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I am grateful to Daniel Jacobson and Lisa Shabel for helpful comments
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I am grateful to Daniel Jacobson and Lisa Shabel for helpful comments.
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2
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65249134668
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This is how I understand the views of Phillippa Foot, Martha Nussbaum, Robert Roberts, and Robert Solomon, for instance, though they differ on other matters. I won't address those differences here, nor will I distinguish here between cogni-tivism and judgmentalism
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This is how I understand the views of Phillippa Foot, Martha Nussbaum, Robert Roberts, and Robert Solomon, for instance, though they differ on other matters. I won't address those differences here, nor will I distinguish here between cogni-tivism and judgmentalism.
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84926133490
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The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotions (Or Anti-Quasijudgmentalism)
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For a discussion of this, see
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For a discussion of this, see D'Arms and Jacobson "The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotions (Or Anti-Quasijudgmentalism)" Philosophy, Supp. 52 (2003) 127-145.
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(2003)
Philosophy
, vol.52
, Issue.SUPP.
, pp. 127-145
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D'Arms1
Jacobson2
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65249159922
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See my Two Arguments for Sentimentalism Philosophical Issues, 15 (2005) 1-21.
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See my "Two Arguments for Sentimentalism" Philosophical Issues, Vol. 15 (2005) 1-21.
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5
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65249116660
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This is how I read the discussion of warrant and kindred normative notions at pp. 236-240, in conjunction with the prior discussion of calibration files at pp. 98-102
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This is how I read the discussion of warrant and kindred normative notions at pp. 236-240, in conjunction with the prior discussion of calibration files at pp. 98-102.
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65249092827
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It sometimes seems that Prinz thinks a given perceptual elicitor can only trigger the calibration file mechanism if a copy of that very perception has already been 'put in the file' through associative learning. Otherwise the perception can cause anger, but the anger state can not count as jealousy because no copy of this particular perception was in the calibration file. But this has bizarre implications. If it were true, one could not get jealous as a result of catching one's lover with another partner unless one had had this perceptual experience before and each new partner, lover, setting, etc. would apparently require a new lesson, Prinz might want to reply that a novel perception can only cause jealousy through the mediation of something else that is in the file: a judgment of infidelity. But it seems implausible to me that any such judgment is required to initiate jealousy, as I explain below. Moreover this line of response would commit him to a significant concession to cogni
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It sometimes seems that Prinz thinks a given perceptual elicitor can only trigger the calibration file mechanism if a copy of that very perception has already been 'put in the file' through associative learning. Otherwise the perception can cause anger, but the anger state can not count as jealousy because no copy of this particular perception was in the calibration file. But this has bizarre implications. If it were true, one could not get jealous as a result of catching one's lover with another partner unless one had had this perceptual experience before (and each new partner, lover, setting, etc. would apparently require a new lesson). Prinz might want to reply that a novel perception can only cause jealousy through the mediation of something else that is in the file: a judgment of infidelity. But it seems implausible to me that any such judgment is required to initiate jealousy, as I explain below. Moreover this line of response would commit him to a significant concession to cognivitism: that emotions such as jealousy can only arise in novel circumstances as a result of a judgment.
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For instance, when the classmate a girl was playing with yesterday decides to play with someone else today the girl might be jealous - bothered (perhaps viscerally) that this person is bestowing attention and affection on another rather than herself. And this reaction may well be fitting, depending on the case. But it need not be an infidelity if the girl has no special claim on her classmate's affections that is now being betrayed.
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For instance, when the classmate a girl was playing with yesterday decides to play with someone else today the girl might be jealous - bothered (perhaps viscerally) that this person is bestowing attention and affection on another rather than herself. And this reaction may well be fitting, depending on the case. But it need not be an infidelity if the girl has no special claim on her classmate's affections that is now being betrayed.
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65249110671
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D'Arms and Jacobson (2003); and Rational Sentimentalism (in preparation).
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D'Arms and Jacobson (2003); and Rational Sentimentalism (in preparation).
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In denying response-dependence Prinz focuses on fear and danger, admittedly the best case for specifying an emotion's content in non-response-invoking terms.
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In denying response-dependence Prinz focuses on fear and danger, admittedly the best case for specifying an emotion's content in non-response-invoking terms.
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