Popular constitutionalism, civic education, and the stories we tell our children

Yale Law Journal

Volumn 118, Issue 5, 2009, Pages 948-1001

  Donnelly, Tom ^a  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 66749092956     PISSN: 00440094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (347)

1. SeeJack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption,24 CONST. COMMENT. 427, 463 (2007).
2. Id.
3. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword:Nomos and Narrative,97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1983) (footnote omitted).
4. See, e.g.,PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 52 (2006) ("[T]he several states who formed [the Constitution], being sovereign and independent, have the unquestionable right to judge of its infraction ... ." (alterations in original) (quoting THE PORTABLE JEFFERSON 286 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975))).
5. See, e.g., id.at 77 ("Nor is our Government to be maintained or our Union preserved by invasions of the rights and powers of the several states. in thus attempting to make our General Government strong we make it weak. its true strength consists in leaving individuals and States as much as possible to themselves ... ." (quoting 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 576-89 (James D. Richardson ed., Washington, D.C., Gov't Printing Office 1897))).
6. See, e.g.,Susanna Mancini, Rethinking the Boundaries of Democratic Secession: Liberalism, Nationalism, and the Right of Minorities to Self-Determination,6 INT'L J. CONST. L. 553, 575-76 (2008) (noting that Calhoun believed that the Constitution is "a 'compact between' states rather than 'a Constitution over them'").
7. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
8. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
11. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 34 (1991).
12. H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION IN HISTORY AND POLITICS 6 (2002).
13. Robert Post defines "constitutional culture" as "a specific subset of culture that encompasses extrajudicial beliefs about the substance of the Constitution." Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law,117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2003). Reva Siegel adds, "[T]he term 'constitutional culture'... refer[s] to the understandings of role and practices of argument that guide interactions among citizens and officials in matters concerning the Constitution's meaning." Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA,94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1325 (2006). I will draw heavily upon Post's and Siegel's conceptions of "constitutional culture" throughout this Note.
14. See, e.g.,JAMES ALBERT BANKS, A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF ELEMENTARY AMERICAN HISTORY TEXTBOOKS: THE TREATMENT OF THE NEGRO AND RACE RELATIONS (1969);
15. NATHAN GLAZER&REED UEDA, ETHNIC GROUPS IN HISTORY TEXTBOOKS (1983).
16. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
17. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
18. Larry D. Kramer, "The Interest of the Man": James Madison, Popular Constitutionalism, and the Theory of Deliberative Democracy,41 VAL. U. L. REV. 697, 697 (2006). But seeFrederick Schauer, The Supreme Court, 2005 Term-Foreword: The Court's Agenda-and the Nation's,120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 53 (2006) ("[T]he glimpse at the universe of what the Court does not even address shows not only that the vast majority of publicly salient decisions are being made by the people themselves ... but also that the same holds true for decisions that have important policy consequences, regardless of their public salience.").
19. Kramer, supranote 17, at 697.
20. As Keith Whittington explains, "Although judicial supremacy entails judicial review, judicial review need not entail judicial supremacy." KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 5-6 (2007). Of course, judicial review can refer to a wide spectrum of checking devices. For a more extensive discussion of the various forms of judicial review, see Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review,115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1353-59 (2006).
21. WHITTINGTON, supranote 19, at 6; see alsoMichael C. Dorf, Fallback Law,107 COLUM. L. REV. 303, 342-43 (2007) (explaining one understanding of "judicial supremacy" as "a practice... in which political actors accept the judgment of the Supreme Court as definitive of constitutional meaning"); Mark A. Graber, The New Fiction:Dred Scott and the Language of Judicial Authority,82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 177, 186 (2007) (defining "judicial supremacy" as "the judicial power to determine authoritatively what the Constitution means");
22. Edward Rubin, Judicial Review and the Right To Resist,97 GEO. L.J. 61, 66 (2008) ("[P]roponents of ... popular constitutionalism do not challenge the practice of judicial review, but only judicial supremacy. That is, they are willing to grant the Judiciary the authority to invalidate statutes on constitutional grounds, but they insist that other branches of government, and the people at large, possess this same authority and can ignore the courts in exercising it.").
23. WHITTINGTON, supranote 19, at 6.
24. Id.at 1.
25. Id.at 28; see, e.g.,CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (2d ed. 1932).
26. WHITTINGTON, supranote 19, at 8.
27. Id.
28. Id.at 8-9.
29. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 209 (1999).
30. Id.
31. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 228 (2004).
32. WHITTINGTON, supranote 19, at 6-7.
33. Id.at 7.
34. Id.
35. David P. Currie, Prolegomena for a Sampler: Extrajudicial Interpretation of the Constitution, 1789-1861, inCONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 18, 21 (Neal Devins&Keith E. Whittington eds., 2005).
