Signaling through board diversity: Is anyone listening?

University of Cincinnati Law Review

Volumn 77, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 431-464

  Broome, Lissa Lamkin ^a,b   Krawiec, Kimberly D ^a,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 67249096089     PISSN: 00096881     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (110)

1. The most prominent example is Norway, which in 2006 enacted legislation requiring that, by 2008, roughly 40% of public company board seats be held by women. Stephanie Holmes, Smashing the Glass Ceiling, BBC NEWS, Jan. 11, 2008, http://news.bbc.co. Uk/2/hi/business/7176879.stm. As of January 2008, women held close to 38% of board seats at Norwegian public corporations, by far the world's highest percentage.
2. Id. The news prompted claims of victory from the legislation's advocates, as well as charges of quotas, window-dressing, and divisiveness from opponents.
3. Id. In the United States, dozens of advocacy groups are dedicated to promoting board diversity, by measuring it, studying it, or providing training or mentoring to potential female or minority board members. See, e.g., The Alliance for Board Diversity (ABD), The Alliance for Board Diversity Factsheet 1-2 (2005), http://www.myjaxchamber.com/upload/ boardminorities.pdf. ABD partners include other advocacy groups such as Catalyst, http://www.catalyst.org (advancing women in business);
4. The Executive Leadership Council, http://www.elcinfo.com (advancing African-Americans);
5. and the Hispanic Association on Corporate Responsibility, http://www.hacr.org (advancing Hispanics). Other groups include the InterOrganization Network (ION) (advancing women);
6. Corporate Women Directors International, http://www.globewomen. comcwdi/CWDI.htm (same);
7. DirectWomen, http://ww w.abanet.org/buslaw/directwomen / (same); the Center for Executive Women, http://www.kellogg.nort hwestem.edu/research/cew (same);
8. and the Director Diversity Initiative, https://ddi.law.unc.edu/def ault.aspx (advancing women and minorities).
9. See, e.g., DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, NO SEAT AT THE TABLE: HOW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE and LAW KEEP WOMEN OUT of the BOARDROOM (2007);
10. Jayne M. Barnard, More Women on Corporate Boards? Not So Fast, 13 WM. and MARY J. WOMEN and L. 703 (2007);
11. Lynne L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate Boards of Directors, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1363 (2002);
12. Lisa M. Fairfax, Clogs in the Pipeline: The Mixed Data on Women Directors and Continued Barriers to Their Advancements, 65 MD. L. REV. 579 (2006);
13. Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Corporate Board Diversity: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Business Rationales for Diversity on Corporate Boards, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 795 [hereinafter Fairfax, The Bottom Line]; Lisa M. Fairfax, Some Reflections on The Diversity of Corporate Boards: Women, People of Color, and the Unique Issues Associated with Women of Color, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV, 1105 (2005);
14. Donald J. Polden, Forty Years After Title VII: Creating an Atmosphere Conducive to Diversity in the Corporate Boardroom, 36 U. MEM. L. REV. 67 (2005);
15. Steven A. Ramirez, Games CEOs Play and Interest Convergence Theory: Why Diversity Lags in America's Boardrooms and What to Do About It, 61 WASH. and LEE L. REV. 1583 (2004);
16. Steven A. Ramirez, A Flaw in the Sarbanes-Oxley Reform: Can Diversity in the Boardroom Quell Corporate Corruption?, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 837 (2003);
17. see also sources cited notes 3-7.
18. In addition, a few qualitative studies address the topic of board diversity. See, e.g., Vicki W. Kremer et al., Critical Mass On Corporate Boards: Why Three or More Women Enhance Governance (Wellesley Ctrs. for Women Working Paper Series, Report No. WCW 11, 2006), available at http://www.tiaa-crefinstitute.org/research/grants/docs/ CriticalMassreport.pdf (interviews and discussions with fifty women directors, twelve CEOs, and seven corporate secretaries from Fortune 1000 companies);
19. ERIKA HAYES JAMES and LYNN PERRY WOOTEN, INST, for LEADERSHIP DEV. and RESEARCH, THE EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP COUNCIL, IMPLICATIONS and RECOMMENDATIONS of the 2004 CENSUS of AFRICAN AMERICANS on BOARDS of DIRECTORS PART II of II (2006), http://www.elcinfo.eom/6-6-06-ELC-Census-Part-II.pdf (telephone interviews with thirty-five African American directors).
