Understanding Legal Realism

Texas Law Review

Volumn 87, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 730-785

  Tamanaha, B Z ^a  

^a ST JOHN'S UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 67249085692     PISSN: 00404411     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (470)

1. BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 15 (2007).
2. WILLIAM M. WIECEK, LIBERTY UNDER LAW: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE 187 (1988).
3. VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER, STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & WENDY L. MARTINEK, JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT 30 (2006).
4. Ch ris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (2007).
5. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 128 (1921).
6. See infra notes 282-304 and accompanying text.
7. See infra Part II.
8. See David M Rabban, The Historiography of The Common Law, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1161, 1164-65 (2003) (book review) (describing the school of historical jurisprudence as emphasizing history as the key to understanding law, rather than as theories of natural law or analytical jurisprudence).
9. For an example that draws this connection between the Historical Jurists and legal formalism, see William P. LaPiana, Jurisprudence of History and Truth, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 519, 539-42, 555-57 (1992)
10. See also David M. Rabban, The Historiography of Late Nineteenth-Century American Legal History, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 541, 567-78 (2003) (surveying the work of nine Historical Jurists).
11. JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 1-2 (1995) (emphasis added).
12. LEITER, supra note 1, at 1.
13. E.g., George Packer, Unrealistic, NEW YORKER, Nov. 27, 2006, at 83, 83.
14. The scholars associated with legal realism made novel contributions in areas other than judging, as will be indicated later, especially by their promotion of the social-scientific study of law. See infra notes 35-38 and accompanying text. This Article focuses on their supposedly radical views about judging, for which they are best known, to show that what they said about judging had often been said before.
15. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
16. The link between the Legal Realists and the New Deal is drawn in broad terms in G. Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999, 1025-28 (1972).
17. ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND WAR 3 (1995).
18. LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, at 231 (1986).
19. Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930).
20. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 42-47 (1930).
21. N.E.H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND & KARL LLEWELLYN: SEARCHING FOR AN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 180-81 (1997).
22. Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1931).
23. Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L.REV. 1222(1931).
24. HULL, supra note 20, at 202-20.
25. The various lists are reproduced as an appendix to HULL, supra note 20, at 343-46.
26. The various lists are reproduced as an appendix to HULL, supra note 20, at 215.
27. The various lists are reproduced as an appendix to HULL, supra note 20, at 207 (quoting a letter from Corbin to Llewellyn).
28. The various lists are reproduced as an appendix to HULL, supra note 20, Id. at 208 (citing a letter from Yntema to Llewellyn).
29. Leon Green, Innocent Misrepresentation, 19 VA. L. REV. 242, 247 (1933).
30. Llewellyn, supra note 22, at 1226 n.18.
31. Llewellyn, supra note 22, at 1226 n.18.
32. Llewellyn, supra note 22, at 1234.
33. MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 171 (1992).
34. CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 128.
35. See Felix Frankfurter, Hours of Law and Realism in Constitutional Law, 29 HARV. L. REV. 353, 366 (1916) ("Courts, with increasing measure, deal with legislation affecting industry in the light of a realistic study of the industrial conditions affected.").
36. ROBERT SAMUEL SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 2 (1982).
37. See SCHLEGEL, supra note 10, at 8 (characterizing empirical social science as one of the defining pursuits of the Realists).
38. See KALMAN, supra note 17, at 97 ("[T]he overriding concern of the average realist was to make the study of law more 'realistic'.⋯").
39. See HORW1TZ, supra note 31, at 170;
40. HULL, supra note 20, at 203 (both acknowledging a connection between realism and political reform).
41. The main internal divide relates to the social-scientific vein of realism, which some heartily endorsed and engaged in, while others took it less seriously. See SCHLEGEL, supra note 10, at 5 (describing the diverse attitudes of Realists toward empirical social science).
42. William Draper Lewis, the dean of Pennsylvania Law School and later director of the American Law Institute, see SCHLEGEL, supra note 10, at 266, was a strong progressive critic of the courts, and advocated introducing social science into legal academia, but has not been considered a Realist by anyone.
43. See generally William Draper Lewis, The Social Sciences as the Basis of Legal Education, 61 U. PA. L. REV. 531, 532-33 (1913) (articulating his belief that laws are a form of expression of social ideas, and therefore must adapt as social ideas change).
44. Harvard Law Professor Albert Kales, also not recognized as a Realist, published a highly skeptical critique of the Supreme Court. Albert M. Kales, "Due Process," the Inarticulate Major Premise and the Adamson Act, 26 YALE L.J. 519 (1917).
45. Also not on any list of Realists were Robert Eugene Cushman, Charles G. Haines, and Max Lerner. Although political scientists, all published realistic reformist law-review articles on judging. Robert Eugene Cushman, The Social and Economic Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 20 MICH. L. REV. 737 (1922);
46. Charles Grove Haines, General Observations on the Effects of Personal, Political, and Economic Influences in the Decisions of Judges, 17 ILL. L. REV. 96 (1922);
47. Max Lerner, The Supreme Court and American Capitalism, 42 YALE L.J. 668 (1933).
48. WALTER F. MURPHY & C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, COURTS, JUDGES, AND POLITICS 6 (3d ed. 1979).
49. Llewellyn, supra note 22, at 1233.
50. Llewellyn, supra note 22, at 1256.
51. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 510 (1960).
52. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 32, at 171 (arguing that "historians have been misled into looking for sharper distinctions between [Pound's] sociological jurisprudence and [Llewellyn's] Legal Realism than are justified");
54. SUMMERS, supra note 35, at 23 (suggesting that Pound and Llewellyn both subscribed to a broader, pragmatic instrumentalist theory and that their "famous dispute ⋯ in the Harvard Law Review in 1931 was really an 'inside' affair").
55. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
56. The ages and matriculation dates of major Realists can be found in the biographic appendix to SCHLEGEL, supra note 10, at 263-69.
57. Pound, supra note 21, at 697.
58. SCHLEGEL, supra note 10, at 263-69 (listing the credentials of the core Realists).
59. Theodore Roosevelt, Address to the Senate and the House of Representatives (Dec. 8, 1908), 41 CONG. REC. 16,21, reprinted in CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 171.
60. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 58 (1905) (striking down legislation intended to improve the health and safety of bakers as being outside the state's police power).
61. E.g., The Adoption of the Recall in California, 23 GREEN BAG 634, 635 (1911).
62. S. 3112, 62d Cong. § 2 (1911); see 62 CONG. REC. 3359 (daily ed. July 31, 1911) (statement of Sen. Robert L. Owen) (introducing the bill).
63. W.F. Dodd, The Growth of Judicial Power, 24 POL. SCI. Q. 193, 198 (1909);
64. see also W.F. Dodd, The Recall and the Political Responsibility of Judges, 10 MICH. L. REV. 79, 87 (1911) (arguing that although "judges steeped in an outworn philosophy are hardly the persons to determine industrial and social policies," a recall provision would be "a dangerous expedient").
