France in British signals intelligence, 1939-1945

French History

Volumn 14, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 41-66

  Thomas, Martin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST OF ENGLAND   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 65849199835     PISSN: 02691191     EISSN: 14774542     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/fh/14.1.41     Document Type: Review

References (65)

1. M. S. Alexander and W. J. Philpott, 'The Entente Cordiale and the next war: Anglo-French views on future military cooperation, 1928-1939', Intelligence and National Security, 13 (1998), 53-84 passim
2. regarding the generally high quality of French military intelligence in 1938-9: P. Jackson, 'Intelligence and the end of appeasement', French foreign and defence policy, 1918-1940: the decline and fall of a great power, ed. R. Boyce (1998), pp. 234-52
3. Gustave Bertrand's Enigma ou la plus grande énigme de la guerre 1939-1945 (1973)
4. Regarding Bertrand's motives: J. Stengers, 'Enigma, the French, the Poles and the British, 1931-1940', The missing dimension: governments and intelligence communities in the twentieth century, ed. C. Andrew and D. Dilks (1984), pp. 127, 268 n. 6
5. Regarding the connection between defensive needs and sigint breakthroughs: D. Kahn, 'Codebreaking in World Wars I and II: the major successes and failures, their causes and their effects', Hist J, 23 (1980), 632-6
6. Improved sigint communication was an early priority of the British and French commands in the Phoney War: Alexander, '"Fighting to the Last Frenchman"?, p. 310
7. PRO, War Office Directorate of Military Intelligence files, WO 208/5125, M.I. 8, memo on wireless intelligence, 14 June 1941; 'Y' committee sub-committee on relations between cryptography and wireless intelligence, memo by Group Captain L. F. Blundy, 1 July 1941; R. Denniston, 'Diplomatic eavesdropping, 1922-44: a new source discovered', Intelligence and National Security, 10 (1995), 431-2
8. J. Ferris, 'The British army, signals and security in the Desert Campaign, 1940-42', Intelligence and National Security, 5 (1990), 263-5
9. D. Porch, 'French intelligence and the fall of France, 1930-40', Intelligence and National Security, 4 (1989), 45-6
10. C. Fink, 'Marc Bloch and the drôle de guerre: prelude to the "Strange Defeat"', The French defeat, ed. Blatt, pp. 44-5
11. Alexander and Philpott, 'The Entente Cordiale and the next war', p. 57
12. Ferris, 'The British army, signals and security', pp. 262-8
13. E. Thomas, 'The evolution of the JIC system up to and during World War II', Intelligence and International Relations, 1900-1945, ed. C. Andrew and J. Noakes (Exeter, 1987), pp. 226-9
14. F. H. Hinsley et al., British intelligence in the Second World War: its influence on strategy and operations (1979), i. 109-12
15. W. K. Wark, 'Beyond intelligence: the study of British strategy and the Norway Campaign, 1940', Power, personalities and politics, ed. M. Fry (1992), p. 247
16. The status, funding and influence of the pre-war SR and deuxième bureau is discussed in R. Young, 'French military intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1938-1939', Knowing one's enemies: intelligence assessment before the two World Wars, ed. E. R. May (Princeton, N.J., 1986), pp. 296-309
17. A. Adamthwaite, 'French military intelligence and the coming of war, 1935-1939', Intelligence and international relations, ed. Andrew and Noakes, pp. 191-208
18. Porch, 'French intelligence', pp. 28-58
19. For an excellent summary of current arguments: M. S. Alexander, 'Did the deuxième bureau work? The role of intelligence in French defence policy and strategy, 1919-39', Intelligence and National Security, 6 (1991), 293-333, esp. 303-17
20. Regarding the First World War activities of the Marseille postal control commission: G. Liens, 'La commission de censure et la commission de contrôle postal à Marseille pendant la première guerre mondiale', Rev Hist M, 18 (1971), 649-67
21. K. Fedorowich, 'Name, rank and number: Axis prisoners of war as sources for British military intelligence, 1939-1942', Intelligence and National Security, 14 (1999)
22. Hinsley, British intelligence, i, app. i, pp. 487-95
23. Stengers, 'Enigma, the French, the Poles and the British', pp. 130-3
24. PRO HW 14/2, memo by A. D. Knox, P. F. G. Twinn, W. G. Welchman, A. M. Turing and J. R. Jeffreys, 'Enigma - Position', 1 Nov. 1939
25. GC and CS directorate, 'Investigation of German Military Cyphers - progress report', 7 Nov. 1939
26. F. H. Hinsley, 'Bletchley Park, the Admiralty and Naval Enigma', Codebreakers: the inside story of Bletchley Park, ed. F. H. Hinsley and A. Stripp (Oxford, 1983)
