Unmasking Chinese business enterprises: Using information disclosure laws to enhance public participation in corporate environmental decision making

Harvard Environmental Law Review

Volumn 33, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 177-224

  Riley, Timothy ^a   Huiyan, Cai ^b  

^a Hopping Green and Sams   (United States)

^b SUN YAT SEN UNIVERSITY   (China)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BUSINESS; DECISION MAKING; ECONOMIC GROWTH; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUE; INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE; LOCAL PARTICIPATION; PARTICIPATORY APPROACH;

ASIA; CHINA; EURASIA; FAR EAST; NORTH AMERICA; UNITED STATES;

EID: 64549093646     PISSN: 01478257     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (402)

1. STATE ENVTL. PROT. ADMIN., REPORT ON THE STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN CHINA5 (2005), available at http://english.mep.gov.cn/ down_load/Documents/200710/P020071023479 859455977.pdf.
2. Ma Jun, A Path to Environmental Harmony, CHINADIALOGUE, Nov. 30, 2006, http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/ 589-A-path-to-environmental-harmony. There were over 50,000 environmental complaints filed in 2005 alone. Wang Canfa, Chinese Environmental Law Enforcement: Current Deficiencies and Suggested Reforms, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L.159, 167 (2007) (citing Pan Yue, Vice Minister, State Envtl. Prot. Admin., Address to the First National Environmental Policy Legal System Workshop (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.sepa.gov.cn/info/Idjh/200701/t20070118_99754.htm).
3. Ma Jun, supra note 2.
4. There were more than 74,000 incidents of protest and unrest recorded in China in 2004, up from 58,000 the year before. While there are no clear statistics linking this number of protests, riots, and unrest specifically to pollution issues, the fact that pollution was one of four social problems linked to disharmony by the Central Committee implies that there is at least the perception of a strong correlation.
5. Nathan Nankivell, China's Pollution and the Threat to Domestic and Regional Stability, CHINA BRIEF, Oct. 25, 2005, available at http://jamestown.org/china_brief /article.php?articleid=2373143 (citation omitted). In 2005, Chinese officials reported over 87,000 "public order disturbances" that were incorrectly called "mass incidents" by Western media. Are Mass Incidents Increasing or Decreasing in China?, Chinese Law and Politics Blog, http://sinolaw.typepad.com/ chinese_law_and_politics_/2007/03/are_mass_incide.html (March 31, 2007).
6. Nevertheless, the semantic confusion gives way to a general recognition that a rising popular movement exists, willing to actively protest against the Chinese government over concerns regarding environmental pollution and public and environmental health risks. In one of many examples, environmental activists in Xiamen recently used cell phone text messaging to bypass government-controlled media, mobilizing almost 10,000 protestors against local police in a successful bid to stop construction of a chemical factory pending further environmental study. Local residents feared the factory would pollute their communities and lead to "leukemia and deformed babies." Edward Cody, Text Messages Giving Voice to Chinese: Opponents of Chemical Factory Found Way Around Censors, WASH. POST, June 28, 2007, at A1 (internal quotation omitted).
7. See Nankivell, supra note 3 ("As the impact of pollution on human health becomes more obvious and widespread, it is leading to greater political mobilization and social unrest from those citizens who suffer the most.").
8. See id. Nankivell goes on to say: Protests are uniting a variety of actors throughout local communities. Pollution issues are indiscriminate. The effects, though not equally felt by each person within a community, impact rich and poor, farmers and businessmen, families and individuals alike. As local communities respond to pollution issues through united opposition, it is leaving Beijing with no easy target upon which to blame unrest, and no simple option for how to quell whole communities with a common grievance.
9. Id.
10. Li Zhiping, Protection of Peasants' Environmental Rights During Social Transition: Rural Regions in Guangdong Province, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L.337, 343 (2007).
11. The survey found that 54.2% of villagers had only "a little" knowledge as to the causes of environmental problems, and that only 12.8% of respondents obtained environmental information from notices provided by village committees, as compared to 38.1 % from personal experience and 34.4% from newspapers or other media. Id. at 368-69 tbls. 3.1 & 3.2.
12. See Li Zhiping, Essay, The Challenges of China's Discharge Permit System and Effective Solutions, 24 TEMP. J. SCI. ThCH. & ENVTL. L.375, 384 (2005) ("Without relevant information, citizens are unaware of events occurring around them; they cannot identify the harm of certain kinds of behavior; they cannot estimate whether an action is legitimate or not; and they cannot foresee the relevance of their interest in the establishment of future legal policy.").
13. Wang Canfa, supra note 2, at 169. The other factors are: (1) poorly researched and "unrealistic" legislation; (2) local governments preferring economic development over environmental protection; and (3) general disjunctions between administrative departments, the National People's Congress Standing Committee, and the court system. Id.
