The world bank inspection panel in context: Institutional aspects of the accountability of international organizations

International Organizations Law Review

Volumn 2, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 57-102

  Orakhelashvili, Alexander ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 66249152785     PISSN: 15723739     EISSN: 15718069     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/1572374054798323     Document Type: Article

References (126)

1. Clark, "The World Bank and Human Rights: The Need for Greater Accountability", 15 Harvard Human Rights Journal (2002), p. 206.
2. Shihata, The World Bank Inspection Panel (1994), p. 42.
3. Boisson de Chazournez, "Le panel d'inspection de la Banque Mondiale : A propos de la complexifcation de l'espace public international", 105
4. Revue General de Droit International Public (2002), p. 150.
5. Cf. Nuclear Tests, [1974] ICJ Reports 253, at 267-270.
6. Hugh Thirlway, "The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1960-1989", BYIL (1996), p. 13.
7. The responsibility of international organizations is currently among the subjects being studied by the UN International Law Commission.
8. See, in this regard, the reports of the Special Rapporteur G. Gaja, First Report, A/CN.4/532, and Second Report, A/CN.4/541.
9. See especially the First Report, pp. 8-9, emphasising that the responsibility of international organizations follows from their international legal personality and their consequent ability to be bound by international obligations.
10. The ILA Final Report affrms that "the principles that international organisations may be held internationally responsible for their acts is nowadays part of customary international law".
11. Shaw & Wellens, ILA Final Report on Accountability of International Organisations (2004), p. 26.
12. K. Wellens, Remedies against International Organisations (Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 181-182.
13. On immunity of international organizations before national courts, see A. Reinisch, International Organisations Before National Courts (Cambridge University Press, 2000).
14. [1999] ICJ Reports 88-89. Otherwise, national and international courts may be inclined to view immunities restrictively.
15. This is not least required in terms of fundamental human rights. For instance, the European Court of Human Rights recognised the immunity of the European Space Organization (ES A) before national courts as a legitimate limitation on the scope of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, bearing in mind that an alternative arbitration body within the ESA was available to the claimants.
16. See ECtHR decisions Beer and Regan, 28934/95 (18 February 1999), Waite and Kennedy, 28934/95 (18 February 1999). Effect of Awards, advisory opinion
17. [1954] ICJ Reports 57. See Clark, supra, fn. 1, p. 217.
18. See Shihata, supra, fn. 2, pp. 127ff (providing the text of the Resolution Establishing Inspection Panel); World Bank, 〈www.worldbank. org〉 (hereinafter the Resolution).
19. See Review of the Resolution Establishing the Inspection Panel (1996) and Conclu sions of the Board's Second Review of the Inspection Panel (1999) (hereinafter referred to respectively as 1996 and 1999 Clarifcations), available at 〈www.worldbank.org〉.
20. Shihata, supra, fn. 2, p. 6;
21. Schlemmer-Schulte, The World Bank, Its Operations, and Its Inspection Panel, Recht Internationaler Wirtschaft, 3/1999, p. 212 (hereinafter Schlem mer-Schulte, RIW).
22. Forget, "Le 'Panel d'inspection' de la Banque Mondiale", XLII Annuaire Français de Droit International (1996), p 645, 647 (referring to the 1992 Wapenhans Report which pointed to the need to improve the elaboration and execution of the Bank-funded projects);
23. Clark, supra, fn. 1, p. 217;
24. Schlemmer-Schulte, "The World Bank's Experience With Its Inspection Panel", 58 Zeitschrift fur ausldndisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (1998), p. 354 (hereinafter Schlemmer-Schulte, ZaöRV)
25. Shihata, supra, fn. 2, pp. 7-8; Clark, supra, fn. 1, pp. 216-217 (dealing with account ability concerns in the early 1990s).
