On the nature of benevolence

Journal of Social Philosophy

Volumn 35, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 304-317

  Livnat, Yuval ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 67349206356     PISSN: 00472786     EISSN: 14679833     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9833.2004.00234.x     Document Type: Article

References (18)

1. John Kekes, in "Benevolence: A Minor Virtue", Social Philosophy and Policy 4(1987):21, mentions in passing three elements of benevolence, which he terms the "emotive", the "cognitive", and the "motivational." My categories bear some resemblance to Kekes's categories but at some points significantly diverge from them.
2. William Frankena, "Beneficence/Benevolence", Social Philosophy and Policy 4(1987):1. Some philosophers use "beneficence" in a broader sense, to include any act of good doing, notwithstanding the motivation behind it (emotive or not). I suggest using "beneficence" in this strict sense, as this would linguistically enable us to contrast and compare emotive and nonemotive good doing and to use "charity" in the broader sense. According to this taxonomy, "benevolence" (emotive good doing) and "beneficence" (nonemotive good doing) are both subcategories of "charity"
3. ("The Justice of Caring", Social Philosophy and Policy 4 [1998]: 180).
4. Debra Shogan, Care and Moral Motivation (Toronto: OISE Press, 1988), 7.
5. Christine M. Korsgaard, "Kant's Analysis of Obligation: The Argument of Groundwork I", Monist 72(1989):311.
6. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1915), 1144a 13-20.
7. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997; originally published 1785), 11.
8. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1104b 4-13.
9. J. O. Urmson, Aristotle's Ethics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 26-27.
10. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Blum, Friendship, Altruism, and Morality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), 12-42.
11. Frankena, "Beneficence/Benevolence"
12. Jeremy Waldron, "A Right to Do Wrong", Ethics 92(1981):21;
13. Theodore M. Benditt, "The Demands of Justice", Ethics 95(1985):224.
14. See the decision of the United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, in Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (1978).
15. Julia Driver, "The Suberogatory", Australian Journal of Philosophy 70(1992):286;
16. Heidi Hurd, "Duties beyond the Call of Duties", Annual Review of Law and Ethics 6(1998):3.
17. Yuval Livnat, "Benevolence and Justice", forthcoming in Journal of Value Inquiry.
18. Indeed, one can be excessively benevolent, and one type of excessively benevolent behavior is patently foolish acts, that is, acts that carry heavy costs to the benefactor yet confer negligible benefits on the beneficiary. Similarly, benevolent acts can be considered excessively benevolent when the benefactor is so preoccupied with the welfare of the beneficiary that she fails to recognize her more pressing duties toward others ("third parties"): See Livnat, "Benevolence and Justice"