36. Kramer, supranote 17, at 698. For an extended discussion of presidential challenges to the Court, see WHITTINGTON, supranote 19, at 31-81.
37. Nathaniel Persily, Introductionto PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 3, 4 (Nathaniel Persily, Jack Citrin&Patrick J. Egan eds., 2008).
38. WHITTINGTON, supranote 19, at 19 (quoting MARY E. STUCKEY, THE PRESIDENT AS INTERPRETER-IN- CHIEF 1 (1991)).
39. KRAMER, supranote 29, at 31.
40. Id.at 58.
41. Robert Post&Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash,42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 376-77 (2007).
42. Id.at 379.
43. Robert C. Post&Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power,78 IND. L.J. 1, 20 (2003).
44. Post&Siegel, supranote 39, at 379.
45. Robert C. Post&Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act,112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1946 (2003).
46. Id.
47. Post&Siegel, supranote 39, at 379.
48. Post&Siegel, supranote 43, at 1982.
49. Robert Post, Democracy, Popular Sovereignty, and Judicial Review,86 Cal. L. Rev. 429, 442 (1998).
50. Post&Siegel, supranote 39, at 380.
51. Id.at 381.
52. Id.Post and Siegel offer the Reagan Administration as a key example of norm contestation, as it "used litigation and presidential rhetoric to challenge and discredit the basic ideals that had generated Warren Court precedents." Id.
53. Siegel, supranote 13, at 1323.
54. Id.
55. See generallyPost&Siegel, supranote 43 (arguing that Section 5 fosters democratic legitimacy by linking the courts' legal interpretations to those of the American people); Post&Siegel, supranote 41 (describing the Court's decreasing deference to congressional judgments).
56. KRAMER, supranote 29, at 229.
57. Id.at 232.
58. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). Several scholars have linked Marburyto claims about judicial supremacy. See, e.g., David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times of Crisis,101 MICH. L. REV. 2565, 2583 (2003) ("The Supreme Court was able to reach the result it did in Marburyin part because it left the President with nothing to defy, and thereby created the space to announce its doctrine of judicial supremacy.");
59. Daniel A. Farber, The Importance of Being Final,20 CONST. COMMENT. 359, 367 (2003) ("[T]he mandamus holding in Marburycarried within it the seeds of practical, if not theoretical, judicial supremacy."); Mark A. Graber, Popular Constitutionalism, Judicial Supremacy, and the Complete Lincoln-Douglas Debates,81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 923, 932-33 (2006) ("Dean Kramer may overreach slightly when claiming that Marbury v. Madisondoes not support judicial supremacy... . The precise legal holding of Marburymay be debatable, but John Marshall clearly believed that the Supreme Court had the final say on what the Constitution meant.").
60. WHITTINGTON, supranote 19, at 4.
61. Id.at 9; see alsoMichael Stokes Paulsen, Lincoln and Judicial Authority,83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1227, 1294 (2008) ("[T]he canard that Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madisonasserted judicial supremacy has been refuted by constitutional scholars dozens of times, yet the myth endures - constitutional law's equivalent of the Creature from the Black Lagoon.").
62. WHITTINGTON, supranote 19, at 4.
63. Id.at 10.
64. Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine,114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 82-83 (2000);
65. see alsoPost&Siegel, supranote 41, at 17 ("The juricentric Constitution does not follow from the Court's holding in Marbury v. Madison." ).
66. WHITTINGTON, supranote 19, at 4.
67. 358 u.s. 1, 18 (1958).
68. WHITTINGTON, supranote 19, at 3.
69. 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
70. 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997).
71. WHITTINGTON, supranote 19, at 3.
72. Id.at 25-26.
73. Gregory A. Caldeira&James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court,36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635, 658 (1992);
74. see alsoDavid Easton, An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems,9 WORLD POL. 383, 399 (1957) (referring to a "reservoir" of public support for the first time).
75. See, e.g.,MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI& SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 101 (1996) (noting that Judge Wapner, host of the television series The People's Court,"was identified by more people than were Chief Justices Burger or Rehnquist").
76. See, e.g., id.at 78 ("Less than half of those asked could identify Sandra Day O'Connor as a member of the Supreme Court during the Reagan years, recall the name of a single member of the Supreme Court beyond the chief justice during the Bush administration, or identify newly appointed Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg during the Clinton administration.").
77. ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 189 (1995).
78. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 140 (1980).
79. POST, supranote 72, at 14.
80. Robert Post, Between Philosophy and Law: Sovereignty and the Design of Democratic Institutions, inNOMOS XLII: DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 209, 217 (Ian Shapiro&Stephen Macedo eds., 2000).
81. PAUL W. KAHN, SACRED VIOLENCE: TORTURE, TERROR, AND SOVEREIGNTY 100 (2008).
82. Id.at 112.
83. Carole L. Hahn, Citizenship Education: An Empirical Study of Policy, Practices and Outcomes,25 OXFORD REV. EDUC. 231, 236 (1999).
