Guaranteeing properties for E-commerce systems

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 2531, Issue , 2002, Pages 253-272

  Guerin, Frank ^a   Pitt, Jeremy ^a  

^a IMPERIAL COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMMERCE; COMPUTATION THEORY; COMPUTER GAMES; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; GAME THEORY;

AGENT SYSTEMS; COMPUTING THEORY; E-COMMERCE SYSTEMS; LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACTS;

INTELLIGENT AGENTS;

EID: 66049152682     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/3-540-36378-5_16     Document Type: Article

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