Crawford v. Marion county election board: The missed opportunity to remedy the ambiguity and unpredictability of Burdick

Denver University Law Review

Volumn 86, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 535-563

  Jensen, Bryan P ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 65149102329     PISSN: 08839409     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Note

References (333)

1. Demian A. Ordway, Note, Disenfranchisement and the Constitution: Finding a Standard that Works, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1174 (2007)
2. (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1963)).
3. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992);
4. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780,788 (1983);
5. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,667 (1966).
6. U.S. CONST, art I § 4, cl. 1.
7. See Harper, 383 U.S. at 666-68.
8. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788.
9. Id. at 789.
10. Id.
11. See Ordway, supra note 1, at 1192.
12. S.B. 483, 114th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2005).
13. 128 S.Ct. 1610 (2008).
14. Id. at 1624 (Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining that the majority opinion rests its decision on a balancing approach while the concurrence bases its decision on an "important regulatory interests" standard).
15. Id. at 1627 (Scalia, J., concurring).
16. David Schultz, Election Law: Less Than Fundamental: The Myth of Voter Fraud and the Coming of the Second Great Disenfranchisement, 34 Wm. MITCHELL L. REV. 483,530 (2008).
17. U.S. CONST, art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
18. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,665 (1966).
19. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983) ("It must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.");
20. see also Harper, 838 U.S. at 666 ("Our cases demonstrate that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment restrains the States from fixing voter qualifications which invidiously discriminate.")
21. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
22. Id. at 665 n.1 (discussing the various sections of the Virginia Constitution that authorize the poll tax). In 1965, one-year prior to Harper, the Virginia poll tax was declared a violation of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment as a prerequisite to voting in federal elections. Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 544 (1965).
23. See Harper, 383 U.S. at 665-66.
24. Id. at 666-67.
25. Id. at 666 n. 3.
26. Id. at 667 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
27. Id. (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1963) (alteration in original)).
28. Id. at 670.
29. Id. at 666.
30. Id. at 666-67.
31. Id. 670 (referring to conditioning the right to vote on affluence).
32. See U.S. CONST, art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
33. Id.
34. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).
35. Id.
36. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433.
37. But see Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793,795 (2006) (discussing the myth "that strict scrutiny is an 'inflexible' rule that invalidates every (or nearly every) law to which it applies").
38. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 ("Although these rights of voters are fundamental, not all restrictions imposed by the States on candidates' eligibility for the ballot impose constitutionally suspect burdens on voters' rights to associate or to choose among candidates.").
39. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1624 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
40. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
41. Id. at 783 n.1 (explaining the challenged Ohio statute).
42. Id. at 782.
43. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall joined in the majority opinion. Id. at 781.
44. Id. at 805-06.
45. Id. at 790.
46. Id. at 806.
47. Id. at 786.
48. Id. at 788 (first and second emphasis added).
49. This quotation was cited in both Burdick and Crawford. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1616 (2008);
50. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,434 (1992).
51. Justice Scalia believed the statement, as used in Burdick, helped refine the Anderson approach into "an administrable rule." Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1624 (Scalia, J., concurring).
52. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 786, 792-93.
53. Id. at 789.
54. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
55. See id. at 730.
56. Id.
57. This appears to be the interpretation the Anderson Court adopts, as it finds the state interests do not outweigh the burden on the right to vote. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 806.
58. This is the interpretation, although refined by Burdick, which Justice Scalia adopts. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 at 1624-25 (2008) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
59. This is the interpretation that the Burdick Court seemingly adopted. See Burdick v. Taku-shi, 504 U.S. 428,434 (1992) ("Under this standard, the rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.").
60. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 790, 792 ("An early filing deadline may have a substantial impact on independent-minded voters"). This evidences that the Court has been willing to look at generalized burdens that impact voters differently-contrary to Justice Scalia's plurality opinion in Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1625 (Scalia, J., concurring).
61. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 793.
62. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1624;
63. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 806;
64. see Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.
65. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 796-802.
66. Id. at 797-98, 800-01.
67. Id. at 798, 801, 805.
68. Id. at 806.
69. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Justices White, Powell, and O'Connor joined in Justice Rehnquist's dissent).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 817 (citing Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431,439 (1971)).
72. Id. (quoting Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 762 (1973) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)).
73. Id. at 818 ,823.
74. See discussion infra Part I.C.
75. See discussion infra Part IC.
76. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
77. Id. at 430.
78. Id. at 430, 438 (internal quotation marks omitted).
79. Id. at 438.
80. Id. at 433 (quoting III. Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979)).
81. Id. at 433 (citing Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 193 (1986)).
82. Id. at 432.
83. Id. at 434.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 437. The majority opinion also characterized the burden as "limited" and "slight." Id. at 438-39.
86. Id. at 435-36 (explaining that the three mechanisms to gain ballot access were filing through a party petition, an established political party, or a designated non-partisan ballot).
87. Id. at. 436-37.
88. Id. at 439.
89. Id.
90. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
91. 502 U.S. 279 (1992).
92. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (citing Norman, 502 U.S. at 289).
93. Norman, 502 U.S. at 288-89 ('To the degree that a State would thwart this interest by limiting the access of new parties to the ballot, we have called for the demonstration of a corresponding interest sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation, and we have accordingly required any severe restriction to be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.") (internal citations omitted).
94. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 439-40.
95. Id. at 440.
96. Id. at 442 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 448.
99. Id. at 450.
100. Id. at 448 (emphasis added).
101. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 793 (1983).
102. Compare Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789, with Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434. This alteration may be an import from Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Anderson.
103. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 817 (Rehn-quist, J., dissenting).
104. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (citing Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)).
105. See Schultz, supra note 13, at 503-22 (discussing Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008);
106. Gonzalez v. Arizona, 485 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007);
107. ACLU of N.M. v. Santillanes, 506 F. Supp. 2d 598 (D.N.M. 2007);
108. Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (N.D. Ga. 2005);
109. In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 740 N.W.2d 444 (Mich. 2007);
110. Weinshenck v. Missouri, 203 S.W.3d 201 (Mo. 2006)).
111. Id. at 521.
112. Id. By this time courts were referring to the Anderson standard as the "Burdick test." See id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 522.
115. See Ordway, supra note 1, at 1174 ("Since the presidential election of 2000, a host of new claims has arisen alleging unlawful denial of the right to vote. Litigants have challenged the use of error-prone voting machines, misleading registration forms, and the highly controversial photo identification requirements for in-person voting.").
116. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1615 (2008).
117. 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
118. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 15301(b)(1) (West 2008);
119. see also Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1614 n.3, 1617-18 (discussing the requirements of HAVA).
120. COMM'N on FED. ELECTION REFORM, BUILDING CONFIDENCE in U.S. ELECTIONS: REPORT of tHE COMMISSION on FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM 4 (2005), available at http://www.american.edu/ia/cfer/report/full-report.pdf [hereinafter CARTER-BAKER REPORT].
121. 42 U.S.C.A. § 15483(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) (West 2008).
122. See CARTER-BAKER REPORT, supra note 103, § 2.5.
123. Schultz, supra note 13, at 485-86.
124. S.B. 483,114th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2005).
125. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1613 (2008).
126. Id. at 1614 (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11.7-5-2.5(b) (West 2006)).
127. Id. at 1613 (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 3-1 l-8-25.1(e) (West Supp. 2007)).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1613-14 (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11.7-5-2.5(c) (West 2006)).
130. Id. at 1614 n.3, 1617-18 (discussing the requirements of HAVA);
131. see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 15483(b)(2)(A)(i)(n) (West 2008) (stating that HAVA did require a voter to include in her registration application some form of identification, e.g., bank statement, utility bill, paycheck, etc., for verification purposes).
132. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1614.
133. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1971 (West 2008).
134. IND. CONST, art II, §§1,2.
135. Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775,782-83 (S.D. Ind. 2006), aff d sub nom. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007), aff d 128 S. CL 1610 (2008);
136. see also Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1614.
137. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1614 (quoting Ind. Democratic Party, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 783).
138. Id. at 1615 (citing Crawford, 472 F.3d at 952 (7th Cir. 2007)).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1613-14.
142. Id. at 1616 n.8;
143. see also id at 1624-25.
144. Id. at 1613.
145. Id. at 1616 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983)).
146. Id. at 1616.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1617-20.
149. Id. at 1621.
150. Id. at 1624.
151. Id. at 1616 n.8.
152. Id. at 1624 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. (calling this tier a "deferential important regulatory interests standard") (internal quotation marks omitted).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1625 (internal quotation marks omitted).
158. Id. at 1626.
159. Id. at 1625.
160. Id. at 1626.
161. Id. at 1626-27.
162. Id. at 1627.
163. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 1643.
165. Id. at 1627.
166. Id. at 1643.
167. Id. at 1628.
168. Id. at 1632 (accepting estimate "that 43,000 voting-age residents lack the kind of identification card required by Indiana's law").
169. Id. at 1634.
170. Id.
171. Id.;
172. see also id. at 1635 ("But having found the Voter ID Law burdens far from trivial, I have to make a rigorous assessment of the precise interests put forward by the State . . ..") (internal quotation marks omitted).
173. Id. at 1636.
174. Id. at 1642-43.
175. 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring).
176. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1643 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
177. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
178. Id. at 1644;
179. Carter-Baker Report, supra note 103, §§ 2.5, 2.5.3.
180. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1645.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1644.
183. Id. Justice Breyer noted, by way of comparison, that the $ 1.50 poll tax-declared unconstitutional in Harper-would be less than $10 today.
184. Id. (citing Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616-17 (Souter, J., dissenting)).
185. Id. (citing Justice Souter's dissent, which stated 21 of Indiana's 92 counties have no public transportation and an additional 32 counties only regional county service).
186. Id. at 1643 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000)).
187. Id. at 1644-45;
188. see FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 101.043(1)-(2), 101.048(2)(b) (West 2008);
189. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 21-2-381, 21-2-417 (West 2007). The Florida and Georgia laws allow the voter a greater range of acceptable forms of identification to present when voting, similar to the list supplied by HAVA.
190. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1640 (Souter, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 1627 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) ("The lead opinion's record-based resolution of these cases, which neither rejects nor embraces the rule of our precedents, provides no certainty, and will embolden litigants who surmise that our precedents have been abandoned.").
192. See generally Posting of Michael C. Dorf to Dorf on Law, http://www.rnicriaeldorf.org/2008/04/roberts-court-on-facial-challenges.html (Apr. 29, 2008, 14:43 EST).
193. Crawford, 128 S. Ct at 1616 n.8 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
194. Id. at 1616.
195. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
196. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1622 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
197. Id. at 1624 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
198. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 438 (1992);
199. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616 n.8 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) ("The Burdick opinion was explicit in its endorsement and adherence to Anderson. . . . ") (citing Burkick, 504 U.S. 428 at 434).
200. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1624 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
201. Id.
202. Id. Justice Scalia, in a parenthetical, seemed to suggest a severe burden is such where a law is "so burdensome as to be virtually impossible to satisfy. " Id. at 1625.
203. Id. at 1625 (citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 728-29 (1974)).
204. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 438.
205. Id. at 433-34.
206. Id. at 434.
207. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).
208. Id. at 789.
209. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1624-25 (2008) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
210. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789.
211. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
212. Id. at 1623.
213. Id. at 1635 (Souter, J., dissenting).
214. See id. at 1621 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion);
215. id. at 1631-32 (Souter, J., dissenting);
216. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 435-36 (1992).
217. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1621 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
218. Id. at 1631-32 (Souter, J., dissenting).
219. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 448.
220. See Posting of Dan Tokaji to Election Law @ Moritz, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/blogs/tokaji/2008-04-01-equalvote-archive.html (Apr. 29, 2008 06:53 CST) [hereinafter Tokaji].
221. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1624 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
222. Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence 1 (Univ. of Chi., Pub. Law Working Paper No. 231, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1260998.
223. Christopher S. Elmendorf, Undue Burdens on Voter Participation: New Pressures for a Structural Theory of the Right to Vote, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 643, 646-47, app. at 703 (2008) ("By way of summary, Democratic judges have expressed 'anti' views on the constitutionality of photo ID requirements 14 times, and 'pro' views only 3 times. For Republican judges, the respective numbers are 3 (anti) and 15 (pro).").
224. Cox & Miles, supra note 194, at 1. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides in part: "No person acting under color of law shall - - (A) in determining whether any individual is qualified under State law or laws to vote in any election, apply any standard, practice, or procedure different from the standards, practices, or procedures applied under such law or laws to other individuals within the same county, parish, or similar political subdivision who have been found by State officials to be qualified to vote." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1971 (West 2008).
225. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
226. Erwin Chemerinsky, Further Thoughts, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 59, 60 (2001).
227. Id. at 60. Dean Chemerinsky supported this contention by stating "[n]o prior case ever had found that differences within a state in counting ballots violates equal protection.
228. For decades, the Supreme Court emphasized that state courts have the final say in interpreting state law; yet, the Supreme Court ended the counting because it believed Florida law required that result" Id.
229. Bush, 531 U.S. at 129 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
230. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
231. Id. at 263 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment in part).
232. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 n.3 (1966).
233. 380 U.S. 528 (1965).
234. See id. at 543.
235. See also Va. Historical Soc'y, The Civil Rights Movement in Virginia - Voting Rights, http://www.vahistorical.org/civilrights/vote.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2008) [hereinafter Voting Rights].
236. Carter Glass served in the Virginia Senate from 1899-1903, then enjoyed a long career as a Representative and Senator from Virginia in the United States Congress, eventually serving as the Secretary of the Treasury for the United States from 1918-20. Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress, GLASS, Carter, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl? index=G000232 (last visited Dec. 18,2008).
237. Harmon, 380 U.S. at 543 (quoting 2 VA. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (1901-1902), REPORT of tHE PROCEEDINGS and DEBATES of the CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, STATE of VIRGINIA: HELD in the CITY of RICHMOND, JUNE 12,1901, to JUNE 26,1902, at 2937, 3076-77 (J.H. Lindsay, ed., Hermitage Press 1906)). The Court noted that this was the general theme of the poll tax discussion with the only real debate occurring as to the effectiveness of the poll tax in disenfranchising African-Americans. Id. at 543 n.23.
238. Voting Rights, supra note 206.
239. 544 U.S. 581 (2005).
240. Id. at 603 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
241. Id. at 602-03.
242. Throughout Part III of this Comment the phrase "discriminatory effect" is synonymous with disparate impact, discriminatory impact, or disproportionate impact.
243. Clingman, 544 U.S. at 603.
244. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1623-24 (2008) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
245. Id. at 1624 n.21.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1621 ("[A] somewhat heavier burden may be placed on a limited number of persons. They include ... persons who because of economic or other personal limitations may find it difficult either to secure a copy of their birth certificate or to assemble the other required documentation to obtain a state-issued identification ....");
248. id. at 1625 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) ("The Indiana law affects different voters differently, but what petitioners view as the law's several light and heavy burdens are no more than the different impacts of the single burden that the law uniformly imposes on all voters.") (citation omitted);
249. id. at 1634 (Souter, J., dissenting) ('Tens of thousands of voting-age residents lack the necessary photo identification. A large proportion of them are likely to be in bad shape economically.") (citations omitted);
250. id. at 1644 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[A]n Indiana nondriver, most likely to be poor, elderly, or disabled, will find it difficult and expensive to travel to the Bureau of Motor Vehicles.");
251. id at 1644 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[TJhis statute imposes a disproportionate burden upon those without valid photo IDs.").
