Anti-inquisitorialism

Harvard Law Review

Volumn 122, Issue 6, 2009, Pages 1634-1704

  Sklansky, David Alan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

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EID: 66149093046     PISSN: 0017811X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (591)

1. William E. Connolly, The Challenge to Pluralist Theory, in THE BIAS OF PLURALISM 3, 22-24 (William E. Connolly ed., 1969).
2. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 189 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
3. see also id. at 183.
4. Id. at 181 n. 2 (majority opinion).
5. See id.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
7. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
8. 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
9. 541 U.S. at 50.
10. Id. at 68.
11. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
12. Id. at 313.
13. Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
14. 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006).
15. Id. at 2686.
16. Id.
17. For similar views about procedural default and the adversary system, see, for example, Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 385-86 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
18. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 325 (1999) (alteration in original) (quoting Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961)).
19. See, e.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964);
20. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49. 54-55 U949) (plurality opinion);
21. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596-97 (1896).
22. See, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 476-77 (1976);
23. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 729 n. 22 (1961);
24. United States v. Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d 141, 190 (D. Mass. 1999), rev'd in part sub nom.
25. United States v. Flemmi, 225 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2000).
26. See, e.g., In re United States, 503 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2007).
27. See, e.g., Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 282 (1989);
28. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268-69 (1948);
29. State v. Costello, 646 N.W.2d 204, 208 (Minn. 2002).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 308 (1973).
31. See, e.g., LLOYD L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE (1977);
32. John H. Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It, 78 MICH. L. REV. 204 (1979);
33. John H. Langbein & Lloyd L. Weinreb, Continental Criminal Procedure: "Myth" and Reality, 87 YALE L.J. 1549 (1978);
34. Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative View, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199 (2006).
35. Cf., e.g., William T. Pizzi, Sentencing in the US: An Inquisitorial Soul in an Adversarial Body, in CRIME, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 65, 66 (John Jackson, Máximo Langer & Peter Tillers eds., 2008) (noting "a fundamental tenet of the belief system of American lawyers and judges that our trial system is strongly adversarial and that such a system is to be preferred over Continental systems, which are often referred to as 'inquisitorial', with some disparagement sometimes intended").
36. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2278 & n. 5 (2006);
37. see, e.g., Roger C. Park, Is Confrontation the Bottom Line?, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 459, 460-61 (2007).
38. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
39. See id. at 56 n. 7.
40. Id. at 62.
41. Id. at 50;
42. accord Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2278.
43. E.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961);
44. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1949) (plurality opinion).
45. See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004).
46. See, e.g., STEFAN TRECHSEL, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 10 (2005) (characterizing "the 'continental' legal tradition" in criminal procedure as "close to the inquisitorial model").
47. See, e.g., MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 4 n. 4 (1986);
48. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 137 (1969);
49. John D. Jackson, The Effect of Human Rights on Criminal Evidentiary Processes: Towards Convergence, Divergence or Realignment?, 68 MOD. L. REV. 737, 741 (2005);
50. J.F. Nijboer, Common Law Tradition in Evidence Scholarship Observed from a Continental Perspective, 41 AM. J. COMP. L. 299, 308, 334-35 (1993). On the recent spread of "mixed" systems to Latin America, see Máximo Langer, Revolution in Latin American Criminal Procedure: Diffusion of Legal Ideas from the Periphery, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 617 (2007).
51. See, e.g., MERRYMAN, supra note 32, at 15-19, 132, 136-39;
52. SARAH J. SUMMERS, FAIR TRIALS: THE EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURAL TRADITION AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 21-59 (2007);
53. Diane Marie Amann, Harmonic Convergence? Constitutional Criminal Procedure in an International Context, 75 IND. L.J. 809, 818-20, 870 (2000);
54. Langer, supra note 32, at 627-28.
55. Nijboer, supra note 32, at 303 (emphasis omitted).
56. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2269, 2686 (2006).
57. See sources cited supra note 22.
58. Cf, e.g., Mireille Hildebrandt, The Trial of the Expert: EApreuve and Preuve, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 78, 95 n. 31 (2007). For a variation on this distinction, see Abraham S. Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American Criminal Procedure, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1016-17 (1974).
59. SUMMERS, supra note 33, at 11.
60. Kim Lane Scheppele, Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case for Studying Cross-Constitutional Influence Through Negative Models, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 296 (2003);
61. see also VICKI C. JACKSON, C ONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA(forthcoming 2009) (manuscript, ch. 1, at 17-18, 45, on file with the author) (discussing the development of "autochthonous constitutional law" through the "use of foreign law as a negative precedent").
62. See, e.g., SUMMERS, supra note 33, at 13.
63. Carlos F. Rosenkrantz, Against Borrowings and Other Nonauthoritative Uses of Foreign Law, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 269, 290 (2003). For a more measured endorsement, see Scheppele, supra note 39.
64. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
65. See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1998).
66. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
67. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015 (1988) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)) (internal quotation mark omitted);
68. accord, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011, 1022 (1998);
69. Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An Alternative History, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 77, 77 (1995);
70. Penny J. White, Rescuing the Confrontation Clause, 54 S.C. L. REV. 537, 540 n. 3 (2003).
71. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 13-16 (2003) (quoting SIR THOMAS SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM 114 (Mary Dewar ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1982) (1583)). On confrontation in Continental criminal trials, see DAMAŠKA, supra note 32, at 137 & n. 71;
72. and WEINREB, supra note 22, at 111.
73. 380 U.S. 400.
74. See id. at 407.
75. 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1395, at 94 (2d ed. 1923). Wigmore explained that "[t]he opponent demands confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross-examination, which cannot be had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining of immediate answers."
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678-79 (1986);
78. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 19-20 (1985);
79. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974). Regarding Wigmore's influence on the law of confrontation, see, for example, SUMMERS, supra note 33, at 52 & n. 152;
80. and Howard W. Gutman, Academic Determinism: The Division of the Bill of Rights, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 295, 332-43 (1981).
