The shrunken power of the purse

Boston University Law Review

Volumn 89, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 487-498

  Feld, Alan L ^a  

^a School of Law   (United States)

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EID: 67649534737     PISSN: 00068047     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (73)

1. 1 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
2. 2 U. S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
3. 3 Id. at cl. 2.
4. 4 Id. § 9, cl. 7.
5. 5 Id. § 7.
6. 6 31 U. S. C. § 1301 (a) (2000).
7. 7 Id. §1341.
8. 8 Id. § 3302 (b).
9. 9 For example, Congress cannot increase or decrease the President's compensation during his term. U. S. CONST, art. II, § 1, cl. 7. Similarly, Congress cannot decrease the compensation of federal judges while they serve in office. Id. at art. Ill, § 1. Beyond explicit constitutional limits, some have thought the President's Article II powers may imply a requirement that funds be made available to carry out the President's powers, for example, for recognition of foreign ambassadors. E.g., Kate Stith, Congress' Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L. J. 1343, 1350-51 (1988) (citing U. S. CONST, art. II, § 3 (presidential power to receive ambassadors);
10. U. S. CONST, art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (presidential power to make treaties)). For a discussion of functions that may continue without an annual appropriation of funds, see generally Alan L. Feld, Shutting Down the Government, 69 B. U. L. REV. 971 (1989).
11. 10 See, e.g., Act of July 10, 1797, ch. 17, 1 Stat. 534 (making additional appropriations for the support of government for the year 1797). For an introduction to congressional budgeting activities from the founding of the nation through the Johnson Administration, see generally Louis Fisher, Presidential Spending Discretion and Congressional Controls, 37 LAW and CONTEMP. PROBS. 135 (1972). For a comprehensive overview of current budget practices, see generally ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET (3d ed. 2007).
12. 11 SCHICK, supra note 10, at 10-14.
13. 12 Id.
14. 13 Id. at 13.
15. 14 Id.
16. 15 Id.
17. 16 Id. at 13-14.
18. 17 Id.
19. 18 Id.
20. 19 OFFICE OF MGMT. and BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, HISTORICAL TABLES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 21 tbl.1.1 (2008) [hereinafter HISTORICAL TABLES], available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/ry09/pdf/hist.pdf.
21. 20 SCHICK, supra note 10, at 13-14.
22. 21 Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, ch. 21, 42 Stat. 20 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 31 U. S. C.).
23. 22 SCHICK, supra note 10, at 17-18.
24. 23 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 31 U. S. C.).
25. 24 Id.
26. 25 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings) Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 31 U. S. C.).
27. 26 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 31 U. S. C.).
28. 27 2 U. S. C. § 902 (a) (2006).
29. 28 H. R. Res. 6, 110th Cong. § 405 (2007) (enacted) (amending clause 10, Rule XXI of the Rules of the House of Representatives).
30. 29 Budget rules may create their own incentives and distortions; that is beyond the scope of this Essay. See generally Tim Westmoreland, Standard Errors: How Budget Rules Distort Lawmaking, 96 GEO. L. J. 1555 (2007);
31. George K. Yin, Temporary-Effect Legislation, Political Accountability, and Fiscal Restraint, 84 N. Y. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn. com/abstract=l 172102.
32. 30 42 U. S. C. § 301 (2000) (authorizing appropriations sufficient to cover each state's social security commitments);
33. id. § 1396 (authorizing appropriations sufficient to allow each state to provide medical assistance for qualifying families and individuals).
34. 31 HISTORICAL TABLES, supra note 19, at 27 tbl 1.3.
35. 32 OFFICE OF MGMT. and BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 25-26 (2008), available at http://www.gpoaccess. gov/usbudget/fy09/pdf/budget/outlook.pdf (observing that fifty-three percent of funding is "mandatory" and nine percent is interest payments under the standards set forth by the 1990 Act).
36. 33 Id.
37. 34 Id.
38. 35 See, e.g., 15 U. S. C. § 1538 (2006) (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration);
39. 50 U. S. C. § 403-4 (d) (2000) (Director of National Intelligence).
40. 36 31 U. S. C. § 3302 (b) (2000).
41. 37 10 U. S. C. § 1095 (g) (2006).
42. 38 42 U. S. C. § 10601 (2000) (Crime Victims Fund);
43. 15 U. S. C. § 2514 (b) (2006) (appropriating funds for federal agencies to use electric and hybrid vehicles).
44. 39 50 U. S. C. § 403-l (c) (2000). A taxpayer has no standing to require reporting of Agency receipts and expenditures. United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166, 170 (1974).
45. 40 The Constitution requires that bills for the raising of revenue originate in the House, U. S. CONST, art. I, § 7, cl. 1, but the Constitution contains no origination requirements for other money bills.
46. 41 RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., THE POWER OF THE PURSE: APPROPRIATIONS POLITICS IN CONGRESS (1966);
47. see also Richard F. Fenno, Jr., The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System: The Problem of Integration, 56 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 310, 310-24 (1962).
48. 42 FENNO, supra note 41, at 127-90.
49. 43 Id. at 82-95. Committee membership was usually awarded to senior members from safe districts. As such, Committee members may remain on the Committee for many terms. Id.
50. 44 Id. at 676-78.
51. 45 See generally Joshua Gordon, The (Dis) Integration of the House Appropriations Committee: Revisiting the Power of the Purse in a Partisan Era 3-7 (Aug. 28, 2003) (unpublished manuscript presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association), available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p-mla-apa-research-citation/0/6/4/6/7/ p64673-index.html (arguing that the HAC can no longer fulfill its historic role because of changes in the partisan atmosphere).
52. 46 Id. at 12-22.
53. 47 Id. at 23-27.
54. 48 SCHICK, supra note 10, at 6-7, 260-63.
55. 49 See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
56. 50 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, tit. X, 88 Stat. 297, 332-39 (codified as amended at 2 U. S. C. §§ 681-688 (2006)).
57. 51 Id.
58. 52 SCHICK, supra note 10, at 120, 284-86.
59. 53 31 U. S. C. §§ 3102-3103 (2000).
60. 54 Id. § 3101 (b).
61. 55 Id. Congress most recently increased the debt limit to $9, 815 trillion. 31 U. S. C. A. § 3101 (b) (West 2003 and Supp. 2008). For a discussion of proposals to make the debt limit statute more effective, see generally Anita S. Krishnakumar, In Defense of the Debt Limit Statute, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 135 (2005).
62. 56 H. R. 5369, 96th Cong., 93 Stat. 589, 589-91 (1979). This rule continues in effect. Rules of the House of Representatives, R. XXVIII, 110th Cong. (2008).
63. 57 Id.
64. 58 HISTORICAL TABLES, supra note 19, at 31-35 tbls.2.1, 2.2 and 2.3.
65. 59 Id.
66. 60 Internal Revenue Code of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-1, 53 Stat. 1 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U. S. C.).
67. 61 E.g., 148 CONG. REC. 15, 487 (2002) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
68. 62 THE FEDERALIST no. 58 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 394.
69. 63 For a list of current tax expenditures, see JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2008-2012, at 48-76 (2008), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/s-2-08.pdf.
70. 64 Rebecca M. Kysar, The Sun Also Rises: The Political Economy of Sunset Provisions in the Tax Code, 40 GA. L. REV. 335, 339 (2006).
71. 65 Yin, supra note 29 (manuscript at 14-15).
72. 66 CHARLES L. BLACK and BOB ECKHARDT, TIDES OF POWER: CONVERSATIONS ON THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 23 (1976).
73. 67 See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.