A comment on mark tushnet's some notes on congressional capacity to interpret the constitution

Boston University Law Review

Volumn 89, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 511-514

  Baxter, Hugh ^a  

^a BOSTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 67649518952     PISSN: 00068047     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (23)

1. 1 See generally Mark Tushnet, Some Notes on Congressional Capacity to Interpret the Constitution, 89 B. U. L. REV. 499 (2009).
2. 2 Id. at 500.
3. 3 Id.
4. 4 Id.
5. 5 Id. at 504.
6. 6 Id.
7. 7 Id.
8. 8 Id. at 503.
9. 9 Id.
10. 10 Id.
11. 11 Id.
12. 12 Id.
13. 13 Id. at 500.
14. 14 Id.
15. 15 Id. at 508.
16. 16 See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 181-82 (1999) (defining "populist constitutional law" as "treating] constitutional law not as something in the hands of lawyers and judges but in the hands of the people themselves");
17. MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15 (2008) [hereinafter Tushnet, Weak COURTS] (comparing "strong-form" and "weak-form institutions of judicial review" to determine which "better accommodate[s] the competing interests in constitutionalism and self-government").
18. 17 Tushnet, supra note 1, at 508.
19. 18 Id. at 508-09.
20. 19 See id. at 509.
21. 20 See id. at 504-08 (discussing problems facing various institutional reforms for Congress such as "revisions in Congress's committee structure").
22. 21 See, e.g., TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, supra note 16, at 81-82.
23. 22 See id. at 22-23.