81. 3 WIGMORE, supra note 49, § 1367, at 27;
82. see, also id. at 29 (quoting with approval JEREMY BENTHAM0, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (1827)).
83. Id. at 27.
84. Id. § 1395, at 95.
85. Id. at 97.
86. Id. § 1396, at 97.
87. Id. § 1395, at 96.
88. Id. at 94.
89. Id. at 97.
90. Id. at 96 n. 2.
91. Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 132 (1968) (quoting Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692 (1931)).
92. See, e.g., Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 282 n. 6 (1989);
93. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988).
94. In 1990, a bare majority of the Court held that the defendant's right to be in the same room with a witness testifying against him may be sacrificed, and the witness may testify from another room by closed-circuit television, when such a procedure is "necessary to further an important public policy" and "the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured." Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990).
95. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result) (suggesting that "[i]f one were to translate the Confrontation Clause into language in more common use today, it would read: 'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be present and to cross-examine the witnesses against him.'").
96. 3 WIGMORE, supra note 49, § 1397, at 101. Lest there be any confusion, Wigmore reiterated the point: The Constitution does not prescribe what kinds of testimonial statements (dying declarations, or the like) shall be given infra-judicially, - this depends on the law of Evidence for the time being, - but only what mode of procedure shall be followed - i.e. a cross-examining procedure - in the case of such testimony as is required by the ordinary law of Evidence to be given infra-judicially.
97. Id.
98. See Dutton, 400 U.S. at 94 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result).
99. For a survey of pre-Crawford cases, see White, supra note 45, at 555-91.
100. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970);
101. see also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
102. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 86 (plurality opinion);
103. see also Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
104. See, e.g., CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE 414-16 (1957);
105. Allen D. Boyer, The Trial of Sir Walter Ralegh: The Law of Treason, the Trial of Treason and the Origins of the Confrontation Clause, 74 MISS. LJ. 869, 888-94 (2005).
106. See, e.g., Green, 399 U.S. at 157 n. 10;
107. FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 104-06 (1951);
108. Boyer, supra note 69, at 895-901;
109. Jonakait, supra note 45, at 81 n. 18. For a skeptical assessment of this received understanding, see Kenneth W. Graham Jr., The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 100 & n. 4 (1972).
110. See, e.g., Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63.
111. Id.
112. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).
113. 448 U.S. 56.
114. Id. at 65.
115. Id. at 66. Roberts also suggested that when a prosecution witness was available to testify in court, the Confrontation Clause "normally" called for the exclusion of the witness's out-of-court statements even in the face of "indicia of reliability."
116. See id. But the Court made clear that "[a] demonstration of unavailability ⋯ is not always required,"
117. id. at 65 n. 7, and the constraint later fell by the wayside, applying only to statements admitted under hearsay exceptions that themselves required a showing of unavailability, see White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355-56 (1992);
118. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986);
119. Robert P. Mosteller, Confrontation As Constitutional Criminal Procedure: Crawford's Birth Did Not Require That Roberts Had To Die, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 685, 694 & n. 28 (2007).
120. See White, 502 U.S. at 355 n. 8.
121. The only exceptions the Court ever found not to qualify were the catchall provisions in the Federal Rules of Evidence and most state evidence codes for statements "not specifically covered" by other exceptions "but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness." Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 812 (1990) (quoting IDAHO R. EVID. 803(24)). The Court reasoned that "ad hoc" assessments of reliability did not deserve the weight given to "longstanding judicial and legislative experience" in evaluating particular categories of extrajudicial statements.
122. Id. at 817. Statements admitted under the catchall exceptions could still survive a Confrontation Clause challenge, but only if they had "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness," which the Court interpreted not to include corroboration.
123. Id. at 822 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66) (internal quotation marks omitted). "To be admissible under the Confrontation Clause," the Court explained, "hearsay evidence used to convict a defendant must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to other evidence at trial."
124. Id.
125. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 40 (2004) (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66) (internal quotation marks omitted).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 41;
128. see also id. at 38-42.
129. Id. at 67;
130. see also id. at 68.
131. Id. at 68-69.
132. See id. at 53-54, 68.
133. Id. at 62.
134. See id. at 56 n. 6 (suggesting that if "an exception for testimonial dying declarations ⋯ must be accepted on historical grounds, it is sui generis").
135. See Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
136. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 & n. 10.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 61 (internal quotation marks omitted).
139. Id. at 67-68.
140. Regarding similar efforts in Fourth Amendment cases, see David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739 (2000).
141. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 68.
144. Id. at 50 (emphasis added).
145. Id. at 43.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 44.
148. See id. at 43-44.
149. See id. at 44-50.
150. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2274 (2006).
151. Id. at 2273-74. Davis said nothing about statements not made in response to law enforcement questioning, other than to disavow any suggestion that they were "necessarily nontestimonial."
152. Id. at 2274 n. 1.
153. See id. at 2271.
154. See id.
155. Id. at 2276 (emphasis omitted).
156. Id. at 2276-77.
157. 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
158. Id. at 2272.
159. Id. at 2278.
160. Id. at 2281 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
161. Id. at 2279 n. 5 (majority opinion).
162. Id. at 2278 (alteration in original).
163. Id. at 2279 n. 5.
164. 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
165. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43.
166. Id. at 50.
167. Sarah J. Summers, The Right to Confrontation After Crawford v. Washington: A "Continental European" Perspective, 2 INT'L COMMENT. ON EVIDENCE, Issue 1, art. 3, 2004, at 1.
168. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.
169. Id. at 61.
170. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). Heller also struck down the District of Columbia's law requiring that any firearms in the home be kept inoperable.
171. Id. at 2790-2807.
172. Id. at 2818.
173. Id. at 2817.
174. Id. at 2818.
175. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed ⋯." U.S. CONST, amend. VI.
176. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
177. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (citing Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156);
178. accord Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 229 (1978).
179. Williams, 399 U.S. at 100;
180. accord Ballew, 435 U.S. at 230.
181. See Williams, 399 U.S. at 102-03.
182. See Ballew, 435 U.S. at 239-45. The Court conceded it could discern no "clear line between six members and five."
183. Id. at 239. But it took note of accumulating social science research raising "substantial doubt about the reliability and appropriate representation of panels smaller than six," and concluded that "[b]ecause of the fundamental importance of the jury trial to the American system of criminal justice, any further reduction that promotes inaccurate and possibly biased decisionmaking, that causes untoward differences in verdicts, and that prevents juries from truly representing their communities, attains constitutional significance."
184. Id.
185. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004);
186. see also Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2692 (2008) (reasoning that the Confrontation Clause permits a defendant to be convicted only on "the basis of evidence the Constitution deems reliable and admissible").
187. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
188. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017 (1988) (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965));
189. accord Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 847 (1990).
190. See Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2692;
191. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
192. Park, supra note 24, at 466.
193. See id. at 459, 467.
194. See id. at 459-62;
195. see also, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2278 n. 5 (2006) (stating that "formality is indeed essential to testimonial utterance");
196. id. at 2276-77 (indicating that recorded statements are more formal and hence more likely to be testimonial). Professor Park notes: Under the formality-is-bad approach, every effort to improve the accuracy of [a] recording [of a declarant who inculpates the defendant] or to test the declarant's story would only make the evidence more likely to be excluded, until a line is crossed and the formalities become powerful enough to be deemed "confrontation." Park, supra note 24, at 461;
197. see also Thomas D. Lyon & Raymond LaMagna, The History of Children's Hearsay: From Old Bailey to Post-Davis, 82 IND. L.J. 1029, 1055-56 (2007).
198. Park, supra note 24, at 460.
199. But see Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2278 (stressing that Amy Hammon's statement implicating her husband shared "[w]hat we called the 'striking resemblance' of the Crawford statement to civillaw ex parte examinations" (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52)).
200. Summers, supra note 117, at 1.
201. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
202. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
203. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 321 (2004) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
204. See, e.g., Pizzi, supra note 23, at 74-76.
205. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
206. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Conceptualizing Booker, 38 ARIZ. St. LJ. 387, 410 (2006);
207. Kate Stith, The Are of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 17 YALE LJ. 1420, 1481-82, 1484, 1494-95 (2008). In subsequent cases extending and applying Booker, "the discretionary license given to district courts" was made even clearer, and "the jury ⋯ pretty much dropped out of the picture." Daniel Richman, Federal Sentencing in 2007: The Supreme Court Holds - The Center Doesn't, 117 YALE LJ. 1374, 1376 (2008) (discussing Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007);
208. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007);
209. Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007)).
210. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 306-07.
211. Id. at 313.
212. See, e.g., Ronald F. Wright, Rules for Sentencing Revolutions, 108 YALE L.J. 13SS, 1372 n-73 (1999) (book review) (suggesting that "[a] lawyer from the civil law tradition, with its emphasis on the limited role of judges as interpreters of the law, would find this view of the sentencing judge very puzzling"). But cf. Pizzi, supra note 23, at 66, 69-71, 75-78 (arguing that American sentencing procedures are "strongly inquisitorial," because they are controlled by the judge rather than by the parties).
213. See KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING 12-13 (1998);
214. JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE 53-56, 71-74 (2003);
215. Richard S. Frase, Comparative Perspectives on Sentencing Policy and Research, in SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 259, 272-73 (Michael Tonry & Richard S. Frase eds., 2001);
216. Constantijn Kelk, Laurence Koffman & Jos Silvis, Sentencing Practice, Policy, and Discretion, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN EUROPE 319, 324-27 (Phil Fennel et al. eds., 1995).
217. See, e.g., WHITMAN, supra note 150, at 50-51.
218. See id. at 73-74.
219. Kate Stith suggests that the mandatory sentencing rules invalidated in Blakely and Booker were "inquisitorial" rather than "adversarial" because they contemplated that the sentencing judge, with the help of the probation officer, would carry out an independent inquiry into the appropriate sentence, rather than relying on the facts and arguments put forward by the parties. See Stith, supra note 146, at 1436-39. But sentencing judges have always had this power, and they retain it today. All that Blakely and Booker prohibited was legislative or administrative rules prescribing the consequences that sentencing judges must attach to the facts that they find. The federal sentencing scheme struck down in Booker might be thought to have heightened the "inquisitorial" nature of sentencing by requiring "real offense" sentencing - that is, requiring judges to sentence based on the actual facts, rather than the facts reflected in the charges or the facts agreed to by the parties. But in practice, as Professor Stith points out, sentencing judges generally accepted any facts about which the parties stipulated.
220. See id. at 1450-51.
221. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004).
222. Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2682 (2008).
223. Id. at 2683-86.
224. Id. at 2696-97 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 2686 (majority opinion).
226. Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004)). Justice Scalia expanded on this point in a later portion of his opinion, joined only by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito: it was "repugnant to our constitutional system of trial by jury" to suggest "murder defendants whom the judge considers guilty (after less than a full trial, mind you, and of course before the jury has pronounced guilt) should be deprived of fair-trial rights, lest they benefit from their judge-determined wrong."
227. Id. at 2691 (opinion of Scalia, J.). "[I]t is most certainly not the norm," Justice Scalia continued, "that trial rights can be 'forfeited' on the basis of a prior judicial determination of guilt⋯. [A] legislature may not 'punish' a defendant for his evil acts by stripping him of the right to have his guilt in a criminal proceeding determined by a jury, and on the basis of evidence the Constitution deems reliable and admissible."
228. Id. at 2692.
229. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 89-144, 161-78 (1997).
