What's law got to do with it?: The Bosnia v. Serbia decision's impact on reconciliation

Rutgers Law Review

Volumn 61, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 131-159

  Rosenberg, Sheri P ^a  

^a Department of Clinical Law ^*

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EID: 65349084884     PISSN: 00360465     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (231)

1. Ed Vulliamy, Srebrenica: Ten Years On, OPEN DEMOCRACY, July 6, 2005, http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict- yugoslavia/srebrenica-2651.jsp.
2. See MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 194- 205 (2007) (arguing in favor of state obligations for reparations); Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation, 24 hum. rts. Q. 573, 573-639 (2002) (examining the limitation of criminal trials to social reconstruction);
3. Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Defense Perspectives on Law and Politics in International Criminal Trials, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 529, 534-43 (2008) (examining the purpose of international criminal trials). For a general description of the evolution of international justice, see RUN G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000).
4. International justice refers, herein, to international criminal justice as well as international civil justice as pursued in, among other venues, the International Court of Justice (ICJ). International justice as used herein does not refer to the entire panoply of mechanisms utilized to address mass atrocities such as, but not limited to, truth commissions, lustration, or property claims commissions. Rather, it refers to judicial proceedings.
5. Diane Orentlicher, one of the early and significant proponents of international justice, states "[w]e must do better not only at defining our expectations [about international criminal tribunals and other forms of justice for mass atrocities], but in testing them through empirical assessments.⋯ [R]igorous assessments are indispensable to the legitimacy of international tribunals ⋯." Diane F. Orentlicher, Judging Global Justice: Assessing the International Criminal Court, 21 Wis. INT'L L.J. 495, 503 (2003).
6. Some champions of global justice claim that the threat of trials has a deterrent effect on the actions of perpetrators. Perhaps this explains in part why the U.N. Commission of Inquiry recommended that the situation in Darfur be referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC). This referral, however, has not proven itself to be an act of prevention. Sudan has only increased its horrific atrocities in Darfur since the referral. In fact, one individual, Ahmed Haroun, who has been indicted by the ICC, has since been promoted to the Minister of Humanitarian Affairs for the Darfur region, made co-chair of a commission to investigate crimes in Darfur, and appointed to a committee responsible for overseeing cooperation with the U.N. peacekeeping force. See Nick Donovan, Forget Trying to Talk to Khartoum, TIMES ONLINE, Dec. 11, 2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/ comment/columnists/guest-contributors/article30311 68.ece.
7. Likewise, against the backdrop of the war and impending genocide in BiH, and an impasse within the international community as to the appropriate response, the U.N. member states agreed to create the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) by a Security Council resolution in 1993. By July of 1995, when the genocide in Srebrenica occurred, the ICTY had yet to hear a case; the threat of prosecution had not been a deterrent. In the wake of the swift 100 day genocide in Rwanda - of which Roméo Dallaire had warned the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, explicitly - the Security Council responded by creating the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).
8. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.) (Feb. 26, 2007), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf [hereinafter Judgment].
9. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]; see Judgment, supra note 6, ¶ 1.
10. Judgment, supra note 6, ¶ 434.
11. Id. ¶ 471.
12. Id.
13. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
14. STEVEN R. RATNER &; JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 6 (2d ed. 2001).
15. Id. at 8.
16. Id.
17. Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1990).
18. RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 12, at 9.
19. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. The Rome Statute took effect upon the ratification of sixty states on July 1, 2002. See International Criminal Court, Establishment of the Court, http://www.icc-cpi.int/about/ataglance/establishment.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2008).
20. Under this view, amnesty may never be granted for international crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, or other serious violations of international humanitarian law. For an exploration of the treaty and customary law obligations to punish individuals for a core set of human rights violations, see Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 yale L.J. 2537 (1991).
21. See generally U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights, Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.l (Feb. 8, 2005) (prepared by Diane Orentlicher) [hereinafter OCHR Updated Principles];
22. RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 12 (discussing the possible breadth and limits of individual accountability for human rights violations).
23. See CLEMENS NATHAN RESEARCH CTR. & REDRESS, REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND WAR CRIMES: SYSTEMS IN PLACE AND SYSTEMS IN THE MAKING (2007), http://www.redress.org/ conferences/CNRC%20Background%20Paper%201-2%20March%2007.pdf. For a general description of the evolution of international justice, including criminal justice and reparations,
24. see TEITEL, supra note 2.
