Bargaining and the division of value in corporate reorganization

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 8, Issue 2, 1992, Pages 253-279

  Bebchuk, Lucian Ayre ^a   Chang, Howard F ^b  

^a NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

^b MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 67649355585     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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