The Kosovo case and international law: Looking for applicable theories

Chinese Journal of International Law

Volumn 8, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 47-61

  Hilpold, Peter ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF INNSBRUCK   (Austria)

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EID: 65249093200     PISSN: 15401650     EISSN: 17469937     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/chinesejil/jmn042     Document Type: Article

References (112)

1. See Ian Brownlie, General Course on Public International Law, 255 Recueil des Cours de la Aca-demie de Droit International de La Haye (1995) 30: "[...] theory provides no real benefits and frequently obscures the more interesting questions" The difficulties in reconciling theoiy and practice with regard to the Kosovo case have been widely noted in the literature.
2. See, for example, Karine Ardault, Christina-Maria Arion and Marina Yetongnon, L'Administration International de Territoire à l'Epreuve du Kosovo et du Timor Oriental: La Pratique à la Recherche d'une Théorie, 39 Revue Beige de Droit International (2005), para 40, 301.
3. See also Peter Hilpold, Der Kosovo-Fall: Ein Testfall für das Völkerrecht, 68 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (2008), 779.
4. Noel Malcolm, A Short History of Kosovo, Macmillan 1998.
5. See Opinion No. 3 of the Badinter Commission, reprinted in 3 European JIL (1992) 184-185.
6. See Steve Ratner, Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New States, 90 American JIL (1996), 590 (613).
7. As it is known, the federation of Serbia and Montenegro was named "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" when it came into being in 1992 while in 2003, in a different constitutional and political setting this entity was renamed in the "State Union of Serbia and Montenegro". In 2006, this State Union disintegrated into its two constitutive parts.
8. See also Peter Radan, Post-Secession International Borders: A Critical Analysis of the Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Commission, 24 Melbourne University LR (2000), 50.
9. See, with regard to the acts of recognition of Kosovo, Alexander Orakhelashvili, Statehood, Recognition and the United Nations System: a Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Kosovo, 12 Max Planck YUNL (2008) 1 (29).
10. See also Srdjan Cvijc, Self-determination as a Challenge to the Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of Kosovo, 8 German LJ (2007), 57 (60).
11. For a detailed account see Peter Hilpold, Humanitarian Intervention: Is There a Need for a Legal Reappraisal?, 12 European JIL (2001), 437.
12. See SC Res. 1160 of 31 March 1998 and, much more explicitly, Res. 1199 of 23 September 1998. It shall no go unmentioned, however, that violations of humanitarian law have been committed also by the Albanian side, in particular by the UCK guerilla army. SC Res. 1199 has confirmed the responsibility of both parties.
13. See, in primis, Antonio Cassese, Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving I owards International Legi-mitation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?, 10 European JIL (1999), 23 (27).
14. This "conditional approach" is not new. See the "Third Interim Report of the Subcommittee on the International Protection of Human Rights by General International Law", ILA Report of the Fifty-Sixth Conference (1974) 217,
15. cited in Richard B. Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention Through the United Nations. Towards the Development of Criteria, 5.3 Zeitschrift für auslän-disches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (1993) 557 (562).
16. See Peter Hilpold, Sezession und humanitäre Intervention - völkerrechtliche Instrumente zur Bewältigung innerstaatlicher Konflikte?, in: 54 Zeitschrift fiir Öffentliches Recht (1999), 529.
17. See Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: "Rather than defining the Kosovo intervention as a precedent, most NATO supporters among international jurists presented the intervention as an unfortunate but necessary and reasonable exception."
18. See also the oral pleadings by Professor Ian Brownlie who acted for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in the cases concerning the Legality of Use of Force, 1999, CR 99/14, p. 36.
19. In a broader perspective, two cases could be seen as a precedent: West New Guinea and South-West Africa. While in the latter case the vicissitudes of history have lead to a positive end result, the former case resulted in a total debacle in 1963 when the nation-building process was aborted and Indonesia gained full control of this territory. In 1969 self-determination was exercised in a form not worth its name. See Antonio Cassese, Self-determination of peoples, CUP (1995), 82 who speaks of a "substantive betrayal of the principle of self-determination" (86).
