Assertion, Moore, and Bayes

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 144, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 361-375

  Douven, Igor ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEUVEN   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Assertion; Bayesian epistemology; Moore

Indexed keywords

EID: 65549119675     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-008-9214-4     Document Type: Article

References (48)

1. Adler, J. (2002). Belief's own ethics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
2. J. Adler 2006 Withdrawal and contextualism Analysis 66 280 285
3. BonJour, L., & Sosa, E. (2003). Epistemic justification. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
4. Christensen, D. (2004). Putting logic in its place. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
5. K. DeRose 1991 Epistemic possibilities Philosophical Review 100 581 605
6. K. DeRose 1996 Knowledge, assertion, and lotteries Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 568 580
7. K. DeRose 2002 Assertion, knowledge, and context Philosophical Review 111 167 203
8. I. Douven 2002 A new solution to the paradoxes of rational acceptability British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 391 410
9. I. Douven 2005 A principled solution to Fitch's paradox Erkenntnis 62 47 69
10. I. Douven 2006 Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility Philosophical Review 115 449 485
11. Douven, I. (2008a). The lottery paradox and our epistemic goal. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, in press.
12. I. Douven 2008 Review of Christensen (2004) Philosophical Review 117 123 126
13. I. Douven J. Uffink 2003 The preface paradox revisited Erkenntnis 59 389 420
14. I. Douven T. Williamson 2006 Generalizing the lottery paradox British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 755 779
15. R. Foley 1992 The epistemology of belief and the epistemology of degrees of belief American Philosophical Quarterly 29 111 124
16. Gillies, D. (2000). Philosophical theories of probability. London: Routledge.
17. Grice, H. P. (1989). Logic and conversation, in his Studies in the Way of Words (pp. 22-40). Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
18. A. Hájek 2003 What conditional probability could not be Synthese 137 273 323
19. Harman, G. (1986). Change in view, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
20. Hintikka, J. (1962). Knowledge and belief, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
21. Howson, C. (2000). Hume's problem: Induction and the justification of belief. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
22. D. Hunter 1996 On the relation between categorical and probabilistic belief Noûs 30 75 98
23. Jeffreys, H. (1961). Theory of probability (3rd ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
24. Johnson, D. (2004). Truth without paradox, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
25. J. Kemeny 1955 Fair bets and inductive probabilities Journal of Symbolic Logic 20 263 273
26. Kitcher, P. (1993). The advancement of science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
27. Kyburg, H. (1970). Conjunctivitis. In: M. Swain (Ed.), Induction, acceptance and rational belief (pp. 55-82). Dordrecht: Reidel.
28. L. Laudan 1981 A confutation of convergent realism Philosophy of Science 48 19 49
29. Lewis, D. (1996). Elusive knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74, 549-567.
30. (Reprinted in K. DeRose & T. Warfield (Eds.) (1999), Skepticism (pp. 220-239). Oxford: Oxford University Press; the page reference is to the reprint.)
31. Maher, P. (1993). Betting on theories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
32. D. Makinson 1965 The paradox of the preface Analysis 25 205 207
33. D. H. Mellor 1993 How to believe a conditional Journal of Philosophy 90 233 248
34. Mendola J. 2007 Knowledge and evidence Journal of Philosophy 104 157 160
35. Meyer, J.-J., & van der Hoek, W. (1995). Epistemic logic for AI and computer science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
36. Moore, G. E. (1962). Commonplace book: 1919-1953. London: Allen and Unwin.
37. Pollock, J. (1986). Contemporary theories of knowledge. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.
38. Psillos, S. (1999). Scientific realism: How science tracks truth. London: Routledge.
39. Schiffer, S. (2005). Paradox and the a priori. In T. Szabó Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Oxford studies in Epistemology (Vol. I, pp. 273-310). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
40. Searle, J. (2002). Consciousness and language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
41. S. Shoemaker 1995 Moore's paradox and self-knowledge Philosophical Studies 77 211 228
42. Tennant, N. (1997). The taming of the true. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
43. Unger, P. (1975). Ignorance: A case for scepticism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
44. B. van Fraassen 1995 Fine-grained opinion, probability, and the logic of full belief Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 349 377
45. B. Weatherson 2005 Can we do without pragmatic encroachment? Philosophical Perspectives 19 417 443
46. R. Wedgwood 1999 The a priori rules of rationality Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 113 131
47. J. Williams 1996 Moorean absurdities and the nature of assertion Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 133 149
48. Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.