230. See, e.g., MERRYMAN, supra note 32, at 138-39;
231. John D. Jackson & Nikolay P. Kovalev, Lay Adjudication and Human Rights in Europe, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 83 (2006).
232. See, e.g., SUMMERS, supra note 33, at 47-58, 137-39;
233. TRECHSEL, supra note 31, at 291-326;
234. Friedman, supra note 45, at 1031 n. 96;
235. supra note 46 and accompanying text.
236. See sources cited supra notes 125-130 and accompanying text.
237. See Steven Arrigg Koh, Note, "Respectful Consideration" After Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon: Why the Supreme Court Owes More to the International Court of Justice, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 243, 252 n. 63 (2007).
238. Vienna Convention, supra note 12, art. 36(2).
239. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487. On the ICJ, see, for example, Mark L. Movsesian, Judging International Judgments, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 65, 73-76 (2007).
240. See Movsesian, supra note 166, at 76-81;
241. Koh, supra note 164, at 252-55.
242. See LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27);
243. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31).
244. See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 497-98;
245. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 57.
246. Edward T. Swaine, Taking Care of Treaties, 108 COI.UM. L. REV. 331, 338 (2008) (quoting Memorandum from President George W. Bush to Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Att'y Gen. (Feb. 28, 2005)).
247. See Movsesian, supra note 166, at 80-81.
248. See Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
249. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2675-77 (2006).
250. See id. at 2678-82. The Court assumed without deciding that the Vienna Convention gave rights to individual criminal defendants, not just to their home countries.
251. See id. at 2677-78.
252. See id. at 2684 (quoting Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 59, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1062, 3 Bevans 1179, 1190);
253. accord id. at 2700 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
254. Compare, e.g., Brief of International Court of Justice Experts as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006) (Nos. 04-10566, 05-51), 2005 WL 3597806, with Brief of Professors of International Law, Federal Jurisdiction and the Foreign Relations Law of the United States as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006) (Nos. 04-10566, 05-51), 2006 WL 259988.
255. See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2690 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
256. Id. at 2687 (majority opinion).
257. Id. at 2685 (quoting Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (per curiam)).
258. Id.
259. Id. at 2686 n. 6 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991)).
260. Id at 2686.
261. Id.
262. Id. (omission in original) (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 n. 2 (1991)).
263. On the broader debate, see, for example, JACKSON, supra note 39;
264. Roger P. Alford, Four Mistakes in the Debate on "Outsourcing Authority" 69 ALB. L. REV. 653, 661 n. 49 (2006);
265. Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court, the Law of Nations, and Citations of Foreign Law: The Lessons of History, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1335 (2007);
266. Timothy K. Kuhner, The Foreign Source Doctrine: Explaining the Role of Foreign and International Law in Interpreting the Constitution, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1389 (2007);
267. Osmar J. Benvenuto, Note, Reevaluating the Debate Surrounding the Supreme Court's Use of Foreign Precedent, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2695 (2006).
268. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (disparaging the Court's discussion of foreign views as "meaningless" but "[d]angerous dicta");
269. Foster v. Florida, S37 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (arguing that the Court "should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans");
270. Farber, supra note 185, at 1343-44. At his confirmation hearing, Chief Justice Roberts explained that he was "concern[ed] ⋯ about the use of foreign law as precedent," not only because of "democratic theory" but also because of indeterminacy: "In foreign law you can find anything you want. If you don't find it in the decisions of France or Italy, it's in the decisions of Somalia or Japan or Indonesia or whatever. ⋯ It allows the judge to incorporate his or her own personal preferences, [and] cloak them with the authority of precedent ⋯." Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 200-01 (2005) (statement of Judge John G. Roberts, Jr.).
271. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596 (1896).
272. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936).
273. See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 582 (1961) (plurality opinion);
274. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961);
275. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 152 n. 8 (1944).
276. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964);
277. accord United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 690 (1998);
278. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 692 (1993);
279. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 595 n. 8 (1990);
280. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 212-13 (1988);
281. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 476 n. 8 (1976);
282. Michigan v. Tucker 417 U.S. 433, 455 n. 2 (1974) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment);
283. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973);
284. Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 566 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
285. Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 414 n. 12 (1966).
286. Ashcraft, 322 U.S. at 152 n. 8 (emphasis added).
287. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. at 287 (emphasis added).
288. 338 U.S. 49 (1949).
289. Id. at 54 (plurality opinion).
290. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
291. Id. at 477.
292. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 237-38 (1940);
293. see also, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 152 n. 8 (1944);
294. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. at 287.
295. Watts, 338 U.S. at 54 (plurality opinion);
296. see also, e.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961)
297. 338 U.S. at 55 (plurality opinion);
298. see also Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 582 n. 24 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.) (plurality opinion) (noting "the careful procedural safeguards which the inquisitorial system now maintains," and pointing out that "the continental countries which employ inquisitorial modes of criminal procedure have themselves long ago given up reliance upon the tortures which they once used to wring incriminating information out of the accused and which were a salient feature of the inquisitorial system at the time that the English definitely rejected it in the seventeenth century").
299. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
300. Id. at 488.
301. Id. at 488-89 (footnotes omitted).
302. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986);
303. accord, e.g., Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 172 (2001);
304. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 (1991).
305. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964);
306. see also cases cited supra note 190. But cf. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 181 n. 2 (taking the view that "[o]ur system of justice is, and has always been, an inquisitorial one at the investigatory stage" and that "no other disposition is conceivable").
307. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 189 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Burbine, 475 U.S. at 468 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). For similar sentiments, see Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 296-97 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting);
308. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 454-55 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment);
309. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 194 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
310. 501 U.S. 171.
311. Id. at 181 n. 2.
312. See case cited supra note 184 and accompanying text.
313. On varieties of originalism, see, for example, Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989).
314. See, e.g., Sklansky, supra note 91, at 1757-61.
315. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 10, 13 (1969) (quoting JOHN ADAMS, NOVANGLUS (1774),
316. reprinted in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 3, 131 (1851)).
