Human dignity: Functions and meanings

Perspectives on Human Dignity: A Conversation

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 73-92

  Shultziner, Doron ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 67349126905     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4020-6281-0_7     Document Type: Chapter

References (81)

1. This chapter is reprinted with permission from the Berkeley Electronic Press. The original paper can be found online in the journal Global Jurist Topics at http://www.bepress.com/gj/topics/vol3/iss3/art3/.
2. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, 3rd edn. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), §340 (original emphasis).
3. Ibid., §11.
4. N. Rotenstreich, Man and His Dignity Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1983.
5. In using the Thick and Thin concepts in this paper I have relied on Michael Walzer's useful distinction in his Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994).
6. The strong linguistic and conceptual relations between human dignity and humiliation are found in Daniel Statman, 'Two Concepts of Dignity', Iyyuney Mishpat 24 (2001), pp.541-603 [in Hebrew]
7. and 'Humiliation, Dignity and Self-Respect', in: D. Kretzmer and E. Klein (eds.), The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002).
8. United Nations Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by GA Res. 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966;
9. United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by GA Res. 2200A of 16 December 1966, Preamble (emphasis added).
10. All the covenants mentioned in this paper are conveniently collected in: Ian Brownlie (ed.), Basic Documents on Human Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).
11. 'To be a human being is not a status conferred upon me by anyone. Nor is this a status that I, nor anybody else, can confer upon others. ... These are facts of recognition, of acknowledgment, constituting the very beings we are, and that we take for granted in what we do. We are not 'instructed' in these truths, they become part of us in the process of being alive and aware as human beings. Let me acknowledge these facts as bedrock truths.' Teresa Iglesias, 'Bedrock Truths and the Dignity of the Individual', Logos 4 (2001), p.114.
12. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Final Act of the Ninth International Conference of American States, 1948.
13. Final Act of the Helsinki Conference, adopted on August 1975, article VII.
14. Cf.: 'human dignity is the source from which human rights and liberties are derived. ... It is human dignity that provides the causa, as well as the ratio, for all human rights legislation.' H. Cohn, 'On the Meaning of Human Dignity' (original emphasis), Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, 13 (1981), pp.231-232.
15. There are about four constitutions (Mexico, Finland, Ireland, and Cuba) that refer to Human Dignity in the period of 1900-1945 (before the end of the war);
16. and more than 37 from 1945-1997, see Iglesias, 'Bedrock Truths and the Dignity of the Individual'.
17. Y. Arieli, 'On the Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Emergence of the Doctrine of the Dignity of Man and His Rights', in: D. Kretzmer and E. Klein (eds.), The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse, pp.11-17.
18. Basic Law of Spain, 1945, article 24.
19. Constitution of India, 1949, Preamble.
20. The Constitution of Portugal, 2 April 1976, article 1.
21. 'In the name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority and to Whom, as our final end, all actions both of men and States must be referred, We, the people of Ireland, humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ, Who sustained our fathers through centuries of trial, Gratefully remembering their heroic and unremitting struggle to regain the rightful independence of our Nation, And seeking to promote the common good, with due observance of Prudence, Justice and Charity, so that the dignity and freedom of the individual may be assured, true social order attained, the unity of our country restored, and concord established with other nations, Do hereby adopt, enact, and give to ourselves this Constitution.' Constitution of Ireland, 1937, Preamble.
22. The Constitution of Hungary, 20 August 1949, article 54(1).
23. Israeli Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 25 March 1992 (revised at 10 March 1994).
24. 'The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the following values: a. Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms.' The Constitution of South Africa (1993), article 1.
25. It is worth noting that the Supreme Justice of South Africa, Arthur Chaskalson, realises that such a linguistic usage is rare and explains this in the following way: 'The reluctance to give dignity the status of a discrete right in human rights instruments may be due to the breadth of its meanings and the difficulty of defining its limits... where this has been done, the entrenchment or implication of a residual right of dignity might be thought to have an open-ended quality which would be unmanageable.' Chaskalson, 'Human Dignity as a Constitutional Value', in: D. Kretzmer and E. Klein (eds.), The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse, pp.135-136.
