plaintiffs are to be chosen for trial, the court selects plaintiffs randomly pursuant to the sampling protocol, the verdicts are used to refine the model, and awards for the remaining plaintiffs are given in accordance with the refined model. Id. at 218-19.
205. Professors Saks and Blanck argued that this approach better approximated corrective justice than the lottery each plaintiff faced at falling somewhere within a broad range of possible jury awards. Saks & Blanck, supra note 20, at 835-36 ("By awarding that same amount to each of the remaining 900 plaintiffs, the court also does better, in terms of accuracy of award, than it would if it conducted 900 individualized trials. The goals of corrective justice are better achieved: defendants pay to each plaintiff an amount that is better correct [sic] than could otherwise be accomplished." (footnote omitted)).
206. See Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 89, at 1391 ("According to the critics, such certification makes trial very risky for the defendant: its liability to the class is determined by a lone jury issuing a single all-or-nothing verdict-a single 'toss of the coin.'").
207. Id. at 1382 n.13 ("[I]f the court held 10 trials on liability, and these resulted in two verdicts for the plaintiff and eight for the defendant, the defendant would pay 20% of the plaintiffs' damages."). Other articles have also endorsed sampling for liability. See Saul Levmore, Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring Wrongs, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 691, 697-98 (1990) (discussing "probabilistic rule" for assessing damages for multiple victims with similar injuries); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 917-19 (1984) (explaining how "damage scheduling" might be useful, cost-effective way to compensate plaintiffs on class, rather than individualized, basis).
208. See Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 89, at 1382 n.13 (noting that court "might base its judgment on the majority of verdicts: for example, if more than half of the verdicts favor the plaintiffs, they collect their full damages; otherwise, they collect nothing"). Professors Hay and Rosenberg propose variations of their methodology for general and special verdicts: [T]he multiple class trials approach can be adapted for both general and special verdict trials. In the context of general verdict trials, where the jury is charged with deciding both liability and damages for the class as a whole, the court would take the average of different jury awards (with a verdict for the defendant on liability being equivalent to a damage award of zero). In special verdict trials, the procedure could easily be modified to yield equivalent results. For example, if the jury is charged with deciding the question of liability alone, the court could discount the ultimate damage award by the proportion of jury verdicts for the defendant. If three-fifths of the juries return a verdict against the defendant, the court could award the class three-fifths of the aggregate damages, and so forth. Id. at 1405-06. Professor Rosenberg has also advocated the use of damage scheduling in class actions based on sample of class members. Rosenberg, supra note 207, at 917 ("At its most general, the schedule might simply compensate all class members at a level equal to the average loss."); see id. at 917 n.252 ("These estimates are derived through sampling techniques."); id. at 907 n.221 ("Courts may employ multiple juries or trials to derive an average judgment on one or more common questions. This procedure closely resembles the representative trials used in test-case-pattern-settlement arrangements and, less formally, in the design of settlement schedules.").
209. Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 89, at 1382.
210. Id. at 1404; see also id. at 1404-05 ("[I]f the court holds two trials (or, equivalently, holds a single trial but empanels two juries), the odds that the plaintiffs will recover nothing drop to one in four; if the court holds four trials, the odds drop to one in sixteen-"). Hay and Rosenberg also argue that the average amount defendant is to pay would therefore be the same as in individual jury trials. Id. at 1405 ("Multiple class trials neither increase nor decrease the overall liability exposure of defendants or recovery by classes. Assuming courts award a figure equal to the average verdict returned by different juries, the aggregate expected judgment from multiple class trials remains the same as it would be from a single trial."); Rosenberg, supra note 207, at 917 ("As long as the defendant was liable for no more than the aggregate loss attributable to its tortious conduct, the defendant could raise no valid complaint that either utilitarian tenets or its own rights had been violated."). Apart from the problems in determining individual claim values from an unwieldy class action, class action treatment of mass torts would also be precluded by the presence of individual issues. See Byron G. Stier, Resolving the Class Action Crisis: Mass Tort Litigation as Network, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 863, 879-83 (discussing individual issues of decision causation, medical causation, product defect, damages, and choice of law).
211. See Bone, supra note 22, at 576 n.44 ("Sampling in a case like Cimino operates differently. Sampling [in Cimino] is used as a trial technique, not as a way to estimate probabilistic variables relevant to recovery."); Donald G. Gifford, The Challenge to the Individual Causation Requirement in Mass Products Torts, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 873, 922-24 (2005) (discussing use of expert testimony in state of Minnesota tobacco expense recoupment litigation and behavioral science and survey methodology in Simon II class certified by Judge Weinstein); Christopher J. Roche, Note, A Litigation Association Model to Aggregate Mass Tort Claims for Adjudication, 91 VA. L. REV. 1463, 1504-05 (2005) (discussing use of statistical expert testimony by Judge Weinstein in In re Simon II tobacco litigation); see also In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86, 127-29 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (demonstrating experts' use of sampling to statistically evaluate large groups of claimants), vacated and remanded, 407 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2005).
212. Walker and Monahan argue that their approach "permits abandonment of the uncertainties of due process balancing and connection with the more precise evidentiary tests established in Daubert." Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Sampling Damages, 83 IOWA L. REV. 545, 561 (1998); see also id. at 563 ("After certification, the class representative, charged with the burden of proof on damages, would employ an expert to conduct the damage survey." (footnote omitted)). The trial judge would rule under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), on the admissibility of the survey report before the jury. Walker & Monahan, supra, at 563-64. Walker and Monahan note: A prudent class representative might wish to have earlier judicial review, and might therefore present the details of a proposed survey-the categories into which the population will be stratified, the sample size for each category, the survey instrument itself-to the court in a motion in limine seeking a determination regarding admission of the results before conducting the survey. Id. at 564.
213. Walker and Monahan also propose that the defendant use discovery mechanisms to undertake its own survey of the plaintiff population for damage purposes. Walker & Monahan, supra note 212, at 564. Walker and Monahan suggest that "[a]lternatively, both sides might choose to employ an expert and conduct a joint survey of damages." Id. at 564-65. Of course, differences in choices of methodology and experts may likely preclude such cooperation. See id. at 565 (recognizing infrequent use of joint surveys).
214. Id. at 563 ("The first step would be certification of a class of plaintiffs co-extensive with the population to be surveyed."); see also id. at 565 ("No individual data would be presented to the jury and no individual damage verdicts would be required or permitted."); Laurens Walker, A Model Plan to Resolve Federal Class Action Cases by Jury Trial, 88 VA. L. REV. 405, 442 (2002) (discussing need for class certification to enable plaintiffs to "realize benefits").
215. Walker, supra note 214, at 433 ("[S]ampling would most often be used by plaintiffs as a technique for determining gross damages."); Walker & Monahan, supra note 212, at 546 ("Our thesis is that a complete solution of the numbers problem in mass torts can only be achieved by abandoning any pretense of individual adjudication and randomly sampling damages without apology."). Referring to their proposal as "A Survey Model Without Apology," id. at 556, Professors Walker and Monahan would introduce the survey results, if admitted into evidence, before the jury with an aggregated estimate of the total amount of compensation divisible among the class, id. at 563-64, 565 n.140 (providing report and testimony of Special Master and noting amount may be divided "among subclasses").
216. Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Sampling Liability, 85 VA. L. REV. 329, 342 (1999) [hereinafter Walker & Monahan, Sampling Liability] ("A strong reading of Daubert thus suggests that in a federal court no statute would be required to permit the use of sampling to determine liability. Sampling is a widely accepted scientific method, and, if validly conducted, would constitute evidence under Daubert." (footnote omitted)). This approach may still use a single jury to decide class action liability. Walker, supra note 214, at 445 (proposing "Model Plan with an operational capability that would permit the trial by a single jury of virtually any class action case in federal court"). Professors Walker and Monahan argue that their method "would be both less expensive and faster" than alternatives. Walker & Monahan, supra note 212, at 565. Professors Walker and Monahan also argue that their proposal benefits from leaving the surveying under the control of the parties, because "when control of the choice of information is left to the parties, the acceptability of the result is significantly higher than when the choice of information is left to others, including judges." Id. at 565-66. Professors Walker and Monahan propose that sampling should apply in states where statistical causation statutes were passed in the wake of the attorney general tobacco litigation. Walker & Monahan, Sampling Liability, supra, at 350 (noting "[t]he response of some states in passing statutes permitting use of 'statistical analysis'" and urging that "such statutes should, at a minimum, be construed to permit sampling to determine elements of liability when proof might otherwise be prohibited by cost"). In other states, Walker and Monahan urge that sampling meets Daubert standards. Id. ("According to a strong reading of Daubert, a valid sample of some element of liability is valid legal evidence of that element."). Examples of such sampled liability include the use of surveys to determine exposure and epidemiological studies for alternative causation. Id. at 337 (noting that Minnesota attorney general tobacco litigation used survey of state residents to adjust damages for disease and expenses not cause by defendant).
217. See Walker, supra note 214, at 444 n.193 (recounting Judge Posner's concern in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995) that defendants in class action "'might. . . easily be facing $25 billion in potential liability (conceivably more), and with it bankruptcy. They may not wish to roll these dice. That is putting it mildly. They will be under intense pressure to settle.'" (omission in original) (quoting Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1298))); id. (noting Judge Smith's concern in Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996), that '"class certification creates insurmountable pressure on defendants to settle .... The risk of facing an all-or-nothing verdict presents too high a risk, even when the probability of an adverse judgment is low.'" (alteration omitted) (quoting Castano, 84 F.3d at 746))).
218. Id. ("Concerns about the coercion of defendants could be met by employing the Model Plan in conjunction with a single-state class format. Typically, a number of trials would be held, diminishing the coercion concern."). They also argue the approach would garner greater efficiency than individual trials. Id. ("As compared to individual adjudication, the Model Plan would yield great benefits even if limited to a statewide class. Fifty trials, at most, would be much better than hundreds or thousands of individual trials.").
219. Robinson & Abraham, supra note 87, at 1490 (noting that authors previously suggested applying techniques developed for mass tort settlements to regular trials, and comparing this innovation to that of Judge Parker in Cimino); id. at 1495 ("We do not doubt that making aggregative valuations conclusive for all claimants would work a radical change in the common-law system. The change is not so radical as to be beyond the contemplation of practically minded judges, as is evident from Cimino-").
220. Professors Glen Robinson and Kenneth Abraham have also proposed a "scheme [that] would draw on a wider database of prior adjudications and settlements by different juries, courts, or parties." Id. at 1492. Claim profiles would be assembled by statisticians and others under special master supervision to include legally relevant factors pertinent to liability, causation, and damages. Kenneth S. Abraham & Glen O. Robinson, Aggregative Valuation of Mass Tort Claims, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1990, at 137,141-42.
221. See Abraham & Robinson, supra note 220, at 141 ("The most modest use would be to permit a profile to be introduced as statistical evidence that the trier of fact-a jury in virtually all of these cases-could consider in evaluating the claim."); Robinson & Abraham, supra note 87, at 1493 (discussing factfinders' use of claim profiles).
222. Either a jury or a hearing could determine into which claim category a particular plaintiff fell. Robinson & Abraham, supra note 87, at 1494 (suggesting that jury could determine which profile best suits claim); id. at 1499 n.50 ("In our proposed scheme, the hearing on the claim profiles could be a regular jury trial, though we are skeptical of the usefulness of a jury in such a hearing inasmuch as the hearing would focus on highly technical questions of statistical methodology.").
223. Id. at 1494 (suggesting approach of "removing individualized determinations altogether and making the profiles conclusive of all claims"); cf. Alexandra D. Lahav, The Law and Large Numbers: Preserving Adjudication in Complex Litigation, 59 FLA. L. REV. 383, 435 (2007) (suggesting that "sampling could be used" and that "[t]he sample could be historical cases that have been adjudicated or settled, or a group of concurrent cases"). Robinson and Abraham also considered giving the claim profiles presumptive legal authority, subject to a special showing to rebut it. Abraham & Robinson, supra note 220, at 146 ("It may be useful... to consider giving the profiles special legal authority by making them presumptive of the value of each claim within the class to which the profile applies."); see also Robinson & Abraham, supra note 87, at 1494 (suggesting that jury would determine which of prespecified profiles applied and then make award within "defined interval around the median claim value of the relevant profile, unless the plaintiff or the defendant showed that the particular claim cannot be fairly represented by any of the profiles" (footnote omitted)). But Robinson and Abraham rejected this approach because it would be too "cumbersome" and they were "not sure a presumption could be meaningfully applied in this context." Robinson & Abraham, supra note 87, at 1494. Robinson and Abraham, however, focus on the use of claim profiles as dispositive of claims. Id. at 1495 (explaining objective of discovering effects of aggregative determinations and, to facilitate that goal, assumption of conclusive nature of claim profiles).
224. Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297,321 (5th Cir. 1998).
225. See id. at 313 ("[U]nder Texas personal injury products liability law causation and damages are determined respecting plaintiffs as 'individuals, not groups.'" (quoting In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 711 (5th Cir. 1990))); id. at 337 (Garza, J., specially concurring) ("The inescapable reality is that Texas law requires that determinations of damages be made as to individuals, not as to groups, and this Court is powerless to alter that reality."); In re Fibreboard Corp, 893 F.2d at 711 ("Texas has made its policy choices .... These choices are reflected in the requirement that a plaintiff prove both causation and damage.. .. These elements focus upon individuals, not groups. The same may be said, and with even greater confidence, of wage losses, pain and suffering, and other elements of compensation."); James M. Wood, The ludicial Coordination of Drug and Device Litigation: A Review and Critique, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 325,354 (1999) ("[F]actors affecting the presumed accuracy of the aggregation of claims certainly include the discovery of an alternative cause of injury in an individual plaintiff, [or] the discovery of no causation defense verdicts in individual cases . . . ."); R. Joseph Barton, Note, Utilizing Statistics and Bellwether Trials in Mass Torts: What Do the Constitution and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Permit?, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 199, 228 (1999) ("The inescapable fact is that individual causation cannot be presented sufficiently by extrapolating results from even statistically significant class or bellwether representatives. To require merely a showing via statistical estimates would change the requisite proof by treating each claim as if it were fungible.").
226. See Arch v. Am. Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469, 493 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (asserting that expert statistical evidence will not relieve case's manageability problems because each class member's "degree of injury" is still relevant); Bone, supra note 22, at 573 (noting differences in facts and damages that make sample plaintiffs poor substitutes for those not sampled).
227. S.C. § 2072 (2000); see, e.g., Barton, supra note 225, at 229 ("Requiring no more than statistical proof is a substantial amendment of substantive rights, an action forbidden by the Rules Enabling Act and beyond the power of the federal judiciary." (footnote omitted)).