20. See, e.g., David Carter, et al., The Diversity of Corporate Board Committees and Firm Financial Performance (Mar. 15, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn. com/abstr act=972763 (reporting the results of a cross-section fixed-effects procedure with lagged variables and a three-stage least-squares estimation that support the hypothesis that board diversity positively affects financial performance as measured by Tobin's q);
21. David Carter et al., Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm Value, 38 FIN. REV. 33 (2003) (finding that Tobin's q is positively related to both the percentage of female directors and the percentage of minority directors);
22. Niclas L. Erhardt et al., Board of Director Diversity and Firm Financial Performance, 11 CORP. GOVERNANCE 102 (2003) (finding that the percentage of Caucasian females plus ethnic minority directors on the board is positively related to both Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Assets (ROA)).
23. See, e.g., Caspar Rose, Does Female Board Representation Influence Firm Performance? The Danish Evidence, 15 CORP. GOVERNANCE 404, 412 (2007) (finding no effects of board gender diversity on corporate performance in a sample of Danish firms and urging case studies to shed light on the role played by female directors in board decision-making);
24. Charles B. Shrader et al., Women In Management and Firm Financial Performance: An Exploratory Study, 9 J. MANAGERIAL ISSUES 355 (1997) (finding no relationship between the percentage of female directors and profit margin, ROA, or ROE);
25. Shaker A. Zahra and Wilbur W. Stanton, The Implications of Board of Directors' Composition for Corporate Strategy and Performance, 5 INT'L J. MGMT. 229 (1988) (finding no relationship between the percentage of females plus ethnic minorities on the board and ROA, profit margin, sales to equity, Earnings Per Share (EPS), or dividends);
26. Øyvind Bøhren and R. Øystein Strøm, Boards and Politics (Aug. 21, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (finding a negative association between corporate performance and board gender diversity in a sample of all non-financial firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange from 1989-2002).
27. See Sanjai Bhagat and Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 237 (2002) (noting that, "[b]oard composition could affect firm performance, but firm performance can also cause the firm to change its board composition. ");
28. Annelies Renders and Ann Gaeremynck, Corporate Governance and Performance: Controlling for Sample Selection Bias and Endogeneity 5 (K. U. Leuven AFI, Working Paper No. 0606, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm7abstract-id=888770 (stating that "[a]n important issue in studying the relation between corporate governance and firm performance is the direction of causation");
29. Renée B. Adams and Daniel Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact on Governance and Performance (Oct. 22, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn. com/abstract= 1107721 (referencing studies finding a positive relationship between board diversity and corporate performance, but concluding that they do not fully address problems of endogeneity and reverse causation, rendering causal interpretations difficult).
30. See, e.g., Kathleen A. Farrell and Philip L. Hersch, Additions to Corporate Boards: The Effect Of Gender, 11 J. CORP. FIN. 85 (2005) (finding a significant, positive relation between ROA and the likelihood of adding a woman to the board, but failing to detect a significant market reaction to the addition of a female board member, thus undercutting the case for causation);
31. Adams and Ferreira, supra note 6, at 3 (stating that "although the correlation between gender diversity and either firm value or operating performance appears to be positive at first inspection, this correlation disappears once we apply reasonable procedures to tackle omitted variables and reverse causality problems" and concluding that, on average, firms with greater gender diversity on the board perform worse).
32. See, e.g., Val Singh et al., Women Directors on Top UK Boards, 9 CORP. GOVERNANCE 206 (2002) (arguing that theories linking board diversity and firm performance are not well developed and urging further study of the methods by which female and minority directors contribute to corporate performance);
33. see also Rose, supra note 5, at 412-13 (calling for case studies to enhance the understanding of the relation, if any, between board diversity and corporate performance).