26. Effect of Awards, [1954] ICJ Reports 57.
27. Admissions to the United Nations, [1947-48] ICJ Reports 68.
28. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations
29. [1949] ICJ Reports 174,182,184; Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administra tive Tribunal
30. [1954] ICJ Reports 47, 57; Certain Expenses
31. [1962] ICJ Reports 167-68; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons
32. [1996] ICJ Reports 226, 240; Difference Relating to Immunity From Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights
33. [1999] ICJ Reports 62, 82. For a sceptical approach, see the dissenting opinion by Judge Hackworth in Reparations, stating that "powers not expressed cannot freely be implied" due to the delegated nature of the powers of the United Nations.
34. [1949] ICJ Reports 198. On conceptual issues related to inherent powers, see P. Gaeta, "Inherent Powers of International Courts and Tribunals", inL.C. Vorhahet al. (eds.), Man's Inhumanity to Man, Essays on International Law in Honour of Antonio Cassese (2003), p 353-372.
35. On the nature and scope of inherent powers, see generally A. Orakhelashvili, "The Concept of International Judicial Jurisdiction: A Reappraisal", 3 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals (2003), pp. 501, 534-538.
36. On the principle of effectiveness as an interpretative principle, see H. Lauterpacht, "Restrictive Interpretation and Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties", BYIL (1949), pp. 50-51, 69.
37. Effectiveness as a canon of interpretation is found in Article 31.1 VCLT 1969, which refers to the plain meaning of a treaty in the light of its object and purpose as the primary method of treaty interpretation.
38. Case concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Ger. v. US), Merits, Decision of 27 June 2001, General List No. 104;
39. see also A. Orakhelashvili, "Questions of International Judicial Jurisdiction in the LaGrand Case", 15 Leiden Journal of International Law (2002), pp. 105-130.
40. Effect of Awards, [1954] ICJ Reports 57.
41. Certain Expenses, [1962] ICJ Reports 162.
42. Cf generally Orakhelashvili, supra, fn. 22, pp. 116-118.
43. Resolution, para. 7. Resolution, para. 4; supra, fn. 2, p. 66.
44. Resolution, para. 5. Ibid., para. 8. Ibid., para. 2. Bradlow, "International Organisations and Private Complaints: The Case of the World Bank Inspection Panel", 34 Virgina Journal of International Law (1994), pp. 554, 572.
45. Members of the Panel receive renumeration for their work in the periods they work on a full-time basis. In other cases they shall be reimbursed on per diem basis, Resolution, para. 10.
46. Operational Manual Statement No. 2.36, para.
47. OD 4.01, Environmental Assessment, para. 12. Operational Manual Statement No. 2.36, para. 14. OD 4.00, Annex A, Environmental Assessment, para. 3.
48. OD 4.01, Environmental Assessment, para. 1. Ibid., para. 4. OD 4.01, Annex D, EA Procedures, Internal, para. 6. OD 7.50, Projects on International Waterways, para. 6.
49. OD 4.30, Involuntary Resettlement, para. 4.
50. OD 4.20, Indigenous Peoples, para. 8.
51. OD 4.01, Annex D, Environmental Assessment Procedures: Internal, para. 12.
52. Bradlow & Schlemmer-Schulte, "The World Bank's New Inspection Panel: A Constructive Step in the Transformation of the International Legal Order", 54 Zeitschrift fur ausldndisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (1994), p. 404 (hereinafter Bradlow & Schlemmer-Schulte, ZaöRV).
53. D. Wirth, "Compliance with Non-binding Norms in Trade and Finance", in: D. Shelton, Commitment and Compliance (2000), p. 337 (suggesting that the Inspection Panel is a natural forum for enforcing cus tomary norms and it is certainly appropriate that generally accepted multilateral standards contained in non-binding instruments would presumptively apply in the Bank's lending operations).
54. Shihata, supra, fn. 2, p. 45; Schlemmer-Schulte, supra, fn. 14, p. 211. Forget, supra, fn. 15, p. 647.
55. Chinkin, "Normative Development in the International Legal System", in: D. Shelton, Commitment and Compliance (2000), p. 33.