228. See Fìbreboard, 893 F.2d at 710-11 ("We are . . . uncomfortable with the suggestion that a move from one-on-one 'traditional' modes is little more than a move to modernity. Such traditional ways of proceeding reflect far more than habit. They reflect the very culture of the jury trial and the case and controversy requirement of Article III."); id. at 711 ("[T]hese concerns find expression in defendants' right to due process."); Donald G. Gifford, The Death of Causation: Mass Products Torts' Incomplete Incorporation of Social Welfare Principles, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 943, 996 (2006) ("[C]ourts have held that the kinds of 'approximations' of causation and damages that Judge Parker pioneered ... are a violation of due process . . . ."); Martin H. Redish. Procedural Due Process and Aggregation Devices in Mass Tort Litigation, 63 DEF. COUNS. J. 18, 18-19 (1996) (arguing that aggregation devices encourage inaccurate decisions and undermine litigants' perception of legitimacy of adjudicatory process).
229. See Cimino, 151 F.3d at 320-21 (noting defendant's "Seventh Amendment rights to have a jury determine[] the distinct and separable issues of the actual damages of each of the extrapolation plaintiffs"); Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 89, at 1406 (noting that "[o]ne possible objection to this proposal is that the Seventh Amendment may be read to give a party the right to insist on a single all-or-nothing trial"); Lahav, supra note 223, at 435 ("[E]ven if the [Seventh Amendment] constitutional problem could be overcome . . . , it would still mean tolerating a level of acceptable error that might make proponents of the day-in-court ideal feel uncomfortable."). But see Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 344 F.3d 211, 226 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting in nonclass union reimbursement action that Fifth Circuit's Cimino decision "struck down a revised trial plan" as violative of Seventh Amendment because "the jury was not to determine damages of the group as consolidated, but was only to consider the damages of certain members of the plaintiff class"); Victoria Branton, Note, A Case for the Jury?: Seventh Amendment Rights in Asbestos Litigation, 3 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 231,244 (1998) ("Arguably,... the right to jury trial does attach to asbestos litigation in so far as it can be honored without depriving the litigants of an adequate remedy. Clearly, one-on-one jury trials deprive litigants of an adequate remedy, but jury trials in the aggregation procedure of Cimino do not."). Importantly, the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Cimino also criticized as dicta the comments favoring mass tort statistical sampling and extrapolation in a 1997 Fifth Circuit decision, In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016 (5th Cir. 1997), which in fact reversed the trial plan before the court. Cimino, 151 F.3d at 318. Judge Jones, concurring in Chevron, also noted the "fine line between deriving results from trials based on statistical sampling and pure legislation. . . . Essential to due process for litigants ... is their right to the opportunity for an individual assessment of liability and damages in each case." Chevron, 109 F.3d at 1023 (Jones, J., concurring). Interestingly, the Chevron decision was authored by Judge Parker, who, before being elevated to the Fifth Circuit, wrote the Cimino trial opinion as a federal district judge. See id. at 1017 (listing Judge Robert M. Parker as author of majority opinion); see also Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 650 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (listing Chief Judge Robert M. Parker as opinion's author), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998). Moreover, refusal to opt out may not be sufficient for a class member to waive his jury trial right under the Seventh Amendment. See, e.g., Branton, supra, at 236 ("In light of the jury trial's historical significance, an opt out procedure may be inadequate to waive the right to trial by jury despite its adequacy for waiving personal jurisdiction; defendants may have the right under Shutts to challenge the adequacy of the plaintiffs' waiver.").
230. Even Saks and Blanck admit such problems render questionable the consent of these better-claim plaintiffs to the aggregative procedure: [0]ne is left to
231. See Wood, supra note 225, at 354 ("Such a model, while seeming to function well in a scientific laboratory, hardly is capable of taking into account the unique nature of a human plaintiff or the individual issues of liability, causation, and contributory negligence."). Indeed, as James Wood discusses in detail, because of the variation of plaintiffs in drug and medical cases, sampling is not appropriate: If any form of categorization of cases is to be fair and constitutional, there must be a scientific certainty that a sample plaintiff is in fact identical to all other plaintiffs included in a category. Any variation among the claimants, as recognized by Saks and Blanck, would result in a variation in damages. Thus, for a hypothetical statistical aggregation of personal injury claims to work accurately, the court first must find: that all of the plaintiffs were healthy before exposure to the medicine; that their health did not bring about their use of the product (i.e., that there is no susceptibility bias); that the spectrum of their injuries can be classified by severity; that any one plaintiff will have only one type of injury from an exposure to the medicine; that no risk factors, other than a plaintiff's contributory negligence, could have caused or been a cofactor in producing the injury; that the status of the injury is either static or has a known and predictable clinical course; that the injury cannot evolve into another type of injury; and that the health, treatments, environment, and behaviors of a plaintiff will not influence the clinical course of his or her injury. Any variation in any one of these factors will prevent an aggregated or statistical finding that two individuals claimed to have been harmed by the medicine are entitled to the same compensation. Thus, the impossibility of a statistical sampling in a prescription drug or medical device case becomes obvious. Id. at 355; see also Bone, supra note 22, at 564 ("All proposals that substitute statistically generated average verdicts for individualized tort judgments smooth over case-specific variation and sacrifice individual participation, at least to some extent."); Wood, supra note 225, at 354 (observing that methods that use statistical averages to inform verdicts necessarily fail to capture some case-specific variation).
232. See Bone, supra note 22, at 577 ("The fact is that, in many mass tort aggregations, an individual trial will give a more accurate verdict than sampling for at least some cases. This is especially true for sample averaging .... But it is also true for the more powerful-and more expensive-technique of regression analysis . . . since any cost-effective regression procedure has to ignore many damage-related variables."). Indeed, the confidence level discussed by Professors Saks and Blanck only refers to the chance that the population mean falls within some range around the sampled mean. See Gibson, supra note 230, at 480 ("[A] 99% confidence level does not indicate a 99% probability exists that the sample exactly reflects the population. Rather, a 99% chance exists that the true population mean is within some range of values around the sample mean."). Even if one accepts Professor McGovern's finding that in Jenkins v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986), "fewer than ten variables . . . can explain approximately 90% of the variation among case values," Saks & Blanck, supra note 20, at 845 n.188 (quoting Francis E. McGovern, The Cycle of Mass Tort Litigation 15 (Yale Law Sch. Program in Civil Liab., Working Paper No. 122, 1990)), that approach still quashes individuality and accepts a 10% error. See Bone, supra note 22, at 586 ("In an asbestos case, for example, the amount of individual damages depends on a number of complex and often hotly contested variables.... [T]he resulting unexplained error, combined with sampling and measurement error, may well exceed individual trial error.").
233. See Gibson, supra note 230, at 478 ("Because contributory negligence, such as smoking, is relevant to quality of life and life expectancy, those non-sample plaintiffs who do not smoke are penalized by receiving averaged awards that include awards to smokers. In fact, some of the representative plaintiffs' awards in Cimino II [751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990)] were zero due to smoking." (footnote omitted)).