34. Lissa Lamkin Broome, John M. Conley and Kimberly D. Krawiec, Board Diversity and Corporate Performance: Filling in the Gaps (forthcoming 2009) (on file with authors).
35. As elaborated below, the qualities of interest typically thought to be signaled through board diversity are equal opportunity in the workplace, attention to the needs of women and minorities in product and service development and provision, or that the firm is "progressive" or "forward-looking" in some other meaningful way-hereafter labeled "good" firms. See infra notes 55-71 and accompanying text (discussing these qualities in more detail).
36. See Broome, Conley and Krawiec, supra note 9.
37. The remaining five respondents represent other categories of interest. See infra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (discussing the breakdown of respondents in more detail).
38. See infra note 18 (discussing the relationship between the number of respondents, the number of board experiences, and the number of firms in the sample).
39. With the exception of one interview, which was conducted by telephone, all interviews were conducted in person by two of the three study co-authors (Lissa Lamkin Broome, John M. Conley, and Kimberly D. Krawiec).
40. Snowball sampling is a sample design in which respondents are asked to suggest other potential study subjects according to some inclusion criteria defined by the researchers (such as someone knowledgeable about the study question or with power in the area). We began by contacting and interviewing public company board members with whom one or both co-authors had direct or indirect personal or professional contacts. At the conclusion of each interview, the respondent was asked to name other potential interview subjects (or to contact them on our behalf). The process was then repeated with these new respondents, and so on. Because the sample selection is nonrandom, samples generated through the snowballing method present problems of sample bias.
41. See Jean Faugier and Mary Sargeant, Sampling Hard to Reach Populations, 26 J. ADVANCED NURSING 790 (1997);
42. Rowland Atkinson and John Flint, Snowball Sampling, in THE SAGE ENCYCLOPEDIA of SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH METHODS 1044 (Michael S. Lewis-Beck, et al., eds., 2004).
43. Atkinson and Flint, supra note 16, at 1044.
44. The number of "public company board experiences" is larger than the number of distinct public companies represented in the sample because several director-respondents served with each other on at least one board. To illustrate, assume that two respondents, Mary and John, both serve on the board of Alpha Corporation and, in addition, John serves on the board of Beta Corporation. The result is: two individual respondents (Mary and John) and three board experiences (Mary's experience on Alpha Corporation, John's experience on Alpha Corporation, and John's experience on Beta Corporation) at two distinct firms (Alpha Corporation and Beta Corporation). Of the thirty board member respondents, three were CEOs serving as inside directors on their corporation's board.
45. Of non-white respondents, four self-identify as African-American, and two self-identify as Hispanic.
46. CATALYST, INC., 2007 CENSUS: BOARD DIRECTORS: WOMEN GAIN BOARD COMMITTEE CHAIRS in THE FORTUNE 500, OVERALL REPRESENTATION STAGNATES 1 (2007) [hereinafter Catalyst, Inc., 2007 CENSUS], available at http://www.catalyst. Org/file/3/census-board.pdf.
47. Id.
48. This may be a function of the snowball sampling method (female respondents seemed more likely to identify other females as potential respondents); a response bias triggered by the identity of the two authors (women may feel more comfortable talking to the authors-two white women-than do members of other demographic groups, leading to a higher response rate among women); or of the subject matter (women and minority directors may naturally be more interested in the subject matter). Professor John M. Conley (a white male) has joined the study and will participate in some of the remaining interviews, particularly where the respondent is male.
49. The firm's region is defined by reference to its corporate headquarters as disclosed in SEC filings. The regions are those employed by the U. S. Census Bureau. See U. S. Census Bureau, Census Regions and Divisions of the United States, http://www.census.gov/geo/www/us-regdiv. pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2009).
50. The four digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Codes that appear in a company's disseminated EDGAR filings are assigned by the U. S. government to indicate the company's type of business. See Occupational Safety and Health Admin., U. S. Dep't of Labor, SIC Division Structure, http://www.osha.gov/pls/ imis/sic-manual.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2009). Because there was no SIC code provided for one sample firm, that firm is excluded from Figure 5.
