THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF REGULATION AND SUNSET REVIEWS OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTANCY LAWS: THE ROLE OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

Research in Accounting Regulation

Volumn 16, Issue C, 2003, Pages 105-119

  Colbert, Gary ^a   Murray, Dennis ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 65249155510     PISSN: 10520457     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S1052-0457(02)16006-1     Document Type: Review

References (19)

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