20. See extensively on this issue, Rernhard Knoll, The Legal Status of Territories Suject to Administration by International Organisations, CUP (2008).
21. It would be inappropriate to take here the recourse to a principle similar to the Stimson doctrine or, more generally, to the jus cogens-character of Art. 2 para. 4 of the UN Charter and arguing, as a consequence, that facts ensuing from acts of humanitarian intervention could not be recognized as the relationship between cause and effect is, in this situation, far more remote.
22. In this sense, however, Epaminontas E. Triantafilou, Matter of Law, Question of Policy: Kosovo's Current and Future Status under International Law, 5 Chicago JIL (2004), 355 (364).
23. For an account of this process see Peter Hilpold, The Duty to Protect and the Reform of the United Nations - a New Step in the Development of International Law?, 10 Max Planck YUNL (2006), 35.
24. A/60/L.1
25. Ibid., para. 138.
26. Ibid., para. 139.
27. Advisory Opinion of the ICJ on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion of 26 January 1971, [1971] ICJ Rep. 208, paras. 112-115 (115).
28. See, for instance, Security Council Resolution UN Doc. S/RES/687 (1991), settling the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait as well as Security Council Resolutions UN Doc. S/RES/757 (1992) and UN Doc. S/RES/777 (1992) on the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a successor of the FSRY, cited according to Jean D'Aspremont, Regulating Statehood: The Kosovo Status Settlement, 20 Leiden JIL (2007), 649 (652).
29. See Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 Virgina JIL (1993), 1;
30. Peter Hilpold, Self-Determination in the 21th Century - Modern Perspectives for an Old Concept, 36 Israel YbHR (2006), 247.
31. See also Reference re Secession of Quebec, 115 ILR 536 (Canada 1998).
32. See Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 Yale JIL (1992), 539
33. and Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 American JIL (1992), 46.
34. For an analysis of the contribution given by the UN to the diffusion and strengthening of democracy in Kosovo see Marc Cogen/Eric De Brabandere, Democratic Governance and Post-Conflict Reconstruction, 20 Leiden JIL (2007), 669.
35. See, extensively, Peter Hilpold, Die Sezession - zum Versuch der Verrechtlichung eines faktischen Phänomens, Zeitschrift für öffendiches Recht (2008), 117.
36. Of course, humanitarian law has to be respected in this context. Otherwise, both State responsibility and individual criminal responsibility may ensue.
37. Still the most important contribution in this sense Lee C. Buchheit, Secession: the Legitimacy of Self-Determination (1976). See also, for example, Karl Doehring, Self-Determination, in: Bruno Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations (vol. I, 2nd edn., 2002), para. 29.
38. To this avail, often reference is made to the so-called "safeguard clause" in the "Friendly-Relations-Declaration" (UNGA Res. 2625 of 24 October 1970) and in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of 25 June 1993 seemingly granting a right to secession to peoples victims of severe discrimination. Such a conclusion is, however, misguided as amply shown elsewhere.
39. See Peter Hilpold, Die Sezession - zum Versuch der Verrechdichung eines faktischen Phänomens, 63 Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht (2008), 117 (127).
40. For an evaluation of the Ahtisaari proposal see Marcelo G. Kohen, Le Kosovo: Un Test Pour La Communauté Internationale, in: Vincent Chetail (ed.), Conflits, sécurité et coopération (2007), 367;
41. Rüdiger Wolfrum, Kosovo: Some Thoughts on Its Future Status, in: Sienha Yee/ Jacques-Ivan Morin (ed.), Multiculturalism and International Law (2009), 561.
42. See, for example, Christopher J. Borgen, Kosovo's Declaration of Independence: Self-Determination, Secession and Recognition, 12 American Society of International Law Insights 2008, www.asil.org/insights080229.cfm (last accesses 28 December 2008). As Morag Goodwin has demonstrated convincingly to allow for past abuses to constitute a justification for secession would lead to unsolvable questions (making the extreme example of Mercia having been integrated into the English nation by the King of Wessex by force in the tenth cenmry).
