The Lisbon Treaty: The Irish 'No'. National parliaments and the principle of subsidiarity - Legal options and practical limits

European Constitutional Law Review

Volumn 4, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 429-452

  Louis, Jean Victor ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ LIBRE DE BRUXELLES   (Belgium)

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EID: 67649194938     PISSN: 15740196     EISSN: 17445515     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S157401960800429X     Document Type: Article

References (71)

1. We quote the report of Mr. Amaral, also a Portuguese MP, at the meeting of 4-5 Dec. 2007, following the report of the Press Service of the EP.
2. This provision is one of the few, if not the only one, where the French verbal form of 'indicative present' does not appear in English as a 'shall' prescription. It was not so in the draft submitted to the UK Chambers of Parliament (the text was negotiated in French) and raised a constitutional debate: The new European treaty would impose obligations on the British Parliament. So the UK Government asked for clarification of the wording. See in particular, House of Commons, European Scrutiny Committee, European Union Intergovernmental Conference, 35th Report of Session 2006-2007, HC1014, No. 70. The Commons raised this sensitive point in COSAC arguing 'these provisions appear to impose legal duties on national parliaments and could be interpreted as constraining the ability of national parliaments to participate to EU affairs.' See COSAC report, quoted in n. 43 infra, p.24. The same debate was held at the House of Lords.
3. 'A new role for national parliaments in the EU', D. Jancic, University of Utrecht, Letter to EurActiv, 17 Dec. 2007.
4. EurActiv, 14 Dec. 2007 quoting Sebastian Kurpas of CEPS (Brussels).
5. See Besselink, 'Shifts in Governance: National Parliaments and Their Governments Involvement in European Union Decision-Making', in Barrett (ed.), National Parliaments and the European Union: The Constitutional Challenge for the Oreiachtas and other Member States, indicated as forthcoming, 2006 (consulted on the web)
6. of the same author: 'National Parliaments in the EU's Composite Constitution: A Plea for a Shift in Paradigm', in P. Kiiver (ed.), National and Regional Parliaments in the European Constitutional Order (Groningen: Europa Law Publishing 2006), p. 117-131
7. Tans, 'De oranje kaart: Een nieuwe rol voor nationale parlementen?', SEW (2007), p. 442-446
8. Kiiver, 'Implementing the Early Warning Mechanism for Subsidiarity: National Parliaments Beyond the Constitutional Treaty', Conference Paper, Fifty Years of Interparliamentary Cooperation, Berlin, 13 June 2007.
9. See a reaction on the Convention's draft by Rizzuto, 'The New Role of National Parliaments in the European Union', The Federal Trust, Online Paper 19/03, June 2003, p. 10
10. for a decisively optimistic view on the provision of subsidiarity in the Constitutional Treaty, and especially on the future role of national parliaments, see Flynn, 'Reformed Subsidiarity in the Constitution for Europe, Can deliver to expectations?', IEAP, W.P. 2005/W/07.
11. A very in-depth analysis is given by Cooper, 'The Watchdogs of Subsidiarity: National Parliaments and the Logic of Arguing in the EU', JCMS 2006), p. 281-304.
12. Although one should mention that Article 5 of the modified TEU brings some interesting elements, such as the better link that is made and the differences of functions between the three principles of conferment of power, subsidiarity and proportionality: The first the 'delimitation' of competences and the two others the 'exercise' of competences. On the other hand, the definition given by the Treaty of domain of exclusive competences, to which the subsidiarity principle does not apply, is of great help in order to put an end to controversies in this regard. Finally, the regional and local factor appears as a criterion to be taken into consideration when evaluating the compatibility of an act with the principle of subsidiarity. See on these points, the paper by Flynn, n. 6 supra.
13. Referring to a source of the European Parliament (its White Paper on the 1996 IGC), Rittberger, 'The Politics of democratic Legitimation in the European Union', Nuffield College Working Papers in Politics, Oxford, 2004-W4, 6 March 2004, p. 26, note (2) mentions that Alain Juppé, then French Foreign Affairs Minister expressed his hope in a speech et the Assemblee nationale on 3 Feb. 1994, that national parliaments would be empowered to challenge EU legislation on the grounds that the subsidiarity was violated.
14. For a synthesis of these proposals, see von Bogdandy/Bast, 'The European Union's vertical order of competences: The current law and proposals for its reform', CML Rev. (2002), p. 237-268 (260-261).
15. See Pernice, Kompetenzabgrenzung im Europäischen Verfassungsverbund, Öffentliche Vorlesungen, Universität Humboldt, Berlin, 6. Juli 2000. Prof. Pernice proposed the creation of a consultative Parliamentary committee on subsidiarity.