25. CLEMENS NATHAN RESEARCH CTR. & REDRESS, supra note 19, at 2.
26. Id. at 3. Forms of reparations include restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of nonrepetition.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.) (Nov. 18, 2008), http://www.icj-cij.org/ docket/files/118/14891.pdf.;
29. Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, 282 (Dec. 19) (ordering Uganda to pay reparations for its responsibility for armed activity, and massive human rights violations in DRC);
30. Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), 2002 I.C.J. 219 (July 10).
31. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 3 Bevans 1179.
32. DRUMBL, supra note 2, at 194-96 (arguing in favor of state obligations for reparations); Fletcher & Weinstein,
33. supra note 2, at 573-639 (examining the limitation of international criminal trials to social reconstruction);
34. Turner, supra note 2, at 534- 43 (examining the purpose of international criminal trials). For a general description of the evolution of international justice,
35. see TEITEL, supra note 2.
36. S.C. Res. 827, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
37. The Secretary-General, Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, para; 16, delivered to the Security Council and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1007, A/49/342 (Aug. 29, 1994).
38. S.C. Res. 955, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). Similarly, a U.N. General Assembly resolution aimed at establishing the Extraordinary Chambers in Cambodia "[r]ecogniz[ed]⋯ that the accountability of individual perpetrators ⋯ is ⋯ a key factor in ensuring ⋯, ultimately, reconciliation and stability within a State." G.A. Res. 57/228, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/228 (Dec. 18, 2002).
39. See MAETHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 123-28 (1998);
40. Ruti Teitel, Bringing the Messiah Through the Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN pOLITICAL TRANSITIONS: GETTYSBURG TO BOSNIA 177, 181-83 (Carla Hesse & Robert Post eds., 1999).
41. See Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 2, at 586-87.
42. Id.
43. Vojin Dimitrijević & Marko Milanović, The Strange Story of the Bosnian Genocide Case, 21 LEIDEN J. INT'L L.. 65, 71-73 (2008).
44. Id.
45. Adila Pašalić Kreso, The War and Post-War Impact on the Educational System of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 54 INT'L REV. EDUC. 353, 359 (2008).
46. See Donald S. Hays, The Effects of an Uncivil War: The Damage to Society Caused by Internal Conflict, Paper Presented at Pathways to Reconciliation & Global Human Rights Conference, Sarajevo (Aug. 2005), http://www.sourcesofinsecurity.org/events/abstracts/Hays%20Donald.pdf.
47. Id.
48. Teitel, supra note 28, at 181.
49. Harvey M. Weinstein & Eric Stover, Introduction: Conflict, Justice, and Reclamation, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY 1, 4 (Eric Stover & Harvey M. Weinstein eds., 2004).
50. Jens Meierhenrich, Varieties of Reconciliation, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 195-231 (2008) (prescribing modifications to clarify the concept of reconciliation).
51. See Aneelah Afzali & Laura Colleton, Constructing Coexistence: A Survey of Coexistence Projects in Areas of Ethnic Conflict, in IMAGINE COEXISTENCE: RESTORING HUMANITY AFTER VIOLENT ETHNIC CONFLICT 3, 3 (Antonia Chayes & Martha Minow eds., 2003).
52. Eileen F. Babbitt, Evaluating Coexistence: Insights and Challenges, in IMAGINE COEXISTENCE: RESTORING HUMANITY AFTER VIOLENT ETHNIC CONFLICT, supra note 39, at 102, 113. The book argues that "reconciliation [(undefined)] is certainly a worthy ultimate goal," but coexistence must be the first and immediate goal in the process of stitching back the fabric of society torn apart by ethnic conflict. Antonia Chayes & Martha Minow, Introduction, in IMAGINE COEXISTENCE: RESTORING HUMANITY AFTER VIOLENT ETHNIC CONFLICT,
53. supra note 39, at xvi, xix-xx.
54. See TEITEL, supra note 2, at 88-92.
55. Amy Gutman & Dennis Thompson, The Moral Foundations of Truth Commissions, in TRUTH v. JUSTICE 22, 29 (Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 32.