51. See Broome, Conley and Krawiec, supra note 9.
52. CATALYST, INC., WOMEN on CORPORATE BOARDS: THE CHALLENGE of CHANGE 7 (1993) [hereinafter CATALYST, INC., WOMEN ON CORPORATE BOARDS], available at http://www.catalyst. org/fil e/227/women-on-corporate-boards-the-challenge-of-change.pdf
53. See CATALYST, INC, 2007 CENSUS, SUPRA note 20, at 1. In recent years, however, female and African-American representation on Fortune 500 boards has remained stagnant or, by some measures, fallen. Id. See also ALLIANCE FOR BD. DIVERSITY, WOMEN AND MINORITIES ON FORTUNE 100 BOARDS (2008), available at http://www.elcinfo.com/downloads/docs/Final-l-22-08.pdf
54. Fairfax, The Bottom Line, supra note 2, at 800 (citing BUS. FOR SOC. RESPONSIBILITY, BOARD DIVERSITY ISSUE BRIEF (2003), http://www.bsr.org/ research/issue-brief-details.cfm7Documen tID=443).
55. Id. at 799 (citing KORN/FERRY INT'L, 3 1st ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY 11 (2004)).
56. Quantitative studies confirm this finding of intentional board diversification across Fortune 500 companies. See, e.g., Farrell and Hersch, supra note 7, at 86 (finding evidence of a diversity goal in adding female directors to Fortune 500 boards).
57. Interview, Transcript No. DS300010, at 3 (July 30, 2007) (transcript on file with authors at University of North Carolina)
58. Interview, Transcript No. DS300024, at 2 (Dec. 4, 2007) (transcript on file with authors at University of North Carolina).
59. Interview, Transcript No. DS300017, at 8 (Oct. 9, 2007) (transcript on file with authors at University of North Carolina).
60. Historically, female and minority directors disproportionately have been drawn from non- profits and academia, although that trend appears to have changed with respect to female directors. See BRANSON, supra note 2, at 91, 103 (reporting that women directors who are Vice Presidents, Chief Operating Officers, Chief Financial Officers, or Chief Executive Officers of a corporate subsidiary have increased their share of the female board seats from 18.3% in 2001 to 32.7% in 2005, while the percentage of women directors coming from academia, nonprofits, and former government service declined from 37.2% of female directors in 2001 to 29% of female directors in 2005).
61. Interview, Transcript No. DS300009, at 7 (July 30, 2007) (transcript on file with authors at University of North Carolina).
62. Interview, Transcript No. DS300014, at 6 (Aug. 30, 2007) (transcript on file with authors at University of North Carolina).
63. Interview, Transcript No. DS300025, at 1 (Dec. 5, 2007) (transcript on file with authors at University of North Carolina).
64. Interview, Transcript No. DS300025, at 8 (Dec. 5, 2007) (transcript on file with authors at University of North Carolina).
65. See Broome, Conley and Krawiec, supra note 9.
66. Id. (discussing these theories at length).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See, Nadav Nur and Oren Hasson, Phenotypic Plasticity and the Handicap Principle, 110 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 275 (1984) (discussing storting in gazelles and roaring among stags as signals from prey to predators);
70. Fernando Vega-Redondo and Oren Hasson, A Game Theoretic Model Of Predator-Prey Signaling, 162 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 309 (1993) (developing a model of strategic predator-prey interaction);
71. Shigeo Yachi, How Can Honest Signalling Evolve? The Role of the Handicap Principle, 262 PROC.: BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES 283 (1995) (examining the conditions for the evolution and maintenance of honest signaling and elucidating the role of the handicap principle).
72. See THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (1899) (arguing that individuals signal wealth through leisure and conspicuous consumption).
73. Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q. J. ECON. 355 (1973) (demonstrating that, because unproductive job applicants face higher opportunity costs than productive applicants in terms of the time and effort invested in education, education serves as a credible signal to employers of prospective employees' likely productivity levels).
