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Volumn 68, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 43-66

Revisiting the demand for agricultural insurance: The case of Spain

Author keywords

Agricultural insurance; Economic models; Insurance demand models; Spain

Indexed keywords


EID: 65249140406     PISSN: 00021466     EISSN: 20416326     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1108/00214660880001218     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (56)

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