84. SeeRICHARD G. NIEMI&JANE JUNN, CIVIC EDUCATION: WHAT MAKES STUDENTS LEARN 6367 (1998). Throughout this Note, when I refer to "civic education," I mean the integrated curriculum that features both history and government courses.
85. SeeDAVID TYACK, SEEKING COMMON GROUND: PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 41 (2003); William A. Galston, Political Knowledge, Political Engagement, and Civic Education,4 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 217, 231 (2001).
86. AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 41 (1987).
87. RONALD W. EVANS, THE SOCIAL STUDIES WARS: WHAT SHOULD WE TEACH THE CHILDREN? 5 (2004).
88. TYACK, supranote 80, at 42.
89. EVANS, supranote 82, at 21. For the entire text of this landmark report, see U.S. BUREAU OF EDUC., THE SOCIAL STUDIES IN SECONDARY EDUCATION: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL STUDIES OF THE COMMISSION ON THE REORGANIZATION OF SECONDARY EDUCATION OF THE NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION (1916).
90. EVANS, supranote 82, at 23 (quoting David Snedden, Teaching of History in Secondary Schools,5 HIST. TCHRS. MAG. 277, 279 (1914)).
91. For a fuller account of the development of the American social studies curriculum, see generally DAVID JENNESS, MAKING SENSE OF SOCIAL STUDIES (1990).
92. SeeMolly W. Andolina et al., Habits from Home, Lessons from School: Influences on Youth Civic Engagement,36 PS: POL. SCI.&POL. 275, 275 (2003);
93. Galston, supranote 80, at 217; Judith Torney-Purta, Links and Missing Links Between Education, Political Knowledge, and Citizenship,105 AM. J. EDUC. 446, 446 (1997).
94. SeeNIEMI&JUNN, supranote 79, at 16-20;
95. Galston, supranote 80, at 218.
96. SeeNIEMI&JUNN, supranote 79, at 13-16, 61-63; Thomas L. Dynneson&Richard E. Gross, The Educational Perspective: Citizenship Education in American Society, inSOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES ON CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 1, 10-11, 15-17 (Richard E. Gross&Thomas L. Dynneson eds., 1991).
97. Galston, supranote 80, at 219. This has led Stephen Caliendo to conclude that "adolescent political education is a particularly important predictor of political attitudes that are out of the mainstream of political discourse (such as latent support for political institutions, especially an institution as invisible as the Court)." STEPHEN M. CALIENDO, TEACHERS MATTER: THE TROUBLE WITH LEAVING POLITICAL EDUCATION TO tHE COACHES 3 (2000).
98. Galston, supranote 80, at 231.
99. See id.at 226.
100. Id.at 223. Civic education has been found to have a variety of positive effects. See, e.g.,CHRIS CHAPMAN, MARY JO NOLIN&KAREN KLINE, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, STATISTICS IN BRIEF: STUDENT INTEREST IN NATIONAL NEWS AND ITS RELATION TO SCHOOL COURSES (1997) (discussing the effect of civic education courses on student interest in politics and national news); Joseph Kahne&Ellen Middaugh, High Quality Civic Education: What Is It and Who Gets It?,72 Soc. Educ. 34 (2008) (developing a set of best practices for civic education programs and evaluating existing programs); Joseph E. Kahne&Susan E. Sporte, Developing Citizens: The Impact of Civic Learning Opportunities on Students' Commitment to Civic Participation,45 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 738 (2008) (noting the effect of civic education programs on levels of student interest and participation in politics and civic life); Josh Pasek et al., Schools as Incubators of Democratic Participation: Building Long-Term Political Efficacy with Civic Education,12 APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 26 (2008) (evaluating an existing civic education program).
101. Galston, supranote 80, at 231.
102. DELLI CARPINI&KEETER, supranote 70, at 176-77.
103. Id.at 177.
104. Id.at 175.
105. See, e.g.,CARNEGIE CORP. OF N.Y.&CIRCLE: THE CTR. FOR INFO.&RESEARCH ON CIVIC LEARNING& ENGAGEMENT, THE CIVIC MISSION OF SCHOOLS 14, 22-25 (2003);
106. Lauren Feldman et al., Identifying Best Practices in Civic Education: Lessons from the Student Voices Program,114 Am. J. EDUC. 75 (2007);
107. Judith Torney-Purta, The School's Role in Developing Civic Engagement: A Study of Adolescents in Twenty-Eight Countries,6 APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL SCi. 203 (2002).
108. SeeMarilyn Chambliss et al., Improving Textbooks as a Way To Foster Civic Understanding and Engagement(CIRCLE, Working Paper No. 54, 2007) (concluding that different ways of presenting the same textbook material had different effects on student interest and understanding of the material).