234. As Saks and Blanck admit: The more they vary from each other in legally relevant ways, the more we move away from aggregation's accuracy-producing benefits and move toward its error-producing harms. . . . At some point along the heterogeneity-homogeneity continuum, aggregation ceases to improve the accuracy of traditional trials and becomes a vitiation- ... The more heterogeneous the subgroups, the greater the error involved. Saks & Blanck, supra note 20, at 836-37; see also Bordens & Horowitz, Limits of Sampling and Consolidation, supra note 25, at 47-48 ("Errors will increase as the degree of heterogeneity among aggregated cases increases.... [I]f the cases selected for trial from the underlying plaintiff population are heterogenous [sic], the awards to the plaintiffs in that sample may not be valid (that is, a plaintiff receiving more or less than is commensurate with the injury sustained)." (footnote omitted)); Wood, supra note 225, at 354 ("[T]he more the cases vary from each other in legally relevant ways, the more one moves away from aggregation's accuracy-producing benefits towards its error-producing harms." (citing Saks & Blanck, supra note 20, at 837)).
235. See Bone, supra note 22, at 599-600 ("[T]he sample average ... is very likely to be less than actual damages for cases above the mean and greater than actual damages for cases below the mean. In many situations... high damage plaintiffs will receive verdicts substantially lower than the verdicts they would receive from an individual trial." (footnote omitted)).
236. See Barton, supra note 225, at 226-27 ("[I]f there were five disease categories, and ten significant variables, and an average of five different possible outcomes for each variable, this would produce 250 separate subclasses. . . . [S]uch a high number of trials hardly produces a more efficient outcome and demonstrates the lack of superiority of this method." (footnotes omitted)).
237. See Bordens & Horowitz, Limits of Sampling and Consolidation, supra note 25, at 48 ("[T]here may be an assimilation effect in which the outlier serves as an anchor with the less severely injured plaintiff's award being assimilated to that plaintiff. The result under this scenario is that the less severely injured plaintiff receives more money than she would have had she received a separate trial.")- Or, conversely, when faced with a high outlier, the jury may reduce awards to other less severely injured plaintiffs. Id. The jury may even be biased to bring the total awards together, thus lowering the award to the high plaintiff and raising that of the lower plaintiffs. Id.
238. Id. at 55 (questioning whether Cimino resulted in higher damages based on juries' knowledge that claims at trial represented population of more than 2000 plaintiffs). Professors Bordens and Horowitz, in an experiment with mock juries, found that reference to a larger plaintiff population significantly raised the punitive damages awarded. Id. at 58 ("With respect to the size of the nontrial plaintiff population, the plaintiff with the weakest case received a higher punitive damage award when jurors were told that there were hundreds of plaintiffs. In comparison, when no information as to the size of the plaintiff population was provided, or when there were twenty-six other plaintiffs, the awards were significantly lower than in the hundreds condition."). This increase was due to the increased blame allotted to the defendant. Bordens & Horowitz, Limits of Sampling and Consolidation, supra note 25, at 59 (noting that juries both assigned increased blame to defendants and awarded higher damages when aware of increased number of nontrial plaintiffs).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 59-60.
241. Id. at 64 (asserting that juries returning verdicts favoring plaintiffs thereafter were psychologically disposed to favor later plaintiffs).
242. See id. ("If a person exerts a great deal of effort in some area, to admit that the effort was unjustified creates a negative motivational state called dissonance.... One way to reduce dissonance is to justify the effort expended or maintain a course of action to which one has become committed.").
243. See Wood, supra note 225, at 354 (explaining limitations of sampling models where sampled population evolves over time); id. at 355-56 ("[T]he early cases of a mass tort [may] represent the most obvious or more serious injuries, while later cases may involve less severe injuries. In other instances, certain injuries, such as cancer, may appear only after the passage of time, whereas less severe injuries from the same exposure may appear earlier."). Moreover, early filed cases may not be representative of all plaintiffs. See Bone, supra note 22, at 587 n.74 ("[I]t is not clear that the early cases will necessarily reflect a random sample of the larger case population. If factors such as severity of injury, amount of litigation resources, and likelihood of success correlate with early filing and disposition, then regression could produce skewed damage awards."). And settlements may not be comparable to trial verdicts. See id. ("[M]ixing settlements and trial verdicts in the same database may create . . . problems. Settlements are influenced by a number of factors other than the expected trial verdict, including the transaction costs of trial versus settlement and the parties' relative bargaining power and strategic skill." (citation omitted)); id. ("[I]t can be argued that the only proper measure of damages is the trial verdict because only the trial verdict reflects the considered judgment of neutral decisionmakers about 'true' damages, those corresponding to the parties' legal rights.").
244. Bordens & Horowitz, Limits of Sampling and Consolidation, supra note 25, at 63; see also Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 941, 960 n.93 (1995) (noting trade-off between addressing claim's unique characteristics and achieving efficiency). As a result of their studies of jury bias in sampling, Professors Bordens and Horowitz conclude that their "research suggests that the consolidation strategy employed in Cimino can result in verdicts and damage awards that differ significantly under certain circumstances from those rendered in separate trials." Bordens & Horowitz, Limits of Sampling and Consolidation, supra note 25, at 60.
245. See Bone, supra note 22, at 573-74 (observing that large stakes of litigation give plaintiffs strong interest in directing their own litigation); Trangsrud, supra note 19, at 75 ("[P]arties often wish to settle or litigate claims based upon a variety of personal economic considerations and intangible personal beliefs or concerns which are unique to them. If the plaintiffs enjoy autonomy over the settlement or trial of their particular claim, they can obtain the outcome best suited to their personal views on the proper disposition of this property.").
246. See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 230, at 479 ("[T]he jury trial remains one judicial process whose goal is not accuracy. The right of personal participation in the one-on-one forum contemplated by Article III has some bite as a right in itself."); see also id. at 480 ("An approach to due process that focuses exclusively on accuracy transforms the traditional tort suit into a sterile, scientific inquiry. The increasing use of science to assure accuracy threatens to fundamentally change the core of traditional decision-making processes.").
247. As Professor Trangsrud has stated: The English and American judicial systems have long favored individual control and disposition of substantial personal injury and wrongful death claims .... Such claims usually involve incidents of tremendous importance to the individual plaintiff or the plaintiffs family.... Until recently, our system treated such incidents and the tort claims they created with uncompromised due process. This we should continue to do. Trangsrud, supra note 19, at 74.
248. See id. ("The first purpose of our civil justice system is and should be to offer corrective justice in disputes arising between private parties.").
249. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 22, at 611-14 (arguing that sampling does not fit well with established tort doctrine focusing on harm-based compensation of individual plaintiffs).
250. See Gibson, supra note 230, at 483 ("[C]oncern for economy should not define the parameters of basic constitutional rights. . . . [E]specially given the array of options open to courts for decreasing caseloads, plaintiffs' and defendants' rights to a fair trial must take precedence over expediency.").
251. See Trangsrud, supra note 19, at 74 ("Regardless of the burden such claims put on the judicial resources of our courts, we ought not compromise in the quality of process we afford these tort plaintiffs.").
252. See Bone, supra note 22, at 593-94 (noting that sampling encourages frivolous lawsuits because plaintiffs can recover without actively participating in lawsuit).