317. 5 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 177 (2d ed., rev. 1937).
318. Id. at 170.
319. 1 Sir JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND X (1883).
320. See Farber, supra note 209, at 1086;
321. Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk (Dec. 30, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
322. Letters from the Federal Farmer, Letter VIII (Jan. 3, 1788),
323. reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI- FEDERALIST 270,271 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
324. Letters from the Federal Farmer, Letter XV, (Jan. 18, 1788),
325. reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI- FEDERALIST, supra note 216, at 315, 320.
326. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
327. The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents (Dec. 18, 1787),
328. reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI- FEDERALIST, supra note 216, at 145, 159;
329. see also Essays of Brutus, Essay XIV (Feb. 28, 1788, and Mar. 6, 1788),
330. reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI- FEDERALIST, supra note 216, at 431, 431-35.
331. See Letters from the Federal Farmer, Letter XV (Jan. 18, 1788),
332. reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI- FEDERALIST, supra note 216, at 315, 319-20.
333. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 487-90 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
334. Id. at 488-89.
335. Id. at 489.
336. Id. at 488.
337. Abraham Holmes and Christopher Gore on the Possible Abuses of the Federal Judiciary (Jan. 30, 1788),
338. reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 910, 910-11 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993).
339. Id. at 911.
340. Roger W. Kirst, Does Crawford Provide a Stable Foundation for Confrontation Doctrine?, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 35,79 (2005).
341. Edmund Burke, Speech in Support of Resolutions for Conciliation with the American Colonies, in ON THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 70, 85 (Elliott Robert Barkan ed., 1966);
342. see Sklansky, supra note 91, at 1776 & n. 228;
343. cf. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 206 n.n (1980).
344. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
345. WOOD, supra note 211, at 9-10;
346. Harry W. Jones, The Common Law in the United States: English Themes and American Variations, in POLITICAL SEPARATION AND LEGAL CONTINUITY 91, no (Harry W. Jones ed., 1976);
347. Sklansky, supra note 91, at 1787.
348. Kirst, supra note 227, at 82.
349. Frank Lovett, A Positivist Account of the Rule of Law, 27 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 41, 66 (2002);
350. see also, e.g., Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the "Rule of Law," 101 MICH. L. REV. 2275, 2284 n. 43 (2003) (suggesting that "[t]o most in the foreign-policy community, the rule of law ⋯ involves laws that comport with basic notions of human rights," as well as "statutes, rules known in advance, courts, [a] politically independent judiciary with powers of judicial review, etc."). Lovett, it should be noted, argues that the institutional requirements for the rule of law are contingent on circumstances: "While securing the Rule of Law might be impossible as a practical matter without an independent judiciary, universal access to courts, and so on, the Rule of Law is not identical with having these institutions." Lovett, supra, at 66-67.
351. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L. REV. 929, 934 (1965);
352. Louis Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74, 77-78 (1963).
353. See AMAR, supra note 43, at 137-307;
354. MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986);
355. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 257-59 (1988);
356. Daniel A. Farber & John E. Muench, The Ideological Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 CONST. COMMENT. 235, 274 (1984). But see James E. Bond, The Original Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in Illinois, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, 18 AKRON L. REV. 435 (1985)
357. For a recent, illustrative example, see Virginia v. Moore, 128 S. Ct. 1598 (2008).
358. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
359. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
360. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 43, at 181-206;
361. CURTIS, supra note 233.
362. FONER, supra note 233, at 203.
363. See sources cited supra note 233.
364. See Farber & Muench, supra note 233, at 277.
365. FONER, supra note 233, at 258;
366. see also, e.g., Farber & Muench, supra note 233, at 274-75.
367. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985)
368. See Farber & Muench, supra note 233, at 257-58.
369. Id. at 277.
370. Id. at 275.
371. There is a variant of the originalist argument worth considering in passing. Originalism is often defended as a necessary constraint on judicial lawmaking. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of the United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 40-47 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). So even someone agnostic about the actual intentions and understandings of the Constitution's framers and adopters might worry that criminal procedure without the contrast model of inquisitorialism would be too open-ended, too arbitrary, too much the product of the Justices' personal preferences. But that is an argument for retaining some constraint, not necessarily anti-inquisitorialism. There are more appealing candidates.
372. See infra Part III, pp. 1688-1703. The problem with using the inquisitorial contrast model to constrain judicial lawmaking is not just that the contrast model points us in the wrong directions, but that the guidance it provides is fuzzy; it points us in too many directions at once.
373. See infra pp. 1680-82.
374. 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 35-54 (1973);
375. see also Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the Limits of Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 St. JOHN'S L. REV. 1149, 1194-1202 (1998);
376. Mark F. Grady, Positive Theories and Grown Order Conceptions of the Law, 23 Sw. U. L. Rev. 461, 461 (1994)
377. 248 Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948). The Court was referring specifically to rules governing the use of character evidence, but similar arguments have been made from time to time for the entire system of evidence law. For example, Frederick Schauer argues that we may be best off keeping pretty much all of our current evidence rules, "warts and all": The very existence of the full set of evidence rules we happen to possess breeds a familiarity that increases understanding, and has developed in such a way over time that the common law process has served to remove many of the most obvious defects⋯. [T]he mistakes embedded in a distinctly non-ideal set of rules may turn out to be less than the mistakes that would come from empowering some non-ideal group of rule makers to start anew, or from expecting some nonideal group of rule appliers to apply an array of newer rules with which they are much less familiar.
378. Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 165, 194-95 (2006).
379. Allen & Rosenberg, supra note 247, at 1161;
380. see also id. at 1197-98 ("Made orders usually possess a limited number of variables, and thus those variables may be manipulated in order to produce predictable outcomes⋯. Unintended, unanticipated consequences are much more likely to result from the introduction of change into a spontaneous order than a made order").
