Solidarity and the common good: An analytic framework

Journal of Social Philosophy

Volumn 38, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 7-21

  Rehg, William ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 67449109234     PISSN: 00472786     EISSN: 14679833     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9833.2007.00363.x     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (34)

1. For the development and uses of the modern idea, see Hauke Brunkhorst, Solidarity: From Civic Friendship to Global Legal Community, trans. J. Flynn (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005);
2. Steiner Stjernø, Solidarity in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); for an overview of sociological approaches,
3. see Michael Hechter, Principles of Group Solidarity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), chap. 2; for normative theories,
4. see Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. C. Lenhardt and S. W. Nicholsen (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990);
5. Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, trans. J. Anderson (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 1995).
6. See Andrew Mason, Community, Solidarity and Belonging (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), chap. 2;
7. I am also indebted to Arthur Madigan, SJ, "Common Good and Common Goods: A Preliminary Study," Proceedings of the Sixty-sixth Annual Meeting of the Jesuit Philosophical Association (2005): 19-40.
8. Cf. Larry May, The Socially Responsive Self (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), chap. 2;
9. also his Morality of Groups (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987).
10. Charles Taylor, "Irreducibly Social Goods," in Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 127-45;
11. Alasdair MacIntyre, "Politics, Philosophy, and the Common Good," in The MacIntyre Reader, ed. K. Knight (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 235-52;
12. also his After Virtue (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981);
13. cf. John Haldane, "The Individual, the State, and the Common Good," Social Philosophy and Policy 13 (1996): 59-79;
14. also David Hollenbach, SJ, The Common Good and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
15. Mark C. Murphy, "The Common Good," Review of Metaphysics 59 (2005): 133-64;
16. Hechter, Principles of Group Solidarity, 33-37.
17. See Taylor, "Irreducibly Social Goods," 129-30.
18. Murphy, "Common Good," 149-50.
19. Mason, Community, Solidarity and Belonging, 42.
20. See Philip Pettit, The Common Mind (New York: Oxford, 1993), 93-95, 115, 182-83.
21. Cf. Hechter, Principles of Group Solidarity, 16, 41-42, 50 n.16;
22. May, Morality of Groups, 29-41.
23. See especially Charles Taylor, "The Dialogical Self," in The Interpretive Turn, eds. D. R. Hiley, J. F. Bohman, and R. Shusterman (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 304-14;
24. This kind of expert authority need not be "preemptive," pace Christopher McMahon, Authority and Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), chap. 2.
25. Although some philosophers, like Habermas, introduce solidarity as a corrective to Kant, others have noticed its implicit presence in his ethics; see David Wiggins, "Categorical Requirements: Kant and Hume on the Idea of Duty," in Virtues and Reasons, eds. R. Hursthouse, G. Lawrence, and W. Quinn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 297-330, here 326-28.
26. Cf. Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 91-94.
27. For analyses of Kant's concept of autonomy, see Thomas E. Hill, Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), chaps. 2 and 5;
28. Thomas E. Hill, Autonomy and Self-Respect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), chap. 4;
29. Paul Guyer, "Kant on the Theory and Practice of Autonomy," in Autonomy, eds. E. Frankel Paul, F. D. Miller, Jr., and J. Paul (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 70-98.
30. "What they count as belonging to their happiness is left up to them to decide; but I may decline many of these things which I do not regard as so belonging, if they otherwise have no right to demand them of me" (MM, 388);
31. and he attributes disagreements over judgments of the moral worth of specific actions, not to deep value conflicts, but merely to temperamental differences in showing respect for the same moral law (CPR, 153-54);
32. See Habermas, Moral Consciousness.
33. Jürgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other, eds. C. Cronin and P. DeGreiff (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), 42.
34. For an attempt to render discourse ethics more plausible as an account of individual conscience formation, see my "Discourse Ethics and Individual Conscience," in Perspektiven der Diskursethik, ed. N. Gottschalk-Mazouz (Würzburg, Germany: Königshausen and Neumann, 2004), 26-40.