253. Dissenting to the Report of the Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation in 1991, Judge Thomas Hogan used words that would be echoed in subsequent judicial opinions: [T]he use of class action "collective" trials (trials by aggregation of claims) .... is a novel and radical procedure that has never been accepted by an appellate court. It has been challenged as being constitutionally suspect in denying defendants their due process and jury trial rights as to individualized claimants, as well as conflicting with the court's obligation to apply state law. It would establish a new form of tort liability with far reaching ramifications to other mass tort cases. .. . Trial by aggregation of claims and then the extrapolation of the damages by the court has been recognized by the committee itself as being "the most radical solution ...." Thomas F. Hogan, Separate Dissenting Statement of Judge Thomas F. Hogan to Report of the Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation, in REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS LIή GATION 41, 41 (1991); see also Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 344 F.3d 211,225 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding no merit in appellants' arguments that "aggregate proof was not permissible because: 1) it violated Appellants' constitutional right to a jury trial; [and] 2) it violated Appellants' constitutional right to due process" but certifying appellants' third argument, that "Section 349 requires individualized proof," to the New York Court of Appeals). But see In re Dow Corning Corp., 211 B.R. 545, 596 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997) (discussing and rejecting "[d]ue process concerns . . . over the fact that not all plaintiffs receive their own day in court in connection with specific causation and damage determination").
254. See, e.g., In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86,149-52 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (authorizing statistical sampling), vacated, 407 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2005); Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 664 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (same), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998); see also In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 712 (5th Cir. 1990) (reversing district court's creation of class where court found too many disparities among plaintiffs, and failing to reach issue of defendant's right to jury trial).
255. See, e.g., Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 786 (9th Cir. 1996) (approving district court's methodology as "justified by the extraordinarily unusual nature of this case"). In Hilao, plaintiffs brought a class action against Ferdinand Marcos, the former President of the Philippines, for human rights violations including torture and execution against nearly 10,000 class members. In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1460, 1461-62 (D. Haw. 1995), aff'd sub nom. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996). The trial court divided the trial into three phases: (1) liability, (2) punitive damages, and (3) compensatory damages. Id. at 1462. In the compensatory damages phase, a statistical expert presented to the Special Master a random sample of 137 plaintiffs, and the Special Master determined damages for three subclasses based on the testimony of sample plaintiffs. Id. at 1462,1464-65 (noting subclasses included victims of torture, execution, and disappearance). After receiving the Special Master's report, the jury found 135 of the sample plaintiffs to be valid and issued a verdict of $766 million, which was $1 million less than the amount recommended by the Special Master. Hilao, 103 F.3d at 784 & n.10; In re Estate of Marcos, 910 F. Supp. at 1466. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, however, defense counsel waived presentation of many of the troubling legal issues. For example, defense counsel in Hilao did not present to the court the argument that the plan violated the Seventh Amendment. See Arch v. Am. Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469, 493 (E.D. Pa. 1997) ("The [Hilao] Court noted that 'degree of injury' would have affected the computation of damages in that case but defendants could not raise this issue because they waived any challenge to the computation of damages."); Thomas E. Willging, Mass Tort Problems and Proposals: A Report to the Mass Torts Working Group, 187 F.R.D. 328, 377 (1999) ("The procedure used by the Hilao court had elements of jury activity that differed from Cimino, but those elements of Hilao have not been reviewed by courts faced with a Seventh Amendment challenge or evaluated by commentators."). Moreover, the opinion of Judge Rymer, concurring and dissenting in part, underscored the difficulties. Judge Rymer noted that the methods here did not "comρort[] with fundamental notions of due process." Hilao, 103 F.3d at 788 (Rymer, J., concurring and dissenting). Hilao also relied on the trial court opinion in Cimino before it was overruled. In re Estate of Marcos, 910 F. Supp. at 1467.
256. Judge Jack Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York has recently written opinions allowing the use of statistical evidence in tobacco class actions, but his efforts have not yet been upheld by the Second Circuit. Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992,1244 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), rev'dsub nom. McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2008); In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86,149-52 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), vacated, 407 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2005).
257. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting "concern with forcing these defendants to stake their companies on the outcome of a single jury trial... when it is entirely feasible to allow a . . . determination of their liability ... to emerge from a decentralized process of multiple trials, involving different juries, and different standards of liability, in different jurisdictions"); id. at 1300 (stating that "the alternative [to a class action] exists of submitting an issue to multiple juries constituting in the aggregate a much larger and more diverse sample of decision-makers"); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring for class certification "that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy"). The approach articulated herein pertains to claims that are of sufficient value for plaintiffs' attorneys to take such claims under a contingency-fee arrangement. Small-value claims, often referred to as negative value claims, are not addressed here. Mass tort litigation, however, generally involves personal injuries the value of which are sufficient to warrant individual cases. See, e.g., Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1299 (distinguishing class action where "individual suits are infeasible because the claim of each class member is tiny relative to the expense of litigation").
258. See Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1299-1300 (stating that individual jury verdicts "will reflect a consensus, or at least a pooling of judgment, of many different tribunals."); Robinson & Abraham, supra note 87, at 1516 ("[0]ne of the great advantages of an adjudicatory system heavily focused on individualized inquiry is that its errors also are individualized. Decisions on key issues are made repeatedly, and any errors committed because of flaws in the process have a chance of averaging out over time.").
259. See Schuck, supra note 244, at 959 ("Individual cases proceeding through trial, verdict, and appeal in a variety of jurisdictions gradually reveal the behavior of juries and judges, clarify the applicable rules of law, and render the expected value of individual claims more predictable."); id. at 963 ("In contrast to an embryonic tort, a mature tort has generated a supply of data which, applying the methods described above, can be used to produce unbiased estimates of claim values.").
260. See, e.g., Abraham & Robinson, supra note 220, at 140 ("These categories are defined as functions of certain variables that affect liability and the severity and duration of a claimant's injury or illness.").
261. See Faulk et al., supra note 88, at 809 (noting that effective case selection in early trials can inflate settlement values for later, lower value claims).
262. See supra Part IV.A for a discussion of the proposals and problems of multiple jury statistical sampling in mass tort class actions.
263. See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42 (1940) (stating that due process fails where procedures do not adequately protect interests of absent parties).
264. See Schuck, supra note 244, at 960 ("Other courts identify 'representative' plaintiffs, who are thought to typify larger claimant populations. The claims of these representatives then proceed to full trials, and the outcomes establish patterns that can encourage settlements...."); Edward F. Sherman, Segmenting Aggregate Litigation: Initiatives and Impediments for Reshaping the Trial Process, 25 REV. LITIG. 691, 696 (2006) ("[A] court management technique often used in complex aggregate litigation is to try a small number of selected cases to give the parties a sense of how the legal and factual issues play out in different cases to a jury."). For example, if a court has multiple cases before it and is deciding which case to send to trial first, the court may seek to try an array of cases that first expose the variety of claims at issue and then return to multiple adjudications of similar issues, in order to develop claim values. See In re Shell Oil Refinery, 136 F.R.D. 588, 596 (E.D. La. 1991) ("[C]laims will be scheduled for trial. .. based on factors such as location of the claimant and/or his property at the time of the explosion, and the extent and nature of the damages.. .. [A]fter several waves are tried, a reasonable judgment value for each category of claims will emerge . . . ."), aff'd sub nom. Watson v. Shell Oil Co., 979 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1992); Barton, supra note 225, at 235 ("A trial of bellwether plaintiffs can be used effectively to give the parties a representative idea of the claims' value."); Sherman, supra, at 697 (noting that in federal multidistrict Vioxx litigation, "[t]he parties submitted proposals for bellwether cases, and Judge Fallon selected some six cases with differing characteristics such as length of use of the drug, the age and medical condition of the plaintiff at the time of use, and the injury claimed (death or lesser health complications)").