381. Id. at 1200.
382. Mirjan Damaška, The Uncertain Fate of Evidentiary Transplants: Anglo-American and Continental Experiments, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 839, 839 (1997).
383. Id. at 851.
384. Id. at 839-40, 851-52 (footnote omitted).
385. Elisabetta Grande, Italian Criminal Justice: Borrowing and Resistance, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 227, 251 (2000).
386. Id. at 232.
387. Máximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 5 (2004).
388. Id.
389. Id.;
390. see also, e.g., Jackson, supra note 32, at 738 (noting the "growing scepticism in much recent comparative scholarship about the effects of 'transplanting' processes and procedures from one national and legal culture into another").
391. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937);
392. see also, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 54 (1947).
393. E.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952);
394. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28-29 (1949);
395. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
396. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 582 n. 24 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.) (plurality opinion).
397. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 55 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.) (plurality opinion).
398. Id.
399. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n. 14 (1968).
400. Id. (emphasis added);
401. accord, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969).
402. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 372 n. 9 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
403. See, e.g., McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 183, 189 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
404. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 468 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
405. See Watts, 338 U.S. at 55 (plurality opinion).
406. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 181 n. 2.
407. Id.
408. See Watts, 338 U.S. at 55 (plurality opinion).
409. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004);
410. accord Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2278 (2006).
411. E.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961).
412. E.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004);
413. see supra p. 1658.
414. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2685-86 (2006).
415. See MERRYMAN, supra note 32, at 15-19, 132, 136-39;
416. SUMMERS, supra note 33, at 21-59.
417. See Langer, supra note 32.
418. Jackson, supra note 32, at 738;
419. cf., e.g., DAMAŠKA, supra note 32, at 4 n. 4;
420. MERRYMAN, supra note 32;
421. Langer, supra note 32;
422. Nijboer, supra note 32, at 308, 334.
423. See, e.g., McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 n. 2 (1991);
424. United States v. John Doe, Inc. I, 481 U.S. 102, 118-19, 123 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919));
425. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 497-98 (1964) (White, J., dissenting);
426. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 262, 264 (1948).
427. Cf., e.g., Amann, supra note 33, at 832-33. See generally Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 290-98 (1997);
428. Gordon Slynn, The Development of Human Rights in the United Kingdom, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 477 (2005).
429. See International Court of Justice, The Court: Current Members, http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?pi = i&p2 = 2&p3=i (last visited Mar. 7, 2009).
430. See DAMAŠKA, supra note 32, at 69, 97-146.
431. Langer, supra note 256, at 20 (emphases omitted);
432. see also Jackson, supra note 32, at 742.
433. See generally DAMAŠKA, supra note 32, at 147-80.
434. See Jackson, supra note 32, at 745;
435. Langer, supra note 256, at 24-26.
436. See generally DAMAŠKA, supra note 32, at 16-46.
437. See DAMAŠKA, supra note 32, at 5, 9;
438. Jackson, supra note 32, at 741-42;
439. Langer, supra note 256, at 8. On ideal types, see 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 20-21 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Univ. of Cal. Press ed. 1978);
440. and Susan J. Hekman, Weber's Ideal Type: A Contemporary Reassessment, 16 POLITY 119 (1983).
441. See, e.g., John Jackson, Transnational Faces of Justice: Two Attempts to Build Common Standards Beyond National Boundaries, in CRIME, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 221, 224 (John Jackson, Máximo Langer & Peter Tillers eds., 2008). European borrowing of common law trial procedures is not just a thing of the past. Recent constitutional amendments in Italy, for example, have strengthened the requirement of oral proof in criminal trials and significantly restricted the admissibility of out-of-court statements - developments widely viewed as "putting⋯ adversarial protections on a much more secure footing." William T. Pizzi & Mariangela Montagna, The Battle to Establish an Adversarial Trial System in Italy, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 429, 466 (2004);
442. see also Giulio Illuminati, The Frustrated Turn to Adversarial Procedure in Italy (Italian Criminal Procedure Code of 1988), 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 567 (2005). But cf. Michele Panzavolta, Reforms and Counter-Reforms in the Italian Struggle for an Accusatorial Criminal Law System, 30 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 577, 622-23 (2005) (expressing doubt). One sign of the changes is the emergence of an Italian version of anti-inquisitorialism: scholars have begun to criticize procedural innovations they oppose as "reintroduc[ing] the inquisitorial style of criminal procedure from which Italy wanted to depart."
443. Id. at 621.
444. See, e.g., McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 n. 2 (1991);
445. United States v. John Doe, Inc. I, 481 U.S. 102, 118-19, 123 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
446. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 262, 264 (1948);
447. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 280-82 (1919);
448. Goldstein, supra note 37, at 1020;
449. Langer, supra note 256, at 16 n. 58. But cf. Niki Kuckes, The Democratic Prosecutor: Explaining the Constitutional Function of the Federal Grand Jury, 94 GEO. L.J. 1265, 1277 (2006) (arguing that "[i]t is more accurate to say that the grand jury's prosecution-driven secret indictment process is 'pre-adversary' than to call it 'inquisitorial'").
450. See, e.g., Oliver, 333 U.S. at 262;
451. John Thibaut, Laurens Walker & E. Allan Lind, Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal Decisionmaking, 86 HARV. L. REV. 386, 388 n. 7 (1972);
452. Myles Leslie, Book Review, 47 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 359, 362 (2007). But cf. Jerold H. Israel, Cornerstones of the Judicial Process, 2 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 5, 26 n. 97 (1993) (suggesting that "[r]eliance on ⋯ inquisitorial proceedings, such as the coroner's inquest, has ⋯ diminished").
453. See, e.g., Françoise Tulkens, Criminal Procedure: Main Comparable Features of the National Systems, in THE CRIMINAL PROCESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 5, 8 (Mireille Delmas-Marty ed., 1995);
454. Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117 (1998);
455. cf. Langer, supra note 256, at 24 n. 94.
456. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982);
457. see also MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 134-38 (1997);
458. DAMAŠKA, supra note 32, at 237-38;
459. Jackson, supra note 32, at 738. But cf. Máximo Langer, The Rise of Managerial Judging in International Criminal Law, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 835 (2005) (arguing that managerial judging is neither adversarial nor inquisitorial).
460. See, e.g., Amann, supra note 33, at 818-20, 841-45;
461. Jackson, supra note 286, at 236-41.
462. See Amann, supra note 33, at 843 & nn.212-13;
463. Langer, supra note 290.
464. Jackson, supra note 286, at 241-42. The International Criminal Court is off to a rocky start, but that is due more to practices and policies of the office of the prosecutor than to trial procedures. See Heikelina Verrijn Stuart, The ICC in Trouble, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 409 (2008).
465. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221;
466. see also Amann, supra note 33, at 826-27.
467. See, e.g., Amann, supra note 33, at 826-30;
468. Jackson, supra note 286, at 227-35.
469. Amann, supra note 33, at 828-29.
470. See id. at 829-30.
471. See SUMMERS, supra note 33, at 16-17;
472. Amann, supra note 33, at 828-30, 833-34;
473. Mireille Delmas-Marty, Toward a European Model of the Criminal Trial, in THE CRIMINAL PROCESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 191 (Mireille Delmas-Marty ed., 1995);
474. Jackson, supra note 32, at 757-64.
475. It is not even clear that actual ecosystems tend to function this way. See Carl Zimmer, Friendly Invaders, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2008, at Fi.
476. SUMMERS, supra note 33, at 11-13;
477. see also, e.g., Malcolm Feeley, The Adversary System, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM 753 (Robert J. Janosik ed., 1987).
478. See, e.g., SUMMERS, supra note 33, at 40-41. On Voltaire's impression of British laws and customs, see generally IAN BURUMA, ANGLOMANIA 21-49 (1998).
479. See sources cited supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
480. See, e.g., Feeley, supra note 300.
481. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, "First Principles" of Constitutional Criminal Procedure: A Mistake?, 112 HARV. L. REV. 680, 689 (1999) (book review).
482. DAMAŠKA, supra note 32, at 88 n. 28;
483. see also, e.g., WEINREB, supra note 22, at 11.
484. WEINREB, supra note 22, at 105-06.
485. See, e.g., David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leaving Home: What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L.J. 683, 696 & n. 37 (2006).
486. See, e.g., David A. Sklansky, Quasi-Affirmative Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 88 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1279-81 (2002);
487. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997);
488. Erik Eckholm, Citing Workload, Public Lawyers Reject New Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2008, at A1.
489. See, e.g., PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA 105-06 (1965);
490. Sklansky, supra note 91, at 1787-88, 1790.
491. See supra pp. 1646-47.
492. JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY 119, 134 (2005).
493. Professor Rubenfeld argues that "it just so happens that there were [core, actuating applications] for just about every one of the Constitution's most important rights and powers."
494. Id. at 119. But he also suggests that the paradigmatic cases can be created by tradition, not just as a matter of original understanding; indeed, he argues that new paradigm cases emerge subsequent to enactment.
495. See id. at 120-22.
496. See Park, supra note 24, at 460.
497. See sources cited supra note 46 and accompanying text.
498. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
499. See id. at 56 n. 7.
500. See, e.g., Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017 (1988) ("[T]here is something deep in human nature that regards face-to-face confrontation between accused and accuser as 'essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution.'" (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965))).
501. Summers, supra note 117, at 1.
502. P.S. v. Germany, App. No. 33900/96, para. 21 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 20, 2001), http://www.echr.coe.int; accord, e.g., Kostovski v. Netherlands, App. No. 1145/85, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 434, 447, para. 41 (1989). For helpful overviews of the case law, see TRECHSEL, supra note 31, at 291-326;
503. Roger W. Kirst, Hearsay and the Right of Confrontation in the European Court of Human Rights, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 777 (2003);
504. Summers, supra note 117.
505. See SUMMERS, supra note 33, at xix; Summers, supra note 117, at 4-5.
506. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 6, § 3(d), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
507. Id. art. 6, § 1.
508. See Saidi v. France, App. No. 14647/89, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 251, 270, para. 44 (1993).
509. See Saidi, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 268, para. 44;
510. Kostovski, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 447, para. 38.
511. See PS. v. Germany, App. No. 33900/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 20, 2001), http://www.echr. coe.int; A.M. v. Italy, 1999-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 45.
512. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, The Confrontation Right Across the Systemic Divide, in CRIME, PROCEDURE, AND EVIDENCE IN A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 261, 269 (John Jackson, Máximo Langer & Peter Tillers eds., 2008).
513. But see Windisch v. Austria, App. No. 12489/86, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 281, 286, para. 23 (1990) ("Although the two unidentified persons did not give direct evidence in court, they are to be regarded ⋯ as witnesses ⋯ since their statements, as reported by the police officers, were in fact before the Regional Court, which took them into consideration.").
514. E.g., Kostovski, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 447, para. 39.
515. Id. at 449, para. 44 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted);
516. see Summers, supra note 117, at 6.
517. See Summers, supra note 117, at 13.
518. See Friedman, supra note 326, at 268.
519. The Supreme Court assumed without deciding in Giles that the victim's statements to the police three weeks before her death, reporting that the defendant had attacked and threatened her, were "testimonial." The State of California did not contend otherwise. See 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2682 (2008).
520. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 326, at 269 (noting that the ECHR sometimes treats the "unavailability of the witness through the fault of neither party" as "enough to excuse the absence of an opportunity for confrontation");
521. cf. Ferrantelli & Santangelo v. Italy, App. No. 19874/92, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 288, 309, para. 52 (1996) (finding no error in introduction of accomplice's confession against defendants, in part because the confession was corroborated, and in part because "the judicial authorities ⋯ cannot be held responsible for" the accomplice's death before the defendants' trial).
