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Volumn 11, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 33-45

Retained liberties and absolute Hobbesian authorization

(1)  Cohen, Andrew I a  

a NONE

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EID: 64949121241     PISSN: 09215891     EISSN: 18750257     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/187502598X00041     Document Type: Conference Paper
Times cited : (5)

References (62)
  • 1
    • 64949117210 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Rousseau was sensitive to this problem when he wrote: For if some rights remained with private individuals, in the absence of any common superior who could decide between them and the public, each person would eventually claim to be his own judge in all things, since he is on some point his own judge. The state of nature would subsist and the association would necessarily become tyrannical or hollow. (Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract in Peter Gay, ed., The Basic Political Writings [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 19871, I.6 [p. 148].)
    • Rousseau was sensitive to this problem when he wrote: "For if some rights remained with private individuals, in the absence of any common superior who could decide between them and the public, each person would eventually claim to be his own judge in all things, since he is on some point his own judge. The state of nature would subsist and the association would necessarily become tyrannical or hollow." (Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract in Peter Gay, ed., The Basic Political Writings [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 19871, I.6 [p. 148].)
  • 2
    • 79956831938 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, C.B. Macpherson, ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1968), II.29 (pp. 365-6)
    • Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, C.B. Macpherson, ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1968), II.29 (pp. 365-6)
  • 3
    • 79956760808 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Lev II.17 (p. 227); II.18 (pp. 229-230); II.21 (pp. 264-265, 269). Though Hobbes did not make the distinction between liberty rights and claim rights, he must have had liberty rights in mind here. From this point forward, unless otherwise noted, I shall use the notion of a right in this restricted, Hobbesian sense of a bare liberty
    • Lev II.17 (p. 227); II.18 (pp. 229-230); II.21 (pp. 264-265, 269). Though Hobbes did not make the distinction between liberty rights and claim rights, he must have had liberty rights in mind here. From this point forward, unless otherwise noted, I shall use the notion of a "right" in this restricted, Hobbesian sense of a bare liberty
  • 4
    • 79956816510 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Lev I.14 (p. 199). Lev II.21 (pp. 270-271); II.27 (p. 337)
    • Lev I.14 (p. 199). See also Lev II.21 (pp. 270-271); II.27 (p. 337)
  • 5
    • 79956771494 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Lev II.21 (p. 269). Hobbes qualifies this right of resistance by noting that one has the liberty to refuse only if doing so does not [frustrate] the End for which the Soveraignty was ordained. De Cive in Man and Citizen (De Homine and De Cive), Bernard Gert, ed., (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1991), II.18 (pp. 130-131), V.7 (pp. 169-170), VI.13 (pp. 182-3)
    • Lev II.21 (p. 269). Hobbes qualifies this right of resistance by noting that one has the liberty to refuse only if doing so does not "[frustrate] the End for which the Soveraignty was ordained." See also De Cive in Man and Citizen (De Homine and De Cive), Bernard Gert, ed., (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1991), II.18 (pp. 130-131), V.7 (pp. 169-170), VI.13 (pp. 182-3)
  • 6
    • 64949111349 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • XIV.18 pp. 305-307
    • De Cive XIV.18 (pp. 305-307)
    • De Cive
  • 7
    • 79956760807 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Lev II.21 (pp. 269-271)
    • Lev II.21 (pp. 269-271)
  • 8
    • 79956816502 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Lev I.14 (p. 199)
    • Lev I.14 (p. 199)
  • 9
    • 79956816475 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • II.19 p. 131
    • See also De Cive II.19 (p. 131)
    • Cive, D.1
  • 10
    • 79956759170 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Lev II.21 (p. 269)
    • Lev II.21 (p. 269)
  • 11
    • 79956768476 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic, Ferdinand Tönnies, ed. (London: Simpkin, Marshall and Co., 1889), I.17.2
    • See also The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic, Ferdinand Tönnies, ed. (London: Simpkin, Marshall and Co., 1889), I.17.2
  • 12
    • 79956758676 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • El Law I.14.11, I.15.3, I.17.2, II.8.8; De Cive I.11; Lev I.14 (190), I.15 (202), II.28 (354)
    • See El Law I.14.11, I.15.3, I.17.2, II.8.8; De Cive I.11; Lev I.14 (190), I.15 (202), II.28 (354)
  • 13
    • 64949135157 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Hobbes would quickly add that Charles cannot transfer his right to resist Jane should she choose to exercise her rights to the coconut by throwing it toward his head
    • Hobbes would quickly add that Charles cannot transfer his right to resist Jane should she choose to exercise her rights to the coconut by throwing it toward his head
  • 14
    • 79956758745 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Lev I.14 (pp. 190-191)
    • See Lev I.14 (pp. 190-191)
  • 15
    • 79956768490 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • De Cive II.4 (p. 124). Lev I.14 (pp. 190-191)
    • De Cive II.4 (p. 124). See also Lev I.14 (pp. 190-191)
  • 16
    • 79956768952 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Lev I.14 (pp. 190-191). Hobbes allows for two modes of transferring (or alienating) rights, (a) gifts (or surrender) wherein one hands over the right without reciprocal consideration, or (b) contracts, which involve some exchange of rights. (See, for ex., Lev I.14 (pp. 192-3). Some contracts involve delayed performance of one's obligations, and such he calls covenants.)