265. See, e.g., L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Unsettling Efficiency: When Non-Class Aggregation of Mass Torts Creates Second-Class Settlements, 65 LA. L. REV. 157,243 (2004) ("ADR could include test-case trials to establish a range of values for resolving similar claims."); Thomas D. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial: An Effective Aid to Settlement, 77 JUDICATURE 6, 8 (1993) (arguing summary jury trial is cost effective and enhances due process by encouraging parties to settle); Schuck, supra note 244, at 960 ("Courts sometimes stage non-binding 'mini-trials,' relying on the hypothetical verdict to induce settlements short of a full trial.").
266. See Schuck, supra note 244, at 959 ("More accurate information about claim values in turn encourages pre-trial settlements, which further refines and improves the quality of that information, which facilitates still more settlements, and so on. In this way, the litigator acquires an increasingly solid empirical foundation for his estimates of claim values."). Of course, defendants may try to keep the best plaintiffs from going to trial, perhaps by settling with them. See Paul D. Rheingold, The MER/29 Story-An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CAL. L. REV. 116, 131 (1968) ("The defendant could and did select the cases it wanted tried. Good cases approaching trial were settled... . The success of these tactics is evident in verdicts for the defendants in the first three cases tried."); Willging, supra note 255, at 352 ("The appearance of success, especially in the early stages of a potential mass litigation, can be controlled by a defendant's careful choice of cases to litigate, settling the more meritorious ones and trying the rest."). But if that is defendant's strategy and there are many meritorious cases, the incentive of obtaining a settlement will drive the filing of additional claims. Id. ("If there are enough meritorious cases, settlement of those cases can be expected to keep the litigation alive.").
267. See REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION, supra note 253, at 16 (discussing case evaluation system producing early settlement of asbestos claims); Bone, supra note 22, at 574 ("In some cases judges, with the help of special masters, have even compiled data on prior settlements and trial verdicts in order to provide the parties with information to assist in formulating reasonable settlement values."); Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659, 669-71 (1989) (describing data compilation that judge assigned to Special Master, the results of which were later presented to jury).
268. See Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1821,1843 (1995) (defining maturity as when '"there has been full and complete discovery, multiple jury verdicts, and a persistent vitality in plaintiffs' intentions'" (quoting McGovern, supra note 267, at 659)); id. (stating that "a rough equilibrium of case values ensues as the cases become more routinized and the parties' contentions become more defined"). But see Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Road Not Taken: Thoughts on the Fifth Circuit's Decertification of the Castano Class, SB24 ALI-ABA 433,447-50 (1996) (criticizing notion of immature torts).
269. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293,1298 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[D]efendants have won twelve of the first thirteen, and, if this is a representative sample, they are likely to win most of the remaining ones as well."); In re Shell Oil Refinery, 136 F.R.D. 588, 5% (E.D. La. 1991) (stating that judge would try cases in groups to create "a reasonable judgment value for each category of claims . . . [that] can be used to facilitate settlement"); Abraham & Robinson, supra note 220, at 140 ("Essentially the strategy is to promote settlement of claims by presenting information to the parties on the valuation of similar claims in prior settlements and/or adjudications. Such a profile provides an indication of the amounts paid, in judgments or in settlement, to different categories of claimants."); id. ("[R]ational parties are kept from reaching settlement... by their different valuations of a claim, and . . . valuations in turn reflect different predictions of the probability and size of an award if the case is adjudicated. The trick ... is to reduce these disparate valuations ... by presenting profiles of awards in similar cases . . . ."); Bone, supra note 22, at 574 ("The outcomes of mass tort cases that happen to settle or reach final judgment first shape future settlements by defining how much a plaintiff is likely to receive from trial, her so-called 'nonagreement baseline,' and by focusing parties on reasonable bargaining outcomes."); Francis E. McGovern, A Model State Mass Tort Settlement Statute, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1809, 1826 (2006) ("Once the parties felt comfortable in being able to distinguish between true and false positives, they would then be in a position to negotiate a metric that embodied a consensus for paying claims."); McGovern, supra note 267, at 692-93 (suggesting disclosure of "relevant data from previously resolved cases concerning key variables that drive case outcomes and settlement values" to encourage settlement); Barton, supra note 225, at 211 ("The traditional use of bellwether trials facilitates settlement by providing a representative picture of a range of verdicts.").
270. See Abraham & Robinson, supra note 220, at 140 ("This can be viewed as an attempt to construct a 'market value' for the claims. . . . Absent a true claims market, statistical claims profiles constitute an alternate source of objective valuation."); McGovern, supra note 269, at 1826 (noting "the assets of the litigation system with its paradigm of perfect, one-on-one trials to establish a marketplace for the characteristics and values of an alleged tort"). Judge Easterbrook commented on the efficiency of this approach, rejecting certification in the Bridgestone/Firestone litigation; "Markets . . . use diversified decisionmaking to supply and evaluate information. . . . This method looks 'inefficient' from the planner's perspective, but it produces more information, more accurate prices, and a vibrant, growing economy." In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1020 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 752 (5th Cir. 1996) ("The collective wisdom of individual juries is necessary before this court commits the fate of an entire industry, or indeed, the fate of a class of millions, to a single jury."); Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1300 ("[I]t is not a waste of judicial resources to conduct more than one trial, before more than six jurors, to determine whether a major segment of the international pharmaceutical industry is to follow the asbestos manufacturers into Chapter 11."); Jeremy T. Grabill, Comment, Multistate Class Actions Properly Frustrated by Choice-of-Law Complexities: The Role of Parallel Litigation in the Courts, 80 TUL. L. REV. 299, 320 (2005) (reporting preference of Fifth and Seventh Circuits for multiple jury verdicts before certifying class of millions); id. at 324 (arguing that "Judge Easterbrook's opinion for the Seventh Circuit in Bridgestone/Firestone [] provides a normative justification for this hostility to multistate class actions, namely that diversified decisionmaking by legal communities around the country will ultimately lead to better law").
271. See Abraham & Robinson, supra note 220, at 140-41 ("[P]arties will settle when the difference in their valuations is smaller than the expected cost of litigation."); Jeffrey M. Davidson, Theories of Asbestos Litigation Costs - Why Two Decades of Procedural Reform Have Failed to Reduce Claimants' Expenses, 7 NEV. L.J. 73, 81 (2006) (stating that decision to litigate or settle drives overall costs of system); Trangsrud, supra note 19, at 78 ("Once the strengths and weaknesses of the plaintiffs' cases have been repeatedly tested before a series of juries, it is likely that the parties will try to negotiate a settlement reflecting the verdict record of prior plaintiffs and, in this way, avoid the expense and delay of trial."); id. at 69 ("The better course is to coordinate and consolidate pretrial discovery and motions practice but then individually try the tort cases in an appropriate venue. After a number of cases have been tried substantial incentives will operate to encourage the private settlement of many of the remaining claims.").
272. See Barbara J. Rothstein et al., A Model Mass Tort: The PPA Experience, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 621, 625 (2006) (noting that as final stage of mass tort model, "the opportunity for a comprehensive settlement after a series of individual federal and state trials provides a basis for valuing individual claims"); Schuck, supra note 244, at 961 ("A much higher percentage of tort victims file claims and receive some payment under these mass tort settlements than would sue and recover in tort.... [T]he relatively high percentage of genuine victims who will recover something under global settlements must be counted as a weighty advantage." (footnote omitted)); id. at 960 ("'Global' settlements of mass tort claims represent the culmination of the system's maturation."). Although Professor Schuck discussed predominantly the class action settlements that predated the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999), and Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997), which rejected particular class action settlements, Professor Schuck's comments attest to the long, established history of resolving mass torts through settlement. Schuck, supra note 244, at 947. Since the Court's decisions in Ortiz and Amchem, mass tort global settlements have simply moved away from the class action setting. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2004) (outlining aggregate-settlement rule); Paul D. Rheingold, Ethical Constraints on Aggregated Settlements of Mass-Tort Cases, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 395, 395 (1998) (discussing unethical decision to settle group of tort cases for aggregated amount and divide settlement among plaintiffs); Charles Silver & Lynn A. Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settlement Rule, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 733, 736 (1997) (discussing whether aggregate settlement rule should be altered to accommodate mass cases); Willging, supra note 255, at 439 (discussing aggregate settlements under Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(g), and noting that "[b]oth the practitioners' and the academics' views converge in identifying the tension created by the attempt to apply to mass torts a rule designed for a single case or a small number of cases").
