Germany and the origins of the First World War in the eyes of the American diplomatic establishment

German History

Volumn 15, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 307-332

  Seligmann, Matthew S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 65849209352     PISSN: 02663554     EISSN: 1477089X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (61)

1. Fritz Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht: Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914/18 (Düsseldorf, 1961)
2. Fritz Fischer, Krieg der Illusionen: Die deutsche Politik von 1911 bis 1914 (Düsseldorf, 1969)
3. Gregor Schöllgen, Die Macht in der Mitte Europas: Stationen deutscher Außenpolitik von Friedrich dem Grossen bis zum Gegenwart (Munich, 1992)
4. David Calleo, The German Problem Reconsidered: Germany and the World Order, 1870 to the Present (Cambridge, 1978)
5. Samuel R. Williamson, Jr, Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War (London, 1991)
6. Samuel R. Williamson, Jr, 'The Origins of World War I', Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18 (1988)
7. Graydon A. Tunstall, Planning for War Against Serbia and Russia: Austro-Hungarian and German Military Strategies 1871-1914 (Boulder, Co., 1993)
8. Criticism of the geopolitical interpretation has come from, amongst others, Hans-Ulrich Wehler. See Hans-Ulrich Wehler, 'Renaissance der Geopolitik?' in Preußen ist wider chic ... Politik und Polemik (Frankfurt, 1983)
9. and more recently "Hans-Ulrich Wehler, 'Hart widersprechen und mit dem Unfug stets konfrontieren', Frankfurter Rundschau, 24 September 1992
10. There has also been criticism of the emphasis on Austria-Hungary. See, for example, Fritz Fellner, 'Austria-Hungary', in Keith Wilson (ed.), Decisions for War 1914 (London, 1995)
11. John C. G. Röhl, 'Germany', in Wilson, Decisions for War, Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, 'Germany and the Coming of War', in R. J. W. Evans and Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann (eds.), The Coming of the First World War (Oxford, 1988)
12. Stig Förster, 'Der deutsche Generalstab und die Illusion des kurzen Krieges, 1871-1914. Metakritik eines Mythos', Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 54 (1995), 61-95
13. Holger Afflerbach, Falkenhayn. Politisches Denken und Handeln im Kaiserreich (Munich, 1994), pp. 147-71
14. Len Scott and Steve Smith, 'Lessons of October: Historians, Political Scientists, Policy-Makers and the Cuban Missile Crisis', International Affairs, 70 (1994), 660
15. This point has, at times, been made about Wilhelmine Germany. See, for example, Dieter Langewiesche, 'Das Deutsche Kaiserreich-Bemerkungen zur Diskussion über Parlamentarisierung und Demokratisierung Deutschlands', Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, 19 (1979), 632
16. Gerhard L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany: Diplomatic Revolution in Europe 1933-36 (Chicago and London, 1970), p. 366
17. A good example of this is the examination of the reports of the Swiss Ambassador to Germany. See Terence F. Cole, 'German Decision-Making on the Eve of the First World War: The Records of the Swiss Embassy in Berlin', in John C. G. Röhl (ed.), Der Ort Kaiser Wilhelms II. in der deutschen Geschichte (Munich, 1991)
18. A considerable body of literature exists on this subject. Sec, for example, Seward W. Liver-more, '"Deserving Democrats". The Foreign Service under Woodrow Wilson', The South Atlantic Quarterly, 69 (1970)
19. See, also, Harry Elmer Barnes, 'The World War of 1914-1918', in Willard Waller (ed.), War in the Twentieth Century (New York, 1940), pp. 71-82
20. Rachel West, The Department of State on the Eve of the First World War (Athens, Ga., 1978), p. 1
21. Mario Toscano, The History of Treaties and International Politics. Vol. I: The Documentary and Memoir Sources (Baltimore, 1966), p. 433
22. John Milton Cooper, Jr, '"An Irony of Fate": Woodrow Wilson's Pre-World War I Diplomacy', Diplomatic History, 13 (1979)
23. Robert D. Schulzinger, The Making of the Diplomatic Mind: The Training, Outlook, and Style of the United States Foreign Service Officers, 1908-1931 (Middletown, Ct., 1975)
24. Ragnhild Fiebig-von Hase, 'The United States and Germany in the World Arena, 1900-1917', in Hans-Jürgen Schröder (ed.), Confrontation and Cooperation: Germany and the United States in the Era of World War I, 1900-1924 (Oxford, 1993)
25. Ragnhild Fiebig von Hase, 'Amerikanische Friedensbemühungen in Europa, 1905-1914', in Norbert Finzsch and Hermann Wellenreuther (eds.), Liberalitas. Festschrift für Erich Angermann zum 65. Geburtstag (Stuttgart, 1992)
26. T. St John Gaffney, Breaking the Silence: England, Ireland, Wilson and the War (New York, 1930), p. 69
27. Waldo Heinrichs, Jr, American Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Development of the United States Diplomatic Tradition (Boston, 1966), p. 21; Irwin B. Laughlin to Frank Polk, 22 October 1916: Frank L. Polk Papers, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University