14. As in the United States, Chinese domestic business entities comprise a wide range of corporate structures, which, in the course of this article, we broadly label "enterprises," a term often used to refer to all business forms in general. See ChinaDetail, Types of Chinese Domestic Companies, http://www.chinadetail.com/Business/ InvestmentChinaCompanyOwnership. php (listing and describing various Chinese business forms);
15. see also Company Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), art. 3, LAWINFOCHINA(last visited Oct. 15, 2008) (P.R.C.) ("A company is an enterprise legal person, which has independent legal person property and enjoys the right to legal person property.") (emphasis added).
16. Pan Yue, The Environment Needs Public Participation, CHINADIALOGUE, Dec. 5, 2006, http://www.chinadialogue.net/ article/show/single/en/604-The-environment-needs-public-participation.
17. Id.
18. SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR84 (Samuel B. Griffith trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1971) (n.d.). The entire passage reads: Therefore I say: "Know the enemy and know yourself, in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril."
19. Id.
20. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are playing an increasingly important role in mobilizing the Chinese citizenry around environmental issues. There may be as many as 2,500 (or as few as 40) environment-related NGOs operative in China. Srini Sitaraman, Regulating the Belching Dragon: Rule of Law, Politics of Enforcement, and Pollution Prevention in Post-Mao Industrial China, 18 COLO. J. INTL ENVTL. L. & POL'Y267, 300 (2007) (citing Jonathan Schwartz, Environmental NGOs in China: Roles and Limits, 77 PAC. AFF.28, 36 (2004)).
21. However, many of these domestic NGOs may be more correctly considered to be government-created consulting and research organizations. Id.
22. For a detailed accounting of domestic and international NGO activities with respect to environmental activism, see generally Adam Briggs, Note, China's Pollution Victims: Still Seeking a Dependable Remedy, 18 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 305, 321-25 (2006).
23. See Visions of China: China at 2050: Experts Consider Possible Scenariosfor the Middle Kingdom 50 Years from Now, CNN.com, http:// www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1999/china.50/50.beyond/china.at.2050/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2008) (exploring various challenges facing China, many of which include the problem of environmental pollution as it impacts the Chinese population, economy, and political stability).
24. ZHENG BUIAN, CHINA'S PEACEFUL RISE: SPEECHES OF ZHENG BUIAN 1997-2005, at 39 (Brookings Inst. Press, 2005).
25. See Enoch Yiu, Old China Hand Sells London Allure; Lord Mayor sees UK-Listed Mainland Firms Tripling, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 22, 2007, at B 16 ("China is no longer a sweatshop to manufacture cheap goods. It has started to play an important economic role in global financial markets. China's development will have a significant impact on the global economy.");
26. Zoran Nedeljkovic, Enter a Different Dragon, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 25, 2007, at 22 ("'Chinese funds will become a major force in global markets as the government liberalizes capital flows,' says Ms. Ulrich, noting that in 2006, foreign direct investment into China was $60USbillion, while outbound investments totaled $16USbillion. High domestic savings rates and huge surpluses in China's balance of payments could see outbound investments rocketing to $800USbillion plus by 2020.");
27. David J. Lynch, China Could Use Its Pile of Cash to Buy U.S. Companies; But Politics Would Likely Play a Part, USA TODAY, Aug. 9, 2007, at 3B ("Earlier this year, the Chinese government announced plans to use some of its $1.33 trillion in financial reserves to crate a $200 billion state investment company. The country's state-owned banks are well heeled, and foreign investment by its leading corporations hit $16.1 billion last year, up 31% from the year before, according to Jing Ulrich, managing director of JPMorgan in Hong Kong.").
28. See generally Wayne M. Morrison & Michael F. Martin, How Large is China's Economy? Does it Matter? (Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for Cong. Order Code RS 22808, Feb. 13, 2008), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22808.pdf.
29. See id. at 40.
30. See id. (commenting that natural resource limitations, environmental damage, and a "lack of coordination between economic and social development" are three "development challenges" China must face in the twenty-first century).
31. See JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA74-81 (2nd ed. 1999) (chronicling the economic structures present during the reign of Emperor Yongzheng (1723-1735) and how the rising population complicated "the mid-Qing society and economy"). It is interesting to note that, in at least one sense, ecological modifications caused by the introduction of New World crops, like potatoes, maize and peanuts, which were capable of growing in marginally productive environments, greatly boosted the caloric intake of the rural poor and thereby helped fuel a rapid population growth. Id. at 80.
32. Id. at 250.
33. Yuwa Wei, A Chinese Perspective on Corporate Governance, 10 BOND L. REV.363, 366 (1998).
34. KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM 120 (2004). Between 1949 and 1956, the communist regime in China effectively destroyed the notion of privately owned companies through a process of transferring ownership from private interests to state or collectively owned enterprises under the rubric of a nationally controlled economy where the government, not the market, dictated the means and outputs of production. Yuwa Wei, supra note 22, at 367.