65. Robert L. Owen, The Right of Election and Recall ofFederalJudges, 5 ME. L. REV. 82, 93 (1912).
66. H.T. Walsh, The Recall of Judges, Address Delivered Before the Washington State Bar Association at its Annual Meeting, in 10 OKLA. L.J. 349, 354 (1912).
67. E.g., Report of the Committee to Oppose Judicial Recall, 1 A.B.A. J. 276 (1915);
68. Report of the Committee to Oppose Judicial Recall, 2 A.B.A. J. 441 (1916);
69. Report of the Committee to Oppose Judicial Recal l, 4 A.B.A. J. 400 (1918);
70. see also, e.g., Bar Association Denounces Recall, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1912, at 6 (citing a report prepared by fifty-four American lawyers denouncing judicial recall as "dangerous to the country");
71. Opposes Recall of Judges: Former Justice Brown Tells Bar Association it Is Political Folly, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1911, at 2 (describing an address by former Supreme Court Justice Henry B. Brown to the American Bar Association in which Justice Brown "bitterly opposed the recall of Judges");
72. Taft Elected Head of Bar Association, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1913, at 8 (reporting that former President William H. Taft, on the eve of his selection to head the American Bar Association, gave a speech arguing that federal judges should not be subject to recall).
73. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
74. SCHLEGEL, supra note 10, at 264.
75. Joseph W. Bingham, What Is the Law? (pt. 2), 11 MICH. L. REV. 109, 113 n.32 (1912).
76. Felix Frankfurter, The Zeitgeist and the Judiciary, Address at the Harvard Law Review Annual Banquet (Mar. 30, 1912), in LAW AND POLITICS: OCCASIONAL PAPERS OF FELIX FRANKFURTER, 1913-1938, at 3,6 (Archibald MacLeish & E.F. Prichard, Jr. eds., 1939).
77. GILBERT E. ROE, OUR JUDICIAL OLIGARCHY 8 (1912).
78. GUSTAVUS MYERS, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 7 (1912).
79. Theodore Schroeder, Social Justice and the Courts, 22 YALE L.J. 19, 26 (1912) (book review).
80. Theodore Schroeder, Social Justice and the Courts, 22 YALE L.J. 19, 26 (1912) (book review) at 26-27.
81. SCHLEGEL, supra note 10, at 266.
82. John Henry Wigmore, The Judicial Function, in IX SCIENCE OF THE LEGAL METHOD: SELECT ESSAYS BY VARIOUS AUTHORS, at xxvi, x1 (1917).
83. Thomas Reed Powell, The Logic and Rhetoric of Constitutional Law, 15 J. PHIL. PSYCHOL. & SCI. METHODS 645, 646 (1918).
84. Thomas Reed Powell, The Logic and Rhetoric of Constitutional Law, 15 J. PHIL. PSYCHOL. & SCI. METHODS 645, 646 (1918) at 648.
85. Thomas Reed Powell, The Logic and Rhetoric of Constitutional Law, 15 J. PHIL. PSYCHOL. & SCI. METHODS 645, 646 (1918) at 652.
86. Theodore Schroeder, The Psychologic Study of Judicial Decisions, 6 CAL. L. REV. 89, 93 (1918).
87. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395,401-06 (1950).
88. SCHLEGEL, supra note 10, at 266.
89. Ernst Freund, Interpretation of Statutes, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 207, 214, 214-15 (1917).
90. Ernst Freund, Interpretation of Statutes, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 207, 214, 214-15 (1917).
91. Ernst Freund, Interpretation of Statutes, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 207, 214, 214-15 (1917).
92. Ernst Freund, Interpretation of Statutes, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 207, 214, 214-15 (1917).
93. HULL, supra note 20, at 344-45.
94. HULL, supra note 20, at 344-45.
95. DAVID W. ROBERTSON, THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN LEON GREEN AND CHARLES MCCORMICK, 1927-1962, at 54 n.68 (Robin Meyer ed., 1988) (providing a graduation date for Radin);
96. SCHLEGEL, supra note 10, at 264-67 (providing graduation dates for Corbin, Cook, and Moore).
97. SCHLEGEL, supra note 10, at 267.
98. Robert M. Jarvis & Phyllis Cbleman, Benjamin N. Cardozo: New York Giant, 13 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 63, 72-73 (2002).
99. Munroe Smith, State Statute and Common Law, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 105, 121 (1887).
100. Munroe Smith, State Statute and Common Law, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 105, 121 (1887).
101. Munroe Smith, State Statute and Common Law, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 105, 121 (1887).
102. Munroe Smith, State Statute and Common Law, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 105, 121 (1887).
103. Munroe Smith, State Statute and Common Law, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 105, 121 (1887).
104. Pennoyer was governor of Oregon from 1886 until 1894. Adrian M. Tocklin, Pennoyer v. Neff: The Hidden Agenda of Stephen J. Field, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 75, 80 n.33 (1997).
105. Sylvester Pennoyer, The Case o/Marbury v. Madison, 30 AM. L. REV. 188,202 (1896).
106. John C. Gray, Some Definitions and Questions in Jurisprudence, 6 HARV. L. REV. 21, 33 (1892).
107. Walter D. Coles, Politics and the Supreme Court of the United States, 27 AM. L. REV. 182, 207 (1893).
108. Id. at 204 (criticizing the majority and concurring opinions in Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871)).
109. See id. at 205 (criticizing the Court's opinion in Milliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884)).
110. See id. at 205 (criticizing the Court's opinion in Milliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884)).
111. See id. at 205 (criticizing the Court's opinion in Milliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884)).
112. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
113. John F. Dillon, Our Law: Its Essential Nature and Ethical Foundations and Relations, 3 COUNSELLOR 99, 103 (1894).
114. 156 U.S. 1(1895).
115. 156 U.S. 1(1895).
116. 158 U.S. 601,637 (1895).
117. Percival E. Jackson, Dissent In The Supreme Court: A Chronology 136, 136-37 (1969) (recounting the "unsatisfactory result" produced by Justice Jackson's absence from the first decision due to illness and Justice Shiras's switch in the second decision to vote to strike down the income tax).
118. 158 U.S. 564(1895).
119. 158 U.S. 564(1895).
120. The outrage provoked by this trio of cases is described in 3 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 421-26 (1922).
121. Alan Furman Westin also explained that during this period, "the Supreme Court created a wide disenchantment with constitutional processes." Alan Furman Westin, The Supreme Court, the Populist Movement and the Campaign of 1896, 15 J.POL. 3,3(1953).
122. WARREN, supra note 105, at 424.
123. Seymour D. Thompson, Government by Lawyers, Address Delivered Before the Wash. State Bar Association at its Annual Meeting, in 30 AM. L. REV. 672, 685 (1896).
124. Democratic Party Platform (July 9, 1896), reprinted in WARREN, supra note 105, at 424 n.2.
125. SHELDON M. NOVICK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 118(1989).
126. Beginning in the 1870s, public dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court's decisions began to build. See, e.g., The Week, NATION, Apr. 27, 1871, at 281 (criticizing the Court for its reversal of very recent precedent, which occurred after a recent change in the membership of the Court). For a discussion of those decisions and their effects on the Populist movement prior to the 1896 elections, see Westin, supra note 105.
127. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 625 (1870).
128. Id. at 638 (Miller, J., dissenting).
129. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (decrying the majority's reliance on "Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics" to strike down a New York labor law).
130. The Legal Tender Act was held invalid in Hepburn, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 625, but held valid the following year in the Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 553-54 (1871). In the interim, a seat was added to the Court, and Justice Grier resigned, allowing President Grant to appoint Justice William Strong and Justice Joseph P. Bradley, both of whom voted to uphold the Act. Sidney Ratner, Was the Supreme Court Packed by President Grant?, 50 POL. SCI. Q. 343, 346-47 (1935).
131. The Week, supra note 110, at 281.
132. See Ratner, supra note 114, at 348, 351 (referencing an alleged conversation between Grant and his Secretary of State wherein Grant claimed to know of Strong and Bradley's favorable views on the constitutionality of the Legal Tender Act).
133. See Ratner, supra note 114, at 348, 351 (referencing an alleged conversation between Grant and his Secretary of State wherein Grant claimed to know of Strong and Bradley's favorable views on the constitutionality of the Legal Tender Act).
134. The Civil Code of the State of New York: Relations of Judge-Made Law to a Code (pt. 3), 2 ALB. L.J. 450,451 (1870).
135. The Civil Code of the State of New York: Relations of Judge-Made Law to a Code (pt. 3), 2 ALB. L.J. 450,451 (1870).
136. Eli K. Price, An Obituary Notice of Chief Justice John Meredith Read, Address Before the American Philosophical Society (Dec. 18, 1874), in 14 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC'Y 271, 273 (1876).
137. Book Review, 14 AM. L. REV. 233,234 (1880) (reviewing C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, WITH A SUMMARY OF THE TOPICS COVERED BY THE CASES).
138. The Scientific Basis of Law, 7 ALB. L.J. 321, 321 (1873).
139. The Scientific Basis of Law, 7 ALB. L.J. 321, 321 (1873).
140. The Scientific Basis of Law, 7 ALB. L.J. 321, 321 (1873).
141. Forensic Eloquence, 7 ALB. L.J. 7, 7 (1873) (emphasis added).
142. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
143. See C.B. Labatt, State Regulation of the Contract of Employment, 27 AM. L. REV. 857, 863-64 (1893). There are several reasons to believe that Holmes would have read the article: this was the leading law review of the day; Holmes worked for the journal early in his career and contributed a number of articles to it over time, see supra note 110 and accompanying text; the article discusses a Massachusetts Supreme Court case in which Holmes had participated, see generally Commonwealth v. Perry, 28 N.E. 1126 (Mass. 1891), and the author singled Holmes out for praise. Labatt, supra, at 869.
144. Labatt, supra note 127, at 864.
145. Labatt, supra note 127, at 864.
146. Labatt, supra note 127, at 864.
147. Labatt, supra note 127, at 864.
148. Christopher G. Tiedeman, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis: And a Proposed Modification of its Practical Application, in the Evolution of the Law, Address Delivered at a Meeting of the State Bar Association of New York, in Dictum and Decision, 6 COLUM. L. TIMES 35, 39 (1892).
149. Max Radin, The Theory of Judicial Decision: Or How Judges Think, 11 A.B.A. J. 357, 362 (1925).
150. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: THE CLASSIC LECTURES ON THE LAW AND ITS STUDY 70 (Steve Sheppard ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2008) (1930) (emphasis omitted).
151. FREDERICK POLLOCK, The Science of Case-Law, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND ETHICS 237 (1882), reprinted in JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL ESSAYS 169,170 (1961).
152. FREDERICK POLLOCK, The Science of Case-Law, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND ETHICS 237 (1882), reprinted in JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL ESSAYS 169,170 (1961).
153. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
154. Tiedeman, supra note 132, at 20.
155. FRANK, supra note 19, at 125.
156. Karl N. Llewellyn, Law and the Modern Mind: A Symposium (pt. 1), 31 COLUM. L. REV. 82, 83-84 (1931) (book review).
157. FRANK, supra note 19, at 125.
158. Thomas M. Cooley, Codification, 20 AM. L. REV. 315, 333 (1886).
159. Thomas M. Cooley, Codification, 20 AM. L. REV. 315, 333 (1886).
160. Christopher G. Tiedeman, Methods of Legal Education (pt. 3), 1 YALE L.J. 150, 152 (1892).
161. Walter Wheeler Cook, Book Review, 38 YALE L.J. 405, 406 (1929) (reviewing BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE (1928)).
162. Seymour D. Thompson, More Justice and Less Technicality, 23 AM. L. REV. 22, 47-48 (1889).
163. FRANK, supra note 19, at 148.
164. LLEWELLYN, supra note 134, at 62 (emphasis omitted).
165. LLEWELLYN, supra note 134, at 71 (emphasis omitted).
166. W.G. Hammond, American Law Schools, Past and Future, 7 S. L. REV. (n.s.) 400, 412 (1881).
167. Smith, supra note 84, at 121.
168. LLEWELLYN, supra note 134, at 34.
169. Hammond, supra note 150, at 413.
170. William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE FROM THE COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 19 (William O. Douglas ed., 1963), quoted in WILFRID E. RUMBLE JR., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM: SKEPTICISM, REFORM, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 55-56 (1968).
171. LLEWELLYN, supra note 134, at 62.
172. FRANK, supra note 19, at 101.
173. FRANK, supra note 19, at 135.
174. Hammond, supra note 150, at 412 (emphasis added).
175. Christopher G. Tiedeman, Silver Free Coinage and the Legal Tender Decisions, 9 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 198,205 (1897).
176. Wilbur Larremore, Judicial Legislation inNew York, 14 YALEL.J. 312, 318 (1905).
177. E.g., LLEWELLYN, supra note 134, at 71.
178. JOHN FORREST DILLON, Our Law in Its Old Home, in THE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA: BEING A SERIES OF LECTURES DELIVERED BEFORE YALE UNIVERSITY 19(1894).
179. JOHN FORREST DILLON, Our Law in Its Old Home, in THE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA: BEING A SERIES OF LECTURES DELIVERED BEFORE YALE UNIVERSITY 19(1894), atl3n.l.
180. JOHN FORREST DILLON, Our Law in Its Old Home, in THE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA: BEING A SERIES OF LECTURES DELIVERED BEFORE YALE UNIVERSITY 19(1894), Id. at 19-20.
181. Radin, supra note 133, at 357.
182. Radin, supra note 133, at 357.
183. Radin, supra note 133, at 357, at 358
184. Walter Wheeler Cook, An Unpublished Chapter of The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 37 ILL. L. REV. 418, 419 (1943).
185. Mat421.
186. Mat421, Id. at 422.
187. Radin, supra note 133, at 359.
188. Herman Oliphant, President, Ass'n of Am. Law Sen., A Return to Stare Decisis, Address at the Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools (Dec. 29, 1927), 14 A.B.A. J. 71,71-72(1928).