26. Cf.: 'The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, striving for a pronouncement that would appeal to diverse political systems governing diverse peoples, built on that faith and eschewed philosophical exploration. . There is no agreed theory justifying "human dignity" as the source of right, and we are not told how the needs of human dignity are determined.' L. Henkin, 'International Human Rights as "Rights"', in: M. Winston (ed.), The Philosophy of Human Rights (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1989), pp.134-135.
27. This was, in fact, the approach taken by the drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See: 'Maritain restated the question before the committee. Instead of, "How can such disparate intellectual positions be reconciled?", he asked, "How much agreement can we reach regarding practices even while remaining incurably divided regarding the underlying theory for such practices?" .... This distinction-taken over from the UNESCO experience by those working on the Universal Declaration-allows people to stand firm on all points of principle, avoiding the trap of moral indifferentism or relativism. A Muslim need not surrender one iota of Muslim faith, or a Christian of Christian faith. Nor need a Communist abandon Communist theory. Maritain's approach was to ask one question only: Do you agree that the support of this practice and the prohibition of that other practice is a worthy criterion for the world community? Do you agree to declare that your nation will live under this code of practices? (original emphasis).' M. Novak, 'Human Dignity, Human Rights', First Things, 97 (1999), p.42.
28. African Charter on Human and People's Rights (17 June 1981), Chapter II (Duties), articles 27-29.
29. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948), Chapter II (Duties).
30. Cf. footnote no. 2.
31. Cf. footnote no. 13.
32. Cf.: 'Developments in the idea and jurisprudence of rights during two hundred years under the Constitution suggest continuing refinement of our society's sense of human dignity and an evolving appreciation of what human dignity requires.' L. Henkin, 'Human Dignity and Constitutional Rights', in: M.J. Meyer and W.A. Parent (eds.), The Constitution of Rights: Human Dignity and American Values (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), p.227.
33. Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad, p.2.
34. M. Benjamin, Splitting the Difference: Compromise and Integrity in Ethics and Politics (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1990), p.88.
35. Compare Benjamin's definition to Herbert Spiegelberg's saying: 'The search for grounds of human dignity presupposes a full pledged philosophical anthropology, showing not only man's essential nature, its ingredients, its structure and its place in the cosmos, but also his values, rights and responsibilities. Only on such basis will it be adequate survey of the possible grounds for his dignity.' H. Spiegelberg, 'Human Dignity: A Challenge to Contemporary Philosophy', in: R. Gotesky and E. Laszlo (eds.), Human Dignity: This Century and the Next (New York: Gordon & Breach, 1970), p.61.
36. See also, N. Rotenstreich, Man and His Dignity, Chapter III.
37. For conceptions of distributive justice as reflecting a thick meaning of morality, see the second chapter in Walzer Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad and on the historical and conceptual connection between human dignity, economics and religion see M.
38. Novak, 'The Judeo-Christian Foundation of Human Dignity, Personal Liberty, and the Concept of the Person', Journal of Markets and Morality, 1 (1998), pp.107-21.
39. See Human Dignity in the Israel Defence Forces (Israel Democracy Institute, 2001).
40. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §19.
41. See also Tom Bryder, 'Patterns for Future Research on Self-Esteem and Human Dignity in Mass Society', Political Psychology 15(3) (1994), pp.401-414.
42. Yuval Luria explains that 'concepts of dignity, by which we observe our life and others around us, are like psychological-glue through which social values that guide our life are attached to us and shape our conduct. They are the initial and fundamental dress that embody humane cultural values'. Y. Luria, 'A Matter of Dignity', in: A. Nemdar (ed.), Virtues and Feelings (Ramat Gan: Hoshen Le Mishpat, 1994), p.179.
43. Abdul, Aziz Said, 'Human Rights in Islamic Perspectives', in: A. Pollis and P. Schwab (eds.), Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological Perspectives (New York: Praeger. 1979), p.90.
