The unknowable: The pragmatist critique of matter

Transactions of the Charles S Peirce Society

Volumn 42, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 206-228

  Tiller, Glenn ^a  

^a TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY CORPUS CHRISTI   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 66849128221     PISSN: 00091774     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2979/TRA.2006.42.2.206     Document Type: Review

References (92)

1. John Dewey, "Half-Hearted Naturalism," in John Dewey: The Later Works, 1925-1953, vol. 3, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), p. 74.
2. C. I. Lewis, The Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis, ed. John D. Goheen and John L. Mothershead, Jr. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), p. 24.
3. Douglas Greenlee, "The Incoherence of Santayana's Scepticism," The Southern Journal of Philosophy, vol. 16 (1978), p. 51-60.
4. John J. Stuhr, Genealogical Pragmatism: Philosophy, Experience, and Community. (New York: State University of New York Press, 1997), pp. 140-14.
5. Santayana, The Letters of George Santayana,Volumes I-V, ed. William G. Holzberger (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2001-2003), vol. 2, p. 263.
6. Hereafter cited as "Letters n:m" - to volume n, page m. Santayana's initial willingness to give pragmatism a fair hearing stemmed in part from his uncertainty about the doctrine. In a 1911 commentary, he wrote charitably, and some might argue prophetically, that: "The time has not yet come when a just and synthetic account of what is called pragmatism can be expected of any man. The movement is still in a nebulous state, a state from which, perhaps, it is never destined to issue. " Santayana, Winds of Doctrine (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1913), p. 124. Hereafter cited as "Doctrine" followed by the page number.
7. Santayana, The Philosophy of George Santayana, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp (Illinois: Open Court, [1940] 1991), p. 533.
8. Hereafter cited as "Philosophy" followed by the page number. There is an irony in this dispute, for it was around the time that Santayana was enduring pragmatist critiques that he was asked to edit Peirce's collected papers. See Letters 3:312.
9. In his earliest writings from the 1860s Peirce argued that the idea of something being "unknowable" or "absolutely incognizable" is meaningless. See CP 5. 254. The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. 8 vol. vols. 1-6 ed. C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1931-35), vols. 7-8 ed. A. Burks (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1958). References to the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce are of the form "CP n. m"-to volume n, paragraph m.
10. Santayana, Scepticism and Animal Faith (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923), p. viii (italics in the original). Hereafter cited as "Scepticism" followed by the page number.
11. Scepticism, p. vii.
12. Although the context is rather different, Santayana was declaring himself the only materialist at least 10 years earlier. See Letters 2:161.
13. John Ryder notes that Roy Wood Sellers took exception to Santayana's remark. See John Ryder, "Introduction: American Naturalism," in Pragmatism and Classical American Philosophy, ed. John J. Stuhr (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 690.
14. The fact there were other versions of materialism on the scene makes Santayana's remark puzzling. Santayana reviewed books that argued for materialist doctrines. See for example his review of J. B. Watson's Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist (the review, "Living Without Thinking," is found in Animal Taith and The Spiritual Life, ed. John Lachs, Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1967, pp. 275-79). In addition, Santayana was well aware and also strongly critical of dialectical materialism and its influence on early 20th century thought. In order to see why Santayana made his remark it would be necessary to distinguish his materialism from other forms and evaluate his criticisms. 1 do not attempt this here. However I agree with an anonymous referee that doing so would be instructive since it might support the thought that it is Santayana's form of materialism that should be congenial to the pragmatists.
15. Scepticism, p. x.
16. Scepticism, p. v.
17. Philosophy, pp. 504-5.
18. Santayana states that he adopts Spinoza's definition of substance. He writes: "intrinsically, according to Spinoza's definition, substance is that which exists in itself and is conceived through itself; so that nothing could be more adventitious to it than being made occasionally the subject (or object) of some assertion. " Philosophy, p. 586.
