A consistent way with paradox

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 144, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 377-389

  Goldstein, Laurence ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KENT   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Buridan; Cassationist; Consistent; Liar; No no; Paradox

Indexed keywords

EID: 65549169966     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-008-9215-3     Document Type: Article

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