Handling interdependent values in an auction mechanism for bandwidth allocation in tactical data networks

SIGCOMM 2008 Conference and the Co-located Workshops - Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Economics of Networked Systems, NetEcon'08

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 73-78

  Klein, Mark ^a   Moreno, Gabriel A ^a   Parkes, David C ^b   Plakosh, Daniel ^a   Seuken, Sven ^b   Wallnau, Kurt ^a  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Interdependent values; Mechanism design; Sensor networks

Indexed keywords

AUCTION MECHANISMS; BAND-WIDTH ALLOCATIONS; EFFICIENT BANDWIDTHS; INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITIES; INTERDEPENDENT VALUES; ITS DATUM; LIMITED BANDWIDTHS; MECHANISM DESIGN; PRIVATE INFORMATIONS; TACTICAL DATA NETWORKS; TRACKING OBJECTS; TWO STAGES;

AGENTS; BANDWIDTH; SENSOR NETWORKS; TECHNICAL PRESENTATIONS; TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS;

MACHINE DESIGN;

EID: 65249119619     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1403027.1403044     Document Type: Conference Paper

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