43. See Morag Goodwin, From Province to Protectorate to State? Speculation on the Impact of Kosovo's Genesis upon the Doctrine of International Law, 8 German LJ (2007), 1 (6).
44. For the difficulties to define the people, the "self, having the right to self-determination, see, in general, Michla Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice, Martinus Nijhoff (1982), 18. She convincingly demonstrates that UN practice in this field has been hopelessly confused and politically biased.
45. The quotation is taken from C.H. Alexadrowicz, The Theory of Recognition in Fieri, 34 British YBIL(1958) 176 (183).
46. One reason for this may lie also in the fact that von Steck's theory on recognition has heavily influenced the following writings and was thereby kept alive up to this day. See Alexandrowicz, 184.
47. See Orakhelashvili, above n.7, p. 8 and 11, referring to James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, OUP (2006), 415 and Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, Martinus Nijhoff (1948), 8.
48. George Scelle, Obsession du Territoire, Symbolae Verzijl, CUP (1958).
49. This can be said at least insofar as it is allowed to argue in terms of an "objectivized governmental thinking".
50. See Peter Hilpold, EU Development Cooperation at a Crossroads: the Cotonou Agreement of 23 June 2000 and the Principle of Good Governance, 7 European Foreign Affairs Review (2002), 53.
51. Such criticism was levelled, in particular, against the policy of conditionality by the European Union.
52. Peter Hilpold, Die Anerkennung der Neustaaten auf dem Balkan, 31 Archiv des Völkerrechts (1993), (para. 515), 387.
53. As it is known, these elements (permanent population, defined territory, government and capacity to enter into relations with other States) are enumerated in the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States of 1933 (165 League of Nations Treaty Series, 19; 28 American JIL Suppl. (1934), 75.
54. See for a discussion of these elements P.K. Menon, Some Aspects of the Law of Recognition, Part II: Recognition of States, 68 Revue de Droit International (1990), 1.
55. UNGA A/63/L. 2.
56. See the "Ahtisaari Report", S/2007/168, para. 10: "Independence is the only option for a politically stable and economically viable Kosovo. Only in an independent Kosovo will its democratic institutions be fully responsible and accountable for their actions."
57. See Ian Brownlie, General Course on Public International Law, 255 Recueil des Cours de la Aca-demie de Droit International de La Haye (1995) 30: "[...] theory provides no real benefits and frequently obscures the more interesting questions" The difficulties in reconciling theoiy and practice with regard to the Kosovo case have been widely noted in the literature.
58. See, for example, Karine Ardault, Christina-Maria Arion and Marina Yetongnon, L'Administration International de Territoire à l'Epreuve du Kosovo et du Timor Oriental: La Pratique à la Recherche d'une Théorie, 39 Revue Beige de Droit International (2005), para 40, 301.
59. See also Peter Hilpold, Der Kosovo-Fall: Ein Testfall für das Völkerrecht, 68 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (2008), 779.
60. Noel Malcolm, A Short History of Kosovo, Macmillan 1998.
61. See Opinion No. 3 of the Badinter Commission, reprinted in 3 European JIL (1992) 184-185.
62. See Steve Ratner, Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New States, 90 American JIL (1996), 590 (613).
63. As it is known, the federation of Serbia and Montenegro was named "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" when it came into being in 1992 while in 2003, in a different constitutional and political setting this entity was renamed in the "State Union of Serbia and Montenegro". In 2006, this State Union disintegrated into its two constitutive parts.
64. See also Peter Radan, Post-Secession International Borders: A Critical Analysis of the Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Commission, 24 Melbourne University LR (2000), 50.
65. See, with regard to the acts of recognition of Kosovo, Alexander Orakhelashvili, Statehood, Recognition and the United Nations System: a Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Kosovo, 12 Max Planck YUNL (2008) 1 (29).
66. See also Srdjan Cvijc, Self-determination as a Challenge to the Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of Kosovo, 8 German LJ (2007), 57 (60).
67. For a detailed account see Peter Hilpold, Humanitarian Intervention: Is There a Need for a Legal Reappraisal?, 12 European JIL (2001), 437.