27. Paul Paillole and Henri Navarre were both critical of the Quai d'Orsay: P. Paillole, Services spéciaux, 1935-1945 (1975), pp. 133-5
28. H. Navarre, Le service de renseignements, 1871-1944 (1978), pp. 102-3
29. for a contrary view of pre-war links between the Quai and French military intelligence: Alexander, 'Did the deuxième bureau work?', pp. 322-3
30. Regarding Foreign Office coyness about its intelligence sources more generally: D. Dilks, 'Flashes of intelligence: the Foreign Office, the SIS and security before the Second World War', The missing dimension, ed. Andrew and Dilks, pp. 102-5
31. Paillole, Notre espion, pp. 163-4
32. on early Franco-Polish liaison: G. Bloch, 'La contribution française à la reconstitution et au décryptement de l'enigma militaire allemande en 1931-1932', Rev Hist Armées, 4 (1985), 17-25
33. Kahn, 'Codebreaking in World Wars I and II', p. 629
34. M. S. Alexander, The republic in danger: General Maurice Gamelin and the politics of French defence, 1933-1940 (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 325-6
35. Wark, 'Beyond intelligence', p. 241
36. R. A. Doughty, The breaking point: Sedan and the fall of France, 1940 (Hamden, Conn., 1990), p. 74
37. PRO, GC and CS Official Histories, HW 11/2, GC and CS official history, 'War in the West 1940-41', compiled by Wing Cmmdr P. Calvocoressi et al., pp. 4-6, 52
38. Alexander, The republic in danger, pp. 324-5
39. HW 14/5, RAF section memo, 'German three letter codes', 22 May 1940
40. Gen. L. Rivet, 'Etions-nous renseignés en mai 1940? II', Revue de Défense Nationale, 6 (July 1950), 32
41. PRO HW 11/2, GC and CS official history, 'War in the West 1940-41', pp. 8-9
42. on Baril: Doughty, The breaking point, pp. 76-7
43. 'Did the deuxième bureau work?', pp. 295, 313
44. Gen. L. Rivet, 'Le camp allemand dans la fièvre des alertes (1939-1940)', Revue de Défense Nationale, 5 (July, 1949), 33-49
45. Rivet, 'Etions-nous renseignés en mai 1940?', p. 34
46. see, for example, the warnings of a German assault on 10 May relayed by Colonel Hans Oster: Rivet, 'Le camp allemand', p. 47 and note
47. Regarding Section FJ: PRO HW 14/5, Lieutenant-Commander M. G. Sanders memo, 'Personnel in section FJ', 28 May 1940
48. M. Garder, La guerre secrète, pp. 194-8. Garder claims that between 14 and 17 May, French cryptanalysts broke German signals revealing the activity of armoured columns near Sedan and the Ardennes and the subsequent advance towards Paris. But he does not state the derivation of this evidence and his findings have been disputed by others, notably Bertrand himself
49. R. Lewin, 'A signal-intelligence war', J Cont Hist, 16 (1981), 504
50. regarding British and American progress against Spanish diplomatic and military ciphers: D. Alvarez, 'No immunity: signals intelligence and the European neutrals, 1939-45', Intelligence and National Security, 12 (1997), 24-6
51. Bertrand, Enigma, pp. 99-101, 135-41
52. Paillole, Services spéciaux, p. 226
53. PRO, Admiralty naval intelligence papers, ADM 223/487, NID1 memo, 'History of the French sub-section of NID1', 2 Oct. 1942
54. HW 14/8, M.I 1(b) memo, 'Instructions for disposal of collected material', 15 May 1940
55. Hinsley, British intelligence, ii. 651
56. PRO HW 14/8, G. C. McVittie, 'Report on staffing of RAF section', 5 Nov. 1940
57. K. Brown, 'Intelligence and the decision to collect it: Churchill's wartime American diplomatic signals intelligence', Intelligence and National Security, 10 (1995), 459-61
58. regarding Dupuy's diplomatic role: J. F. Hilliker, 'The Canadian government and the Free French: perceptions and constraints 1940-44', Int Hist R, 2 (1980), 88-92
59. Lewin, 'A signal-intelligence war', pp. 506-7
60. for a full account: C. Boyd, Hitler's Japanese confidant: General Oshima Hiroshi and magic intelligence, 1941-45 (Kansas, 1993)
61. D. McLachlan, Room 39: naval intelligence in action, 1939-45 (1968), pp. 198-9
62. PRO HW 1/580 104618, Japanese Foreign Ministry to Vichy and Berlin embassies, 19 May 1942
63. regarding Cot's four month mission: John W. Young, France, the Cold War and the Western Alliance, 1944-1949: French foreign policy and post-war Europe (Leicester, 1990), p. 15
64. See S. Berstein, R. Frank, S. Janson and N. Werth, 'Rapport de la Commission d'Historiens constituée pour examiner la nature des relations de Pierre Cot avec les autorités soviétiques' (1995). This Rapport effectively repudiates the allegations against Cot. My thanks to Alan Clinton for providing me with this material
65. Rivet, 'Étions-nous renseignés en mai 1940?', p. 38: 'Le renseignement est une chose, la manoeuvre est une autre. L'ultime manoeuvre du chef ennemi peut démentir le renseignement de la source la meilleure.'