35. In contrast, the Nationalist government that succeeded the Qing enacted and updated China's first Company Laws, modeled after the Great Qing Commercial Code. See id. at 366.
36. For a more detailed history the development of Chinese company laws, see DAVID FAURE, CHINA AND CAPITALISM: A HISTORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN MODERN CHINA45-64 (2006).
37. See LIEBERTHAL, supra note 23, at 127.
38. Deng recognized that, in order to achieve rapid economic growth, China would have to develop new sources of "capital, technology, and managerial know-how" in order to reconfigure its "Soviet-type system" of production into a more efficient, technology-based scheme, rather than one focused on mere capacity. Id. at 129-30.
39. NICHOLAS R. LARDY, CHINA'S UNFINISHED ECONOMIC REVOLUTION22 (1998).
40. Id.
41. See id. at 23-24.
42. See id. at 24;
43. see also Company Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 29, 1993, effective July 1, 1994) art. 21, LAWINFOCHINA(last visited Oct. 21, 2008) (P.R.C.) ("A [s]tate-owned enterprise set up before the implementation of this law if [sic] can fulfill the condition of a limited liability company under this law may be reorganized into a solely [s]tate-owned limited liability company in the case of an investment entity with a single investor, or into a limited liability company as provided for in the first paragraph of the preceding Article in the case of an investment entity with many investors [which requires capital contributions from more than two, but fewer than fifty shareholders].").
44. LARDY, supra note 25, at 24.
45. See SHAHID YUSUF ET AL., UNDER NEW OWNERSHIP: PRIVATIZING CHINA'S STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES4 (2006) ("With many of the initial and easier stages of reform completed and the economy significantly deregulated, growth now depends more on institutions governing market competition, how industrial organization evolves, and what firms do.").
46. Id. at 5.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., POLICY BRIEF, ECONOMIC SURVEY OF CHINA, 2005, at 1 (2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/25/35294862.pdf.
51. See id at 7 ("National income has been doubling every 8 years and this has been reflected in the reduction of the poverty rate to much lower levels. Indeed, by some accounts, over half of the reduction in absolute poverty in the world between 1980 and 2000 occurred in China.");
52. see also Window of China, Sept. 26, 2008, http:// news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-09/26/content_10116246.htm (transcript of Premier Wen Jiabao before the U.N.) ("Since 1978, we in China have accelerated development mainly with our own efforts and through reform and opening-up. As a result, China has brought down the number of people in absolute poverty from 250 million to 15 million in less than 30 years."). Yet approximately 595 million Chinese, at least as of 2001, still live on less than two dollars a day.
53. YUSUF, supra note 30, at 8.
54. THE WORLD WATCH INSTITUTE, STATE OF THE WORLD2006: SPECIAL FOCUS: CHINA AND INDIA, at XV(2006) [hereinafter STATE OF THE WORLD2006].
55. In 2005, China used 26 percent of the world's crude steel, 32 percent of the rice, 37 percent of the cotton, and 47 percent of the cement." Id. at 5.
56. Moreover, China is also starting to build one of the world's largest automobile industries. Annual production rose from 320,000 in 1995 to 2.6 million in 2005, and China could overtake Japan and the United States, which each produce about 8 million cars annually, to become the world's largest auto producer by 2015.
57. Id.
58. Yuhong Zhao, Trade and Environment: Challenges After China's WTO Accession, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.41, 49 (2007).
59. In fact, one scholar has noted that the international community now actively seeks China's participation in the "global governance system ... because of the transboundary implications of its environmental problems, its growing share of the world's population, its increasing global economic clout, its blistering economic growth, and the globalization of the Chinese economy." Sitaraman, supra note 13, at 317 (footnote omitted).
60. Additionally, international scholars have recognized the geopolitical concerns surrounding China's management (or mismanagement) of domestic watercourses, in particular the downstream environmental impacts associated with India's interests related to Himalayan headwaters and southeast Asian countries' concerns with what happens upstream within the Mekong River basin. James D. Seymour, China's Environment: A Bibliographic Essay, in CHINA'S ENVIRONMENT AND THE CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT248, 254 (Kristen A. Day ed., 2005). 41 STATE OF THE WORLD 2006, supra note 37, at 7. "Of the 412 sites on China's seven main rivers that were monitored for water quality in 2004, 58 percent were found to be too dirty for human consumption."
61. Id.
62. YALE CTR. FOR ENVTL. L. & POL'Y & CTR. FOR INT'L EARTH SCIENCE INFO. NETWORK, PILOT2006 ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE INDEX52, available at http://epi.yale.edu/Home [hereinafter 2006 EPI];
63. see also Ruoying Chen, Legal Implications of a Rising China: Information Mechanisms and the Future of Chinese Pollution Regulation, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L.51, 52 (2006).