189. LEITER, supra note 1, at 21-25.
190. James C. Carter, The Provinces of the Written and Unwritten Law, 24 AM. L. REV. 1,15 (1890) [hereinafter Carter, Provinces] (emphasis in original). Carter illustrates this principle via hypothetical in JAMES COOLIDGE CARTER, LAW: ITS ORIGIN GROWTH AND FUNCTION 69-74 (1907) [hereinafter CARTER, LAW].
191. Carter, Provinces, supra note 174, at 15.
192. Carter, Provinces, supra note 174, at 15.
193. CARTER, LAW, supra note 174, at 279.
194. Max Radin, Legal Realism, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 824, 824 (1931).
195. Tiedeman, supra note 132, at 36.
196. Tiedeman, supra note 132, at 36.
197. Tiedeman, supra note 132, at 19.
198. Coles, supra note 92, at 190.
199. Consistent with the argument here, Lewis Grossman has recently argued that there are strong parallels between the work of James Carter and that of the Legal Realists. See generally Lewis A. Grossman, Langdell Upside-Down: James Coolid ge Carter and the Anticlassical Jurisprudence of Anticodflcation, 19 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 149 (2007). There are two important differences between our arguments. Grossman ties Carter's realism to his anticodification position, id. at 15 1-52, whereas I have linked it to the general position held by historical jurists. This matters because several historical jurists, most prominently John Dillon, werefor codification, but still held the same Realist views. The second important difference is that Grossman continues to privilege the Legal Realists by calling Carter a pre-Realist, id. at 201, whereas I argue that realism about judging was in place before the Legal Realists.
200. LaPiana, supra note 9, at 557.
201. This is explained more fully in Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Bogus Tale About the Legal Formalists (St. John's Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 08-0130, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1 123498.
202. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
203. Leon Green, My Philosophy of Law, LAW. GUILD REv., Oct. 1941, at 10, 12.
204. See Leon Green, The Law Must Respond to the Environment, Address During Law Week at the University of Texas School of Law (May 1969), in 47 TExAs L. REV. 1327, 1340 (1969) ("No other group is entrusted with so much power over so broad a field of human affairs.").
205. LLEWELLYN, supra note 134, at 59-60.
206. LLEWELLYN, supra note 134, at 59-60.
207. CARTER, LAW,supra note 174, at 129.
208. James C. Carter, The Ideal and the Actual in the Law, Address Before the American Bar Association (Aug. 1890), in 24 AM. L. REv. 752, 769 (1890).
209. CARTER, LAW, supra note 174, at 327.
210. Carter, supra note 192, at 773.
211. CARTER, LAW, supra note 174, at 334.
212. DILLON, supra note 162, at 13 n.1.
213. DILLON, supra note 162, at 13 n.1.
214. DILLON, supra note 162, at 13 n.1.
215. Llewellyn, supra note 22, at 1236.
216. Carter, supra note 192, at 773.
217. Liewellyn, supra note 22, at 1236.
218. W.G. Hammond, The Legal Profession-Its Past-Its Present-Its Duty, Address to the Graduating Class in the Law Department of Iowa State University, in 9 W. JURIST 1, 12 (1875) (emphasis omitted).
219. Carter, supra note 192, at 773.
220. Llewellyn, supra note 22, at 1237.
221. CARTER, LAW, supra note 174, at 73.
222. Hammond, supra note 202, at 12.
223. CARTER, LAW, supra note 174, at 329.
224. FRANK, supra note 19, at 120.
225. FRANK, supra note 19, at 120.
226. See DILLON, supra note 162, at 19 (explaining that when judges are required to legislate "where the legislative will is silent and the case is novel," they must consider ethics and morality, which are inseparable from the law).
227. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 103-04 (1924).
228. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 2 (1881) (stressing that he uses the "history of our law so far as it is necessary to explain a conception or to interpret a rule, but no further").
229. See Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence (pt. 2), 25 HARV. L. REV. 140, 146-47 (1912) ("[T]he conception of law as a means toward social ends, the doctrine that law exists to secure interests, social, public and private, requires the jurist to keep in touch with life.").
230. Frankfurter, supra note 62, at 7.
231. See generally SCHLEGEL, supra note 10.
232. See infra notes 261-61, 386 and accompanying text.
233. See infra notes 278-84 and accompanying text.
234. See infra notes 250-71 and accompanying text.
235. See JOHN FORREST DILLON, Our Law: Its Progressive Forces, in THE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA, supra note 162, at 344 ("[C]odification is [often] practicable, and so far as it is practicable, it is, if well done, desirable.")
236. Cooley, supra note 142, at 464-66 (arguing that codification does not make the law more clear, and that common law decisions are required to properly apply the law to the infinite variety of facts that will arise in different cases)
237. Grossman, supra note 183, at 155 (identifying Carter as a leading opponent of codification)
238. Hammond, supra note 150, at 406, 405-08 (stating that codification has improved the law by requiring lawyers actually to comprehend the law rather than rely on the old "forms of action" and "language of pleading").
239. See CLYDE E. JACOBS, LAW WRITERS AND THE COURTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THOMAS M. COOLEY, CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, AND JOHN F. DILLON UPON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1954).
240. Thomas M. Cooley, The Interstate Commerce Act-Pooling and Combinations Which Affect Its Operation, Address at the Dinner of the Boston Merchants' Association (Jan. 8, 1889), reprinted in CHARLES CURTICE MCCAIN, COMPENDIUM OF TRANSPORTATION THEORIES: A COMPILATION OF ESSAYS UPON TRANSPORTATION SUBJECTS BY EMINENT EXPERTS 242, 248 (1893).
241. See MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 187 (1977) (noting that Dillon and Cooley "led the assault on railroad and other aid")
242. See MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 187 (1977) (noting that Dillon and Cooley "led the assault on railroad and other aid") at 400, 399-400 (placing Cooley among those who worked to create a "system of arbitration for labor-capital disputes" to "check the abuses that threatened" employer-employee relationships).
243. See MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 187 (1977) (noting that Dillon and Cooley "led the assault on railroad and other aid") at 400, 399-400 (placing Cooley among those who worked to create a "system of arbitration for labor-capital disputes" to "check the abuses that threatened" employer-employee relationships)
244. See MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 187 (1977) (noting that Dillon and Cooley "led the assault on railroad and other aid") at 400, 399-400 (placing Cooley among those who worked to create a "system of arbitration for labor-capital disputes" to "check the abuses that threatened" employer-employee relationships). at 346, 344-46 (describing Dillon, Cooley, and others advocating for "more intensive judicial review of other units of government"). Cooley specifically "thought it the duty of the judiciary to intervene when legislation threatened the 'personal, civil, and political' rights of the individual." at 345. Tiedeman and others criticized the amount of legislation based on state police power.