273. See Peter Toll Hoffman, Valuation of Cases for Settlement: Theory and Practice, 1991 J. DlSP. RESOL. 1, 7 (noting use of schema for "1) determining the distribution of verdicts in similar claims; 2) adjusting the distribution of verdicts in similar claims to reflect the unique facts of the particular claim; 3) adjusting the revised distribution to reflect transaction costs; and 4) selecting a settlement value reflecting the client's preferences and values"); Sanders, supra note 34, at 509 ("[E]ach case is evaluated [through]... a limited number of weighted factors ... based, at least in part, on aggregative and averaging processes.. .. [I]n many settlement processes a number of variables, generally between five and twenty, may be considered and applied to individual cases by use of an algorithm or formula." (footnote omitted)). Professors Hay and Rosenberg urge settlement in the class context based on a similar multiple-trial process. Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 89, at 1406 ("[C]onducting multiple class action class test-trials to derive average claim values for settling the bulk of the remaining present and future claims replicates prevailing practice in the separate action process, [except that it] ... . assures plaintiffs the same scale economy incentives defendants have-").
274. The vast majority of claims are settled in civil litigation, including mass torts. See Davidson, supra note 271, at 81 ("To understand the asbestos litigation phenomenon, one must understand settlement."); Schuck, supra note 244, at 958 ("As is well known, the cost and risks of going to trial induces settlement or other dispositions short of trial in over ninety-five percent of all civil claims, mass tort or otherwise."); id. at 962 ("Experiences of litigators, courts, and claims facilities in negotiating and administering global settlements are being accumulated and integrated into patterned, recurrent, and increasingly predictable forms. As a result, new settlements are likely to employ variations on now-familiar themes.").
275. As Professor Schuck has noted: Global settlements can also resolve a variety of complex administrative and policy issues. These agreements establish detailed ground rules to govern the necessary long-term relationship between bitter adversaries, under changing and unpredictable conditions. These rules cover such diverse issues as exposure criteria, medical criteria, claims administration, atypical or extraordinary claims, all aspects of compensation, funding guarantees, opt-outs, case flows, notice, counsel fees, administrative cost, informal dispute resolution, limits on judicial review, and termination of the agreement. In the absence of global settlements, these thorny issues would have to be resolved by further litigation and courts lacking good information and relevant expertise. Schuck, supra note 244, at 962; see also id. at 987 ("[Mass tort settlements] contain detailed definitions, decision criteria, and distribution protocols. They provide a mix of categorical and individualized treatment of claims.. .. They seek to anticipate numerous contingencies ... that cannot be foreseen or immediately resolved." (footnote omitted)).
276. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293,1300 (7th Cir. 1995) ("With the aggregate stakes in the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars, or even in the billions, it is not a waste of judicial resources to conduct more than one trial, before more than six jurors, to determine whether a major segment of the international pharmaceutical industry is to follow ... into Chapter 11.").
277. See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 244, at 962 (discussing efficiency with which global settlements resolve administrative issues and issues between litigants to reduce need for additional litigation).
278. See, e.g., Trangsrud, supra note 19, at 78 (noting that judicial efficiency achieved by mass trials is overstated due to likelihood of settlement following individual trials).
279. See Stier, supra note 210, at 895-96 (describing ease of communication enabled by e-mail and listservs, and ease of dissemination of documents by CD or central depository). Professors Hay and Rosenberg note the concerns of high spending in a single class action trial in the context of multiple class trials compared to a single class trial: "[D]espite redundancy costs, multiple class trials might well reduce the parties' costs overall. The prospect of a single class trial would induce risk-averse parties to spend excessively on pre-trial preparation as a measure of insurance against the possible horrendous verdict." Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 89, at 1406.
280. See Bone, supra note 22, at 574-75 ("The similarity to Cimino-sty\e sampling is obvious. The set of early cases constitutes a kind of sample (although not necessarily a random sample) of the overall population, and attorneys in later cases use a rough statistical method, such as weighted averaging, to infer settlement information from this sample group."); Barton, supra note 225, at 211 n.100 ("Although the district court's extrapolation to non-bellwether plaintiffs in Cimino is controversial, using the average to determine a settlement value is not.").
281. See, e.g., Faulk et al., supra note 88, at 803 (explaining procedure for categorizing plaintiffs by characteristics).
282. See, e.g., Robinson & Abraham, supra note 87, at 1490 (proposing statistical modeling of claims in mass tort litigaton); Schuck, supra note 244, at 959 ("One such approach employs regression analysis of claim profiles and other statistical methods to model the precise relationship that various claim characteristics bear to claim values in recent litigation and settlements. This approach enables lawyers to estimate more accurately the expected value of pending and future claims.").
283. See Schuck, supra note 244, at 959 ("The claims-processing facilities established by mass tort defendants and insurers (as in the asbestos and silicone gel breast implant litigation) and by courts administering settlement funds (as in the Agent Orange and Dalkon Shield litigation) employ some variants of this approach.").
284. See Bone, supra note 22, at 575 ("Despite these similarities, sampling presents more serious problems than settlement. Settlement always requires consent.").
285. See id. ("[C]onsent is not analytically essential to sampling. A judge might require consent, as Judge Parker did for the plaintiffs in Cimino, but he need not do so."). Of course, the defendants in Cimino vigorously opposed the sampling methodology used. See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 311 (5th Cir. 1998) (describing defendant's attack of trial plan on basis that it failed to determine individual causation).
286. See Bone, supra note 22, at 575 ("Parties bargain when they settle, and all must agree to the ultimate resolution. If a party believes that previous case outcomes are not representative of her case, all she need do is reject her opponent's offer and insist on a higher settlement figure.").
287. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 89, 92-93 (describing research suggesting distant lawyer-client relationships and lack of client control).
288. See Anne Bloom, From Justice to Global Peace: A (Brief) Genealogy of the Class Action Crisis, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 719, 749 (2006) (noting Agent Orange veterans' discontent with class-action resolution because "the veterans wanted to tell their stories and have them heard by a court of law"); Schuck, supra note 244, at 978 ("[W]hatever the distance between ideal and reality, the [client's day in court] retains overwhelming symbolic power. Indeed, the larger the gap, the more enchanting the ideal.").
289. See Abraham & Robinson, supra note 220, at 141 ("It is notoriously true that defendants who face large exposure to multiple claims may adopt a strategy of litigating claims regardless of their individual value to discourage future claims or to encourage more favorable settlements."); Branton, supra note 229, at 243 (noting possibility that "defendants have adopted a 'fortress mentality' to achieve exactly this result").