109. Lee H. Ehman, The American School in the Political Socialization Process,50 REV. EDUC. RES. 99, 101 (1980).
110. See id.at 103.
111. SeeNIEMI& JUNN, supranote 79, at 70 ("[T]he evidence suggests that civics courses do have an effect on student knowledge, an effect that is wide-ranging in terms of content and, as best we can tell from limited testing, that also appears to raise students' capacity for reasoning and exposition about civic matters."); Ehman, supranote 100, at 103.
112. Cf.CALIENDO, supranote 90, at 13 ("Political socialization is more important in explaining latent attitudes in adulthood (such as diffuse support for the Supreme Court) than attitudes toward more salient political institutions, actors, and issues. The reason is quite simple: adults will constantly have their attitudes about many aspects of political life challenged or reinforced throughout life as more and more information concerning those things comes forth.").
113. NIEMI&JUNN, supranote 79, at 157.
114. schauer, supranote 17, at 9. schauer is quick to add, however, that "this gap between the Court's agenda and the nation's does not make the Court's work less consequential." Id.
115. Persily, supranote 35, at 8.
116. Id.at 9.
117. THOMAS R MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT 189 (1989).
118. SeeCALIENDO, supranote 90, at 18-19.
119. Benjamin I. Page, Robert Y. Shapiro&Glenn R. Dempsey, What Moves Public Opinion?,81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 23, 24 (1987).
120. Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism,101 MICH. L. REV. 2596, 2620 (2003).
121. Persily, supranote 35, at 6.
122. Friedman, supranote 111, at 2622.
123. CALIENDO, supranote 90, at 13.
124. Page et al., supra110, at 24.
125. Persily, supranote 35, at 9.
126. Friedman, supranote 111, at 2606.
127. MARSHALL, supranote 108, at 192.
128. Friedman, supranote 111, at 2626.
129. Persily, supranote 35, at 14.
130. Jeffrey J. Mondak&Shannon Ishiyama Smithey, The Dynamics of Public Support for the Supreme Court,59 J. POL. 1114, 1115 (1997).
131. Id.at 1119.
132. Id.at 1124.
133. Jeffrey J. Mondak, Institutional Legitimacy and Procedural Justice: Reexamining the Question of Causality,27 LAW&SOC'Y REV. 599, 608 (1993).
134. Friedman, supranote 111, at 2615.
135. Id.
136. Id.at 2617.
137. Id.at 2627.
138. Id.
139. schauer, supranote 17, at 57.
140. Mondak&Smithey, supranote 121, at 1123.
141. Id.This observation mirrors Kramer's claim that "high school civics teachers" are partly to blame for the rise of judicial supremacy. KRAMER, supranote 29, at 232.
142. SeeCALIENDO, supranote 90, at 6-7.
143. See, e.g.,Richard C. Remy, Treatment of the Constitution in Civics and Government Textbooks, inTEACHING ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN SECONDARY SCHOOLS 107, 107 (Howard D. Mehlinger ed., 1981).
144. See id.
145. TYACK, supranote 80, at 40.
146. Id.For a comprehensive account of the changes in American history textbooks through the 1970s, see generally FRANCES FITZGERALD, AMERICA REVISED: HISTORY SCHOOLBOOKS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1979).
147. ROBERT LERNER, ALTHEA K. NAGAI& STANLEY ROTHMAN, MOLDING THE GOOD CITIZEN: THE POLITICS OF HIGH SCHOOL HISTORY TEXTS 1 (1995).
148. TYACK, supranote 80, at 59.
149. Id.
150. Id.at 59-60.
151. Id.at 60.
152. Id.
153. SeeDIANE RAVITCH, THE LANGUAGE POLICE: HOW PRESSURE GROUPS RESTRICT WHAT STUDENTS LEARN 98 (2003).
154. Id.
155. See id.at 97.
156. Remy, supranote 134, at 107.
157. Id.
158. DIANE RAVITCH, THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST., A CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO HIGH SCHOOL HISTORY TEXTBOOKS 13 (2004), available athttp://www.edexcellence.net/doc/ Historytextbooks[02-06-04].pdf.
159. Remy, supranote 134, at 107.
160. Chester E. Finn, Jr., Forewordto RAVITCH, supranote 149, at 6.
161. RAVITCH, supranote 149, at 13.
162. TYACK, supranote 80, at 61.
163. See, e.g.,TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 31.022 (Vernon 2006).
164. See, e.g.,CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44200-44399 (West 2006).
165. See, e.g.,N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 340-348 (McKinney 2006).
166. For an overview of my methodology, see infraAppendix.
167. STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT 16 (2008).
168. Id.
169. See, e.g.,KENNETH JANDA, JEFFREY M. BERRY& JERRY GOLDMAN, THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA (1994).
