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1
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65249121098
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See Wittgenstein's Philosophical Remarks, Oxford: Blackwell, 1975 (1930), p. 267. Mach's illustration, given in my book (figure 2.1) is from his The Analysis of Sensation. New York: Dover Press, 1959 (1886).
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See Wittgenstein's Philosophical Remarks, Oxford: Blackwell, 1975 (1930), p. 267. Mach's illustration, given in my book (figure 2.1) is from his The Analysis of Sensation. New York: Dover Press, 1959 (1886).
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2
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65249085886
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This is discussed in M. von Senden's Space and Sight. London: Methuen, 1932 1960
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This is discussed in M. von Senden's Space and Sight. London: Methuen, 1932 (1960).
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3
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65249122832
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See A. Valvo's Sight Restoration after Long-term Blindness: the Problems and Behavior Patterns of Visual Rehabilitation. New York: American Federation for the Blind.
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See A. Valvo's Sight Restoration after Long-term Blindness: the Problems and Behavior Patterns of Visual Rehabilitation. New York: American Federation for the Blind.
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4
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65249134669
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See J. Ruskin, The Elements of Drawing, New York, Dover
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See J. Ruskin, The Elements of Drawing, New York, Dover.
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5
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65249159924
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Susanna Siegel has pressed a similar concern in conversation
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Susanna Siegel has pressed a similar concern in conversation.
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6
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65249165710
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The account of color perception that I develop in Action in Perception is indebted to J. Broackes, The autonomy of color, in Reduction, Explanation and Realism, ed. D. Charles and K. Lennon, 421-465. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
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The account of color perception that I develop in Action in Perception is indebted to J. Broackes, "The autonomy of color," in Reduction, Explanation and Realism, ed. D. Charles and K. Lennon, 421-465. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
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7
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65249178650
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In Real presence (Philosophical Topics, 33, Number 1, Spring 2005, pp.235-264) and Conscious reference (Philosophical Quarterly, forthcoming) I explore further the idea that naive realism needs an account of perceptual understanding to explain how we can achieve perceptual awareness of objects.
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In "Real presence" (Philosophical Topics, Volume 33, Number 1, Spring 2005, pp.235-264) and "Conscious reference" (Philosophical Quarterly, forthcoming) I explore further the idea that naive realism needs an account of perceptual understanding to explain how we can achieve perceptual awareness of objects.
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8
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65249157684
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Block seems to misunderstand my position in just this way. See his review of Action in Perception ( Journal of Philosophy II, 5, May 2005, 259-272). I reply to Block and clarify the relation of my own work on the relation between perception and action and recent work in psychology and visual neuroscience in Perception without representation, forthcoming in the proceedings of Susan Hurley's July 2007 Bristol meeting on Perception, Action, and Consciousness: Sensorimotor Dynamics and Dual Vision. The will appear in an Oxford University Press under the editorship of N. Gangopadhyay. The locus classicus of the two-visual systems hypothesis is A.D. Milner and M.A. Goodale, The Visual Brain in Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
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Block seems to misunderstand my position in just this way. See his review of Action in Perception ( Journal of Philosophy II, 5, May 2005, 259-272). I reply to Block and clarify the relation of my own work on the relation between perception and action and recent work in psychology and visual neuroscience in "Perception without representation," forthcoming in the proceedings volume of Susan Hurley's July 2007 Bristol meeting on "Perception, Action, and Consciousness: Sensorimotor Dynamics and Dual Vision." The volume will appear in an Oxford University Press volume under the editorship of N. Gangopadhyay. The locus classicus of the two-visual systems hypothesis is A.D. Milner and M.A. Goodale, The Visual Brain in Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
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