64. Ruoying Chen, supra note 42, at 52-53 (citing Qu Geping, Zhong guo huan jing xing shi yu huan jing fa zhi jian she [China's Environment Status and Legal Development], Report to the National People's Congress Standing Committee (July 11, 2002), available at http://www.npc.gov.cn (Chinese)).
65. Lü Zhi, Michael Totten & Philip Chou, Spurring Innovations for Clean Energy and Water Protection in China: An Opportunity to Advance Security and Harmonious Development, in CHINA ENV'T SERIES 61, 62 (2006), available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics /pubs/CEF_SpecialReport.8.pdf [hereinafter Spurring Innovations]. For instance, the north China plain in the 92 million people strong Beijing-tianjin is considered the "breadbasket" of China - producing 67% of the nation's wheat and 44% of its corn, and more importantly, 31% of total GDP - but has access to only 7.5% of China's total runoff discharge. CHARLES WOLF, JR. ET AL., FAULT LINES IN CHINA'S ECONOMIC TERRAIN76 (2003).
66. See Spurring Innovations, supra note 44, at 71 (citing Tina Butler, China's Imminent Water Crisis (May 30, 2005), http://news. mongabay.com/2005/0531-tina•tler.html).
67. EPI, supra note 42.
68. STATE OF THE WORLD2006, supra note 37, at 8-9.
69. Id. at 10- 11.
70. Jack J. Fritz, Environmental Performance of Coal-Fired Power Plants Financed by the World Bank, in NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNSEL ET AL., URBANIZATION, ENERGY, AND AIR POLLUTION IN CHINA: THE CHALLENGES AHEAD 187, 188 (Nat'l Res. Couns. et al. eds., 2004).
71. Drew Thompson & Xiaoqing Lu, China's Evolving Civil Society: From Environment to Health, in CHINA ENV'T SERIES27, 30 (2006), available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/ CEF_SpecialReport.8.pdf.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. WORLD HEALTH ORG., ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH COUNTRY PROFILE - CHINA8 (2005), available at http://www.wpro.who.int/NR/rdonlyres/ IBAA5515-9571-4383-BAID-169 BDD4A8C38/0/China_EHCP_EHDS_9jun05.pdf.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 9.
77. Yok-shiu F. Lee, Public Environmental Consciousness in China: Early Empirical Evidence, in CHINA's ENVIRONMENT AND THE CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 40, at 35, 46-48 (citing China Envtl. Prot. Found. & China People's Univ., Quan min huan jing yi shi diao cha [A Survey on Public Environmental Consciousness], in ZHONG, GUO GONG ZHONG HUAN JING YI SHI DIAO CHA [A SURVEY ON CHINA'S PUBLIC ENVIRONMENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS]73 (Xi Xiaolin & Xu Qinghua eds., China Envtl. Sci. Press, 1999)).
78. Id. at 48.
79. See Elizabeth Economy, Environmental Enforcement in China, in CHINA'S ENVIRONMENT AND THE CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 40, at 102, 116 (noting the general increase in public awareness of environmental issues through increased lodgings of complaints with the Chinese government).
80. See generally Ruoying Chen, supra note 42 (arguing that existing public participation requirements under Chinese environmental laws are inadequate).
81. Wanxin Li, Commentary, Opening Up the Floor: Environmental Performance Information Disclosure Pilot Programs in Zhenjiang and Hohhot, 8 CHINA ENV'T SERIES125, 125 (2006), available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/CEF_SpecialReport.8.pdf.
82. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA: AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT PRACTICES AND WAYS FORWARD43 (2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd /33/5/37867511.pdf.
83. See id. at 38-40 (providing a brief synopsis of SEPA regulations and programs related to the release of environment-related information to the public).
84. Provisions on Code of Conduct for Environmental Impact Assessment and Honest and Clean Administration Concerning Construction Projects (promulgated by State Envtl. Prot. Admin., Nov. 23, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), LAWINFOCHINA(last visited Oct. 15, 2008) (P.R.C.).
85. See generally Jesse L. Moorman & Zhang Ge, Promoting and Strengthening Public Participation in China's Environmental Impact Assessment Process: Comparing China's EIA Law and U.S. NEPA, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L.281 (2007).
86. Wanxin Li, supra note 60, at 125;
87. see also Hua Wang et al., Environmental Performance Rating and Disclosure: China's Green-Watch Program (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2889, 2002), available at http:// www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2002/10/ 18/000094946_02100304104987/additional/126526322_20041117182557.pdf. The two municipalities were Zhenjiang, Jiangsu Province, and Hohbot, Inner Mongolia.