    • See Lev I.14 (pp. 190-191). Hobbes allows for two modes of transferring (or alienating) rights, (a) gifts (or surrender) wherein one hands over the right without reciprocal consideration, or (b) contracts, which involve some exchange of rights. (See, for ex., Lev I.14 (pp. 192-3). Some contracts involve delayed performance of one's obligations, and such he calls "covenants. ")
  • 17
    • 79956768956 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • De Cive VI.13 (p. 182). Oddly, Hobbes seems to rest his argument here on dubious empirical premises. He explicitly says that someone else will do as the sovereign commands
    • De Cive VI.13 (p. 182). Oddly, Hobbes seems to rest his argument here on dubious empirical premises. He explicitly says that someone else will do as the sovereign commands
  • 18
    • 79956759174 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • El Law I.14.10 (p. 72); De Cive I.10 (p. 117); Lev I.14 (pp. 189-190)
    • El Law I.14.10 (p. 72); De Cive I.10 (p. 117); Lev I.14 (pp. 189-190)
  • 21
    • 79956831900 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • One might also argue that subjects cannot help but resist when they are threatened with bodily harm. This is why (following Hobbes's example) prisoners are escorted to the gallows, although they are still supposedly subjects of the law. Kavka points out that subjects would then not bother to exclude resistance rights from the original compact, for they'd recognize that the sovereign could overcome such a right in any case, Gregory Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory [Princeton: University Press, 1986, ch. 8, This still leaves us in the dark as to whether absolute authorization is consistent with retained liberties
    • One might also argue that subjects cannot help but resist when they are threatened with bodily harm. This is why (following Hobbes's example) prisoners are escorted to the gallows, although they are still supposedly subjects of the law. Kavka points out that subjects would then not bother to exclude resistance rights from the original compact, for they'd recognize that the sovereign could overcome such a right in any case. (See Gregory Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory [Princeton: University Press, 1986], ch. 8.) This still leaves us in the dark as to whether absolute authorization is consistent with retained liberties
  • 22
    • 0039547362 scopus 로고
    • Oxford: Clarendon Press 126
    • David Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), pp. 124, 126-7
    • (1969) The Logic of Leviathan , pp. 124-127
    • Gauthier, D.1
  • 23
    • 79956822902 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Of course, here we speak only of the person(s) who-would-later-become the sovereign and the persons who-would-later-become subjects. Sovereigns and subjects have no rights in the state of nature because there are neither sovereigns nor subjects in such a condition. The rights in question are also only liberty rights
    • Of course, here we speak only of the person(s) who-would-later-become the sovereign and the persons who-would-later-become subjects. Sovereigns and subjects have no rights in the state of nature because there are neither sovereigns nor subjects in such a condition. The rights in question are also only liberty rights
  • 24
    • 79956823025 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • for ex., Lev II.17 (pp. 227, 228); II.18 (p. 229); II.20 (pp. 251-2); II.21 (pp. 268, 269), II.24 (p. 297)
    • See, for ex., Lev II.17 (pp. 227, 228); II.18 (p. 229); II.20 (pp. 251-2); II.21 (pp. 268, 269), II.24 (p. 297)
  • 25
    • 79956759164 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Lev I.16 (p. 218)
    • Lev I.16 (p. 218)
  • 26
    • 79956807372 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Lev II.21 (pp. 264-5)
    • Lev II.21 (pp. 264-5)
  • 27
    • 79956807371 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Sir William Molesworth, Bart., ed., (London: John Bohn, Henrietta Street, Covent Garden: 1840), VI, p. 52: He that transferreth his power, hath deprived himself of it: but he that committeth it to another to be exercised in his name and under him, is still in the possession of the same power
    • Cf. A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Sir William Molesworth, Bart., ed., (London: John Bohn, Henrietta Street, Covent Garden: 1840), vol. VI, p. 52: "He that transferreth his power, hath deprived himself of it: but he that committeth it to another to be exercised in his name and under him, is still in the possession of the same power."
