Chapter 27 Market Design Using Agent-Based Models

Handbook of Computational Economics

Volumn 2, Issue , 2006, Pages 1339-1380

  Marks, Robert ^a  

^a Australian Graduate School of Management   (Australia)

Author keywords

analysis; auctions; design; electricity; learning; market; on line

Indexed keywords

EID: 66049140790     PISSN: 15740021     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0021(05)02027-7     Document Type: Review

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