ΑΙΔΩΣ in Epictetus

Classical Philology

Volumn 93, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 136-160

  Kamtekar, Rachana ^a  

^a WILLIAMS COLLEGE   (United States)

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EID: 66649118957     PISSN: 0009837X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/449384     Document Type: Article

References (26)

1. Diogenes Laertius 7. 126, characterizes the Stoic ideal as φρόνιμος, αcombining comma aboveνδρειος, δί καιος, and σώφρ ων; cf. Plutarch De stoicorum repugnantiis 1034c-e [= 61C in The Hellenistic Philosophers, ed. A. A. Long and D. Sedley (Cambridge, 1987), hereafter LS];
2. However, Epictetus is not completely alone: as A. Long has pointed out to me, there is an affinity between Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius in the emphasis on the element of self-scrutiny in αιcombining comma aboveδώς (see below, and in Marcus, e. g. , Meditations 2. 6, 3. 6). A. O. Bonhöffer, The Ethics of the Stoic Epictetus, tr. W. O. Stephens (New York, 1996), 30-32, notes but does not really explain Epictetus' avoidance of standard Stoic virtue-terms.
3. On the role of impulse in the Stoic analysis of action, see B. Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism (Oxford, 1985), 47-53.
4. On the restriction of good emotions to the wise, see the discussions in Inwood, Ethics, 173-75,
5. and F. H. Sandbach, The Stoics (London, 1975), 67-68.
6. On this point, see I. G. Kidd, "Moral Actions and Rules in Stoic Ethics," in The Stoics, ed. J. Rist (California, 1978), 247-58.
7. See also Bonhöffer's argument that Nemesius cannot be describing true Stoic αιcombining comma aboveδώς, because he does not sufficiently distinguish αιcombining comma aboveδώς from αιcombining comma aboveσχύνη: both are a kind of fear of censure, attendant upon unease about one's conduct and indicative of there being something wrong with it. A. F. Bonhöffer, Epictet und die Stoa (Stuttgart, 1890), 291-93.
8. It is also possible that some Stoics gave αιcombining comma aboveδώς a double classification - as a passion when felt by the fool and a good emotion when felt by the sage. On double classifications, especially the double classification of εcombining comma abovéρως, see B. Inwood, "Why Do Fools Fall in Love?" forthcoming in Aristotle and After, ed. R. Sorabji.
9. This account of cognition follows F. H. Sandbach, "Phantasia Kataleptike," in Problems in Stoicism, ed. A. A. Long (London, 1971), 9-19.
10. On progress from cognition to knowledge, see S. Menn, "Physics as a Virtue," in the Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 11 (1995): 1-34.
11. A. A. Long, "Greek Ethics After MacIntyre," in AncPhil 3 (1983): 184-97.
12. See A. R. Dyck's A Commentary on Cicero, "De Officiis" (Michigan, 1996), introduction and comments ad loc. , for thorough discussions of the personae-doctrine in Cicero and other writers including Epictetus, as well as for a full treatment of the doctrine's Panaetian source and its anticipations in Aristo of Chios and Bion of Borysthenes. As Dyck notes, the third and fourth personae fit oddly with the first and second; for example, "the choice of career involved in the fourth persona could have been described equally well as the result of the action of the second persona within limits imposed by universal human nature (the first persona) and external circumstances (necessitas or the third persona)" Dyck argues convincingly, however, that all four personae are likely to be from Panaetius (pp. 285-86).
13. On the individual role, see C. Gill, "Peace of Mind and Being Yourself," ANRW 36. 7 (1994): 4599-640, esp. 4603-8.
14. See also C. Gill, "Personhood and Personality: The Four-Personae Theory in Cicero De Officiis I," in OSAP 6 (1988): 169-99, esp. 180-82, on some of the different uses to which Cicero and Epictetus put the four-personae theory. I do not agree with Gill that for Cicero, the individual role is that which makes a person distinguished or successful in conventional terms, but I do not thereby accept the only alternative Gill considers, that the individual role is what distinguishes a person from others, or makes him unique. Rather, the individual role seems to me to constitute a person's "type" or particular nature - like the types in Plutarch's Lives or Theophrastus' Characters. There is no suggestion that a person's type would be unique or distinctive, but only that there are different types of people.