58. David A. Crocker, Truth Commissions, Transitional Justice, and Civil Society, in TRUTH v. JUSTICE, supra note 42, at 99, 108.
59. International Center for Transitional Justice, Reconciliation, http://www.ictj.org/en/tj/784.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2008).
60. Id.
61. See Afzali & Colleton, supra note 39, at 3;
62. Weinstein & Stover, supra note 37, at 5;
63. Edith Marko-Stöckl, My Truth, Your Truth - Our Truth? The Role of Truth Commissions and History Teaching for Reconciliation (unpublished MIRICO paper, on file with author).
64. See General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosn. & Herz.-Croat.-Yugo., Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75 [hereinafter GFAP].
65. Id. Annex 1-A art. 1, ¶ 2(c), Annex 4 pmbl.
66. The right to return is enshrined in the BiH Constitution, bosn. & HERZ. Const. art. II, http://ccbh.ba/public/down/USTAV-BOSNE-I-HERCEGOVINE-engl. pdf, and Annex 7 to the GFAP specifically sets forth the right of refugees and displaced persons to return home free of discrimination, GFAP, supra note 49, Annex 7 art. 1.
67. See GFAP, supra note 49, Annex 7 art. 1.
68. See Sheri P. Rosenberg, Promoting Equality After Genocide, 16 tul. J. int'l & comp. L. 329, 333-34 (2008).
69. Kofi Annan called the Srebrenica genocide "a massacre on a scale unprecedented in Europe since the Second World War." Press Release, Kofi Annan, Secretary-General, United Nations, Srebrenica Tragedy Will Forever Haunt United Nations History, Says Secretary-General on Fifth Anniversary of City's Fall, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/7489 (July 10, 2000).
70. Rosenberg, supra note 53, at 336;
71. see STEVEN L. BURG & PAUL S. SHOUP, THE WAR IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: ETHNIC CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION 56-57 (1999) (describing the corrupted results of the elections of 1990 and resultant ethnic polarization).
72. BURG & SHOUP, supra note 55, at 69-70.
73. See NORMAN CIGAR, GENOCIDE IN BOSNIA: THE POLICY OF "ETHNIC CLEANSING" 39-43 (1995) (noting Serb leaders' vision of a "Greater Serbia" and instances of anti- non-Serb rhetoric).
74. BURG & SHOUP, supra note 55, at 46-48.
75. Id. at 48.
76. Id. at 92.
77. Id. at 29.
78. Id. at 73.
79. Rosenberg, supra note 53, at 336-39 (footnotes omitted).
80. Id. at 339.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.;
84. BURG & SHOUP, supra note 55, at 129.
85. Rosenberg, supra note 53, at 339.
86. See Mirsad Tokaca, Sarajevo Research and Documentation Ctr., Human Losses in Bosnia and Herzegovina 91-95, http://www.idc.org.ba/presentatiori/ Bosnia%20and%20Herzegovina.zip (last visited Dec. 18, 2008). Slide 33 shows the number of deaths by ethnicity, and slide 34 demonstrates that, for the entire war, 65.88% of victims were Bosniaks, 25.62% were Serbs, and 8.01% were Croats. Id. This project, also called the "Bosnian Book of the Dead," is the most comprehensive so far in establishing the number of victims of the war.
87. ECOSOC, Comm'n on Human Rights, Report on the Second Special Session, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. E/1992/22/Add.2 (Dec. 1, 1992) ("Categorically condemns the ethnic cleansing being carried out ⋯. recognizing that the Serbian leadership in territories under their control in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Yugoslav Army and the political leadership of the Republic of Serbia bear primary responsibility for this reprehensible practice."). The Special Rapporteur on BiH said the following: "During the whole period of the Special Rapporteur's mandate the policy of 'ethnic cleansing', initiated by the de facto Bosnian Serb authorities, has continued unabated. It is obvious that inadequate reaction to that policy prompted other sides, in particular the de facto Bosnian-Croat authorities to use the same methods." ECOSOC, Comm'n on Human Rights, Sixth Periodic Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, amp; 289, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/110 (Feb. 21, 1994) (prepared by Tadeusz Masowiecki).
88. See Rosenberg, supra note 53, at 330 n.3.
89. For a good discussion of the ethnic cleansing in BiH, see Drazen Petrovic, Ethnic Cleansing - An Attempt at Methodology, 5 Eur. J. INT'L L. 342 (1994).
90. Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 17 (Aug. 2, 2001).
91. Id. ¶ 11.
92. Id. ¶ 18.
93. S.C. Res. 819, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/819 (Apr. 16, 1993).
94. S.C. Res. 824, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/824 (May 6, 1993). The Bosnian "safe areas" were modeled after a similar arrangement established in northern Iraq for the Kurds after the Gulf War.
95. See S.C. Res. 688, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (Apr. 5, 1991). However, the Kurds were granted a "safe haven," which, under international law, does not require the consent of the warring parties. JAN WLLLEM HONIG & NORBERT BOTH, SREBRENICA: RECORD OF A WAR CRIME 104 (1996). On the other hand, a "safe area" requires consent.
96. Id.
97. S.C. Res. 819, supra note 76, ¶ 1.
98. S.C. Res. 836, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/836 (June 4, 1993).
99. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, ¶¶ 20, 26.
100. Shashi Tharoor, Special Assistant to the U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, made the following comments about the Srebrenica Resolutions: The Security Council Resolutions on the safe areas required the parties to treat them as 'safe', imposed no obligations on their inhabitants and defenders, deployed United Nations troops in them but expected their mere presence to 'deter attacks', carefully avoided asking the peacekeepers to 'defend' or 'protect' these areas, but authorised them to call in air-power 'in self-defence' - a masterpiece of diplomatic drafting, but largely unimplementable as an operational directive. Shashi Tharoor, Should UN Peacekeeping Go 'Back to Basics"?, 37 SURVIVAL 52, 60 (1995-96) (single quotation marks in original).
101. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, ¶¶ 20, 26.
102. Id. ¶¶ 21, 27.
103. Id. ¶¶ 14, 17, 20.
104. Id. ¶ 14.
105. Id. ¶ 32.
106. Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, ¶ 15 (Apr. 19, 2004).
107. Stephen Engelberg & Tim Weiner, Massacre in Bosnia; Srebrenica: The Days of Slaughter, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1995, at A1.
108. Id.
109. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, ¶ 36. The "safe area" of Žepa was attacked by Serb forces on July 14, 1995, and captured late that July.
110. Id. ¶¶ 89, 119.
111. Id. ¶¶ 53-57.
112. Id. ¶¶ 58, 66-69.
113. Id. ¶¶ 60-68.
114. Id. ¶¶ 45-46.
115. Europe's Most Wanted, TIMES ONLINE, July 12, 2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/leading-article/article4318755. ece.
116. Id.;
117. see Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, ¶ 81 (stating that "a minimum of 7,475 persons from Srebrenica" are missing and likely dead).
118. An unknown number of bodies are speculated to have sunk to the bottom of the River. Interview by Carmel Maseng and Shala Gafary with Amor Masovic, President, Fed. Comm'n of Missing Persons, in Sarajevo, Bosn. & Herz. (Jan. 4, 2008) (on file with author).
119. BURG & SHOUP, supra note 55, at 164-65.
120. Id. at 355.
121. Elizabeth m. Cousens, Making Peace in Bosnia Work, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 789, 792 (1997). The estimate of 200,000 killed is the most widely cited, although research published in 2005 by Mirsad Tokaca, head of the Sarajevo-based Investigation and Documentation Centre, put the number at around 100,000. Nedim Dervisbegovic, Research Halves Bosnia War Death Toll to 100,000, REUTERS, Nov. 23, 2005.
122. GFAP, supra note 49.
123. Rosenberg, supra note 53, at 340 (footnotes omitted).
124. GFAP, supra note 49, art. III.
125. Rosenberg, supra note 53, at 340 (footnotes omitted).
126. Id. at 340-41.
127. Id. at 341.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 341-42.
131. Id. at 344-45 (footnotes omitted).
132. Interview by Carmel Maseng and Shala Gafary with Abdurahman Malkic, Mayor of Srebrenica, in Sarajevo, Bosn. & Herz. (Jan. 6, 2008) (on file with author).
133. Id. Mayor Malkic puts the number at 5,000 returnees. Monika Nalepa states that Srebrenica has one of the lowest rates of return, with only 2,884 returnees.
134. See Monika Nalepa, Why Do They Return? Evaluating the Impact of ICTY Justice on Reconciliation 16 (2008) (unpublished paper, on file with author).