290. Cf. Barton, supra note 225, at 212 ("If the trial of the bellwether plaintiffs does not result in a settlement of the remaining claims, the court is left potentially with the same daunting task it encountered before the bellwether trial-trial of the remaining non-bellwether claims.").
291. Willging, supra note 255, at 352 (noting that, in the repetitive stress injury cases, "[i]ndividual trials in seven different jurisdictions resulted in defense verdicts or judgments. Those outcomes ... led to a dramatic reduction in the rate of filing of new computer keyboard claims" and as a result, "what was once compared to asbestos litigation and described as the mass tort of the nineties seems to have paused far short of that mark." (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
292. In the asbestos context, one defendant after another has been pushed into bankruptcy by such individual trials. Branton, supra note 229, at 243.
293. In the breast implant litigation, for example, a scientific consensus on the safety of silicone breast implants emerged after the bankruptcy of major manufacturer Dow Corning. See B.J. Feder, Dow Corning in Bankruptcy over Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, May 16,1995, at Al (describing Dow Corning seeking protection of bankruptcy to deal with claims worth billions of dollars); FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA BREAST IMPLANT CONSUMER HANDBOOK 68-69 (2004) (noting that in 1999 Institute of Medicine concluded there was "insufficient evidence" of systemic health concerns from silicone and saline breast implants), available at http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/breastimplants/indexbip.PDF. Today, silicone breast implants are again on the market. All About Silicone Breast Implants, http://www.justbreastimplants.com/implants/silicone.htm (last visited Sept. 1,2008).
294. Cf. Robinson & Abraham, supra note 87, at 1493 (observing that changes in legal rules over time can lead to differences in valuation).
295. See Trangsrud, supra note 19, at 79 (explaining that "persistent discovery efforts" in Dalkon Shield and asbestos litigation bore fruit while participants in Bendectin mass trial were precluded from further action).
296. See Richard Abel, General Damages Are Incoherent, Incalculable, Incommensurable, and ¡negalitarian (But Otherwise a Great Idea), 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 253, 299 (2006) ("Others have recommended that jurors receive data on 'similar' awards .... But experience is unique ...."); Chase, supra note 80, at 777 ("I propose that jurors in all personal injury actions in which nonpecuniary damages are sought be informed of the range of awards made by other juries in the same state for such damages during a contemporaneous time period."); DeCamp, supra note 76, at 235 ("[J]uries should be informed of the range of previous awards for comparable cases."); Wissler et al., supra note 36, at 817 ("Another powerful yet modest reform would be to pool jury awards made for similar injuries, and to present these cases and their award distributions to juries for guidance in reaching their general damages awards and to judges for conducting their additur/remittitur reviews." (footnote omitted)); see also Sanders, supra note 34, at 507 ("Each [proposal] suggests one or more ways of using aggregate data to estimate the 'proper' level of pain and suffering damages in each case.").
297. See Branton, supra note 229, at 245 ("The Federal Rules have not made individual jury trials a practical possibility for asbestos plaintiffs, as most of them would predecease the resolution of individual trials . . . ."); see also Bone, supra note 22, at 575 ("[A]t the limit delay costs exceed expected trial recovery, and plaintiff's baseline drops to zero.").
298. See Bone, supra note 22, at 575 ("By the same token, a defendant's baseline improves because a mass tort defendant normally benefits from longer delays.").
299. See id. ("Bargaining power therefore becomes more asymmetric as delay increases, and a plaintiff becomes more willing to accept a settlement based on previous case outcomes even when she thinks that those outcomes do not accurately reflect the merits of her own case.").
300. See id. ("[T]here is reason to disapprove of a settlement baseline significantly skewed in the defendant's favor by high delay costs."). Professor Bone therefore rejects such settlements: "If one rejects the baseline, one must also reject the bargaining outcome. Stated differently, consent cannot legitimate a settlement when a plaintiff's fallback position is itself normatively flawed." Id.; see also Edward F. Sherman, Aggregate Disposition of Related Cases: The Policy Issues, 10 REV. LITIG. 231, 238-39 (1991) (arguing individualized trials contribute to court congestion, thereby preventing plaintiffs' cases from being tried and therefore that reducing settlement value). Professor Bone ultimately views both mass tort settlements and trial sampling to be coercive: Once one discredits consent as a legitimating factor . . . mass tort settlement takes on a coercive character similar to sampling. One has to answer the following question for each process: What justifies "forcing" case outcomes on a party who neither participated in litigating those cases nor effectively waived her participation right? Bone, supra note 22, at 576. Nevertheless, Professor Bone believes "this question may pose more of a challenge for sampling than for settlement," because "[s]ampling reflects a deliberate institutional decision to impose outcomes on nonparticipants whereas settlement ordinarily takes place incidental to the adjudicative process." Id.; see also id. (arguing that state action that deliberately burdens parties not participating in suit with particular outcome may be more troubling than when same outcome results incidental to proper state action). But see id. (observing trend toward institutionalizing settlement and noting that trend makes distinctions less meaningful).
301. See, e.g., ACandS, Inc. v. Godwin, 667 A.2d 116,159 (Md. 1995) (quoting letter from judge consolidating 8555 asbestos cases: '"From four years of my own experience and that of virtually everybody else, if there are firm credible trial dates, these cases will settle. If not, they will not. . . . [D]efendants will only settle when they have nowhere to go" (emphasis omitted)).
302. See Stier, supra note 210, at 912-19 (discussing benefits of judicial mass tort networks).
303. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (stating that rules of civil procedure "should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding" (emphasis added)). Courts can ease their burden by prioritizing claims of those with more significant, physical injuries. See, e.g., Behrens & Crouse, supra note 76, at 197 (noting courts' "giv[ing] trial priority to the truly sick and preserv[ing] compensation for those that may become sick in the future, rather than hav[ing] those resources depleted by earlier-filing unimpaired claimants").
304. See Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 89, at 1403-04 ("An all-or-nothing gamble is precisely what each plaintiff-but no defendant-faces in the separate action process. ... If it is inappropriate to face both parties with an all-or-nothing gamble (a single class trial), we do not see how it improves things to simply face one party-the plaintiff-with an all-or-nothing gamble (which is what occurs with separate actions)." (footnote omitted)); id. at 1404 n.53 ("In the separate action process, trial is an all-or-nothing event for the plaintiff; a loss may be catastrophic. But it is not an all-or-nothing event for the defendant firm; a loss means paying only one plaintiff."). Professors Hay and Rosenberg argue that defendants can use this supposed asymmetry of risk to extract from a risk-averse plaintiff a settlement that is beneath what the claim should be worth. Id. at 1404 ("[W]e should expect the defendant to be able to exploit plaintiff risk aversion in separate actions-by offering the plaintiff, who may have a meritorious case, less than his claim is worth."); T. Dean Malone, Comment, Castano v. American Tobacco Co. and Beyond: The Propriety of Certifying Nationwide Mass-Tort Class Actions Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 When the Basis of the Suit Is a "Novel" Claim or Injury, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 817, 842 (1997) ("Every day, the United States judicial system allows a single jury to decide that a person deserves execution or that a company should pay millions of dollars to a single individual. Therefore, the argument that a single jury should not be able to decide the fate of an industry elevates the value of commerce above that of a person's life.").
305. See Trangsrud, supra note 19, at 77 ("[O]ur civil justice system has traditionally and correctly aimed to give each individual tort litigant a fair and equal opportunity to try his case, knowing that similarly situated plaintiffs will sometimes obtain widely different outcomes.").
306. o. 2d 1246 (Ha. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 96 (2007).