  • 28
    • 79956759149 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Lev II.17 (p. 227, emphasis omitted). This reading of the compact shows that a subject's political obligations are owed not to the sovereign per se, but to the other subjects. Failure to authorize what the sovereign does is then a breach of the obligations one owes to other subjects. Each subject is obligated to every other subject to do what the sovereign commands. Things would be different in the case of sovereignty by acquisition, where political obligations are owed to the sovereign itself. Even in the case of instituted sovereigns, disobedience could count as reneging on the terms of a free gift
    • Lev II.17 (p. 227, emphasis omitted). This reading of the compact shows that a subject's political obligations are owed not to the sovereign per se, but to the other subjects. Failure to authorize what the sovereign does is then a breach of the obligations one owes to other subjects. Each subject is obligated to every other subject to do what the sovereign commands. Things would be different in the case of sovereignty by "acquisition," where political obligations are owed to the sovereign itself. Even in the case of instituted sovereigns, disobedience could count as reneging on the terms of a "free gift."
  • 29
    • 79956758931 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Lev II.18 (p. 229)
    • See Lev II.18 (p. 229)
  • 30
    • 79956759138 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Gauthier, p. 149
    • Gauthier, p. 149
  • 31
    • 79956807382 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • I emphasize here that the rights in question are purely liberties; they do not entail obligations on the parts of others
    • I emphasize here that the rights in question are purely liberties; they do not entail obligations on the parts of others
  • 32
    • 79956759130 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Gauthier, p. 155. Gauthier argues that the obligation to maintain one's authorization is not explicitly entailed by the authorization itself but by the independent covenant with others to do so. e.g., Gauthier, pp. 149-150
    • See also Gauthier, p. 155. Gauthier argues that the obligation to maintain one's authorization is not explicitly entailed by the authorization itself but by the independent covenant with others to do so. See, e.g., Gauthier, pp. 149-150
  • 33
    • 79956768797 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Along similar lines, one might authorize someone to perform some act while retaining rights to do the same. The authorization here would be a bare privileging to perform some act, absolving the actor of blame. Hohfeld describes a case where one licenses another to eat one's shrimp salad but retains the liberty to interfere with her doing so. This tracks the conceptual distinction between the creation of liberties and the creation of no-rights. Here, the owner of the shrimp salad merely assures that he will not blame the other for pursuing the salad. He is not promising to assist or even allow her to get the salad. People do still take authorization to entail such an allowance. the discussion at Thomas S. Schrock, The Rights to Punish and Resist Punishment in Hobbes's Leviathan The Western Political Quarterly 44 1991, pp. 878-881
    • Along similar lines, one might authorize someone to perform some act while retaining rights to do the same. The authorization here would be a bare privileging to perform some act, absolving the actor of blame. Hohfeld describes a case where one licenses another to eat one's shrimp salad but retains the liberty to interfere with her doing so. This tracks the conceptual distinction between the creation of liberties and the creation of "no-rights." Here, the owner of the shrimp salad merely assures that he will not blame the other for pursuing the salad. He is not promising to assist or even allow her to get the salad. People do still take authorization to entail such an allowance. See the discussion at Thomas S. Schrock, "The Rights to Punish and Resist Punishment in Hobbes's Leviathan" The Western Political Quarterly 44 (1991), pp. 878-881
  • 34
    • 84933486796 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The Rights to Punish and Resist Punishment in Hobbes's
    • For an illuminating, careful discussion of the Hobbesian right to punish, pp
    • For an illuminating, careful discussion of the Hobbesian right to punish, see Schrock, "The Rights to Punish and Resist Punishment in Hobbes's Leviathan," pp. 853-890
    • Leviathan , pp. 853-890
    • Schrock1
  • 35
    • 79956759036 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Lev II.28 (p. 354). Lev I.14 (pp. 189-190)
    • Lev II.28 (p. 354). See also Lev I.14 (pp. 189-190)