245. See MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 187 (1977) (noting that Dillon and Cooley "led the assault on railroad and other aid") at 400, 399-400 (placing Cooley among those who worked to create a "system of arbitration for labor-capital disputes" to "check the abuses that threatened" employer-employee relationships). at 346, 344-46 (describing Dillon, Cooley, and others advocating for "more intensive judicial review of other units of government"). Cooley specifically "thought it the duty of the judiciary to intervene when legislation threatened the 'personal, civil, and political' rights of the individual." at 345. Tiedeman and others criticized the amount of legislation based on state police power. at 410.
246. Tiedeman, for example, criticized miscegenation laws and opposed school Bible readings.
247. See CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN THE UNITED STATES § 157, at 536-37 (1886) (arguing against miscegenation statutes)
248. See CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN THE UNITED STATES § 157, at 536-37 (1886) (arguing against miscegenation statutes); id. § 71, at 161 (arguing against school Bible readings). § 71, at 161 (arguing against school Bible readings).
249. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 112-20 and accompanying text.
251. See generally Robert Eugene Cushman, Constitutional Decisions by a Bare Majority of the Court, 19 MICH. L. REV. 771, 773-90 (1921) (discussing the implications of bare-majority rulings on the doctrine of reasonable doubt); Albert H. Putney, Five to Four Constitutional Law Decisions, 24 YALE L.J. 460, 462 (1914) (noting that the Court's decision in the Prize Cases demonstrated the importance of its composition).
252. Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1009-13 (C.P. 1670).
253. Robert Rantoul, Oration at Scituate (July 4, 1836), in AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: CASES AND MATERIALS 317,318 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 2d ed. 1996).
254. Robert Rantoul, Oration at Scituate (July 4, 1836), in AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: CASES AND MATERIALS 317,318 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 2d ed. 1996).
255. Richard Peters, Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Supreme Court of the United States: January Term, 1837,46 N. AM. REV. 126, 153-54 (1838).
256. Political Regeneration, 11 AM. MONTHLY MAG. 297,299 (1838).
257. Political Regeneration, 11 AM. MONTHLY MAG. 297,299 (1838) at 300 (emphasis added).
258. FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 40 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., Wm. S. Hein & Co. 1970)(1839).
259. FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 40 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., Wm. S. Hein & Co. 1970)(1839) at 230.
260. LIEBER, supra note 231, at 236-37.
261. Paul D. Carrington, William Gardiner Hammond and the Lieber Revival, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2135,2144(1995).
262. M.H. Hoeflich & Ronald D. Rotunda, Simon Greenleaf on Desuetude and Judge-Made Law: An Unpublished Letter to Francis Lieber, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 93, 101 n.32 (1993)
263. The two cases were United States v. Farenholt, 206 U.S. 226, 229-30 (1907)
264. (quoting LIEBER, supra note 233, at 56), and Lowrey v. Hawaii, 206 U.S. 206, 223-24 (1907)
265. (quoting LIEBER, supra note 233, at 144).
266. See Hoeflich & Rotunda, supra note 237, at 94 n.ll (noting that the third edition was published in 1881).
267. Frank engaged in deliberate distortions when making his case. See Tamanaha, supra note 185, at 10-16.
268. See generally FRANK, supra note 19, at 118-59.
269. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
270. See infra notes 363-67.
271. See infra notes 369-71 and accompanying text.
272. See Tamanaha, supra note 185, at 18-24, 48-51 (citing statements from Judges Burch, Baker, Hough, Hiscock, Colt, McClain, Ewing, Savage, and Fellows).
273. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to John T. Morse (Nov. 28, 1926), quoted in LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB: A STORY OF IDEAS IN AMERICA 67 (2001).
274. Lochner V. New York 198 U.S 45-75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
275. Baldwin V. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
276. Baldwin V. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
277. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 192 (1991).
278. K.N. Llewellyn, On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 224, 264 (1942).
279. K.N. Llewellyn, On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 224, 264 (1942). at 250.
280. Eugene V. Rostow, American Legal Realism and the Sense of the Profession, 34 ROCKY Mm L. REV. 123,132(1962).
281. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 2 (1949).
282. SCHLEGEL, supra note 10, at 263-65.
283. See Charles L. Zelden, The Judge Intuitive: The Life and Judicial Philosophy of Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 905, 908-09 (1998)
284. SCHLEGEL, supra note 10, at 264.
285. SCHLEGEL, supra note 10, at 263-67 (noting that Frank and Douglas served at the SEC, Arnold was a U.S. Assistant Attorney General, and Oliphant was general counsel for the Treasury Department); Donald Craig Mitchell, Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie: Statutory Construction or Judicial Usurpation? Why History Counts, 14 ALASKA L. REV. 353, 363 (1997) (observing that Felix Cohen worked in the Solicitor's Office of the Department of the Interior); Interview by Joe B. Frantz of Justice Abe Fortas (Aug. 14, 1969), transcript available at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/ johnson/archives.hom/oralhistory.hom/fortasa/ fortasOl.pdf (indicating that Wesley Sturges served in the Department of Agriculture).
286. See ERIC A. PoSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 163 (2000) (calling Llewellyn "the U.C.C.'s drafter")
287. SCHLEGEL, supra note 10, at 264 (noting Clark's role on the Advisory Committee on Civil Procedure).
288. SCHLEGEL, supra note 10, at 263-68.
289. E.g., K.N. Llewellyn, On What Is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 651,678(1935).
290. Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School? 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 920, 917-20 (1933).
291. Rostow, supra note 252, at 131 (quoting ALEXANDER H. PEKELIS, The Case for a Jurisprudence of Welfare, in LAW AND SOCIAL ACTION: SELECTED ESSAYS OF ALEXANDER H. PEKELIS 1,20 (Milton R. Kovnitz ed., 1950), and Llewellyn, supra note 22, at 1236, respectively).
292. Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457,487(1924).
293. Cook, supra note 168, at 421.
294. LLEWELLYN, supra note 134, at 73.
295. LLEWELLYN, supra note 44, at 45.
296. LLEWELLYN, supra note 44, at 19-20 (emphasis omitted).
297. LLEWELLYN, supra note 44, at 20-21.
298. LLEWELLYN, supra note 44, at 21-25.
299. LLEWELLYN, supra note 44, at 21-26.
300. LLEWELLYN, supra note 44, at, at 26.
301. LLEWELLYN, supra note 44, at, at 45-51.
302. See supra Part II.
303. See Tamanaha, supra note 185, at 3 (noting that the Realists, in attacking their opponents' arguments, identified the position advanced by formalist judges as "a slavish adherence to rules contrary to good sense").
304. Morris R. Cohen, The Place of Logic in the Law, 29 HARV. L. REV. 622, 638 (1916).
305. LLEWELLYN, supra note 44, at 45-51.
306. Oliphant, supra note 172, at 159.
307. Felix S. Cohen Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809-843 (1935).
308. Felix S. Cohen Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809-843 (1935). at 845 (footnote omitted).
309. Felix S. Cohen Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809-843 (1935). at 843.
310. Felix S. Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238, 251 (1950).
311. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
312. Leiter labels this the "Frankification of Realism" the tendency to wrongly see realism in terms of Frank's unrepresentative position. LEITER, supra note 1, at 17.