56. Birnie & Boyle, International Law and the Environment (2002), p. 132.
57. Nicaragua, [1986] ICJ Reports 98ff.
58. Request for an examination of the situation in accordance with paragraph 63 of the Court's Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), [1995] ICJ Reports 344-345.
59. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros (Hungary v Slovakia), [1998] ICJ Reports.
60. Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (2000), p. 57.
61. See supra section I.1. For the general reasoning on this issue
62. see Nicaragua, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, [1984] ICJ Reports 424-426
63. and Nicaragua, Merits, [1986] ICJ Reports 92-97.
64. Shihata, supra, fn. 2, p. 14.
65. This assistance includes inter alia f ' nancial and technical assistance. See Schlemmer-Schulte, supra, fn. 14, p. 210.
66. The Banks role may be viewed in some circumstances as more than assistance and participation. The Bank's involvement is capable of limiting and replacing the role of peoples and their representatives in making decisions on important economic and political issues of their country.
67. See Anne Orford, "Locating the International: International Military and Monetary Interventions after the Cold War", 38
68. Harvard International Law Journal (1997), pp. 443ff, 465,470-471.
69. On such and related phenomena, see a remarkable study of Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention (Cambridge University Press, 2003) (hereinafter Orford, Humanitarian Intervention).
70. See Bradlow, supra, fn. 31, pp. 554ff., 558ff.
71. Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, [1980] ICJ Reports 89-90;
72. see also Admission to the United Nations, [1947-48] ICJ Reports 64.
73. Shaw & Wellens, Second ILA Report on the Accountability of International Organisations (2000), pp. 6-7 (hereinafter Shaw & Wellens, Second Report);
74. Shaw & Wellens, ILA Final Report on Accountability of International Organisations (2004), pp. 12-14 (hereinafter Shaw & Wellens, Final Report).
75. Shaw & Wellens, Final Report, supra, fn. 66, p. 8.
76. Shaw & Wellens, Second Report, supra, fn. 66, pp. 4-6;
77. Shaw & Wellens, Third ILA Report on the Accountability of International Organisations (2002), 2-5 (hereinafter Shaw & Wellens, Third Report);
78. Shaw & Wellens, Final Report, supra, fn. 66, pp. 8-12.
79. Cf. Shihata, supra, fn. 2, p. 28. Bradlow, supra, fn. 31, p. 565.
80. Orford, supra, fn. 63, p. 468;
81. Orford, Humanitarian Intervention, supra, fn. 63.
82. Shihata, supra, fn. 2, p. 17. 74 [1947-48] ICJ Reports (stating that the motives of member-States in decision-making in political organs are outside of external control). Shihata, supra, fn. 2, p. 120;
83. Bradlow & Schlemmer-Schulte, ZaöRV, supra, fn. 52, pp. 402, 413;
84. Forget, supra, fn. 15, p. 646.
85. The ECJ which may establish non-contractual liability of the EU, is considered as a special case because of the sui generis nature of the EC. See Schlemmer-Schulte, ZaöRV, supra, fn. 15, p. 354.
86. But also in this area it is not alone: consider, for instance, the ombudsman within the European Union, which is not mentioned in the literature on the Inspection Panel, and international administrative tribunals.
87. See Bradlow, supra, fn. 31, pp. 554, 604;
88. Bradlow & Schlemmer-Schulte, ZaöRV, supra, fn. 52, p. 395;
89. Schlemmer-Schulte, RIW, supra, fn. 14, p. 210; Wellens, supra, fn. 7, p. 187.
90. This further corresponds to the International Court's f ndings that international organizations are bound by general international law. See supra, fn. 65.