68. See SC Res. 1160 of 31 March 1998 and, much more explicitly, Res. 1199 of 23 September 1998. It shall no go unmentioned, however, that violations of humanitarian law have been committed also by the Albanian side, in particular by the UCK guerilla army. SC Res. 1199 has confirmed the responsibility of both parties.
69. See, in primis, Antonio Cassese, Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving I owards International Legi-mitation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?, 10 European JIL (1999), 23 (27).
70. This "conditional approach" is not new. See the "Third Interim Report of the Subcommittee on the International Protection of Human Rights by General International Law", ILA Report of the Fifty-Sixth Conference (1974) 217,
71. cited in Richard B. Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention Through the United Nations. Towards the Development of Criteria, 5.3 Zeitschrift für auslän-disches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (1993) 557 (562).
72. See Peter Hilpold, Sezession und humanitäre Intervention - völkerrechtliche Instrumente zur Bewältigung innerstaatlicher Konflikte?, in: 54 Zeitschrift fiir Öffentliches Recht (1999), 529.
73. See Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: "Rather than defining the Kosovo intervention as a precedent, most NATO supporters among international jurists presented the intervention as an unfortunate but necessary and reasonable exception."
74. See also the oral pleadings by Professor Ian Brownlie who acted for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in the cases concerning the Legality of Use of Force, 1999, CR 99/14, p. 36.
75. In a broader perspective, two cases could be seen as a precedent: West New Guinea and South-West Africa. While in the latter case the vicissitudes of history have lead to a positive end result, the former case resulted in a total debacle in 1963 when the nation-building process was aborted and Indonesia gained full control of this territory. In 1969 self-determination was exercised in a form not worth its name. See Antonio Cassese, Self-determination of peoples, CUP (1995), 82 who speaks of a "substantive betrayal of the principle of self-determination" (86).
76. See extensively on this issue, Rernhard Knoll, The Legal Status of Territories Suject to Administration by International Organisations, CUP (2008).
77. It would be inappropriate to take here the recourse to a principle similar to the Stimson doctrine or, more generally, to the jus cogens-character of Art. 2 para. 4 of the UN Charter and arguing, as a consequence, that facts ensuing from acts of humanitarian intervention could not be recognized as the relationship between cause and effect is, in this situation, far more remote.
78. In this sense, however, Epaminontas E. Triantafilou, Matter of Law, Question of Policy: Kosovo's Current and Future Status under International Law, 5 Chicago JIL (2004), 355 (364).
79. For an account of this process see Peter Hilpold, The Duty to Protect and the Reform of the United Nations - a New Step in the Development of International Law?, 10 Max Planck YUNL (2006), 35.
80. A/60/L.1
81. Ibid., para. 138.
82. Ibid., para. 139.
83. Advisory Opinion of the ICJ on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion of 26 January 1971, [1971] ICJ Rep. 208, paras. 112-115 (115).
84. See, for instance, Security Council Resolution UN Doc. S/RES/687 (1991), settling the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait as well as Security Council Resolutions UN Doc. S/RES/757 (1992) and UN Doc. S/RES/777 (1992) on the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a successor of the FSRY, cited according to Jean D'Aspremont, Regulating Statehood: The Kosovo Status Settlement, 20 Leiden JIL (2007), 649 (652).
85. See Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 Virgina JIL (1993), 1;
86. Peter Hilpold, Self-Determination in the 21th Century - Modern Perspectives for an Old Concept, 36 Israel YbHR (2006), 247.
87. See also Reference re Secession of Quebec, 115 ILR 536 (Canada 1998).
88. See Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 Yale JIL (1992), 539
89. and Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 American JIL (1992), 46.
90. For an analysis of the contribution given by the UN to the diffusion and strengthening of democracy in Kosovo see Marc Cogen/Eric De Brabandere, Democratic Governance and Post-Conflict Reconstruction, 20 Leiden JIL (2007), 669.