44. Ibid., 92.
45. Jack Donnelly, 'Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western Conceptions of Human Rights', American Political Science Review, 76 (1982), pp.303-316.
46. R. Howard and J. Donnelly, 'Human Dignity, Human Rights and Political Regimes', American Political Science Review, 80 (1986).
47. R. Howard, 'Dignity, Community, and Human Rights', in: A.A. An-Na'im (ed.), Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspective; A Request for Consensus (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), p.83 (original emphasis).
48. Consult also: A. Pollis and P. Schwab, Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological Perspectives (New York: Praeger, 1979).
49. For a similar claim see R. Howard and J. Donnelly, 'Human Dignity, Human Rights and Political Regimes', p.801.
50. Jack Donnelly, 'Human Rights and Human Dignity' (1982).
51. And compare: 'The personal dignity of citizens of the People's Republic of China is inviolable. Insult, libel, false charge, or frame-up directed against citizens by any means is prohibited.' Article 38, Constitution of China, adopted 4 December 1982.
52. I have relied on the translation of the constitutions mentioned hereinafter found in: www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/home.html.
53. See also: 'The Islamic Republic is a system based on belief in: '6) the exalted dignity and value of man, and his freedom coupled with responsibility before God; in which equity, justice, political, economic, social, and cultural independence, and national solidarity are secured by recourse to: a) continuous leadership of the holy persons, possessing necessary qualifications, exercised on the basis of the Koran and the Sunnah, upon all of whom be peace...' article 2, Constitution of Iran, adopted 24 October 1979.
54. 'May the Thai people unite in observing, protecting and upholding the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand in order to maintain the democratic regime of government and the sovereign power derived from the Thai people, and to bring about happiness, prosperity, and dignity to His Majesty's subjects throughout the Kingdom according to the will of His Majesty in every respect.' Constitution of Thailand (1997), Preamble.
55. 'No person shall expose the King to any sort of accusation or action', article 8, ibid.
56. See also Orit Kmir's recent linguistic and conceptual analysis in her 'Honor and Dignity Cultures: The Case of Kavod and Kvod Ha-Adam in Israeli Society and Law', D. Kretzmer and E. Klein, The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse.
57. Rotenstreich, Man and his Dignity, pp.11-12.
58. Charles Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', in: A. Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition: An Essay, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp.25-51.
59. Honour requires social relations between humans, because without the attitude of the public towards the honourable man or woman, without this honour demonstrated in some way, honour does not exist-namely, honour is fully conditioned by appraisals of others to the honourable (Luria, 1994: 166); and compare: 'The Value, or Worth of a man is, as of all other things, his Price; that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his Power: and therefore is not absolute; but a thing dependent on the need and judgement of another. An able conductor of Souldiers, is of great Price in time of War present, or imminent; but in Peace not so. A learned and uncorrupt Judge, is much Worth in time of Peace, but not so much in war. And as in other things, so in men, not the seller, but the buyer determines the Price. For let a man (as most men do) rate themselves at the highest Value they can; yet their true Value is no more than it is esteemed by others' (original emphasis). T. Hobbes, in: R. Tuck (ed.), Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.63.
60. Also compare: 'The publique worth of a man, which is the Value set on him by the Commonwealth, is that which men commonly call DIGNITY. And this Value of him by the Commonwealth is understood, by offices of Command, Judicature, publique Employment; or by Names and Titles, introduced for distinction of such Value.' Hobbes (1996), pp.63-64.
61. For the possible contradiction between claiming rights and human dignity see: 'However, every time a person claims his rights this activity is not expressive of his dignity. Claiming one's rights might be unrelated to expressing dignity or even, in extreme cases, antithetical to the expression of human dignity. Someone might conceivably claim his rights in a very undignified way. He might be too pushy about his rights or he might claim some rights insincerely, not really believing that they were his but still hoping to get the benefit of the display.' M.J. Meyer, 'Dignity, Rights and Self-Control', Ethics, 99 (1989), p.524.
