Congress in comparative perspective

Boston University Law Review

Volumn 89, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 827-845

  Wilson, Graham K ^a  

^a Boston University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 67649562366     PISSN: 00068047     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (99)

1. 1 J. BLONDEL, COMPARATIVE LEGISLATURES 2-3 (1973);
2. GERHARD LOEWENBERG and SAMUEL C. PATTERSON, COMPARING LEGISLATURES, at v (1979).
3. 2 See, e.g., Susan E. Scarrow, Political Career Paths and the European Parliament, 22 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 253, 253-55 (1997).
4. 3 LUCIANO CANFORA, DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE: A HISTORY 109-10 (2006).
5. 4 VINCENT WRIGHT, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF FRANCE 46-57 (1978).
6. 5 I am not sure Polsby put this comment into print. Many close friends and associates recall him saying it.
7. 6 See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra note 4, at 107-09 (describing how the French Parliament was strong during the 1800s and early 1900s, but was slowly surpassed by a strong President).
8. 7 See BARBARA HINCKLEY, LESS THAN MEETS THE EYE: FOREIGN POLICY MAKING AND THE MYTH OF THE ASSERTIVE CONGRESS 86 (1994);
9. Samuel P. Huntington, Congressional Responses to the Twentieth Century, in THE CONGRESS AND AMERICA'S FUTURE 6, 31-32 (David B. Truman ed., 2d ed. 1973).
10. 8 2 U. S. C. §§601-688 (2006).
11. 9 DAVID R. MAYHEW, PARTIES and POLICIES: HOW THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT WORKS 102-36 (2008).
12. 10 See, e.g., Philip Cowley and Mark Stuart, When Sheep Bark: The Parliamentary Labour Party Since 2001, 14 J. ELECTIONS, PUB. OPINION and PARTIES 211, 211 (2004).
13. 11 GABRIEL A. ALMOND ET AL., COMPARATIVE POLITICS TODAY 207-10 (9th ed. 2008).
14. 12 DENIS JUDD, EMPIRE: THE BRITISH IMPERIAL EXPERIENCE FROM 1765 TO THE PRESENT 391-92 (1997).
15. 13 Reuven Y. Hazan, Yes, Institutions Matter: The Impact of Institutional Reform on Parliamentary Members and Leaders in Israel, in THE UNEASY RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PARLIAMENTARY MEMBERS AND LEADERS 317-22 (Lawrence D. Longley and Reuven Y. Hazan eds., 2000).
16. 14 John D. Huber, The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 269, 269 (1996).
17. 15 Carl Hulse and David M. Herszenhom, Defiant House Rejects Huge Bailout: Next Step Is Uncertain, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2008, at Al.
18. 16 For a description of Question Time, see PHILIP NORTON, PARLIAMENT IN BRITISH POLITICS 112-16 (2005).
19. 17 ARCO I. TLMMERMANS, HIGH POLITICS IN THE LOW COUNTRIES: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF COALITION AGREEMENTS IN BELGRJM AND THE NETHERLANDS 12-15 (2003).
20. 18 British Governments and Elections Since 1945, http://www.psr.keele.ac. uk/area/uk/uktable.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2008).
21. 19 The Richard Dimbleby Lecture: Lord Hailsham Elective Dictatorship (BBC television broadcast Oct. 14, 1976).
22. 20 See CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY: DECISION MAKING THROUGH MUTUAL ADJUSTMENT 3 (1965) (explaining that mutual adjustment is the idea that "people can coordinate with each other without anyone's coordinating them, without a dominant common purpose, and without rules that fully prescribe their relations to each other").
23. 21 See, e.g., WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 58-60, 128-30, 223-28 (1885).
24. 22 See TODD LANDMAN, ISSUES AND METHODS IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS 70-73 (3d ed. 2008).
25. 23 See William M. Kuhn, The Monarchy and the House of Lords: The "Dignified" Parts of the Constitution, in A COMPANION TO NINTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN 95, 95-100 (Chris Williams ed., 2004).
26. 24 ALMOND ET AL., supra note 11, at 162.
27. 25 Id. at 163.
28. 26 John F. Bums, New Problems and Old Friction Put British Premier in Political Jeopardy, N. Y. TIMES, May 14, 2008, at A6.
29. 27 See ALMOND ET AL., supra note 11, at 171.
30. 28 Walter Goldstein, Europe After Maastricht, FOREIGN AFF., Winter 1992-93, at 117, 118-32.
