The influence of presidential heads of state on government formation in European democracies: Empirical evidence

European Journal of Political Research

Volumn 48, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 543-572

  Kang, Shin Goo ^a  

^a Korea University   (South Korea)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 66149167210     PISSN: 03044130     EISSN: 14756765     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2009.00840.x     Document Type: Article

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