Adverse selection or advantageous selection? Risk and underwriting in China's health-insurance market

Insurance: Mathematics and Economics

Volumn 44, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 505-510

  Gao, Feng ^a   Powers, Michael R ^a,b   Wang, Jun ^a  

^a Tsinghua University   (China)

^b TEMPLE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Advantageous selection; Adverse selection; Asymmetric information; Probit analysis

Indexed keywords

EID: 65049088091     PISSN: 01676687     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2009.02.004     Document Type: Article

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