15. On the value of καθήκον τα for guiding the trainee, as well as on the use of the notion of τα κατὰ φύσι ν and praecepta (rules), see I. G. Kidd, "Stoic Intermediates and the End for Man," in Problems in Stoicism, ed. A. A. Long (London, 1971), 150-72.
16. I take this translation for προαίρ εσις from R. Dobbin, "Προα ίρεσις in Epictetus "in AncPhil 11 (1991): 111-35.
17. Cf. Bonhöffer, Ethics, 25.
18. G. Taylor, Pride, Shame and Guilt (Oxford, 1985), 81-84.
19. T. Hill argues that self-respect can be a matter of having a personal standard, and not only of valuing one's moral rights as a human being. See T. Hill, "Self-Respect Reconsidered," in Autonomy and Self-Respect (Cambridge, 1991), 19-24.
20. Although in Epictetus, self-respect involves an assessment of oneself as better than the run-of-the-mill person, a high self-assessment is not necessary for self-respect - one could set one's standard at what any human being should expect. On this point, see Taylor, Pride, 76-84.
21. On the identity of Epictetus' audience and the character of his interactions with them, see R. F. Hock, "'By the Gods, It's My One Desire to See an Actual Stoic': Epictetus' Relations with Students and Visitors in His Personal Network," Semeia 56 (1991): 121-42. Hock distinguishes two groups among Epictetus' Nicopolis audience: students, usually young and from an aristocratic background with worldly aspirations aplenty, and visitors, both from Nicopolis itself and Rome, also of an aristocratic background. Hock argues that Epictetus fails to compel his audience to adopt his ideal of a practical Stoicism because (1) he rebuffs most of his visitors, (2) his students want only to excel in Stoic doctrine, and are supported in this aspiration both by each other and by their families, outside audience, and others, and (3) the duration of Epictetus' contact with his audience is limited, partly due to (1) and (2). As an objective assessment of the situation in Epictetus' school this may be true, although I am skeptical about the extent to which his students' goals are strictly at cross-purposes with Epictetus (why then not attend another school and spare themselves the insults of Epictetus?). However, my interest here is in what Epictetus thought and did intentionally, not in whether or how he failed.
22. Cf. 2. 8. 11: ε̌χεις τι εcombining comma aboveν σεαυιωcombining dot belowcombining macron μέρος εcombining comma aboveκείνου. By the "god within" or "part of god within," Epictetus seems to mean our reason. Epictetus says that because each of us has within himself this μέρος (part) of god, each of us is an αcombining comma aboveπόσπασμ α (fragment) of god (2. 8. 11; cf. 1. 14. 6). On the "god within" in other Stoics, see E. Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics (London, 1880), 216 and 351-52.
23. The ideas that one might be one's own judge, that shame before oneself might set standards for one's conduct and that self-approval might contribute to happiness go back at least to Democritus; see frags. 84, 174, 244, 264. On αιcombining comma aboveδώς in Democritus, see D. L. Cairns, Aidos: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature (Oxford, 1993), 363-70.
24. On the contribution of consciousness of one's character to ευcombining comma aboveθυμία (tranquility) in various Stoic and Epicurean writers, see Gill, "Peace of Mind," 4628-29.
25. On αιcombining comma aboveδώς and the Cynic, see M. Billerbeck, Epiktet: Vom Kynismus (= Philosophia Antiqua 34 [Leiden, 1978]), esp. 67-68.
26. D. R. Dudley, A History of Cynicism from Diogenes to the Sixth Century A. D. (London, 1937), 5. E. g. , D. L. 6. 32, 46, 69. But notice that Diogenes the Cynic is also shown provoking people by asking them, ουcombining comma aboveκ αιcombining comma aboveσχύ νη ("are you not ashamed?") about various aspects of their behavior (D. L. 6. 65). Thanks to A. Long for calling this passage to my attention.