74. See Fairfax, The Bottom Line, supra note 2, at 830 (noting that, "[b]ecause board members do not normally interact with company employees, employees may be unaware of the composition of their company's board").
75. See infra notes 55-71 and accompanying text (discussing each of these signals in more detail).
76. See Nur and Hasson, supra note 43, at 277.
77. See Spence, supra note 45, at 355-58.
78. When signals are not inherently reliable some social or other effective mechanism for punishing cheaters must ensure their reliability. See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW and SOCIAL NORMS (2000);
79. Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 765 (1998). Because we discern no disciplining mechanism with respect to the use of board diversity as a signal, we do not discuss this possibility further.
80. Judith S. Donath, Identity and Deception in the Virtual Community, in COMMUNITIES IN CYBERSPACE 32-33 (Marc A. Smith and Peter Kollock eds., 1999).
81. Indeed, researchers have sought to analyze the impact of numerous board characteristics on firm performance, with conflicting results. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance Indices (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 89, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1019921 (summarizing the literature on this point).
82. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 66-69 (1992). Alternatively, one can also imagine plausible scenarios in which board diversity is equally costly to all firms, but in which progressive firms reap greater benefits from the board diversity signal than do non-progressive firms. If this is the case then, once again, board diversity could act as a credible signal of a firm's good nature. These costs could arise if, for example, female and minority directors were less experienced than their white male counterparts, brought less status and prestige than white male directors to the boards on which they sit, or if recruiting and retaining women and minority directors was more difficult.
83. See, e.g., John M. Conley and Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed, And Embellish: Theory Versus Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31 J. CORP. L. 1, 14-15 (2005) (noting that, "the very existence of a coherent CSR movement may invite insincerity, " because a "company could learn the culturally appropriate behaviors and participate in the CSR discourse without significantly changing their real world behavior");
84. Oona A. Hathaway, The New Empiricism in Human Rights: Insights and Implications, 98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 206, 209 (2004) (stating that "the states with the best human rights practices (and hence the best reputations) are often more reluctant to join human rights treaties than those with worse practices (and hence worse reputations), " suggesting "that states with better practices have little to gain and something to lose by joining the treaties, whereas the opposite is true of states with poor practices");
85. Oona A. Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1821 (2003) (presenting evidence that states with poor human rights records will sometimes commit to human rights treaties, when the probability of compliance is low);
86. Andrew A. King and Michael J. Lenox, Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions: The Chemical Industry's Responsible Care Program, 43 ACAD. MGMT. J. 698 (2000) (presenting evidence of adverse selection in the membership of Responsible Care);
87. Michael J. Lenox and Jennifer Nash, Industry Self-Regulation and Adverse Selection: A Comparison Across Four Trade Association Programs, 12 BUS. STRATEGY and ENV'T 343 (2003) (presenting evidence that, in the absence of measuring and enforcement mechanisms for compliance, poorer performing firms will seek to join industry trade associations in an attempt to gain the signaling and other benefits of membership).
88. We understand that there may be overlap in the intended audience for each of these signals. For example, consumers and employees may also care about the firm's level of social responsibility. Nonetheless, for the sake of simplicity, we have organized the signaling scenarios in this section along the lines most frequently articulated by our respondents and other researchers.
89. See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
90. Interview, Transcript No. DS300010, at 3-4 (July 30, 2007) (transcript on file with authors at University of North Carolina).
91. Interview, Transcript No. DS300007, at 24 (July 27, 2007) (transcript on file with authors at University of North Carolina).
92. Id. at 24-25.
93. See Frank Dobbin, Alexandra Kalev and Erin Kelly, Diversity Management in Corporate America, 6 CONTEXTS 21-27 (2007) (discussing the large sums spent on diversity measures, some of which may be ineffective);
94. Alexandra Kalev, Frank Dobbin and Erin Kelly, Best Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies, 71 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 589 (2006) (examining the effects of seven common diversity programs on the representation of various demographic groups in management at a sample of 708 firms, and reporting varying rates of effectiveness, depending on the type of program).
95. Interview, Transcript No. DS300029, at 12 (Dec. 17, 2007) (transcript on file with authors at University of North Carolina).