28. Walter Fulghum Bell, 'American Embassies in Belligerent Europe', Doctoral Dissertation, University of Iowa, 1983, pp. 27-8
29. House was technically a private citizen. However, as he had enormous influence over President Wilson and as he was regularly employed in matters of foreign affairs in a role that can only be described as a special executive agent, he will be considered a US diplomat for the purposes of this study. For further justification of this stance, see E. Wilder Spaulding, Ambassadors Ordinary and Extraordinary (Washington, 1961), p. 6
30. Henry Merritt Wriston, Executive Agents in American Foreign Relations (Baltimore and London, 1929), pp. 157 and 209
31. West, The Department of State, p. 3
32. Walter Hines Page to Woodrow Wilson, 5 July 1914: quoted in Burton J. Hendrick, The Life and Letters of Waller II. Page (3 vols., London, 1926), vol. HI, p. 63
33. Page was not the only person to find Lichnowsky hard to evaluate. Many figures in the German government, including the Kaiser, initially believed Lichnowsky to be strongly anti-British. See John C. G. Röhl, 1914: Delusion or Design? The Testimony of Two German Diplomats (London, 1973), pp. 41-3
34. James W. Gerard, My Four Years in Germany (London and New York, 1917), pp. 44-56
35. Lewis Einstein, 'The Anglo-German Rivalry and the United States'. This article originally appeared in National Review, 60 (January 1913), 736-50
36. It is quoted here from Lewis Einstein, A Prophecy of the War (1913-1914) (New York, 1918), p. 21
37. Andrew D. White, Autobiography of Andrew D. White (2 vols., New York, 1905), vol. I, p. 265
38. James Gerard to the Secretary of State, 19 February 1914: quoted in FRUS 1914 Suppl., p. 4
39. The German government maintained this position even though their diplomats in Washington regularly warned that it would damage Germany's reputation in America. See Reinhard R. Doer-ries, Imperial Challenge: Ambassador Count Bernstorff and German-American Relations, 1908-1917 (Chapel Hill and London, 1989), pp. 25-32
40. Colonel House to Woodrow Wilson, 1 August 1914: quoted in Arthur S. Link et al. (eds.), The Papers of Woodrow Wilson (68 vols., Princeton, 1966-88), vol. XXX, p. 327
41. Einstein, 'Anglo-German Rivalry', p. 37
42. Colonel House to James Watson Gerard, 30 June 1914: House Papers
43. Arthur Link, Wilson: The New Freedom (Princeton, 1956), p. 315
44. L. C. F. Turner, Origins of the First World War (New York, 1970), p. 69
45. An example of this is to be found in the official German documentary collection Die Große Politik. In a footnote in vol. XXXIX, the editor observed that '... House mit dem "militarism run stark mad" nicht bloß die Situation in Deutschland, sondern die allgemeine Situation Europas meint. Deutlicher wird noch in den folgenden Worten, daß House nicht in Deutschland, wie ihm unterstellt worden ist, die den Weltfrieden bedrohende Macht gesehen hat, sondern in Frankreich und Rußland ...': Johannes Lepsius et al., Die Große Politik der Europäischen Kabinette (40 vols., Berlin, 1922-7), vol. XXXIX, pp. 111-12
46. Pogge von Strandmann, 'Germany and the Coming of War', p. 91
47. Walter Hines Page to Colonel House, 10 September 1914: Page Papers, bMS Am 1090.1, Box 14
48. Whitlock Journal, 3 August 1914: quoted in Allan Nevins (ed.), The Letters and Journal of Brand Whitlock (3 vols., New York and London, 1936), vol. I, p. 7
49. Myron T. Herrick to the Secretary of State, 2 August 1914: quoted in FRUS 1914 Suppl., p. 33
50. Maurice Francis Egan, Recollections of a Happy Life (New York, 1924), p. 276
51. Lewis Einstein, 'The War and American Policy'; first published in National Review, 64 (November 1914): quoted from Einstein, Prophecy of the War, pp. 77-8
52. Einstein, 'The War and American Policy': quoted from Einstein, Prophecy of the War, p. 54
53. James W. Gerard to Colonel House, 1 June 1915: House Papers
54. Walter Hines Page to the Secretary of State, 3 September 1914: quoted in FRUS 1914 Suppl., p. 87
55. Walter Hines Page to Woodrow Wilson, 6 September 1914: Link et al. (eds.), Papers of Woodrow Wilson, XXXI, p. 7
56. Seymour, Intimate Papers, II, p. 159
57. Recent historical opinion agrees with this assessment. See John C. G. Röhl, The Kaiser and his Court: Wilhelm II and the Government of Germany (Cambridge, 1995), p. 6
58. Fred Sondermann, 'The Wilson Administration's Image of Germany', Doctoral Dissertation, Yale University, 1953, p. 196
59. This would seem to support John Maurer's idea that the outbreak of war in 1914 was in part a failure of deterrence. See John H. Maurer, The Outbreak of the First World War: Strategic Planning, Crisis Decision Making and Deterrence Failure (London, 1995)
60. For some of the latest summaries of this interpretation see Volker Berghahn, Imperial Germany 1871-1914: Economy, Society, Culture and Politics (Oxford, 1994)
61. Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Imperial Germany 1867-1918: Politics, Culture, and Society in an Authoritarian State (London, 1995)