31. 29 See ANTHONY SELDON ET AL., BLAIR 596-97 (2004).
32. 30 See ALMOND ET AL., supra note 11, at 171.
33. 31 See Paul Routledge and Simon Hoggart, Major Hits at Cabinet "Bastards, " THE OBSERVER (U. K.), July 25, 1993, at 1.
34. 32 HOUSE OF COMMONS INFO. OFFICE, PRIVATE MEMBERS' BILLS PROCEDURE (2008), http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/102.pdf.
35. 33 HOUSE OF COMMONS INFO. OFFICE, THE SUCCESS OF PRIVATE MEMBERS' BILLS (2008), http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/L03.pdf.
36. 34 MICHAEL JOGERST, REFORM IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS: THE SELECT COMMITTEE SYSTEM 201-17 (1993).
37. 35 RICHARD S. KATZ, DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS 207 (1997).
38. 36 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
39. 37 See Philip Norton, The Growth of the Constituency Role of the MP, 47 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 705, 710-19 (1994).
40. 38 ALMOND ET AL., supra note 11, at 166-68.
41. 39 Samuel H. Beer, The British Legislature and the Problem of Mobilizing Consent, in LAWMAKERS IN A CHANGING WORLD 30, 33 (Elke Frank ed., 1966).
42. 40 SAMUEL H. BEER, MODERN BRITISH POLITICS: A STUDY OF PARTIES AND PRESSURE GROUPS 350-51 (2ded. 1969).
43. 41 Brit Hume, NAFTA Endgame: Bill Clinton's Maneuverings to Achieve Passage of NAFTA in the House of Representatives, NAT'L REV., NOV. 15, 1993, at 25, 25-26.
44. 42 Id.
45. 43 DONALD R. MATTHEWS, U. S. SENATORS AND THEIR WORLD 92-117 (1960).
46. 44 WILLIAM S. WHITE, CITADEL: THE STORY OF THE U. S. SENATE 81-120 (1957).
47. 45 Jon Nordheimer, Sparkman Cites Service in Bid for Re-Election, N. Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1972, at 32.
48. 46 BARRY C. BURDEN and DAVID C. KIMBALL, WHY AMERICANS SPLIT THEIR TICKETS: CAMPAIGNS, COMPETITION, AND DIVIDED GOVERNMENT 74-85 (2004).
49. 47 SEAN J. SAVAGE, JFK, LBJ, AND THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY 91-143 (2004).
50. 48 David W. Rohde, Committees and Policy Formation, in THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH 201, 203 (Paul J Quirk and Sarah A. Binder eds., 2005).
51. 49 Paul S. Herrnson, Directing 535 Leading Men and Leading Ladies: Party Leadership in the Modern Congress, in GREAT THEATRE, THE AMERICAN CONGRESS IN THE 1990s, at 109, 117-19 (Herbert F. Weisberg and Samuel C. Patterson eds., 1998).
52. 50 See Brody Mullins, Loose Change: Lawmakers Tap PAC Money to Pay Wide Array of Bills, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 2006, at Al.
53. 51 Rohde, supra note 48, at 204.
54. 52 THOMAS E. MANN and NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW CONGRESS IS FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK 1-5 (2006).
55. 53 Id. at 1.
56. 54 DAVID R. OBEY, RAISING HELL FOR JUSTICE 378 (2007).
57. 55 RONALD BUTT, THE POWER OF PARLIAMENT 302 (1967).
58. 56 See James Bennet and John M. Broder, The President's Acquittal: The White House, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1999, at Al.
59. 57 Compare Barbara Sinclair, Parties and Leadership in the House, in THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH, supra note 48, at 224, 249 (explaining that severe partisanship in the House ensures that the majority party rarely loses and the minority rarely wins), with Steven S. Smith, Parties and Leadership in the Senate, in THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH, supra note 48, at 255, 255 (explaining that the structure of the Senate allows a minority of it members to prevent a vote on regular legislation by way of filibuster).
60. 58 GREGORY J. WAWRO and ERIC SCHICKLER, FILIBUSTER 27 (2006).
61. 59 MR. SMITH GOES TO WASHINGTON (Columbia Pictures 1939) (depicting Senator Jefferson Smith collapsing at the end of a long filibuster).
62. 60 WAWRO and SCHICKLER, supra note 58, at 27.
63. 61 This data is taken from HAROLD W. STANLEY and RICHARD G. NIEMI, VITAL STATISTICS ON AMERICAN POLITICS 2007-2008, at 224-25 (2008).
64. 62 See generally Am. Political Sci. Ass'n, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A Report of the Committee of Political Parties, 44 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 1-14 (Supp. 1950).