313. Llewellyn, supra note 22, at 1230 (emphasis omitted).
314. Llewellyn, supra note 22, at 1242-43.
315. Llewellyn, supra note 140, at 87.
316. Llewellyn, supra note 140, at 87.
317. Cohen, supra note 277, at 843
318. accord Cohen, supra note 280, at 248.
319. See Cohen, supra note 277, at 843 (arguing that judges' actions are shaped by the judicial system in which they operate as well as by general social forces).
320. FRANK, supra note 19, at 131.
321. FRANK, supra note 19, at 131.
322. FRANK, supra note 253, at 286 (emphasis omitted).
323. In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 652 (1943). Frank wrote the unanimous opinion for a three-judge panel that included Judge Learned Hand, another judge with a realistic view of the law. Frank made the same point in a later publication: "It is well, too, that a judge be himself aware of his own human foibles and prejudices: he will then be the better able to master them." Jerome Frank, The Cult of the Robe, SATURDAY REV. LITERATURE, Oct. 13, 1945, at 12, 12.
324. Jerome Frank, Cardozo and the Upper-Court Myth, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 369, 373-74 (1948) (reviewing BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO (Margaret E. Hall ed., 1947)) (quoting CARDOZO, supra note 211, at 60).
325. Jerome Frank, Cardozo and the Upper-Court Myth, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 369, 373-74 (1948) (reviewing BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO (Margaret E. Hall ed., 1947)) (quoting CARDOZO, supra note 211, at 60). at 380.
326. Frank's argument to this effect can be found in Jerome Frank, Modern and Ancient Legal Pragmatism John Dewey & Co. vs. Aristotle (pt. 2), 25 NOTRE DAME LAW. 460, 460-61 (1950).
327. WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973).
328. William Twining, Talk About Realism, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 329, 350 (1985).
329. FRANK, supra note 253, at 66-67 (referring to Law and the Modern Mind as a foolish attempt at defining "law")
330. LLEWELLYN, supra note 134, at xxiii (quoting the preface to the 1951 edition of The Bramble Bush).
331. LLEWELLYN, supra note 135, at xxiii (quoting the preface to the 1951 edition of The Bramble Bush).
332. LLEWELLYN, supra note 135, at xxiii (quoting the preface to the 1951 edition of The Bramble Bush) at xxiv.
333. Thurman Arnold, Judge Jerome Frank, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 635 (1957).
334. Thurman Arnold, Judge Jerome Frank, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 635 (1957).
335. Thurman Arnold, Judge Jerome Frank, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 635 (1957).
336. Thurman Arnold, Judge Jerome Frank, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 635 (1957).
337. William Novak challenges the credibility of this narrative in an important new article. William Novak, The Myth of the Weak American State, 113 Am. HIST. Rev. 752 (2008).
338. A description of these events can be found in BRIAN Z. Tamanaha, Law AS A MEANS TO an End: Threat to the Rule of Law 77-81 (2006).
339. Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (invalidating state minimum-wage laws for women);
340. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating provisions of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act that regulated miners' wages and coal prices)
341. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (invalidating provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act that required crop reduction and price increases for agricultural products)
342. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating minimum-wage and maximum-hours provisions for poultry-industry workers).
343. Edward McWhinney, Judge Jerome Frank and Legal Realism: An Appraisal, 3 N.Y.L.F. 113,116(1957).
344. The Increase of State Interference in the United States, 10 SCIENCE 2,2 (1887).
345. James Bryce, The Methods and Conditions of Legislation in Our Time, Address Delivered Before the New York State Bar Association (Jan. 24,1908), in 8 Colum. L. Rev. 157,157 (1908).
346. James Bryce, The Methods and Conditions of Legislation in Our Time, Address Delivered Before the New York State Bar Association (Jan. 24,1908), in 8 Colum. L. Rev. 157,157 (1908).
347. Frederick N. Judson, The Progress of the Law in the United States, Annual Address Before the Colorado Bar Association (June 30,1911), in 23 GREEN BAG 560, 560 (1911).
348. See William B. Shaw, Social and Economic Legislation of the States in 1890, 5 Q. J. ECON. 385,385(1891).
349. See William B. Shaw, Social and Economic Legislation of the States in 1890, 5 Q. J. ECON. 385,385(1891).
350. See William B. Shaw, Social and Economic Legislation of the States in 1890, 5 Q. J. ECON. 387-91, 387-91(1891).
351. E.g., William B. Shaw, Social and Economic Legislation of the States in 1894, 9 Q.J. ECON. 195, 195 (1895) [hereinafter Shaw, Legislation 1894] (mentioning a similar statute enacted in Massachusetts)
352. William B. Shaw, Social and Economic Legislation of the States in 1891, 6 Q.J. ECON. 227, 232 (1892) [hereinafter Shaw, Legislation 1891] (describing a Texas statute that invalidated contracts aiming to limit an employer's liability for injury to an employee).
353. Shaw, Legislation 1891, supra note 316, at 227.
354. Shaw, Legislation 1891, supra note 316, at 227.
355. E.g., William B. Shaw, Social and Economic Legislation of the States in 1895, 10 Q.J. ECON. 218,222 (1896).
356. E.g., Shaw, Legislation 1894, supra note 316, at 204.
357. E.g., Shaw, Legislation 1894, supra note 316, at 201-02.
358. E.g., Shaw, supra note 313, at 389.
359. E.g., Shaw, supra note 313, at 392-93.
360. E.g., William B. Shaw, Social and Economic Legislation of the States in 1893, 8 Q.J. ECON. 230, 237(1894).
361. E.g., William B. Shaw, Social and Economic Legislation of the States in 1893, 8 Q.J. ECON. 230, 237(1894).
362. Keller, supra note 222, at 407.
363. Charles Warren, A Bulwark to the State Police Power-The United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 667, 695 (1913).
364. Charles Warren, The Progressiveness of the United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 294, 309 (1913).
365. People v. Lochner, 69 N.E. 373, 378-81 (1904).
366. A recent historical study confirms Warren's argument that a high proportion of state statutes survived challenge. Michael J. Phillips, The Progressiveness of the Lochner Court, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 453,488-89 (1998).
367. Munroe Smith, The Development of American Constitutional Law, PROC. ACAD. POL. SCI. N.Y., Jan. 1913, at 52, 63.
368. Ernst Freund, Constitutional Limitations and Labor Legislation, 4 III. L. Rev. 609, 610 (1910).
369. Ernst Freund, Constitutional Limitations and Labor Legislation, 4 III. L. Rev. 609, 610 (1910).
370. Ernst Freund, Constitutional Limitations and Labor Legislation, 4 III. L. Rev. 609, 610-14 (1910).
371. See id. at 610-11 (acknowledging that the twenty judicial decisions from 1885 to 1910 that declared state labor regulations unconstitutional were from "many different sections of the country" and "produced a great impression upon the legal profession and the community at large").
372. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
373. E.g., Novak, supra note 305, at 753-54 (describing the disconnect between the narrative of a laissez-faire America and the reality of the powerful American state). A superb account of the nineteenth-century expansion of die bureaucratic state is Keller, supra note 222.