16. See the references going back to the pre-Maastricht debate in Rittberger, n. 8 supra, p. 22.
17. On the twin goals of the early warning system, see Cooper, n. 6 supra, p. 290-291.
18. See M. Cartabia, 'Prospects for national parliaments in EU affairs', in G. Amato/H. Bribosia/B. de Witte (eds.), Genèse et Destinée de la Constitution européenne - Genesis and Destiny of the European Constitution (Brussels, Bruylant 2007), p. 1081-1103 (1096)
19. Tans, n. 5 supra, p. 444; without using the term 'compensation'; Cooper expresses the same idea, n. 6 supra, p. 292.
20. The sense of 'frustration' of national parliaments goes back to well before the Single European Act, as Rittberger, n. 8 supra, p. 28 seems to suggest. But, of course, the increase in the powers of the EP in legislative matters has played a role in incrementing this reflex. Both the primacy of the national executive branch of power in European affairs and the increased role of the European Parliament contributed to create the sense of 'frustration'.
21. See also the developments in Sleath, 'The role of national parliaments in European affairs', in Amato/Bribosia/de Witte, n. 13 supra, p. 545-564, 546 and the reference to the important work done by Mauer (Berlin, Stiftung Europäische Politik) alone or with Wessels on national parliaments.
22. On this, among others, Rittberger, n. 8 supra, p. 27.
23. See in particular, Sleath, n. 14 supra.
24. Italics are ours. The Amsterdam Protocol No. 13 provides for a 'rapid' transmission. Hence, the new wording constitutes progress for national parliaments.
25. See Bribosia, 'La répartition des compétences entre l'Union et ses Etats membres', in Dony/Bribosia (eds.), Commentaire de la Constitution de l'Union européenne (Brussels, Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles 2005), p. 47-82 (74), who criticizes the exclusion of some regulations and 'National Parliaments and the. Subsidiarity Principle', Joint Study CEPS, EGMONT, EPC, Nov. 2007, p. 83-88 (84) for a more general criticism of this limitation. We find that the extension of the early warning system to acts adopted under the comitology procedure would put at risk the advantages in flexibility and rapidity inherent to these procedures, now under the tutelage of both the EP and the Council.
26. Some have seen in this limitation the risk that the review by national parliaments would be reduced to a crude 'thumbs up' or 'thumbs down'. Cooper, n. 6 supra, p. 302. This remark ignores the content of proportionality, which is necessarily included in the subsidiarity test under Art. 5 of the Treaty. We will come back to this argument.
27. In a report of the president of the French Senate Delegation for the EU, Mr. Hubert Haenel, on 'Dialogue avec la Commission européenne sur le principe de subsidiarité', Les Rapports du Sénat, No. 88, 2007-2008, 21 Nov. 2007, p. 16, the following figures are given: There are in the Union, 13 bicameral parliaments and 14 unicameral parliaments.
28. As recalled by Cooper, n. 6 supra, p. 289, in a draft version of the protocol, national parliaments would have had the possibility to issue reasoned opinions when the conciliation committee in the codecision procedure would meet, if the thought that either the Council's position or the amendments of the EP are not in compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. This 'two stage approach' was dropped because it was found that it made the already heavy procedure too complicated but the Council's position and the amendments of the EP shall be forwarded to national parliaments (Art. 4, last subpara.).
29. Pérez Trems, 'La incidencia de la Constitución Europea en la organización territorial del Estado', in Montero/Sola (eds.), La Constitución de la Unión Europea, Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales (2005), p. 199-215 (212) points out that 'this rule, coherently with the principle of institutional autonomy, cannot be interpreted as an 'enabling clause' that would leave to national parliaments the discretion of deciding to hear regional parliaments, but as a 'remittance', in a way that such forwarding can consist, if appropriate, in a constitutional obligation.'
30. See Tans, n. 5 supra, p. 442, 443.
31. Italics ours. Cooper, n. 6 supra, p. 293 observes that 'more holistic deliberations on the merits of the Commission proposal' impedes sharp review of the proposal for its fidelity to subsidiarity. It is one of the merits he finds in the early warning system.
32. See the case-law quoted by the Court of First Instance in its judgment of 12 July 2006, T-253/02, Ayadi, Rec. II-2139, point 107.
33. See Michel/De La Riga, 'Les compétences dans le traité établissant la Constitution européenne', in Constantinesco/Gauthier/Michel (eds.), Le traité établissant une Constitution pour l'Europe. Analyse et Commentaires (Strasbourg, Presses universitaires de Strasbourg 2005), p. 281-310 (304).