62. Daniel Statman defines the wide moral outlook as 'dignity as a moral attitude'. According to Statman, every immoral behaviour is contained within dignity as a moral attitude. D. Statman, 'Two Concepts of Dignity', p.544.
63. Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics distinguishes between the ultimate end (telos), that is happiness, and honour. Aristotle claims that some people confuse honour-which is what politicians strive for and is conditioned by those honouring the honoured-with the quality of the person whose virtue is not conditioned by others, but is inherent in him. Compare: 'People of quality, for their part, those who tend towards a life of action, go for honour; for pretty much this is the end of the political life. But it appears more superficial than what we are looking for, as it seems to be located in those doing the honouring rather than in the person receiving it, and our hunch is that the good is something that belongs to a person and is difficult to take away from him... so it is clear, at any rate according to them, that excellence is of greater value. In fact, perhaps one might suppose that this is even more the end of the political life than honour is' (1095b21-1095b31).
64. The thin meaning of human dignity with relation to humiliation is demonstrated both linguistically and conceptually in Statman's articles (2001, 2002).
65. 'Its [human dignity] intrinsic meaning has been left to intuitive understanding, conditioned in large measures by cultural factors. When it has been evoked in concrete situations, it has been generally assumed that a violation of human dignity can be recognised even if the abstract term cannot be defined' (emphasis mine). Oscar Schachter, 'Human Dignity as a Normative Concept', American Journal of International Law, 77(4) (1983), pp.848-854.
66. Victor Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), p.36.
67. Ibid., p.72.
68. Frankl's feelings that he has been treated like an animal lacking human dignity is a recurring theme in his book: 'A man's character became involved to the point that he was caught in a mental turmoil which threatened all the values he held and threw them into doubt. Under the influence of a world which no longer recognised the value of human life and human dignity, which had robbed man of his will and had made him an object to be exterminated (having planned, however, to make full use of him first-to the last ounce of his physical resources)-under this influence the personal ego finally suffered a loss of values. If the man in the concentration camp did not struggle against this in the last effort to save his self-respect, he lost the feeling of being an individual, a being with a mind, with inner freedom and personal value. He thought of himself then as only a part of an enormous mass of people; his existence descended to the level of animal life. The men were herded-sometimes to one place then to another; sometimes driven together, then apart-like a flock of sheep without thought or a will of their own.' V. Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, p.60.
69. Although slavery still exists in some parts of the world (like in parts of Africa). Compare: 'Mindful that the peoples of the United Nations reaffirmed in the Charter their faith in the dignity and worth of the human person; Considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights...states that no one shall be held in slavery or servitude and that slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms; .... Being aware, however, that slavery, the slave trade and institutions and practices similar to slavery have not yet been eliminated in all parts of the world; Having decided, therefore, that the Convention of 1926, which remains operative, should now be augmented by the conclusion of a supplementary convention designed to intensify national as well as international efforts towards the abolition of slavery, the slave trade and institutions and practices similar to slavery' (emphasis added). Preamble to Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, adopted on 7 September 1956.
70. Jochen Frowein, 2002, 'Human Dignity in International Law', in: D. Kretzmer and E. Klein (eds.), The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse, p.122.
71. Compare: 'minimalist meanings are embedded in the maximal morality, expressed in the same idiom, sharing the same historical/cultural/religious/ political) orientation. Minimalism is liberated from its embeddedness and appears independent, in varying degrees of thinness, only in the course of a personal or social crisis or a political confrontation....' Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad, p.3.
72. Martin Luther King, 'Letter from Birmingham Jail', 1963 (emphasis added).
73. Ibid., p.295 (emphasis added).
74. Compare also to Henkin, 'Human Dignity and Constitutional Rights', at n.27 above.
75. For the different reasons for this practice and its scope see Amnesty International's Female Genital Mutilation: A Human Rights Information Pack (AI Index: ACT 77/05/97), http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/femgen/fgm1.htm#a7.
76. Rotenstreich, Man and his Dignity, p.9.
77. Ibid.
78. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §91 (original emphasis).
79. Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition", p.37.
80. Ibid., p.38.
81. Ibid., p.25.