374. See also Richard R. John, Ruling Passions: Political Economy in Nineteenth-Century America, 18 J. POL'Y HIST. 1, 8-9 (2006) (noting that historians no longer accept the myth of nineteenth-century laissez-faire).
375. See supra notes 99-114 and accompanying text.
376. Tiedeman, supra note 132, at 36. In a fascinating and convincing study that details the great amount of regulation-much of it local-in the early nineteenth century, William Novak shows that the nineteenth century was not a golden age of laissez-faire, as has often been claimed. William Novak, The People's Welfare: Law and Regulation in the Nineteenth Century 112 (1996).
377. Albert Venn Dicey, Law and Public Opinion in England in the Nineteenth Century 65-66 (1917).
378. See, e.g., Sidney Webb, Fabian Tract No. 69: The Difficulties of Individualism (1896), reprinted in FABIAN TRACTS NOS. 1 TO 212 (1925). Webb recognized that the nineteenth century "ha[d] seen an almost complete upsetting of every economic and industrial relation in the country."
379. See, e.g., Sidney Webb, Fabian Tract No. 69: The Difficulties of Individualism (1896), reprinted in FABIAN TRACTS NOS. 1 TO 212 (1925). Webb recognized that the nineteenth century "ha[d] seen an almost complete upsetting of every economic and industrial relation in the country." Id. at 3.
380. The wave of change had created a "rapidly-spreading conviction" that "the production and distribution of wealth, like any other public function, cannot safely be intrusted to the unfettered freedom of individuals, but needs to be organized and controlled for the benefit of the whole community⋯ [and is] more advantageously accomplished through the collective enterprise."
381. The wave of change had created a "rapidly-spreading conviction" that "the production and distribution of wealth, like any other public function, cannot safely be intrusted to the unfettered freedom of individuals, but needs to be organized and controlled for the benefit of the whole community⋯ [and is] more advantageously accomplished through the collective enterprise." at 5.
382. Thomas Whittaker, Individualism and State-Action, 13 MIND 52, 52 (1888).
383. Dicey, supra note 340, at xxxv (criticizing the Old Age Pensions Act as "evil" and as "nothing but a new form of outdoor relief for the poor");
384. Alan Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and "Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism ": A Reconsideration, 53 J. AM. HIST. 751, 768 (1967) (indicating that Cooley "did not usually look to government for a solution to the problems of the relations of labor and capital");
385. Mathias Reimann, The Historical School Against Codification: Savigny, Carter, and the Defeat of the New York Civil Code, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 95, 116 (1989) (describing Carter's opposition to socioeconomic legislation).
386. Seymour Thompson and William Draper Lewis were among the most vocal supporters of progressive legislation and were strongly opposed to judicial nullification of such laws. See William Draper Lewis, The Recall of Judicial Decisions, PROC. ACAD. Pol. SCI. N.Y., Jan. 1913, at 37, 37 (supporting a proposal that would allow the electorate to override the judiciary by voting to reinstate laws that had previously been declared unconstitutional);
387. Thompson, supra note 107, at 682 (lamenting the judiciary's power to overturn the "useful and necessary" revenue laws of the states and the federal government).
388. See supra notes 326-34 and accompanying text.
389. Leonard C. Crouch, Assoc. Justice, N.Y. Supreme Court, Judicial Tendencies of the Court of Appeals During the Incumbency of Chief Judge Hiscock, Address Delivered at the Fourth Annual Meeting of the Cornell Law Association (Nov. 13, 1926), in 12 CORNELL L.Q. 137, 139 (1927).
390. Excellent chronicles of the various transformations that occurred during this period include Jack Beatty, Age of Betrayal: The Triumph of Money in America, 1865-1900 (2007).
391. Rebecca Edwards, New Spirits: Americans in the Gilded Age, 1865-1905 (2006).
392. Maureen A. Flanagan, America Reformed: Progressives and Progressivisms, 1890s-1920s (2007).
393. Elizabeth sanders, roots of reform: farmers, workers, and the American State, 1877-1917 (1999).
394. Alan Trachtenberg, The Incorporation of America: Culture and Society in the gilded age (2007).
395. Crouch, supra note 346, at 142 (footnotes omitted).
396. Crouch received a Ph.B. from Cornell in 1889. See A Catalogue of the Cornell Chapter of Phi Beta Kappa (Theta of New York), 1882-1912, at 21 (1912).
397. Crouch, supra note 346, at 141-142 (emphasis added).
398. Crouch, supra note 346, at 140 (emphasis added).
399. Crouch, supra note 346, at 147-152 (emphasis added).
400. Daniel R. Ernst, The Critical Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History, 102 Yale L.J. 1019, 1020 (1993) (book review).
401. Id. at 1020 (quoting Letter from John Henry Wigmore to William Howard Taft, enclosed in Letter from John Henry Wigmore to Elihu Root (Jan. 28,1914)) (footnote omitted).
402. Edwin R. Keedy, The Decline of Traditionalism and Individualism, 65 U. Pa. L. Rev. 764, 764(1917).
403. Edwin R. Keedy, The Decline of Traditionalism and Individualism, 65 U. Pa. L. Rev. 764, 764(1917).
404. Cardozo, supra note 5, at 101-102. Legal historian Frederick Pollock also wrote at the time that the law had already begun to change in these respects in the late nineteenth century.
405. See Frederick Pollock, The Genius of the Common Law 107-108 (1912). Pollock wrote that when "the reign of utilitarian individualism," which had begun in the 1830s, began to subside after "approximately half a century," it became "a probable or plausible, opinion, that the State was abdicating its functions by remaining passive, and should not only leave the road open for ability, but give active assistance in suppressing unfavourable external conditions and equalizing opportunities." Id. Pollock added: "The present generation is full of this spirit, and its power seems likely to increase for some time yet." Id. at 108.
406. See supra notes 305-312 and accompanying text.
407. See supra notes 18-32 and accompanying text.
408. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
409. See supra note 40.
410. William Draper Lewis, The Possibility of New Legal Obligations, 45 Am. L. Reg. & REV. 1,6(1897).
411. LeBaron B. Colt, U.S. Circuit Judge, First Circuit, Law and Reasonableness, Address at the American Bar Association Meeting, in 37 AM. L. REV. 657, 674 (1903).
412. LeBaron B. Colt, U.S. Circuit Judge, First Circuit, Law and Reasonableness, Address at the American Bar Association Meeting, in 37 AM. L. REV. 657, 674 (1903).
413. LeBaron B. Colt, U.S. Circuit Judge, First Circuit, Law and Reasonableness, Address at the American Bar Association Meeting, in 37 AM. L. REV. 657, 670 (1903).
414. LeBaron B. Colt, U.S. Circuit Judge, First Circuit, Law and Reasonableness, Address at the American Bar Association Meeting, in 37 AM. L. REV. 657, 673 (1903).
415. LeBaron B. Colt, U.S. Circuit Judge, First Circuit, Law and Reasonableness, Address at the American Bar Association Meeting, in 37 AM. L. REV. 657, 675 (1903).