252. Id. at 1624 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
253. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).
254. See Schultz, supra note 13, at 485-86.
255. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
256. See supra Part III.A.
257. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1624 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Although Burdick liberally quoted Anderson, Burdick forged Anderson's amorphous 'flexible standard' into something resembling an administrable rule.")
258. (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)).
259. See Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 599 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964));
260. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433 (quoting Ill. Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979));
261. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788;
262. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,370 (1886)).
263. See Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 17.
264. UK Parliament, "No Taxation Without Representation" - Britain, America and the 1765 Stamp Act, http://www.parUament.uk/parhamentary- pubucations-and-archives/parliamentary-archives/archive s-stamp-act.cfm (last visited on Dec. 18, 2008).
265. See Schultz, supra note 13, at 484.
266. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1626 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
267. Neither Justice Stevens's, nor Justice Scalia's opinion mentioned that voting was a fundamental right. See id. at 1613-24 (Stevens, J.), 1624-27 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
268. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 628 (1969).
269. U.S. CONST, art. I, § 4, cl. 1;
270. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (2008).
271. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983);
272. see also Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
273. See Recent Cases, Constitutional Law - Voting Rights - Seventh Circuit Upholds Voter ID Statute, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1980, 1984-86 (2007) [hereinafter Voting Rights]. The Voting Rights article advocates a raised level of scrutiny, similar to the review used of campaign finance laws, that would look more to the "process by which such laws were enacted ...." Id. at 1985. The analysis would also "take a peek" at the effects of such regulations. Id. This comment suggests that evidence of entrenchment or discriminatory effect should raise the level of scrutiny to intermediate; the presence of both entrenchment and discriminatory effect should trigger strict scrutiny.
274. See also Cling-man v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 603 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting heightened scrutiny should be used in cases where discriminatory effects are present).
275. See infra note 250.
276. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789 ("In passing judgment, the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests; it also must consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights.").
277. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 ("[Wjhen those rights are subjected to severe restrictions, the regulation must be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.").
278. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 628 (1969);
279. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) ("The Equal Protection Clause demands no less than substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens, of all places as well as of all races.");
280. Voting Rights, supra note 233, at 1986.
281. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 263 (2003).
282. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 817 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
283. Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 603 (2005).
284. See 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
285. Id. at 248.
286. Id. at 241-42.
287. The contested regulation in Davis was 'Test 21," a test to determine minimum verbal and communicative skill, which applicants for the police academy were required to take. Id. at 234.
288. The Supreme Court found no error in the District Court's finding that the test was "directly related to the requirements of the police training program." Id. at 251-52. Further, this contention "was supported by a validation study, as well as by other evidence of record." Id. Under intermediate scrutiny, Test 21 would comply with the requirement of a necessary regulation to effectuate an important state interest.
289. Id. at 242.
290. See id. at 232-33.
291. See Schultz, supra note 13, at 501-03.
292. Davis, 426 U.S. at 254 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
293. Id. at 242.
294. Id.
295. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1621-22 (2008);
296. see also Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609 (2004) ("We add an afterword on Sabri's technique for challenging his indictment by facial attack on the underlying statute, and begin by recalling that facial challenges are best when infrequent.") (emphasis added);
297. see also Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 328-29 (2006) ("We prefer, for example, to enjoin only the unconstitutional applications of a statute while leaving other applications in force, or to sever its problematic portions while leaving the remainder intact.") (citation omitted).
298. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 628 (1969).