  • 36
    • 84972363256 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • D.J.C. Carmichael, for example, argues that true liberties (i.e., retained resistance rights) and sovereign authority are logically consistent. The sovereign's absolute authority, Carmichael claims, flows from each subject's right to all things. (D.J.C. Carmichael, Hobbes on Natural Right in Society Canadian Journal of Political Science 23 (1990), p. 3)
    • D.J.C. Carmichael, for example, argues that "true liberties" (i.e., retained resistance rights) and sovereign authority are logically consistent. The sovereign's absolute authority, Carmichael claims, "flows from each subject's right to all things." (D.J.C. Carmichael, "Hobbes on Natural Right in Society" Canadian Journal of Political Science 23 (1990), p. 3)
  • 37
    • 79956807108 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • In a similar vein, Deborah Baumgold writes that certain retained rights do not jeopardize state sovereignty. Civil society does not require individuals to renounce the right of resistance in self-defense; it merely requires renunciation of the aggressive 'right to kill, which becomes a state monopoly (Deborah Baumgold, Pacifying Politics Political Theory 21 1993, p. 14
    • In a similar vein, Deborah Baumgold writes that certain retained rights do not jeopardize state sovereignty. "Civil society does not require individuals to renounce the right of resistance in self-defense; it merely requires renunciation of the aggressive 'right to kill,' which becomes a state monopoly" (Deborah Baumgold, "Pacifying Politics" Political Theory 21 (1993), p. 14)
  • 38
    • 79956768800 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • This allows for the coexistence of resistance rights and sovereign authority. Jean Hampton's reconstruction of this view in Jean Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition Cambridge: University Press, 1986, pp. 190-192
    • This allows for the coexistence of resistance rights and sovereign authority. See also Jean Hampton's reconstruction of this view in Jean Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition (Cambridge: University Press, 1986), pp. 190-192
  • 39
    • 79956768786 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Hobbes claims that by allowing him to kill me, I am not bound to kill my selfe when he commands me. 'Tis one thing to say, Kill me, or my fellow, if you please; another thing to say, I will kill my selfe, or my fellow Lev II.21 (p. 269). The utterance kill me seems to express (at least figuratively) an authorization
    • Hobbes claims that "by allowing him to kill me, I am not bound to kill my selfe when he commands me. 'Tis one thing to say, Kill me, or my fellow, if you please; another thing to say, I will kill my selfe, or my fellow" Lev II.21 (p. 269). The utterance "kill me" seems to express (at least figuratively) an authorization
  • 40
    • 79956759048 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • e.g., Lev II.14 (pp. 192, 199). The inalienability of self-preservation rights is questionable. Kavka, pp. 322-337. Even if such rights are alienable, we might nevertheless suppose that subjects do not (instead of cannot) alienate them. The question would then still remain whether retained rights are compatible with absolute authorization
    • See, e.g., Lev II.14 (pp. 192, 199). The inalienability of self-preservation rights is questionable. See Kavka, pp. 322-337. Even if such rights are alienable, we might nevertheless suppose that subjects do not (instead of cannot) alienate them. The question would then still remain whether retained rights are compatible with absolute authorization
  • 41
    • 79956759132 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • We can rest with the idea that subjects are known to avoid death above all else and they cannot help but do so. Simply as a fact of human psychology, their self-preservation is not something subject to their discretion, Of course, this is false. It is more plausible to say that subjects cannot, or at least, do not, alienate or authorize their rights of self-defense. Kavka discusses why subjects would not bother to include the surrender of resistance rights to the sovereign Kavka, pp. 334-5
    • We can rest with the idea that subjects are known to avoid death above all else and they cannot help but do so. Simply as a fact of human psychology, their self-preservation is not something subject to their discretion. (Of course, this is false. It is more plausible to say that subjects cannot - or at least, do not - alienate or authorize their rights of self-defense. Kavka discusses why subjects would not bother to include the surrender of resistance rights to the sovereign (see Kavka, pp. 334-5).)