88. Id. at 2.
89. Wanxin Li, supra note 60, at 127.
90. Id. at 128 (finding that, while 56% of respondents knew about EPID, only 8.3% understood its objectives). The Nanjing University poll was limited to the Zhenjiang municipality (Jiangsu Province).
91. Id.
92. Id. Industries wanted more than publicity; they wanted "substantial benefits for their good performance, such as favorable treatment by the Zhenjiang EPB [Environmental Protection Board] in loan applications for environmental protection work or rights to label their product as green."
93. Id.
94. Janelle Plummer & John G. Taylor, The Characteristics of Community Participation in China, in COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN CHINA: ISSUES AND PROCESSES FOR CAPACITY BUILDING36, 52 (Janelle Plummer & John G. Taylor eds., 2004) (citing generally PARTICIPATION: THE NEW TYRANNY?(Bill Cooke & Uma Kothari eds., 2001)).
95. Id. at 52-53.
96. Allison Moore & Adria Warren, Legal Advocacy in Environmental Public Participation in China: Raising the Stakes and Strengthening Stakeholders, 8 CHINA ENV'T SERIES3, 10-11 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://www. wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/CEF_SpecialReport.8.pdf.
97. Hari M. Osofsky, Popular Sovereignty, Geography, and Public Participation in Environmental Decision-Making in China, 24 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L.225, 227 (2005).
98. Id.
99. Frances Irwin & Carl Bruch, Public Access to Information, Public Participation, and Justice, in STUMBLING TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY 511, 511 (John C. Dernbach ed., 2002).
100. Nancy Perkins Spyke, Public Participation in Environmental Decisionmaking at the Millennium: Structuring New Spheres of Public Influence, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.263, 267 (1999).
101. Company Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006) art. 5, LAWINFOCHINA(last visited Oct. 15, 2008) (P.R.C.) (emphasis added).
102. Shenzhen Stock Exchange, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY INSTRUCTIONS TO LISTED COMPANIES ART.1 (Sept. 25, 2006), available at http:// www.szse.cn/main/en/rulseandregulations/sserules/2007060410636.shtml [hereinafter Shenzhen SRI].
103. Id. art. 2.
104. Id. art. 3.
105. Id. art. 27. These policies should cover compliance with applicable laws and also include efforts to reduce resource consumption and waste generation, use environmentally-friendly materials, minimize adverse impacts to the environment, institute training programs, and "create an environment for sustainable development."
106. Id. art. 28.
107. Id. art. 36.
108. Id.
109. ZHAO XUDONG, THE SYSTEMATIC DESIGN OF NEW CORPORATION LAW207 (2006);
110. see also Nike O. Gozali, Janice C.Y. How & Peter Verhoeven, The Economic Consequences of Voluntary Environmental Information Disclosure, 2 Int'l Envtl. Modeling & Software Soc. Integrated Assessment & Decision Support Conf. 484, 486 (2002), available at http://www.iemss.org/iemss2002/proceedings/pdf/volume%20due /349.pdf (reviewing literature related to social responsibility disclosures among companies and recognizing such disclosures as a "strategy to improve ... public image and gain public acceptance") (citing specifically K.T. Trotman, Social Responsibility Disclosures by Australian Companies, ACCOUNTANT IN AUSTRALIA, Mar. 1979, 24-28).
111. Guo Peiyuan, Corporate Environmental Reporting and Disclosure in China 1, 48 (School of Public Pol'y & Management, Tsinghua Univ., 2005), http://www.csr-asia.com/upload/environmentalreporting.pdf;
112. see also infra Part IV.
113. Guo Peiyuan, supra note 83, at 48.
114. Id.
115. Li Qiwei & Wang Chao, Lue lun wo guo huan jing zhi qing quan fa lu zhi du [On the Protection of Environmental Right to Know in China Legislation], 6 J. CHAOHU COLLEGE41 (Mar. 2004).
116. Wang Ziyuan, Public Participation in Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Law of China (Guo jia huan jing bao hu zong ju wu han da xue huan jing fa yan jiu suo [State Envtl. Prot. Admin. Wuhan Univ. Envtl. L. Inst.] 2005), http://www.riel.whu.edu.cn/show.asp?ID=3082.
117. Guo Peiyuan, supra note 83, at 48.
118. XU JIALIN & MENG FANLI, ENVIRONMENTAL ACCOUNTING164 (2004).
119. Liu Chengqing et al., Study on the Environmental Information Disclosure System for Companies Listed in Securities Market [sic], 22 CHINA ENVTL. MANAGEMENT20, 22 (2003).
120. Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Maxwell, Greenwash: Corporate Environmental Disclosure under Threat of Audit 5 (Stephen M. Ross School of Business, Univ. Michigan, Working Paper No. 1055, 2006), http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/tplyon/Lyon_Maxwell_Greenwash_ March_2006.pdf.