91. See, extensively, Peter Hilpold, Die Sezession - zum Versuch der Verrechtlichung eines faktischen Phänomens, Zeitschrift für öffendiches Recht (2008), 117.
92. Of course, humanitarian law has to be respected in this context. Otherwise, both State responsibility and individual criminal responsibility may ensue.
93. Still the most important contribution in this sense Lee C. Buchheit, Secession: the Legitimacy of Self-Determination (1976). See also, for example, Karl Doehring, Self-Determination, in: Bruno Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations (vol. I, 2nd edn., 2002), para. 29.
94. To this avail, often reference is made to the so-called "safeguard clause" in the "Friendly-Relations-Declaration" (UNGA Res. 2625 of 24 October 1970) and in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of 25 June 1993 seemingly granting a right to secession to peoples victims of severe discrimination. Such a conclusion is, however, misguided as amply shown elsewhere.
95. See Peter Hilpold, Die Sezession - zum Versuch der Verrechdichung eines faktischen Phänomens, 63 Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht (2008), 117 (127).
96. For an evaluation of the Ahtisaari proposal see Marcelo G. Kohen, Le Kosovo: Un Test Pour La Communauté Internationale, in: Vincent Chetail (ed.), Conflits, sécurité et coopération (2007), 367;
97. Rüdiger Wolfrum, Kosovo: Some Thoughts on Its Future Status, in: Sienha Yee/ Jacques-Ivan Morin (ed.), Multiculturalism and International Law (2009), 561.
98. See, for example, Christopher J. Borgen, Kosovo's Declaration of Independence: Self-Determination, Secession and Recognition, 12 American Society of International Law Insights 2008, www.asil.org/insights080229.cfm (last accesses 28 December 2008). As Morag Goodwin has demonstrated convincingly to allow for past abuses to constitute a justification for secession would lead to unsolvable questions (making the extreme example of Mercia having been integrated into the English nation by the King of Wessex by force in the tenth cenmry).
99. See Morag Goodwin, From Province to Protectorate to State? Speculation on the Impact of Kosovo's Genesis upon the Doctrine of International Law, 8 German LJ (2007), 1 (6).
100. For the difficulties to define the people, the "self, having the right to self-determination, see, in general, Michla Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice, Martinus Nijhoff (1982), 18. She convincingly demonstrates that UN practice in this field has been hopelessly confused and politically biased.
101. The quotation is taken from C.H. Alexadrowicz, The Theory of Recognition in Fieri, 34 British YBIL(1958) 176 (183).
102. One reason for this may lie also in the fact that von Steck's theory on recognition has heavily influenced the following writings and was thereby kept alive up to this day. See Alexandrowicz, 184.
103. See Orakhelashvili, above n.7, p. 8 and 11, referring to James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, OUP (2006), 415 and Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, Martinus Nijhoff (1948), 8.
104. George Scelle, Obsession du Territoire, Symbolae Verzijl, CUP (1958).
105. This can be said at least insofar as it is allowed to argue in terms of an "objectivized governmental thinking".
106. See Peter Hilpold, EU Development Cooperation at a Crossroads: the Cotonou Agreement of 23 June 2000 and the Principle of Good Governance, 7 European Foreign Affairs Review (2002), 53.
107. Such criticism was levelled, in particular, against the policy of conditionality by the European Union.
108. Peter Hilpold, Die Anerkennung der Neustaaten auf dem Balkan, 31 Archiv des Völkerrechts (1993), (para. 515), 387.
109. As it is known, these elements (permanent population, defined territory, government and capacity to enter into relations with other States) are enumerated in the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States of 1933 (165 League of Nations Treaty Series, 19; 28 American JIL Suppl. (1934), 75.
110. See for a discussion of these elements P.K. Menon, Some Aspects of the Law of Recognition, Part II: Recognition of States, 68 Revue de Droit International (1990), 1.
111. UNGA A/63/L. 2.
112. See the "Ahtisaari Report", S/2007/168, para. 10: "Independence is the only option for a politically stable and economically viable Kosovo. Only in an independent Kosovo will its democratic institutions be fully responsible and accountable for their actions."