  • 42
    • 79956822992 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Now, if we allow that one's rights could be used to take one's own life, we would be backing away from Hobbesian premises. Were rights of self-preservation completely alienable or otherwise discretionary, there would probably be little problem with the idea of absolutely authorizing a sovereign one now resists
    • Now, if we allow that one's rights could be used to take one's own life, we would be backing away from Hobbesian premises. Were rights of self-preservation completely alienable or otherwise discretionary, there would probably be little problem with the idea of absolutely authorizing a sovereign one now resists
  • 43
    • 79956823053 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Lev II.18 (p. 232), II.28 (p. 355); De Cive V.7 (pp. 169-170), VI.8 (pp. 177-178), VI.13 (pp. 180-182)
    • See Lev II.18 (p. 232), II.28 (p. 355); De Cive V.7 (pp. 169-170), VI.8 (pp. 177-178), VI.13 (pp. 180-182)
  • 44
    • 79956807236 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Gregory Kavka denies that authorization adds anything substantial to what transfer of the right of self-governance entails. Licensing the sovereign's actions, submitting to his rule, and not interfering with the sovereign's conduct are all taken care of given the very likely assumption that the sovereign wills them (Kavka, p. 391, Once subjects have given up their rights of self-governance to the sovereign, they are obligated (to the other subjects) not to resist what the sovereign wills that they do. But if subjects retain any resistance rights, it would still be unclear how they have given up their rights of self-governance. Indeed, as Jean Hampton notes, retained resistance rights would, more broadly, seem to unravel Hobbes's arguments for absolute sovereign power, Hampton, pp. 124-5, 198-207
    • Gregory Kavka denies that authorization adds anything substantial to what transfer of the right of self-governance entails. Licensing the sovereign's actions, submitting to his rule, and not interfering with the sovereign's conduct are all taken care of "given the very likely assumption that the sovereign wills them" (Kavka, p. 391). Once subjects have given up their rights of self-governance to the sovereign, they are obligated (to the other subjects) not to resist what the sovereign wills that they do. But if subjects retain any resistance rights, it would still be unclear how they have given up their rights of self-governance. Indeed, as Jean Hampton notes, retained resistance rights would, more broadly, seem to unravel Hobbes's arguments for absolute sovereign power. (See Hampton, pp. 124-5, 198-207.)
  • 45
    • 79956822916 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Lev II.28 (p. 356)
    • Lev II.28 (p. 356)
  • 46
    • 79956823004 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Lev II.25 (pp. 302-3). This right to command must be a liberty right because subjects' obedience obligations are not owed to the sovereign with this right
    • See Lev II.25 (pp. 302-3). This right to command must be a liberty right because subjects' obedience obligations are not owed to the sovereign with this right
  • 47
    • 0004237063 scopus 로고
    • On the structure of commands as directives which ought displace one's judgment, London: Hutchinson & Co
    • On the structure of commands as directives which ought displace one's judgment, see J. Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1975), pp. 41-43
    • (1975) Practical Reason and Norms , pp. 41-43
    • Raz, J.1
  • 48
    • 0003956640 scopus 로고
    • Oxford: Clarendon Press, chs. 1-2
    • The Morality of Freedom, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), chs. 1-2
    • (1986) The Morality of Freedom
  • 49
    • 79956758814 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • the discussion of the content independence of commands at H.L.A. Hart, Essays on Bentham (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 254
    • See also the discussion of the "content independence" of commands at H.L.A. Hart, Essays on Bentham (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 254
  • 50
    • 79956822910 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • De Cive V.7 (pp. 169-170), VI.5 (pp. 176-177), II.18 (p. 131)
    • See De Cive V.7 (pp. 169-170), VI.5 (pp. 176-177), II.18 (p. 131)
  • 51
    • 79956758909 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Lev II.21 (p. 270), II.28 (p. 353)
    • See also Lev II.21 (p. 270), II.28 (p. 353)
  • 52
    • 79956807106 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Schrock uses this term in his The Rights to Punish and Resist Punishment in Hobbes's Leviathan
    • Schrock uses this term in his "The Rights to Punish and Resist Punishment in Hobbes's Leviathan."
