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Volumn 144, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 1617-1635

Asymmetric first price auctions

Author keywords

Asymmetric auctions; First price auctions

Indexed keywords


EID: 67649386834     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.12.001     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (33)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.