170. Diana Hess, Jeremy Stoddard&Shannon Murto, Examining the Treatment of 9/11 and Terrorism in High School Textbooks, inEDUCATING DEMOCRATIC CITIZENS IN TROUBLED TIMES: QUALITATIVE STUDIES OF CURRENT EFFORTS 192, 195 (Janet Bixby&Judith Pace eds., 2008).
171. SeeKerry J. Kennedy, The Historical Perspective: The Contribution of History to Citizenship Education, inSOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES ON CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 66, 84 (Richard E. Gross&Thomas L. Dynneson eds., 1991) ("History has a significant role to play in promoting citizenship education.... It has the potential to create an inclusive national community to which all belong and to which all can contribute.").
172. For an overview of my methodology, see infraAppendix.
173. For a brief overview of the origin of this phrase, see Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law's Politics,148 U. PA. L. REV. 971, 974 n.9 (2000).
174. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
175. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
176. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
177. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
178. 163 u.S. 537 (1896).
179. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 513 (1832).
180. 22 u.s. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
181. 208 u.s. 412 (1908).
182. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
183. 198 u.s. 45 (1905).
184. 372 u.s. 335 (1963).
185. 384 u.s. 436 (1966).
186. 378 u.s. 478 (1964).
187. 377 u.s. 533 (1964).
188. 369 u.s. 186 (1962).
189. 531 u.s. 98 (2000).
190. 410 u.s. 113 (1973).
191. 249 u.s. 47 (1919).
192. GERALD A. DANZER ET AL., THE AMERICANS 333 (2007);
193. see alsoWILLIAM DEVERELL&DEBORAH GRAY WHITE, UNITED STATES HISTORY 489-90 (2007) (identifying the Dred Scottdecision as among the "causes of conflict").
194. DAVID SAVILLE MUZZEY, A HISTORY OF OUR COUNTRY 283 (1952).
195. See, e.g.,EUGENE C. BARKER&HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, OUR NATION 374 (1949);
196. FREMONT P. WIRTH, UNITED STATES HISTORY 221 (rev. ed. 1955).
197. DAVID SAVILLE MUZZEY, A HISTORY OF OUR COUNTRY: A TEXTBOOK FOR HIGH- SCHOOL STUDENTS 370 (1943).
198. See, e.g.,LEON H. CANFIELD&HOWARD B. WILDER, THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 291 (Howard R. Anderson et al. eds., 1962).
199. HENRY F. GRAFF&JOHN A. KROUT, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES : THE ADVENTURE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 264 (2d ed. 1968).
200. ANDREW CAYTON ET AL., AMERICA: PATHWAYS TO THE PRESENT 444 (2005);
201. see alsoDANZER ET AL., supranote 183, at 398 ("Although Congress had passed important laws to protect the political and civil rights of African Americans, the Supreme Court began to take away those same protections.");
202. JESUS GARCIA ET AL., CREATING AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 548 (2007) ("To make matters worse for the Republicans, the Supreme Court began to undo some of the changes that had been made in the South.... These Court decisions weakened Reconstruction and blocked African-American efforts to gain full equality.");
203. GARY B. NaSH, AMERICAN ODYSSEY: THE 20TH CENTURY AND BEYOND 191 (2004) ("[T]he Supreme Court's support of African American rights diminished still further.").
204. CAYTON ET AL., supranote 189, at 566.
205. HENRY W. BRAGDON&SAMUEL P. MCCUTCHEN, HISTORY OF A FREE PEOPLE 540 (6th rev. ed. 1967).
206. LEWIS PAUL TODD&MERLE CURTI, RISE OF THE AMERICAN NATION 413 (2d ed. 1966).
207. LEWIS PAUL TODD&MERLE CURTI, RISE OF THE AMERICAN NATION 422 (3d ed. 1972).
208. LEONARD C. WOOD, RALPH H. GABRIEL&EDWARD L. BILLER, AMERICA: ITS PEOPLE AND Values 578 (1985).
209. DANZER ET AL., supranote 183, at 908. 196. Id.
210. CAYTON ET AL., supranote 189, at 931.
211. BRAGDON&MCCUTCHEN, supranote 191, at 744.
212. TODD&CURTI, supranote 193, at 824.
213. DANZER ET AL., supranote 183, at 915.
214. See, e.g., id.at 914-15.
215. JANDA ET AL., supranote 160, at 321.
216. DANZER ET AL., supranote 183, at 207.
217. Id.
218. Id.; see alsoWILLIAM A. MCCLENAGHAN, MAGRUDER'S AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 517 (2007) ("[T]he Supreme Court [is] the final authority on the meaning of the Constitution.");
219. RICHARD C. REMY, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: DEMOCRACY IN ACTION 66 (2008) ("[T]he Supreme Court is the final authority on the meaning and interpretation of the Constitution.").