416. Pound, supra note 21, at 709.
417. Charles F. Amidon, The Nation and the Constitution, 19 GREEN BAG 594, 598 (1907).
418. Charles F. Amidon, The Nation and the Constitution, 19 GREEN BAG 594, 599 (1907).
419. Charles F. Amidon, The Nation and the Constitution, 19 GREEN BAG 594, 599 (1907).
420. See, e.g., Freund, supra note 75, at 231 (suggesting that "in cases of genuine ambiguity courts should use the power of interpretation consciously and deliberately to promote sound law and sound principles of legislation⋯[rather than] a painstaking fidelity to the supposed legislative intent").
421. John Henry Wigmore, Problems of the Law's Evolution, 4 Va. L. Rev. 247, 251 (1917) ("The lesson here to be drawn is that the study of the substantial element of law begins always with social facts and institutions.").
422. John Henry Wigmore, Problems of the Law's Mechanism in America, 4 Va. L. Rev. 337, 344 (1917) (arguing that adherence to precedent must be tempered with the need for flexibility and fluidity).
423. John H. Wigmore, The Qualities of Current Judicial Decisions, 9 ILL. L. REV. 529, 533 (1915) (observing the shortcomings associated with judges' "undue servitude to the bondage of precedent").
424. Samuel Williston, Change in the Law, 69 U.S. L. REV. 237, 239 (1935) ("To the extent that social needs and mores change, legal principles should Change-").
425. Harlan F. Stone, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Fifty Years' Work of the United States Supreme Court, Address Delivered at the Semi-Centennial Meeting of the American Bar Association, in 14 A.B.A. J. 428, 429-30 (1928) (praising the adaptation of the Commerce Clause to the growing needs of national and local governments after the Civil War).
426. Harlan F. Stone, U.S. Att'y Gen., Some Phases of Legal Education, Address at the Centennial Celebration of Yale Law School (June 18, 1924), in 5 AM. L. SCH. REV. 389, 391 (1924) (praising the legal education system for "bring[ing] to the service of mankind a more profound knowledge of legal principles and their more perfect adjustment to social and economic needs").
427. See also CARDOZO, supra note 211, at 14-16 (discussing the reformist work of several of these thinkers and others).
428. See FRANK, supra note 19, at 48, 53,48-56 ("Beale seems to consider that the judgment of any court is too finite, too lowly, of too little real import, to be worthy the name Law.").
429. Joseph H. Beale, The Necessity for a Study of Legal System, 1914 PROC. AM. ASS'N L. SCH. 31,39.
430. Llewellyn, supra note 22; see supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
431. William W. Fisher et al., The Struggle over the Meaning of Realism, in AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 51 (William W. Fisher et al. eds., 1993).
432. HULL, supra note 20, at 343-46.
433. Letter from Roscoe Pound to Karl N. Llewellyn (Apr. 9, 1931), quoted in HULL, supra note 20, at 215.
434. Llewellyn, supra note 22, at 1234.
435. G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 78 (2003) ("Bohlen never endorsed Realism nor accommodated his thinking about Torts to that of Green.").
436. HULL, supra note 20, at 344-45 tbls.1 & 2.
437. Llewellyn, supra note 22, at 1256.
438. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 159-62 (1973) (claiming that collective fears during World War II contributed to the growing fear that legal realism, like Hitler's relativism, could lead to oppressive totalitarianism if left unchecked by defined legal boundaries).
439. See TAMANAHA, supra note 306, at 60-63. Although in that work I described the rise of instrumental thinking about law, the timing of the analysis now appears to be incorrect, as I did not know at the time that realism was in place earlier than discussed.
440. HULL, supra note 20, at 344 tbl. 1.
441. Robert M. Hutchins, President, Univ. of Chi., The Autobiography of an Ex-Law Student, Address Delivered at the Association of American Law Schools Banquet (Dec. 29, 1933), in 7 AM. L. SCH. REV. 1051,1052-53 (1934).
442. Thurman Arnold also later expressed doubt about the fruits of the social-science initiative. Arnold, supra note 301, at 641-42.
443. E.g., John Dickinson, Legal Rules: Their Function in the Process of Decision, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 835-36 (1931) [hereinafter Dickinson, Legal Rules].
444. John Dickinson, The Problem of the Unprovided Case, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 115, 122 (1932) thereinafter Dickinson, Unprovided Case];
445. Hermann Kantorowicz, Some Rationalism About Realism, 43 YALE L.J. 1240,1241 (1934).
446. Rostow explained this well. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
447. See supra notes 283-88 and accompanying text.
448. Dickinson, Legal Rules, supra note 387, at 835.
449. Dickinson, Unprovided Case, supra note 387, at 124; L.L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429,434 (1934); Kantorowicz, supra note 387, at 1244.
450. Pound, supra note 21, at 707.
451. Brian Leiter argues that the fact of the criticism is proof that the Realists' views challenged prevailing views. See Brian Leiter's Legal Philosophy Blog, http://leiterlegalphilosophy.typepad.com/leiter/2008/04/tamanaha-on-the. html (Apr. 30, 2008) ("[I]f it were true that there was no 'formalist' age and that Legal Realism just continued earlier lines of thinking, then why did Roscoe Pound, John Dickinson, and Lon Fuller, among others, react so strongly to Realism?"). But this argument fails to appreciate the nature of the criticism. The critics argued that the Realists overemphasized skepticism at the expense of recognizing the rule-bound aspect.
452. Llewellyn responded that this criticism was a distortion, that they did in fact recognize the rule-bound aspects. With respect to the underlying views about judging, both the Realists and their critics accepted the presence of the skeptical aspects and the rule-bound aspects (and both agreed that the law largely worked, and was predictable)-they both adhered to the "realism" defined at the outset of this Article. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
453. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
454. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
455. See supra notes 228-38 and accompanying text.
456. Another remarkable example of early realism about judging can be found in an 1812 workurging the reform of common law crimes. See JOHN M. GOODENOW, HISTORICAL SKETCHES OF THE PRINCIPLES AND MAXIMS OF AMERICAN JURiSPRUDENCE 283 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., 1972) (1819) (arguing that the Constitution does not compel courts to follow English common law).
457. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 253-308 (3d ed.2005) (1973).
458. For additional realistic statements from the 1870s through the 1920s about the law and judging, see Tamanaha, supra note 185, at 42-46.
459. TAMANAHA, supra note 306, at 77-100.
460. See generallyid. at 101-32.
461. See Generally Id. at 227-45
462. See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
463. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
464. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
465. Lieber, supra note 233 at 30
466. Judge Alex Kozinski contrasted the skepticism about judging taught in law schools with his more balanced realism. Alex Kozinski, What I Ate for Breakfast and Other Mysteries of Judicial Decision Making, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 993 (1993).
467. See generally TAMANAHA, supra note 306, at 172-89.
468. LLEWELLYN, supra note 44, at 3.
469. Harry T. Edwards, The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of Principled Decision Making, 1991 wIs. L. Rnv. 837, 855.
470. Arnold, supra note 301, at 635.