121. China Accounting Association, The Review of Seminar on Environmental Accounting Board [sic], 1 Kuai ji yan jiu s ACCT. RES.] 58, 60 (2002).
122. " Xiao Shufang & Hu Wei, A Study on the Environment Information Disclosure System of Chinese Enterprises, 3 Kuai ji yan jiu s ACCT. RES.] 47, 50 (2005). Third parties cannot evaluate overall corporate performance such as toxic emissions or hazardous waste practices when they merely receive ad hoc reports of noncompliance events.
123. Xiao Hua & Li Jianfa, Proposals To Improve China's Business Environment Information Reporting, J. XIAMEN U., Nov. 2002, at 114-15.
124. Chang Jiwen, How To Harmonize Community Autonomy and Administrative Responsibility in Environmental Decision-Making: Environmental Hearing Institutions in Wuhan, 24 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L.229, 238 (2005).
125. Li ZHIPING, HUAN JING FA DE XIN FA ZHAN GUAN ZHI YU MIN ZHU ZHI HU DONG [THE NEW DEVELOPMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN CONTROL AND DEMOCRACY]287 (The People's Court Press, 2006).
126. Li Zhiping, supra note 7, at 385.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Jolene Lin Shumen, Assessing the Dragon's Choice: The Use of Market-Based Instruments in Chinese Environmental Policy, 16 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV.617, 618 (2004).
130. Joseph Kahn & Jim Yardley, As China Roars, Pollution Reaches Deadly Extremes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2007, at 1.
131. See, e.g., Environmental Protection Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 26, 1989, effective Dec. 26, 1989) art. 27, LAW INFOCHINA(last visited Oct. 1, 2008) (P.R.C.) ("Enterprises and institutions discharging pollutants must report to and register with the relevant authorities in accordance with the provisions of the competent department of environmental protection administration under the State Council.");
132. Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Law on the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution (promulgated by the State Council, Mar. 20, 2000, effective Mar. 20, 2000) art. 4, LAWINFOCHINA(last visited Oct. 15, 2008) (P.R.C.) (requiring entities that either already do or seek to discharge a pollutant to a watercourse to file an application with the government);
133. Provisions on the Prevention and Control of Vessel Pollution of the Inland Water Environment (promulgated by the Ministry of Comm., Aug. 20, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006) art. 6, LAWINFOCHINA(last visited Oct. 15, 2008) (P.R.C.) (requiring a vessel to obtain an "effective pollution prevention certificate").
134. See, e.g., Environmental Protection Law art. 31 (P.R.C.) ("Any unit that, as a result of an accident or any other exigency, has caused or threatens to cause an accident of pollution, must promptly take measures to prevent and control the pollution hazards, make the situation known to such units and inhabitants as are likely to be endangered by such hazards, report the case to the competent department of environmental protection administration of the locality and the departments concerned and accept their investigation and decision.");
135. Measures for the Prevention and Control of Environment [sic] Pollution by Discarded Dangerous Chemicals (promulgated by State Envtl. Prot. Admin., Aug. 30, 2005, effective Oct. 1, 2005) art. 19, LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 15, 2008) (P.R.C.) (establishing emergency reporting and disclosure requirements for entities managing dangerous chemicals that may be released into the environment);
136. Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Law on the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution art. 19 (P.R.C.) (mandating, in detail, reporting following a "water pollution accident").
137. Generally understood, "command-and-control" regulations are defined as "measures that require or proscribe specific conduct by regulated firms." Barbara K. Bucholtz, Coase and the Control of Transboundary Pollution: The Sale of Hydroelectricity Under the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement of 1988, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.279, 315 n.189 (1991)
138. (quoting Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1264 (1981)). Another scholar defines the term as "a top-down, hierarchical regulatory form used to control pollution either through performance standards established for polluters, enforced through a permitting system, or uniform technology-based controls established for certain types of polluting activity."
139. David W. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting as Informational Regulation: A Law and Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 379, 380 (2005). Despite becoming "part of political discourse," legal scholars have not settled on one definitive definition, but many tend to focus on the "prescription" scheme of compelling specific conduct from a regulated entity.
140. David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?: Replacing the Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV.289, 297 n.44 (1998).
141. Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV.21, 22 (2001).
142. See Paula C. Murray, Inching Toward Environmental Regulatory Reform - ISO 14000: Much Ado about Nothing or a Reinvention Tool?, 37 AM. BUS. L.J.35, 35-36 (1999) ("The command-and-control paradigm was necessary to jump-start American environmental policy - companies had to be ordered to clean up their pollution act and to be punished to keep them in line.") (citations omitted).