135. Rosenberg, supra note 53, at 346.
136. Id.
137. Interview by Carmel Maseng and Shala Gafary with Amra Celebic, Special Assistant to the High Representative's Envoy for the Srebrenica Region, in Sarajevo, Bosn. & Herz. (Jan. 6, 2008) (on file with author).
138. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo. (Serb. & Mont.)), 1993 I.C.J. 3, 3-4 (Apr. 8). When the government of BiH instituted these proceedings before the ICJ against Serbia (then FRY), the war in BiH was in its second year. Indeed, by 1994 the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats had established separatist entities. BURG & SHOUP,
139. supra note 55, at 294-95. When the case was decided in 2007, BiH, though the same legal personality, was a very different place.
140. Genocide Convention, supra note 7, art. I.
141. Id. art. VIII.
142. Id. art. IX.
143. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide, 1993 I.C.J, at 24.
144. Judgment, supra note 6.
145. Dimitrijević & Milanović, supra note 31, at 74.
146. Judgment, supra note 6, ¶ 166.
147. Id. ¶ 434.
148. Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-t, Judgment (Aug. 2, 2001).
149. Judgment, supra note 6, ¶ 438.
150. Id. ¶ 450.
151. Id. ¶ 471.
152. Id.
153. See Marko Attila Hoare, The International Court of Justice and the Decriminalization of Genocide, BOSNIA REP., Jan.-July 2007, http://www.bosnia.org.uk/bosrep/report-format.cfm?articleid= 3170&reportid=173; Marlise Simons, Op-Ed.,
154. Serbia's Darkest Pages Hidden from Genocide Court, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 8, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/ 04/08/news/Serbia.php.7.
155. See Some Local Reactions to the ICJ Verdict, BOSNIA REP., Jan.-July 2007, http://www.bosnia.org. uk/bosrep/report-format. cfm?articleid=3169&reportid=173.
156. Id.
157. See generally id. (recounting how Serbia has not been held accountable for its actions).
158. Interview by Carmel Maseng and Shala Gafary with Professor Smail Cekic, Director, Institute for the Research of Crimes Against Humanity, Univ. of Sarajevo, in Sarajevo, Bosn. & Herz. (Jan. 4, 2008) (on file with author).
159. Hoare, supra note 130;
160. Some Local Reactions to the ICJ Verdict, supra note 131.
161. Hoare, supra note 130.
162. Tim Judah, Bosnia: The Future on Hold?, REAL INSTITUTO ELCANO, Mar. 28, 2007, http://www. realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/1114.asp (the author covers the Balkans for the Economist magazine).
163. Hoare, supra note 130. This is not to say that the failure lies in the outcome of this decision or any other decision rendered by an international court. Nor does it implicate the debates about collective versus individual responsibility. Any decision would simply have been utilized by each group to bolster that group's version of the past. In this way, international court decisions, generally, are simply being instrumentalized by all three groups trying to validate their collective narratives about the nature of the conflict. Speculation about why and how the court came to this compromise decision abounds. Some argue that it had no choice due to its dubious procedural ruling on admissibility. Andrea Gattini, Evidentiary Issues in the ICJ's Genocide Judgment, 5 J. Int'L crim. Just. 889 (2007). Others argue that it was bound by the ICTY to find genocide in Srebrenica in order to prevent fragmentation of international law.
164. See Christian Leathley, An Institutional Hierarchy to Combat the Fragmentation of International Law: Has the LLC Missed an Opportunity?, 40 N. Y.U. J. INT'L l. & POL. 259, 264-65 (2007);
165. David Turns, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, 8 MELB. J. INT'L l. 398, 425-27 (2008). Still others argue that it was simply a political decision to appease, just a little, all parties to the dispute.
166. See Ante Cuvalo, The ICJ Decision and its Effects, wORLD fEDERALIST mOVEMENT, May 12, 2007, http://www.wfm.org/site/index.php?module=uploads&func=download&fileld= 291;
167. Martin Shaw, The International Court of Justice: Serbia, Bosnia, and Genocide, OPENDEMOCRACY, Feb. 28, 2007, http://www.opendemocracy. net/globalization-yugoslavia/icj-bosnia-serbia-4392.jsp. Regardless of which justification one accepts for the court's ruling, it can only be said that the goal of creating a unified historical truth in order to provide consensus has not been achieved by this ruling.