220. REMY, supranote 205, at 74-75.
221. KRAMER, supranote 29, at 229.
222. DANIEL J. BOORSTIN&BROOKS MATHER KELLEY, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 191 (2005);
223. see alsoDEVERELL&WHITE, supranote 183, at 269 "[Marbury]established the Court as the final authority on the Constitution.");
224. GARCIA ET AL., supranote 189, at 317 ("[Marbury] states that the Supreme Court has the final say in interpreting the Constitution.").
225. BARKER&COMMAGER, supranote 185, at 285.
226. BRAGDON&MCCUTCHEN, supranote 191, at 196.
227. MUZZEY, supranote 186, at 167.
228. Id.at 166-67.
229. Id.at 167.
230. See, e.g., DANIEL J. BOORSTIN& BROOKS MATHER KELLEY, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 154 (1990);
231. GRAFF&KROUT, supranote 188, at 148;
232. WOOD ET AL., supranote 194, at 257.
233. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
234. Post&Siegel, supranote 41, at 31.
235. Kramer, supranote 17, at 748.
236. Although I will not focus on President Lincoln's defiance of Chief Justice Taney, it is worth noting that one of the accounts of President Lincoln's direct challenge to Chief Justice Taney provides the clearest instance of support for popular constitutionalism in any of the textbooks: Lincoln now showed his instinctive grasp of the deeper meaning of the conflict for this nation. He felt that the Constitution could not contain the seeds of its own destruction. If he had to bend the Constitution in order to save the Constitution and the Union, he would do so. BOORSTIN& KELLEY, supranote 208, at 339. The textbook continues, When ChiefJustice Taney issued a writ of habeas corpus for a secessionist named Merryman, the military commander of the area refused to free the man. Taney then issued an opinion that the President had no right to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, only Congress could do that. Lincoln believed that he must act to save the Union - even if he had to break the law to do so. So he ignored Taney's decision. it was by actions such as these that Maryland was held in the union and Washington was saved. Id.at 340. Another textbook mentions matter-of-factly, "When Supreme Court Chief Justice Roger Taney declared that Lincoln had gone beyond his constitutional powers, the president ignored his ruling." DANZER ET AL., supranote 183, at 349. Perhaps the key conclusion to be drawn from these accounts is simply that it might be legitimate to defy the Court and bend the Constitution, but only if your name is Abraham Lincoln and the nation is in a civil war. Furthermore, it is significant that most textbooks ignore this episode entirely. 219. BOORSTIN&KELLEY, supranote 208, at 192. 220. GARCIA ET AL., supranote 189, at 316.
237. See, e.g.,CAYTON ET AL., supranote 189, at 214; DANZER ET AL., supranote 183, at 199.
238. MUZZEY, supranote 186, at 214, 215; see alsoBRAGDON&MCCUTCHEN, supranote 191, at 196 (discussing the Republicans' successful impeachment of Federalist Judge John Pickering); CANFIELD&WILDER, supranote 187, at 164 (describing Republican efforts to "weaken the Federalist hold by impeaching several Federalist judges").
239. See, e.g., BARKER&COMMAGER, supranote 185, at 190; MUZZEY, supranote 186, at 215.
240. See, e.g.,BRAGDON&MCCUTCHEN, supranote 191, at 196;
241. MUZZEY, supranote 186, at 215.
242. BRAGDON&MCCUTCHEN, supranote 191, at 195.
243. CANFIELD&WILDER, supranote 187, at 160.
244. GRAFF&KROUT, supranote 188, at 147. amp 228. BRAGDON&MCCUTCHEN, supranote 191, at 196.
245. FRANK FREIDEL&HENRY N. DREWRY, AMERICA: A MODERN HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 152 (1970).
246. BOORSTIN&KELLEY, supranote 208, at 192.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. For an extended discussion of how the Chase impeachment helped "construct" the proper role of a Supreme Court Justice in our constitutional system, see WHITTINGTON, supranote 27, at 20-71. Whittington notes that "[t]he Chase impeachment was the culmination of a movement to define the nature of the federal courts under the Constitution and how judges were to conduct themselves and their courtrooms in a republic." Id.at 25. Whittington adds, "The Republicans were fairly successful in both areas, expanding the impeachment power to serve as a mechanism for disciplining the judicial branch while constraining judges from engaging in political disputes." Id.
253. DEVERELL&WHITE, supranote 183, at 334 ("By not enforcing the Court's decision, Jackson violated his presidential oath to uphold the laws of the land.").
254. See, e.g., WIRTH, supranote 185, at 173-74.
255. See, e.g.,CANFIELD&WILDER, supranote 187, at 208 ("The removal of the Indians went on all through the Jacksonian Era. States passed laws extending their authority over Indian lands within their boundaries and more or less forced the indians to pick up and go west.").