  • 53
    • 79956822887 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • It is unclear if Jill could be understood to have authorized this act by the sovereign if Jack is Jill's husband, brother, father, or child
    • It is unclear if Jill could be understood to have authorized this act by the sovereign if Jack is Jill's husband, brother, father, or child
  • 54
    • 79956758933 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • De Cive VI.5 (pp. 176-177); II.18 (p. 131). Lev II.21 (p. 270), II.28 (p. 353). Gauthier discusses a similar view at Gauthier, p. 148. Hobbes is equivocal on whether subjects authorize punishment. On the one hand, the right to punish is not grounded on any concession, or gift of the Subjects. On the other hand, to count as punishment, the evil a sovereign inflicts must have for Author, the person condemned (Lev II.28 [pp. 353-5])
    • See De Cive VI.5 (pp. 176-177); II.18 (p. 131). Cf., Lev II.21 (p. 270), II.28 (p. 353). Gauthier discusses a similar view at Gauthier, p. 148. Hobbes is equivocal on whether subjects authorize punishment. On the one hand, the right to punish "is not grounded on any concession, or gift of the Subjects." On the other hand, to count as punishment, the evil a sovereign inflicts must have "for Author, the person condemned" (Lev II.28 [pp. 353-5])
  • 55
    • 79956768640 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See also Schrock, pp. 869-877, 885
    • , vol.869-877 , Issue.885
    • Schrock1    pp2
  • 56
    • 79956822738 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Lev II.28 (p. 354)
    • Lev II.28 (p. 354)
  • 57
    • 79956768551 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Lev II.28 (pp. 353-4)
    • Lev II.28 (pp. 353-4)
  • 58
    • 79956822791 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Here I draw on Bernard R. Boxill's discussion of consent and authorization in his On Some Recent Criticisms of Consent Theory Journal of Social Philosophy 24 (Number 1, Spring, 1993): 81-102. Boxill sharply distinguishes consenting to another from authorizing another, partly because the former does not always create a right to perform an act. Here I adapt the discussion to the case of Hobbes, whose sovereign starts as a person with a liberty right to do any act, but without a right to act in the names of others
    • Here I draw on Bernard R. Boxill's discussion of consent and authorization in his "On Some Recent Criticisms of Consent Theory" Journal of Social Philosophy 24 (Number 1, Spring, 1993): 81-102. Boxill sharply distinguishes "consenting to" another from "authorizing" another, partly because the former does not always create a right to perform an act. Here I adapt the discussion to the case of Hobbes, whose sovereign starts as a person with a liberty right to do any act, but without a right to act in the names of others
  • 59
    • 79956807009 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Hampton, p. 124
    • Hampton, p. 124
  • 60
    • 79956768556 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Hampton, ch. 8
    • Hampton, ch. 8
  • 61
    • 79956822806 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Hampton expresses a similar worry and cites this as another reason Hobbes's argument fails. e.g., Hampton, ch. 7 (esp. p. 202). Rousseau's Social Contract I.6
    • Hampton expresses a similar worry and cites this as another reason Hobbes's argument fails. See, e.g., Hampton, ch. 7 (esp. p. 202). See also Rousseau's Social Contract I.6
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    • Earlier versions of this essay were presented to audiences at UNC-Chapel Hill, UNC-Wilmington, Ohio University, and the 1997 APA Central Division. I am grateful to the participants for their helpful thoughts, and particularly to Larry May, who commented at the APA. Harry Dolan, Chris Morris, Tom Hill, Gerald Postema, and the editors of this Journal, all generously offered constructive suggestions on earlier versions. A long overdue thanks goes to Claire Miller for her encouragement. I am especially grateful to Bernard Boxill for his extensive, detailed comments on several drafts and his patient support throughout
    • Earlier versions of this essay were presented to audiences at UNC-Chapel Hill, UNC-Wilmington, Ohio University, and the 1997 APA Central Division. I am grateful to the participants for their helpful thoughts, and particularly to Larry May, who commented at the APA. Harry Dolan, Chris Morris, Tom Hill, Gerald Postema, and the editors of this Journal, all generously offered constructive suggestions on earlier versions. A long overdue thanks goes to Claire Miller for her encouragement. I am especially grateful to Bernard Boxill for his extensive, detailed comments on several drafts and his patient support throughout


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