522. The United Kingdom, for example, no longer bars evidence of hearsay statements made by witnesses who die before a criminal trial or otherwise become unavailable to testify. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 116 (U.K.);
523. Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act, 1995, c. 20, § 17 (U.K.). Recent constitutional amendments in Italy significantly restrict the admissibility of out-of-court statements, but they do not apply when "examination of the witness is impossible for objective reasons independent of the parties' will." Panzavolta, supra note 286, at 611-12;
524. see also, e.g., Pizzi & Montagna, supra note 286, at 462.
525. On the controversy surrounding this question in the United States after Crawford and Davis, see Carolyn Zabrycki, Comment, Toward a Definition of "Testimonial": How Autopsy Reports Do Not Embody the Qualities of a Testimonial Statement, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1093 (2008). A case currently pending before the Supreme Court raises the related question whether a forensic chemist's laboratory report is " testimonial" for purposes of the Confrontation Clause.
526. See Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, No. 05-P-1213, 2007 WL 2189152 (Mass. App. Ct. July 31, 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1647 (2008).
527. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004).
528. Id.
529. WHITMAN, supra note 150, at 50.
530. See, e.g., id. at 117-19.
531. See, e.g., MERRYMAN, supra note 32, at 15-19, 132, 136-39;
532. Langer, supra note 32, at 627. On the use of lay adjudicators in Europe today, see Jackson & Kovalev, supra note 161.
533. MERRYMAN, supra note 32, at 38. See generally Mary Ann Glendon, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 246, at 95.
534. See sources cited supra note 150 and accompanying text.
535. Scalia, supra note 246, at 7.
536. Id. at 13.
537. Id. at 3-14.
538. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2686 (2006);
539. see also id. at 2685.
540. Id. at 2686 n. 6 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
541. Vienna Convention, supra note 12, art. 36, ¶ 2;
542. see also Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 56-57 (Mar. 31);
543. LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 497-98 June 27).
544. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2686.
545. Id.
546. Cf. JACKSON, supra note 39 (manuscript, intro., at 25, 32) (arguing generally that "the most appropriate posture" for courts to take toward transnational legal norms "is one of engagement," remaining "open to the possibilities of either harmony or dissonance").
547. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 497-98 (first alteration in original) (quoting Vienna Convention, supra note 12, art. 36, ¶ 2).
548. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2685.
549. See id. at 2687 (citing United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 n. 9 (2004)).
550. Id. (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
551. Id. (citing Wainright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977)).
552. Id.
553. But cf. Osagiede v. United States, 543 F.3d 399, 411 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that, by 2003, reasonably competent criminal defense attorneys representing foreign nationals in Illinois would have known to advise their clients of their Vienna Convention rights).
554. See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2686 n. 6.
555. See generally Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 83 n. 9;
556. Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679 (2007). At least one federal court of appeals has since held that failure to invoke the Vienna Convention can in fact constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
557. See Osagiede, 543 F.3d at 411.
558. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2686 (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 n. 2 (1991)).
559. Id. at 2686 n. 6.
560. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
561. See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2705 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
562. Id. at 2686 (majority opinion).
563. David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1147 (1986).
564. William J. Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and Excuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1228 (1988);
565. see also, e.g., Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Required Records Doctrine: Its Lessons for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 6-10 (1986);
566. William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1024 (1995).
567. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964);
568. see also supra p. 1636.
569. Dolinko, supra note 365, at 1067 n. 24.
570. See supra Part II, pp. 1668-88.
571. If anti-inquisitorialism is used as an argument for the privilege against self-incrimination, and the functionalist argument is used to justify anti-inquisitorialism, then the problem is a kind of circularity, because the functionalist argument for anti-inquisitorialism ultimately amounts to the claim that particular elements of the inquisitorial system - such as compelled self-incrimination - are themselves unjust or undesirable. See supra section II.C, pp. 1685-88. But if the originalist or holistic arguments are invoked for anti-inquisitorialism, then the problem is not circularity; it is simply that the argument is unconvincing.
572. See supra sections II.A-B, pp. 1670-85.
573. See supra notes 32, 33, and 286 and accompanying text.
574. Regarding the privilege against self-incrimination in the European Court of Human Rights - developed, notably, in the absence of any specific mention of the privilege in the European Human Rights Convention - see TRECHSEL, supra note 31, at 340-59.
575. See SUMMERS, supra note 33, at 156-60.
576. See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424 (1986);
577. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 312-14 (1985).
578. See SUMMERS, supra note 33, at 156-63.
579. See supra p. 1668.
580. Charles D. Weisselberg, Terror in the Courts: Beginning To Assess the Impact of Terrorism-Related Prosecutions on Domestic Criminal Law and Procedure in the USA, 50 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 25, 25 (2008) (voicing skepticism).
581. TRECHSEL, supra note 31, at 3;
582. see also, e.g., Amann, supra note 33, at 851-62;
583. Jackson, supra note 32.
584. See, e.g., NORMAN ABRAMS, ANTI- TERRORISM AND CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT 459-505 (3d ed. 2008).
585. See Connolly, supra note 1, at 4-8.
586. See, e.g., FONER, supra note 233;
587. Farber & Muench, supra note 233.
588. See, e.g., BRIAN CHAPMAN, POLICE STATE (1970);
589. Richard Primus, A Brooding Omnipresence: Totalitarianism in Postwar Constitutional Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 423 (1996);
590. Margaret Raymond, Rejecting Totalitarianism: Translating the Guarantees of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1193 (1998). On the use of contrast models of inequality in shaping the democratic ideal, see generally W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, in THE IMPORTANCE OF LANGUAGE 121, 134-36 (Max Black ed., 1962);
591. and Ian Shapiro, Three Ways To Be a Democrat, 22 POL. THEORY 124, 138-39 (1994).