256. See, e.g., FREIDEL&DREWRY, supranote 229, at 206; TODD&CURTI, supranote 193, at 270.
257. CAYTON ET AL., supranote 189, at 301.
258. STERLING STUCKEY ET AL., CALL TO FREEDOM 347 (2005).
259. BREST ET AL., supranote 4, at 75.
260. Id.
261. DANZER ET AL., supranote 183, at 232.
262. Id.at 233.
263. See, e.g.,EDWARD L. AYERS ET AL., AMERICAN ANTHEM 248 (2007).
264. See, e.g.,PAUL BOYER, AMERICAN NATION 247 (2005) ("President Jackson attacked the Bank as a dangerous monopoly that benefited rich investors at the expense of poor, honest, and industrious people."); CAYTON ET AL., supranote 189, at 302 ("Jackson justified his action as a protection of the rights of ordinary citizens. He attacked the bank as a tool of greedy, powerful people.").
265. MUZZEY, supranote 186, at 299.
266. BRAGDON&MCCUTCHEN, supranote 191, at 268.
267. GRAFF&KROUT, supranote 188, at 190;
268. see alsoWIRTH, supranote 185, at 174 ("[Jackson] felt that it was a corporation which represented the moneyed powers rather than the people.... ");
269. WOOD ET AL., supranote 194, at 334 ("What Jackson really objected to was the great influence of the Bank on national affairs and Congress").
270. MUZZEY, supranote 186, at 302.
271. BARKER&COMMAGER, supranote 185, at 283;
272. see alsoBRAGDON&MCCUTCHEN, supranote 191, at 268 ("it was an overextension of federal power, because the Constitution nowhere explicitly granted the federal government the right to establish a central bank.");
273. GRAFF&KROUT, supranote 188, at 190 ("[A]fter McCulloch v. Marylandin 1819, the Bank seemed to be beyond successful attack. Nevertheless, Jackson's supporters were finding new reasons for criticizing 'the Monster.'").
274. CANFIELD&WILDER, supranote 187, at 209-10.
275. TODD&CURTI, supranote 193, at 271 (citation omitted).
276. SeeLEWIS PAUL TODD&MERLE CURTI, RISE OF THE AMERICAN NATION 263 (Liberty ed. 1982).
277. CAYTON ET AL., supranote 189, at 783.
278. GARCIA ET AL., supranote 189, at 738.
279. CAYTON ET AL., supranote 189, at 783.
280. Id.
281. See, e.g., id.at 783 ("With several dictators ruling in Europe, the world seemed already to be tilting toward tyranny. If Congress let FDR reshape the Supreme Court, critics worried, the United States might head down the same slope.").
282. BOORSTIN&KELLEY, supranote 208, at 638 ("What [President Roosevelt] offered as a plan to 'reform' the Court really was a way to make the Supreme Court approve the New Deal laws.").
283. DANZER ET AL., supranote 183, at 699 ("Many people believed that the president was violating principles ofjudicial independence and the separation of powers.").
284. See, e.g.,DEVERELL&WHITE, supranote 183, at 789 ("Critics charged that Roosevelt was trying to change the balance of power so carefully defined in the U.S. Constitution.").
285. MUZZEY, supranote 186, at 852-53.
286. BARKER&COMMAGER, supranote 185, at 935 ("Those who supported the change contended that the Court was already packed, and that this was merely an effort to unpack it, and that the Court should be in harmony with the purposes of the people as expressed through their political branches.").
287. MUZZEY, supranote 186, at 853.
288. See, e.g.,BRAGDON&MCCUTCHEN, supranote 191, at 642-43; GRAFF&KROUT, supranote 188, at 661.
289. See, e.g., BOORSTIN&KELLEY, supranote 214, at 534.
290. BOYER, supranote 248, at 360.
291. SeeAYERS ET AL., supranote 247, at 340.
292. See, e.g.,CAYTON ET AL., supranote 189, at 366 ("The debates highlighted two important principles in American government, majority rule and minority rights.");
293. DANZER ET AL., supranote 183, at 326 ("The crucial difference between the two was that Douglas believed that popular sovereignty would allow slavery to pass away on its own, while Lincoln doubted that slavery would cease to spread without legislation outlawing it in the territories.").
294. NASH, supranote 189, at 171. Although this is understandable, given the limited space each textbook could devote to these historic debates, "Dred Scottfigured centrally in the exchanges between Abraham Lincoln and stephen Douglas during their campaign for the U.S. Senate in 1858." BREST ET AL., supranote 4, at 257. For instance, Lincoln argued, "[Judge Douglas] would have the citizen conform his vote to [the Dred Scott]decision; the member of Congress, his; the President, his use of the veto power. He would make it a rule of political action for the people and all the departments of government. i would not. " Id.at 259. Lincoln added, "By resisting [Dred Scott]as a political rule, i disturb no right of property, create no disorder, excite no mobs." Id.