143. See Sanford E. Gaines, Reflexive Law as a Legal Paradigm for Sustainable Development, 10 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J.1, 19 (2003) ("Substantive, purposive environmental law - yes, command-and-control regulation - still has a vital role, especially in helping to achieve the sweeping economic, social, and environmental agenda implicit in 'sustainable development.'");
144. Jessica C. Stabile, Clashes Between Economics and Environments: Consumerism Versus Conservation in Taiwan and Hong Kong, 7 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J.125, 168 (2006) ("Command-and-control regulation continues to dominate in most of Taiwan's environmental laws, although market-based strategies such as levying pollution tax on sources of pollution are beginning to be utilized as well.") (citation omitted).
145. See Case, supra note 104, at 383.
146. Id. at 383, 387.
147. Id. at 384.
148. Id. at 390, 391.
149. Id. at 440.
150. Id. at 441-42.
151. Id. at 439.
152. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, §§ 300-330, 100 Stat. 1613, 1728-58 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (2000)).
153. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006));
154. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (2006)).
155. HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN185 (G.G. Harrap, 1910) (1854).
156. §§ 300-330, 100 Stat. at 1613.
157. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000)).
158. Kathryn E. Durham-Hammer, Left to Wonder: Reevaluating, Reforming, and Implementing the Emergency Planning and Community, Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.323, 325 (2004) (citations omitted).
159. Id. The actual death toll and injury count for the Bhopal disaster
160. Trevor C.W. Farrow, Globalization, International Human Rights, and Civil Procedure, 41 ALBERTA L. REV.671, 671 n.3 (2003) (citations omitted). In the United States civil litigation that followed, federal district Judge John F. Keenen started his opinion and order by stating that Bhopal was the "most tragic industrial disaster in history."
161. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India, 634 F. Supp. 842, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1986),
162. modified & aff'd, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987),
163. cert. denied, 484 U.S. 871 (1987).
164. Durham-Hammer, supra note 120, at 325.
165. CONG. REC.28,418 (1986).
166. Id. (emphasis added).
167. "Just as the public has a right to know about releases that might happen as a result of an accident, the public also has a right to know about releases that do happen every hour and every day that some manufacturing facilities operate." Id.
168. Id.
169. U.S.C. § 11001 (2000).
170. Id. § 11002.
171. Id. § 11003.
172. Id. § 11004.
173. Id. § 11021.
174. Id. § 11023.
175. Id. § 11044.
176. Id. § 11045.
177. Id. § 11046.
178. See Case, supra note 104, at 382;
179. see also id. at 382 n.13 (citing proponents).
180. James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV.29, 30 (1960).
181. Kathleen Ambrose Ley, Note, CBI Industries, Inc. v. Horton: The Seventh Circuit Lets the Insider Off, 33. AM. U. L. REV.247, 248-49 (1983) (citations omitted).
182. Jeffrey A. Smith, Environmental Disclosure Requirements Under Securities Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF REAL ESTATE AND COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: FROM BROWNFIELDS TO GREEN BUILDINGS415, 417 (James B. Witkin ed., 3d ed. 2004) (citation omitted).
183. Dariusz M. Budzen & Ania M. Frankowska, Prohibitions Against Insider Trading in the United States and the European Community: Providing Guidance for Legislatures of Eastern Europe, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J. 91, 95 n.20 (1994).
184. For instance, the Securities Act establishes civil liabilities for including false information in a registration statement, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006), and unlawfully offering or selling securities. 15 U.S.C. § 771. Individuals violating any provision of the Act or making an "untrue statement of a material fact" are subject to a monetary fine and possible federal incarceration, 15 U.S.C. § 77x. Similarly, the Securities and Exchange Act includes provisions establishing civil liabilities for individuals who make misleading statements, 15 U.S.C. § 78r, and specific liabilities for individuals who "aid and abet" violations of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t, or participate in "insider trading," 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1, u-1. Additionally, the Securities and Exchange Act provides for substantial, multi-million dollar criminal fines and federal incarceration up to ten years. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff. For a general discussion on U.S. Securities Acts penalties, liabilities, and SEC enforcement, see Anish Vashista et al., Securities Fraud, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV.877 (2005)
185. and Matthew Scott Morris, Comment, The Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990: By Keeping Up with the Joneses, the SEC's Enforcement Arsenal is Modernized, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U.151 (1993).
186. For a general critique of the SEC's limited scope of environmental liability disclosures, see Clifford Rechtschaffen, Enforcing the Clean Water Act in the Twenty-First Century: Harnessing the Power of the Public Spotlight, 55 ALA. L. REV.775, 809-14 (2004).
187. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70 (2000)).
188. Tracy Soehle, Comment, SEC Disclosure Requirements for Environmental Liabilities, 8 TUL. ENVTL. L.J.527, 529 (1995) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332(1) (2000)).