299. See Posting of Rick L. Hasen to FindLaw, http://writ.lp.findlaw. com/commentary/20080326-hasen.html#bio (Mar. 26, 2008).
300. Id.
301. 128 S.Ct. 1184(2008).
302. Id. at 1187 ("The People's Choice Initiative of 2004, or Initiative 872 (1-872), provides that candidates for office shall be identified on the ballot by their self-designated party preference; that voters may vote for any candidate; and that the top two votegetters for each office, regardless of party preference, advance to the general election.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
303. Id. at 1189.
304. Id. at 1193.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 1195.
307. Id. at 1194. The Court further noted the record did not contain the new style of ballot because they had not been created yet; therefore, there was no way to determine how the party preference would appear on the ballots. Id.
308. Id. at 1190-91 ("[A] plaintiff can only succeed in a facial challenge by 'establish[ing] that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid . . . .'") (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987));
309. see also Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1621 (2008) ("Given the fact that petitioners have advanced a broad attack on the constitutionality of SEA 483, seeking relief that would invalidate the statute in all its applications, they bear a heavy burden of persuasion.").
310. Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1190 (internal quotation marks omitted).
311. Id. at 1191 (internal brackets omitted) (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
312. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1622.
313. Id. at 1614.
314. Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 783 (S.D. Ind. 2006), aff'd sub nom. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 2007), affd 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1623 (2008).
315. Crawford, 472 F.3d at 952.
316. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1622-23.
317. Id. at 1615 ("[T]he District Court and the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the evidence in the record is not sufficient to support a facial attack on the validity of the entire statute .. .."); Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1193 (2008) ("But these cases involve a facial challenge, and we cannot strike down I-872 on its face based on the mere possibility of voter confusion.").
318. Hasen, supra note 254. Professor Hasen calls this the "unfair double standard" because the state can justify its election law by "merely positing - not proving - the existence of voter confusion or another interest. However, if voters (or groups) want to challenge a law, then they need to come forward with actual evidence of confusion or another burden. For them to posit the risk of confusion is not enough."
319. Hason, supra note 254;
320. see also Schultz, supra note 13, at 521-22.
321. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1615.
322. Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 845 (S.D. Ind. 2006), aff'd sub nom. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007), aff'd 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008);
323. Crawford, 472 F.3d at 954.
324. Crawford was a 6-3 decision upholding SEA 483; however, provided the record had shown evidence of an actual harm and Justices Stevens and Kennedy adhered to their reasoning in Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 442-450 (1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting), it is possible the outcome of the case would have been 6-3 or 5-4 (depending on Chief Justice Roberts's vote) holding SEA 483 unconstitutional.
325. The facial challenge would seemingly be a non-issue in such a case because Justice Scalia expressed his dissatisfaction with the lead opinion resolving the case in such a manner, Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1624 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion), and the dissenting opinions did not discuss facial challenges, id. at 1627-43 (Souter, J., dissenting);
326. id. at 1643-45 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
327. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 430.
328. Id. at 442 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
329. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1621.
330. Compare Burdick, 504 U.S. at 448-450 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), with Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1636-1643 (Souter, J., dissenting). The result of each dissent is not surprising as both used the flexible standard of Anderson in finding a substantial burden on the right to vote and thus taking a close look at the purported state interests.
331. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 187 (2008) ("An 'as applied' challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is evaluated considering how it operates in practice against the particular litigant and under the facts of the instant case, not hypothetical facts in other situations.");
332. see also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971) ("Our cases further establish that a statute or a rule may be held constitutionally invalid as applied when it operates to deprive an individual of a protected right although its general validity as a measure enacted in the legitimate exercise of state power is beyond question. Thus, in cases involving religious freedom, free speech or assembly, this Court has often held that a valid statute was unconstitutionally applied in particular circumstances because it interfered with an individual's exercise of those rights.").
333. See Tokaji, supra note 193.