168. Judah, supra note 137.
169. Id.
170. Raffi Gregorian, Principal Deputy High Representative, Office of the High Representative, Testimony at the Helsinki Commission Hearing, U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Outstanding Issues in Post- Conflict Recovery and Reconciliation (Nov. 9, 2007), http://csce.gov/ index.cfm?FuseAction=ContentRecords.ViewWitness&ContentRecord-id= 893&ContentType=D&ContentRecordType=D&ParentType=H&CFID= 18849146&CFTOKEN=53.
171. Interview by Carmel Maseng and Shala Gafary with Amra Celebic, supra note 111.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See Judah, supra note 137.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Bosniak Municipal Councillors in Srebrenica Adopt Resolution for Special Status, Se. Eur. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2007, http://www.setimes. com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en-GB/features/setimes/newsbriefs/2007/03/25/nb-06.
179. Mario Brkic, Office of the High Representative [OHR], European Union Special Representative in Bosn. & Herz., Transcript of the International Agencies' Joint Press Conference, (Mar. 27, 2007), http://www.eusrbih.eu/media/ pc/l/?cid=948,l,l [hereinafter OHR Transcript]. The High Representative's office is established by Annex 10 of the GFAP to oversee civil implementation of the peace agreement. GFAP, supra note 49, Annex 10;
180. see Judah, supra note 137. Over time, the High Representative garnered extensive powers, including the power to dismiss government officials believed to be thwarting the objectives of the GFAP.
181. See Judah, supra note 137.
182. OHR Transcript, supra note 150.
183. See Judah, supra note 137.
184. Bosnian Leaders Debate the Present Ethnic Split-State, ISLAMTODAY, June 20, 2007, http://www.islamtoday.com/showme2.cfm?cat-id=38&sub-cat-id= 1245.
185. Nedim Dervisbegovic, Bosnia Split on Srebrenica Request for Self-Rule, REUTERS, Mar. 12, 2007, http:www.reuters.com/article/ latestcrisis/idUSDER261608.
186. FAST Update: Bosnia and Herzegovina: Trends in Conflict and Cooperation, SWISSPEACE, Mar.-Apr. 2007, http://www.swisspeace.ch/typo3/ fileadmin/user-upload/pdf/FAST/Updates/2007/Bosnia-Update-2-2007.pdf [hereinafter FAST Update No. 2].
187. Srecko Latal, RS Leader Clashes with Western Diplomats over Reforms, BALKAN INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING NETWORK, Aug. 29, 2007, http://www.birn.eu.com/en/101/10/39721. In BiH, recognition of a federalist system has a double meaning. First, it implies the idea of a Croat "third-entity," and second, within the Yugoslav context, federalism gives the right to self-determination to the then republics, which in the current Dayton structure of BiH the RS does not have.
188. See Judah, supra note 137.
189. Latal, supra note 156.
190. FAST Update No. 2, supra note 155.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See id. Currently, there is no unified police force in BiH.
194. See Judah, supra note 137. Integrating the police force is a key issue for Bosnian succession to the EU.
195. See Int'l Crisis Group, Bosnia's Stalled Police Reform: No Progress, No EU, at 3, Europe Report No. 164 (Sept. 6, 2005), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Bosnia%20ICG%20Report.pdf.
196. Peace Implementation Council, Declaration by the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council (June 19, 2007), http://www.ohr.int/pic/ default.asp?content-id=39997.
197. FAST Update: Bosnia and Herzegovina: Trends in Conflict and Cooperation, swisspeace, Sept.-Oct. 2007, http://www.swisspeace.ch/typo3/ fileadmin/user-upload/pdf/FAST/Updates/2007/Bosnia-Update-5-2007.pdf [hereinafter FAST Update No. 5].
198. See id.
199. Interview by Carmel Maseng and Shala Gafary with Abdurahman Malkic, supra note 111.
200. Id.
201. Interview by Carmel Maseng and Shala Gafary with Amra Celebic, supra note 115.
202. Interview by Carmel Maseng and Shala Gafary with Abdurahman Malkic, supra note 111.
203. Id.
204. See generally id. (discussing the achievement of the Special Status Initiative in Srebrenica).
205. Press Release, OHR, Schwarz-Schilling Appoints Clifford Bond Srebrenica Envoy (May 3, 2007), http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp? content-id=39661.