19. See also Scepticism, p. 208.
20. Santayana, Realms of Being (one volume edition which contains Santayana's four books: The Realm of Essence (1927);
21. The Realm of Matter (1930);
22. The Realm of Truth (1938);
23. and The Realm of Spirit (1940)) (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942), p. 2
24. See also Realms, p. 189 and p. 198.
25. Santayana comments: "from the point of view of knowledge, every event, even if wholly psychological or phenomenal, is a substance. It is a self-existing fact, open to description from the point of view of other events, if in the bosom of these other events there is such plasticity and intent as are requisite for perception, prophecy, or memory. " Scepticism, p. 182.
26. Realms, p. 238.
27. Realms, p. 202.
28. Realms, p. 207.
29. Santayana states that both flux and permanence are attributes of substance. Though they might appear contradictory, he argues that they cannot be meaningfully separated. He writes: "that some permanence, not the casual persistence of this or that image, is interwoven with the flux of things, follows from the reality of this flux itself. If change were total at any point, there transformation and existence would come to an end. The next, completely new, fact would not be next; it would be the centre, or the beginning, of a separate world. In other words, events, if they are to be successive or contiguous, must be pervaded by a common medium. " Realms, pp. 207-8.
30. For a discussion of this point see Angus Kerr-Lawson, "A Name for Substance," in Transactions of the Charles S. Peine Society 15. 1 (1979): 28-50.
31. Realms, p. 209.
32. Realms, pp. 202-3.
33. Realms, p. 215.
34. Realms, p. 234.
35. For an analysis and defence of this point see Kerr-Lawson, "Santayana on the Matter of Aristotle" in Transactions of the Charles S. Peine Society 39. 3 (2003), pp. 349-71;
36. and T. L. S. Sprigge, Santayana (London: Routledge, 1995).
37. John Lachs in Santayana (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1988).
38. "Substance and Matter: A Response to Angus Kerr-Lawson" in Transactions of the Charles S. Peine Society 39. 3 (2003); 373-81, offers a rival interpretation.
39. David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), p. 16.
40. William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1912), p. 42
41. William James, The Meaning of Truth (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1912), p. xvi.
42. Greenlee, "The Incoherence of: Santayana's Scepticism," p. 58,
43. William James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1907), p. 89-90.
44. CP 5. 402.
45. Scepticism, p. 188;
46. Santayana, Reason and Common Sense (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905), p. 84;
47. Scepticism, pp. 297-98.
48. See Book I of Realms and chapter IX of Scepticism. A useful summary description of essence is given in Philosophy, pp. 28-29: Whatsoever existing fact we may think we encounter, there will be obvious features distinguishing that alleged fact from any dissimilar fact and from nothing. All such features, discernible in sense, thought, or fancy, are essences; and the realm of essence which they compose is simply the catalogue, infinitely extensible, of all the characters logically distinct and ideally possible. Apart from the events they may figure in, these essences have no existence; and since the realm of essence, bv definition, is infinitely comprehensive and without bias, it can exercise no control over the existing world, nor determine what features shall occur in events, or in what order.
49. Scepticism, p. 44.
50. Elsewhere Santayana makes this point by stating that perceptions do not perceive themselves. See his criticisms of Hume in Scepticism, p. 294.
51. Scepticism, p. 35.
52. Although it is directed upon matter, animal faith is not an assertion of a proposition. Santayana describes animal faith as "the confident unspoken assurance that action implies. " Yet it is not "merely behaviouristic, because if it were disappointed you would feel surprise. " (Letters 4:30) He writes that: "The animal organism is wound up, and has certain potentialities which it discharges upon occasion: the sentiment which accompanies this discharge, when it is conscious, is a vague, wordless confidence or premonition. It is not a proposition to be verified, because it has no terms. That is why I call it faith, not belief. " (Letters 4:40)