34. See Besselink, 'Shifts in Governance', n. 5 supra, p. 12. This author draws argument from Art. I-11 (3) of the Constitutional Treaty providing that institutions shall apply the principle of subsidiarity and that 'national parliaments shall ensure compliance with that principle in accordance with the procedure set out in that Protocol'. In other words, it is a direct prerogative of parliaments.
35. See Nettesheim, 'The Order of Competence within the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe', in Montero/Sola (eds.), n. 22 supra, p. 239- 277 (273)
36. Besselink, 'National Parliaments', n. 5 supra, point 7 writes that 'National parliaments can on the basis of national law force their government to bring a case before the ECJ.' Hubert Haenel, president of the Delegation of the French Senate for the EU writes that 'le protocole ouvre la possibilité qu'il [the appeal] soit simplement 'transmis' par ce gouvernement, l'auteur véritable du recours étant le parlement national ou une chambre de celui-ci.' It is this kind of automatism that the French Constitutional law of 2005 (of which the entry into force was made conditional to the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty) provided in Art. 88-5, para. 2, (a provision quoted by Besselink who also refers to the more elaborate German law dating of 1993). A provision providing the same kind of automatism is inserted in Art. 88-6, para. 2 of the French Constitution, as revised in 2008. The entry into force of this provision is made conditional to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.
37. Cooper underlines the negative effects of such a restriction, n. 6 supra, p. 294 because it would encourage national parliaments to give an opinion, with the only objective of being able to preserve their right of appeal before the Court. Cooper considers that this possibility would have not only obstructed the scrutiny process but also given national parliaments 'power without responsibility'.
38. 'Shifts in Governance...', n. 5 supra, p. 12.
39. See n. 6 supra, p. 302; Italics are ours.
40. Kiiver, n. 5 supra, p. 4-5.
41. Ibid., p. 20.
42. See the Rules of procedure of COSAC, OJEU, C 270, 4 Nov. 2004, p. 1-6 and the Guidelines on Interparliamentary Cooperation in the EU, 3 July 2004, published on the (excellent) website as well as the so-called 'Copenhagen parliamentary guidelines' for relations between governments and parliaments on Community issues (instructive minimum standards), 27 Jan. 2003, OJEU, C 154/1, 2 July 2003. These guidelines were drafted at the invitation of the Group of the European convention on the role of national parliaments in the Union. T here also exists independently from COSAC an informal Conference of regional legislative assemblies of Europe (CARLE) that groups the chairpersons of these assemblies.
43. See Maurer/Wessels (eds.), National Parliaments on their way to Europe (Baden-Baden, Nomos 2001).
44. And if some parliaments are very positive on direct relations with the EU institutions, and especially the Commission, like the French assemblies, others, like the Finnish Eduskunta '[stress] that parliamentary scrutiny of proposed EU legislation should first and foremost take place in the context of relations between national parliaments and their respective governments. The Estonian Rügikogu intends to concentrate its efforts on domestic scrutiny; it is not planning to seek direct access to EU institutions, and expects 'business as usual' in its handling of EU affaires'. We quote a report of COSAC mentioned in n. 43 infra.
45. Rizzuto, 'The New Role of National Parliaments in the European Union', The Federal Trust, Online Paper 19/03, June 2003, p. 10.
46. In order to cite what is surely an extreme example, due to the intricacy of the allocation of competences in Belgium between the federation, the Communities and the Regions, an assembly like the Senate will need to first obtain legal advice on its competence to look at the matter covered by the draft proposal. It is foreseen that this check will last from day one to day seven.
47. The EP is represented at COSAC meetings.
48. That leads one to relativise the arguments based on the 'enormous additional workload floating from extensive legislative activity' [Rittzer/Ruttlof/Linhart, 'How to Sharpen a Dull Sword - The Principle of Subsidiarity and its Control', German Law Journal, Vol. 7, Sept. 2006, p. 1-27 (15)]. While the number of 'consultative documents' is increasing, that is not the case for (important) legislative acts.
49. Anne Levade in its commentary of the Protocol on the role of national parliaments gives both technical and political posssible explanations of this difference between Amsterdam and Lisbon texts. First, it was difficult for a Treaty that substitute the Union for the Community to refer itself to a Conference of Committees specialised in European and Community affairs, and it could not change the denomination of a body that was not within the institutional sphere of the Union. The other possible reasons are political. Members of the Group of the Convention wished to privilege the cooperation between the two levels of parliamentary assemblies (as the title of Title II and Article 9 reveal) and they had reservations against an institutionalisation of the 'horizontal' co-ordination, see 'Traité établissant une Constitution pour l'Europe', Commentaire article par article, Burgorgue-Larsen/Levade/Picod (eds.) (Brussels, Bruylant 2007), p. 869-894, (893), para. 47-48.