206. The Special Assistant to the Envoy, as well as the Political Department in the OHR, expressly stated that Srebrenica was "forgotten" before the events of 2007. Interview by Carmel Maseng and Shala Gafary with Amra Celebic, supra note 115.
207. Cliff Bond, Srebrenica: Confronting the Past, While Embracing the Future, HELSINKI COMMISSION DIG., July 24, 2008, http://csce.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=ContentRecords.ViewDetail& ContentRecord-id=143&Region-id=5&Issue-id=0&ContentType=R, G&ContentRecordType=G&CFID=5549507&CFTO KEN=74185067.
208. Gregorian, supra note 141.
209. See Bosnian Leaders Debate the Present Ethnic Split-State, supra note 153.
210. See id.
211. "[Six] months ago the situation began to get better. We will make it possible to produce clean water, and RS stopped disrupting our initiatives to do something." Interview by Carmel Maseng and Shala Gafary with Abdurahman Malkic, supra note 111.
212. Bond, supra note 173.
213. See Interview by Carmel Maseng and Shala Gafary with Amra Celebic, supra note 115. The author benefitted from numerous conversations with Carmel Maseng.
214. See id.
215. At the time, the RS was self proclaimed and not recognized by any state other than Serbia-Montenegro. BURG & SHOOT, supra note 55, at 193-94.
216. See Prosecutor v. Karadzic & Mladic, Case No. IT-95-5-I, Indictment, ¶¶ 17-48 (July 24, 1995). These charges also allege crimes committed during the siege of Sarajevo.
217. Id. ¶ 46.
218. Dan Bilefsky & Marlise Simons, Bosnian Serb Under Arrest in War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2008, at Al.
219. Both initially lived openly, disregarding the indictments. See Nicholas Kulish & Graham Bowley, The Double Life of an Infamous Serbian Fugitive, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2008, at Al;
220. Profile: Ratko Mladic, BBC news, July 31, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/europe/1423551.stm. It appears that Mladic had continued receiving a pension from Serbia for a full decade after his becoming an indicted fugitive.
221. See The Hunt for Karadzic and Mladic, BBC news, July 23, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/europe/4079642.stm. Graffiti glorifying his name is commonplace in the RS. Aleksander Vasovic, Serbia May 'Trade' Mladic for Concessions in Kosovo, BALKAN INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING NETWORK, June 19, 2007, http://www.birn.eu.com/en/ 88/10/3354/.
222. See, e.g., U.N. Office: Karadzic in Belgrade, CNN, Feb. 11, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/02/11/bosnia.karadzic/index.html.
223. Bosnia Leaders 'Childish' over Karadzic, BALKAN INSIGHT, July 25, 2008, http://ww.balkanmsightxom/en/main/news/12068/? tpl=299&STl=Text&ST- Tl=Article; Nick Thorpe, Karadzic Casts Shadow over Bosnia's Fate, BBC news, July 30, 2008, http://newsvote.bbc.co.Uk/ mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ europe/7531572.stm.
224. This is especially true in a former communist country where the role of courts played a very different and far less significant role in persons' lives. See generally Interview by Carmel Masseng and Shala Gafary with Amra Celebic, supra note 115.
225. See id.;
226. see also Paddy Ashdown, Europe Needs a Wake-up Call, Bosnia Is on the Edge Again, OBSERVER (London), July 27, 2008, at 27; Dan Bilefsky, Fears of New Ethnic Conflict in Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2008, at A6;
227. Lajcak Sees Threat of BiH Partition, SE. EUR. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2008, http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/print/en- GG/features/setimes/features/2008/09/25/feature-01.
228. The fact, also, that an international justice decision may force a fragile state back into conflict means it was likely not a viable state to begin with.
229. See TINA ROSENBERG, THE HAUNTED LAND: FACING EUROPE'S GHOSTS AFTER COMMUNISM 314 (1995).
230. See Mark A. Drumbl, Punishment Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1221, 1288-90 (2000).
231. Usta Kaitesi, Univ. of Butare, Presentation to Cardozo Law students and the author at Butare Law School, Butare, Rwanda (January 2008).