53. Robert G. Meyers has recently argued that the initial act of mind in knowledge is an intentional act where the mind assumes the existence of and is directed upon objects. Meyers is correct in noting Santayana as someone who holds this view, though he mistakenly identifies Santayana's term for this act as "intuition. "The term should be "animal faith" or perhaps "intent", since for Santayana "intuition" is only the conscious apprehension of some essence or another; it is not directed upon objects as is animal faith. See Robert G. Meyers, "Immediacy, Knowledge, and Naturalism," in Pragmatic Naturalism and Realism, ed. John R. Shook (Amherst, N. Y. : Prometheus Books, 2000).
54. There is a large amount of literature on this point. But see for example John E. Smith, "Experience in Peirce, James and Dewey," The Monist 68. 4 (October, 1985).
55. Scepticism, p. 16.
56. Eor a discussion of this idea see Isaac Levi, "Pragmatism and Change of View," in Pragmatism, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, ed. C. J. Misak, supplementary vol. 24 (1998), p. 177-201.
57. Scepticism, p. 265.
58. Scepticism, p. 17.
59. Scepticism, pp. 9-10.
60. Realms, pp. 442-43.
61. Dewey, "Half-Hearted Naturalism," p. 531.
62. Santayana, "Literal and Symbolic Knowledge. " in Obiter Scripta, eds. Justus Buchler and Benjamin Schwartz (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), p. 109. Hereafter cited as "LSK" followed by the page number.
63. Scepticism, p. 188.
64. Scepticism, p. 93.
65. Beth f. Singer has adduced a number of helpful references on this point. See Beth J. Singer, "Signs Of Existence," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 16 (1978): 415-27.
66. Scepticism, p. 282.
67. LSK, p. 115.
68. LSK, p. 139.
69. LSK, p. 110.
70. Scepticism, p. 179.
71. See Scepticism p. 102 and pp. 179-80.
72. Santayana's reasons for rejecting "literal knowledge" in favour of "symbolic knowledge" are those to which the pragmatists appeal when they reject the correspondence theory of truth. The pragmatists reject the correspondence theory of truth for the reason that we can never get outside our beliefs to check whether or not they correspond to the world. As Peirce wrote, when it comes to truth "all you have any dealings with are your doubts and beliefs" (CP 5. 416). We cannot, in other words, compare our beliefs about the world with the world itself. Hence the motivation for the pragmatist account of truth that seeks to elucidate truth in terms of our beliefs (i. e. what we would indefeasibly believe after a sufficiently sustained scientific inquiry) Santayana runs the same line of reasoning at the level of knowledge rather than truth, denying that knowledge must involve correspondence with reality.
73. Realms, p. 186.
74. Santayana, "The Unknowable," in Obiter Scripta, eds. Justus Buchler and Benjamin Schwartz (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), p. 127. Hereafter cited as "TU" followed by the page number.
75. Lewis, The Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis, p. 24.
76. Stuhr, Genealogical Pragmatism: Philosophy, Experience, and Community, pp. 140-41.
77. TU, p. 127. In LSK, p. 88 Santayana make the same point. "A being without any essence," he writes, "is a contradiction in terms. The existence of something without quality would not differ from its absence nor from the existence of anything else. There would be no meaning in asserting it - since what was asserted would have no character. "
78. Scepticism, p, viii.
79. Realms, p. 279.
80. Scepticism, p. 42.
81. Realms, p. 288.
82. Realms, p. 210.
83. Realms, p. 18.
84. Realms, p. 58.
85. It is important to note that the same line of reasoning applies to any essence, such as space and time. See Santayana, Physical Order and Moral Liberty, eds. John and Shirley Lachs (Vanderbilt: Vanderbilt University Press, 1969), p. 54.
86. Hereafter cited as "Physical" followed by the page number. The same point is made in Scepticism where Santayana writes that existence is "odious to the logician . . . since anything existent is more than the description of it. having suffered an unintelligible emphasis or materialization to fall upon it, which is logically inane and morally comic. " Scepticism, p. 48.
87. Realms, pp, 21, 119, and 274.
88. Santayana's position on existence is connected to other aspects of his philosophy. For example, his rejection of the principle of sufficient reason is expressed in his denial that we can explain why there is something instead of nothing. He held that: "Existence is groundless, essentially groundless; for if I thought I saw a ground for it, I should have to look for a ground for that ground, ad infinitum. I must halt content. . . at the brute fact. " Philosophy, p. 505.
89. Scepticism, p. 28.
90. Physical, p. 57-61.
91. William James, Some Problems of Philosophy (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968 [1911]), p. 46.
92. James, Collected Essays and Reviews (New York: Russell and Russell, 1969 [1920]), p. 125.