295. See, e.g.,BRAGDON&MCCUTCHEN, supranote 191, at 339;
296. CANFIELD&WILDER, supranote 187, at 291;
297. MUZZEY, supranote 186, at 373-74;
298. WOOD ET AL., supranote 194, at 426.
299. See, e.g.,CAYTON ET AL., supranote 189, at 365 ("Antislavery forces were disgusted with the Dred Scottdecision. ").
300. See, e.g., id.at 980 (featuring a picture of a billboard that exclaims, "Save Our Republic! Impeach Earl Warren!").
301. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
302. TODD&CURTI, supranote 256, at 810.
303. Id.at 810-11;
304. see alsoBOORSTIN&KELLEY, supranote 214, at 730 ("The new feminists hailed a victory. They said that a woman's most important right was to control her own body. But their passionate 'Right-to-Life' opponents said that the unborn child had rights of its own and that abortion was murder.").
305. AYERS ET AL., supranote 247, at 989.
306. CAYTON ET AL., supranote 189, at 1000.
307. DANZER ET AL., supranote 183, at 1042.
308. NASH, supranote 189, at 861.
309. DANZER ET AL., supranote 183, at 1042.
310. Id.
311. NASH, supranote 189, at 861.
312. DANZER ET AL., supranote 183, at 1042;
313. see alsoBOYER, supranote 248, at 1049 ("President Reagan vowed to appoint justices who would uphold his conservative agenda.");
314. NASH, supranote 189, at 861 ("The Supreme Court began to hand down some conservative decisions that pleased the President. For example, the Court curtailed affirmative action and limited the rights of criminal suspects.").
315. See, e.g., AYERS ET AL., supranote 247, at 1071 ("[Reagan's conservative nominations] at times set[] off furious confirmation clashes in the Senate.").
316. Id.
317. See, e.g.,BOYER, supranote 248, at 1050 ("Bork's views concerned many people, including a number of senators.");
318. CAYTON ET AL., supranote 189, at 1110 ("The Democratic Party had won control of the Senate in the 1986 elections and most Democratic senators did not share Reagan's goal of appointing conservative judges. Liberal groups joined together in 1987 to lobby the Senate to reject Bork's nomination.").
319. DANZER ET AL., supranote 183, at 915.
320. See, e.g., BOORSTIN&KELLEY, supranote 208, at 739;
321. DEVERELL&WHITE, supranote 183, at 871.
322. See, e.g.,CANFIELD&WILDER, supranote 187, at 776-77.
323. CAYTON ET AL., supranote 189, at 932.
324. See, e.g.,BOORSTIN&KELLEY, supranote 214, at 628;
325. FREIDEL&DREWRY, supranote 229, at 753.
326. BOORSTIN&KELLEY, supranote 208, at 739.
327. DANZER ET AL., supranote 183, at 915.
328. Id.;
329. see alsoCAYTON ET AL., supranote 189, at 932-33 ("The congressmen asserted that the Supreme Court had overstepped its bounds.... ").
330. DANZER ET AL., supranote 183, at 1003; see alsoBOORSTIN&KELLEY, supranote 208, at 829 ("[Nixon] criticized the Supreme Court for giving the 'green light' to criminals and for failing to slow down the integration of the schools.").
331. This Note draws heavily on the methodologies employed by FITZ GERALd, supranote 137;
332. LERNER ET AL., supranote 138;
333. and BESSIE LOUISE PIERCE, CIVIC ATTITUDES IN AMERICAN SCHOOL TEXTBOOKS (1930).
334. American Textbook Council, Widely Adopted History Textbooks, http://www.historytextbooks.org/adopted.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2009).
335. in selecting the textbooks for this Note, i was guided by Diane Ravitch, Meira Levinson, and John J. Patrick, as well as Frederick Hess of the American Enterprise Institute and staff members at the Center for Civic Education and the National Council on the Social Studies.
336. American Textbook Council, supranote 301.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. For an overview of their methodology, see LERNER ET AL., supranote 138, at 159-62.
341. Id.at 159.
342. Id.at 160.
343. This is part of the reason why i have focused more on the history textbooks than the government textbooks in my analysis above.
344. This methodology was suggested by Diane Ravitch and Frederick Hess, as well as a staff member from the National Council on the Social Studies.
345. i consulted with Meira Levinson and John J. Patrick.
346. To that end, I draw upon KLAUS KRIPPENDORFF, CONTENT ANALYSIS: AN INTRODUCTION TO ITS METHODOLOGY (1980);
347. and DAVID R. MAYHEW, AMERICA'S CONGRESS: ACTIONS IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE, JAMES MADISON THROUGH NEWT GINGRICH (2000).