91. Schlemmer-Schulte, "The World Bank Inspection Panel: Accountability to Non-State Actors", Translex, April 1999, pp. 11,13 (hereinafter Schlemmer-Schulte Translex) (arguing that the Bank's corrective measures after the Panel has submitted its report is based on accountability concerns and not on the Bank's international responsibility).
92. Shaw & Wellens, ILA-Committee on Accountability of International Organisations, First Report, 17 (hereinafter Shaw & Wellens, First Report);
93. Bradlow & Schlemmer-Schulte, supra, fn. 31, p. 409 (considering that establishment of the Panel is itself acknowledgment by the Bank of its international responsibility).
94. But see Schlemmer-Schulte, RIW, supra, fn. 14, p. 213;
95. Schlemmer-Schulte, "The World Bank and Human Rights", 4 Austrian Review of International and European Law (1999), p. 256
96. 83 Shihata, supra, fn. 2, p. 36.
97. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its Fifty-third session (2001), Off cial Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), 43, 59.
98. Shaw & Wellens, Final Report, supra, fn. 66, p. 27.
99. Gaja, First Report on Responsibility of International Organisations, A/CN. 4/532,19-21 (hereinafter Gaja, First Report) (emphasising that there is no reason to adopt the attribution standardsapplicable to international organizations that are different from ap in the law of State responsibility).
100. Request for Inspection from Swissbourgh Diamond Mines (Pty) Ltd. & Others-Lesotho: Lesotho Highlands Water Project (Loan No: 4339-LSO), para. 26.
101. Boisson de Chazournez, supra, fn. 3, p. 152.
102. Wellens, supra, fn. 7, p. 188.
103. Shaw & Wellens, First Report, supra, fn. 80, pp. 25-26
104. Shaw & Wellens, Final Report, supra, fn. 66, p. 32.
105. ILC Articles on State Responsibility, Articles 49-54, ILC Report 2001, 56-58.
106. International Court in Barcelona Traction, [1970] ICJ Reports paras. 33-34.
107. Separate Opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry, Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, [1998] ICJ Reports. [1954] ICJ Reports 57;
108. International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia in Tadic case (Appeals Chamber), noting that the establishment of the ICTY was caused by need to restore international peace and security in Former Yugoslavia and thus served the purposes of the United Nations, ICTY, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, 5 October 1995, 8ff., paras 29-30.
109. [1962] ICJ Reports 168.
110. C.F. Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organisations (2nd ed., 2005), pp. 139-142; (hereinafter Amerasinghe, Principles);
111. Jaenicke, "Article 7", in: Simma (ed.), The United Nations Charter. A Commentary (2nd ed., 2002), pp. 218ff.
112. Shaw & Wellens, Final Report, supra, fn. 66, p. 13.
113. Shaw & Wellens, Final Report, supra, fn. 66, p. 13.
114. [1954] ICJ Reports 56-58. 104 Ibid . pp. 60-61 Resolution, para. 11.
115. Bradlow & Schlemmer-Schulte, ZaöRV, supra, fn. 52, p. 415.
116. Coller & Lowe, The Settlement of Disputes in International Law (1999), 121;
117. Boisson de Chazournez, supra, fn. 3, p. 154.
118. Hey, "The World Bank Inspection Panel: Towards the Recognition of a New Legally Relevant Relationship in International Law", 2 Hofstra Law and Policy Symposium (1997), p. 72.
119. Van Hoof & de Vey Mestdagh, "Mechanisms of International Supervision", in: van Dijk (ed.), Supervisory Mechanisms in International Economic Organisations (1984), p. 22.
120. Shihata, supra, fn. 2, p. 36.
121. Wellens, supra, fn. 7, p. 186.
122. C. Amerasinghe, Jurisdiction of International Tribunals (2003), pp. 245-314.
123. Schlemmer-Schulte, ZaöRV, supra, fn. 15, p. 360.
124. Bradlow, supra, fn. 31, p. 583.
125. H. Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court (1958), pp. 246, 248.
126. Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law (1989), pp. 140-141.