96. Interview, Transcript No. DS300025, at 5 (Dec. 5, 2007) (transcript on file with authors at
97. Interview, Transcript No. DS300015/DS300016, at 6-7 (Sept. 21, 2007) (transcript on file with authors at University of North Carolina).
98. See Broome, Conley and Krawiec, supra note 9 (discussing this rationale).
99. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text (discussing the different manner used by respondents to discuss signaling to employees versus signaling to consumers).
100. Interview, Transcript No. DS300050, at 19-20 (Oct. 3, 2008) (transcript on file with authors at University of North Carolina).
101. Interview, Transcript No. DS00034, at 4-5 (Feb. 5, 2008) (transcript on file with authors at University of North Carolina).
102. Interview, Transcript No. DS00034, at 9 (Feb. 5, 2008) (transcript on file with authors at University of North Carolina).
103. We note that, so far as we could tell, this asserted signal did not break down into democratic versus republican or liberal versus conservative. Instead, the concept seemed to be invoked as a means of demonstrating that the firm was law abiding and conformed to broadly held societ al. norms. In other words, the asserted signal seemed to be, "we're not Enron, " rather than "we're the Body Shop. "
104. Interview, Transcript DS00033, at 21 (Feb. 5, 2008) (transcript on file with authors at University of North Carolina).
105. Interview, Transcript DS00033, at 22 (Feb. 5, 2008) (transcript on file with authors at University of North Carolina) (emphasis added).
106. The Fifteen Best Companies for Board Diversity, BLACK ENTERPRISE, July 2008, available at http://www.blackenterprise. com/diversity/diversity-lists/2008/07/11 /the-15-best-companies-for-boar d-diversity-2/. The Black Enterprise list of most diverse boards differs from that produced by the Alliance for Board Diversity, presumably because the ABD list includes white females in its diversity measure and is limited to the Fortune 100, whereas the Black Enterprise list extends to the 1, 000 top publicly traded companies and is limited to board representation by African-Americans and other ethnic minority groups. See id.; ALLIANCE FOR BD. DIVERSITY, supra note 27, at 7 (listing the twelve Fortune 100 companies with more than 40% board diversity). Not surprisingly, there is even less overlap between the Alliance for Board Diversity list and the Black Enterprise sub-lists for workplace diversity, senior management diversity, and supplier diversity.
107. See, e.g., Press Release, Reuters, Black Enterprise Magazine Names Verizon to Publication's List of 40 Best Companies (Jun. 30, 2008), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelea se/idUS164791+30-Jun-2008+PRN20080630; Press Release, Xerox, Black Enterprise Names Xerox Among the Best for Diversity (June 12, 2007), available at http://www.xerox.com/go/xrx/templat e/inv-rel-newsroom.jsp?ed-name=NR- 2007Junel2-BlackEnterpriseMag-Diversity&app=Newsroom&view= newsrelease&format=article&Xcntry=USA&Xlang=en-US;
108. Press Release, The Corporate Social Responsibility Newswire, UPS Named a Top Company for Diversity; Black Enterprise Magazine Releases 'The 40 Best Companies for Diversity' (June 14, 2006), available at http://www.csrwire.co m/News/5778.html.
109. Compare The Fifteen Best Companies for Board Diversity, supra note 72, with The Fifteen Best Companies for Senior Management, BLACK ENTERPRISE, July 2008, available at http://www. Mack enterprise.com/diversity/diversity-lists/2008/07/03/the-15-best-companies- for-senior-management/.
110. Compare The Fifteen Best Companies for Board Diversity, supra note 72, with The Fifteen Best Companies for Workforce Diversity, BLACK ENTERPRISE, July 2008, available at http://www.blac kenterprise.com/diversity/diversity-lists/2008/07/10/the-15- best-companies-for-workforce-diversity-2/, and The Fifteen Best Companies for Supplier Diversity, BLACK ENTERPRISE, July 2008, available at http://www.blackenterprise.com/diversity/diversity-lists/2008/07/ 09/the-15-best-companies-for-supplier- diversity-2/.