50. See French Senate, Delegation for the EU, Deuxième Rencontre avec la Commission des Affaires européennes du Bundesrat, 4-5 Oct. 2007, p. 29-30 on political co-operation among parliaments. The president of the BR Committee declares in answer to a suggestion made by two French colleagues: J«e pense qu'il ne serait pas opportun de solliciter les parlements des vingt-sept Etats membres. Il faudrait plutôt créer une petite 'force de frappe' dans le domaine de l'examen de la subsidiarité et de la proportionnalité »and President Haenel evokes parliaments having 'a particular sensitivity to the theme of subsidiarity'. Mr. Stachele mentions Austria, and may be Italy or Spain and a new member state, underlining that they need overall partners that have the will of building the Community mechanism and not of destroying it; Mr. Haenel quotes the names of the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, the House of Lords but considers that neither Italy nor Spain are ready.
51. See on the COSAC Website, the reports of these experiences. See for example, the Eight biannual report: Developments in European Union Procedures and Practices Relevant to Parliamentary Scrutiny presented at the XXXVIII COSAC, Estoril, Portugal, 14-15 Oct. 2007.
52. There is an electronic platform for communications among parliaments called IPEX.
53. See the Communication of Mr. Hubert Haenel on the Conference on subsidiarity hold at Sankt Pölten, on 18 and 19 April 2006, Sénat français, Actualités de la Délégation pour l'Union européenne, No. 119, 17 avril au 21 mai 2006, p. 15 et s., p. 16: 'ce n'est qu'en fonction du libellé qui figure dans les traités que ce principe est justiciable. Et ce libellé ne concerne que la limitation de l'action de l'Union et ne joue que pour les compétences non exclusives de celle-ci.'
54. Les rapports du Sénat No. 88, 2007-2008, Dialogue avec la Commission européenne sur la subsidiarité, p. 19.
55. Another example would be the EU action against floods, which for some should be limited to the situation of transnational rivers.
56. See Ritzer et al., 'Europäisches öffentliches Recht', Ausgewählte Beiträge (2006), p. 14.
57. 'The role of the principle of subsidiarity in the case law of the European Court of Justice', European Conference on Subsidiarity, Sankt Pölten, 19 April 2004. We quote from the 'Thesen' in German of the Impulsreferat of Vassilios Skouris.
58. Court of Justice, 7 Sept. 2006, case C-310/04, Spain v. Council, ECR I- 7285, points 96 and 97.
59. The Delegation of the French Senate has practiced very actively this dialogue and it approved an interesting report on the lessons drawn from this experience. See Dialogue avec la Commission européenne sur la subsidiarité, Les rapports du Sénat, No. 88, 2007-2008. They have asked for a continuation of this direct dialogue after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.
60. Sleath, n. 14 supra, p. 563.
61. See European Convention, Point No. 1. Subsidiarity. This paper inaugurated a series of short notes presenting the main points of the reports submitted to the Convention by working groups.
62. See Bengston, 'National parliaments in European decision-making. A real prospect or wishful thinking?', The Federal Trust, Online Paper 29/03, p. 5. For a reaction against the skeptical attitude,
63. see Flynn, n. 6 supra, p. 5.
64. See Sleath, n. 14 supra, p. 558-559.
65. See Vahlas, 'Appartenance à l'Union européenne', in Constantinesco/Gauthier/Michel (eds.), n. 26 supra, p. 239-278 (277-278). The views of this author are referring to the right of secession that the new treaty recognises for the member states, but these words can be applied to the 'constitutional brake'.
66. For a positive view of this mechanism because it offers 'a wider democratic basis for the fundamental decisions of the Union', see Cartabia, n. 13 supra, p. 1089-1090.
67. See the final report of the Group that 'noted' this observation.
68. See Sleath, n. 14 supra, p. 562.
69. Michel/De La Riva, n. 26 supra, p. 304.
70. See also Flynn, n. 6 supra, p. 22, who defends the idea that if the subsidiarity principle may prove 'legally operable', that is as a 'procedural rule' that ought to be followed, rather than a 'substantive test' and plead for a 'manifest error' approach.
71. Ritzer et al., n. 48 supra, p. 15.