65. 63 See, e.g., Barry Ames, Party Discipline in the Chamber of Deputies, in LEGISLATIVE POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA 197-98 (Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif eds., 2002) (studying party unity by looking at congressional votes in contested and uncontested votes, using Brazil as a case study).
66. 64 See NORTON, supra note 16, at 84-87.
67. 65 I am indebted to Professor Philip Cowley of Nottingham University for his help on this paragraph.
68. 66 NORTON, supra note 16, at 27.
69. 67 See supra notes 28, 31 and accompanying text.
70. 68 Cowley and Stuart, supra note 10, at 215.
71. 69 Id.
72. 70 Id. at 216.
73. 71 Id.
74. 72 Id. at 213.
75. 73 Philip Cowley and Mark Stuart, Conservatives in Unity Shock: Conservative Voting in the House of Commons, 2001-05, at 2 (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.revolts.co.uk/ Conservatives%20in%20Unity%20Shocker.pdf).
76. 74 Cowley and Stuart, supra note 10.
77. 75 See James Kirkup, Gordon Brown's Personal Popularity Hits Historic Low, Poll Shows, TELEGRAPH (U. K.), Aug. 1, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2481215/Gordon-Browns-personal-popularity-hits- historic-low-poll-shows.html.
78. 76 See generally FRANK STACEY, THE BRITISH OMBUDSMAN (1971) (discussing the origins and functions of the British Ombudsman).
79. 77 STEPHEN D. TANSEY and NIGEL JACKSON, POLITICS: THE BASICS 178 (4th ed. 2008).
80. 78 See NORTON, supra note 16, at 121-25.
81. 79 JOHN DICKIE, THE NEW MANDARINS: HOW BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY WORKS 140 (2004).
82. 80 See David Corner and Gavin Drewry, The Implications of Public Service Reform for Accountability and Audit - Recent Developments in the UK, in CONTRACTS, PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 59, 59-64 (Gavin Drewry, Carsten Greve and Thierry Tanquerel eds., 2005).
83. 81 ALMOND ET AL., supra note 11, at 171.
84. 82 Alan Travis, Peers in Power, GUARDIAN (U. K.), June 29, 2000, http://www.guardian. co.uk/politics/2000/jun/29/lords.lordrefoim.
85. 83 NORTON, supra note 16, at 96.
86. 84 Raymond Bonner, British Lords Reject Plan to Lengthen Detentions, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2008, at A7.
87. 85 Id.
88. 86 See HILAIRE BARNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL and ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 507 (4th ed. 2002) (emphasizing the "great influence" that party whips have over the Committee of Selection).
89. 87 See NORTON, supra note 16, at 117-25.
90. 88 See generally FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, THE DECISION TO GO TO WAR IN IRAQ, REPORT, 2002-3, H. C. 813-1 (analyzing the available evidence about a threat in Iraq and making recommendations to Parliament suggesting how to proceed).
91. 89 See generally BEYOND CONTINUTTY: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN ADVANCED POLITICAL ECONOMIES (Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen eds., 2005) (compiling empirical case studies that support the assumption that "there is a wide but not infinite variety of modes of institutional change");
92. KATHLEEN THELEN, HOW INSTITUTIONS EVOLVE (2004) (examining institutional change across nations through case studies of skill formation in Germany, Britain and Japan);
93. Peter Hall, Historical Institutionalism in Rationalist and Sociological Perspective, in EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: AMBIGUITY, AGENCY, POWER (James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen eds., forthcoming 2009) (on file with author) (exploring the commonalities between "rational choice and historical institutionalism").
94. 90 See ANGELO PANEBIANCO, POLITICAL PARTIES: ORGANIZATION AND POWER 93-94 (Marc Silver trans., 1982).
95. 91 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONTEMPORARY BRITISH CULTURE 294-96 (1999).
96. 92 Id. at213.
97. 93 British Governments and Elections Since 1945, supra note 18.
98. 94 LEON D. EPSTEIN, POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE AMERICAN MOLD 3 (1986).
99. 95 See Hall, supra note 89 (manuscript at 1-4).