189. Id. (citing Disclosures Pertaining to Matters Involving the Environment and Civil Rights, Exchange Act Release No. 9252, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 23,507 (July 19, 1971)). It should be noted, however, that the SEC asserted that compelling corporate environmental disclosure was not to "change corporate conduct," but merely to "facilitate investors' access to relevant, economically significant information, thereby assisting the investors to make informed investment decisions."
190. Robert J. Lewis, Note, "Shh! Maybe in My Backyard!" An Equity and Efficiency-Based Critique of SEC Environmental Disclosure Rules and Extraterritorial Environmental Matters, 78 MINN. L. REV.1045, 1049 n.22 (1994) (citing Proposed Environmental Disclosures, No. 5627, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶¶ 85,710-13 (Oct. 14, 1975)).
191. C.F.R. §§ 229.10-229.802 (2007).
192. C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(xii) (2007). Moreover, a reporting entity must "disclose any material estimated capital expenditures for environmental control facilities for the remainder of its current fiscal year and its succeeding fiscal year and for such further periods as the registrant may deem material."
193. C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(xii).
194. C.F.R. § 229.103.
195. C.F.R. § 229.303;
196. see Soehle, supra note 143, at 536.
197. Smith, supra note 138, at 434-35. Federal regulations require that information presented in prospectuses, for example, must be drafted in a "clear, concise and understandable manner."
198. C.F.R. § 230.421(b). The regulations specify "six minimum plain English writing principles [for] use in drafting the front of prospectuses: Active voice, short sentences, everyday language, tabular presentation of complex material, no legal jargon, and no multiple negatives."
199. Plain English Disclosure, 62 Fed. Reg. 3152, 3152-53 (Jan. 21, 1997) (codified as amended at 17 C.F.R. § 230.421 (2007)).
200. There are two exchanges in Mainland China: the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. These exchanges are administered directly by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). There is also the Hong Kong Stock Exchange located in the special administrative region of Hong Kong.
201. Chi Guotai et al., The Trends of Transparency, Laws and Regulations on Chinese Corporate Governance 1 (Dalian Univ. of Tech. 2007), http://ethicsworld.org/corporategovernance/ ChinaCorporateGovernance.pdf.
202. Id.
203. Law on the Promotion of Cleaner Production (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., June 29, 2002, effective Jan. 1, 2003), ISINOLAW(last visited Oct. 15, 2008) (P.R.C.).
204. Id. art. 1. The law defines "cleaner production" as fundamental reduction of pollution from sources, efficiency improvement of resource utilization, reduction or avoidance of pollutions [sic] from the course of production and use of services and products by means of improving design incessantly, using cleaner energy resources and raw materials, adopting advanced techniques, equipment, improving management, and comprehensive utilization, so as to reduce or eliminate harm to human health and environment.
205. Id. art. 2. This definition is consistent with and expands upon the U.N.'s notion of "cleaner production." The U.N. broadly defines "cleaner production" to mean the "continuous application of an integrated, preventive strategy applied to processes, products and services in pursuit of economic, social, health, safety and environmental benefits." U.N. ENV'T PROGRAMME, INTERNATIONAL DECLARATION ON CLEANER PRODUCTION(1998), available at http:// www.unep.fr/scp/cp/network/pdf/english.pdf.
206. Law on the Promotion of Cleaner Production (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., June 29, 2002, effective Jan. 1, 2003) arts. 7, 15, 2002 STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAZ.291 (P.R.C.).
207. Id. art. 17.
208. Id. art. 31.
209. According to a SEPA bulletin, local and provincial authorities enforcing the Cleaner Production law should publish a wide range of information regarding the environmental performance of offending enterprises, including total discharge of pollutants, major pollution abatement projects, compliance histories, and environmental management initiatives. State Envtl. Prot. Admin., Guan yu qi ye huan jing xin xi gong kai de gong gao [Bulletin on Information Disclosure for Corporate Environmental Performance], U.N. Conference on Env't and Dev. 156 (2003), available at http://www.sepa.gov.cn/info/gw/huangfa /200309/t20030902_86629.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2008).
210. Law on the Promotion of Cleaner Production art. 41 (P.R.C.). It should also be noted that the Act provides for a "cleaner production commending and rewarding system" for "[e]ntities and individuals that achieve remarkable successes in cleaner production."
211. Id. art. 32.
212. State Admin. for Indus. & Commerce of the People's Republic of China, Decree of State Environmental Protection Administration No. 35, http:// english.wzj.saic.gov.cn/nd/070429093919-0.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2008);
213. Measures for the Disclosure of Environmental Information (for Trial Implementation) (promulgated by State Envtl. Prot. Admin., Apr. 11, 2007, effective May 1, 2008), LAWINFOCHINA(last visited Oct. 15, 2008) (P.R.C.).
214. See also Ma Jun, The Environment Needs Freedom of Information, CHINADIALOGUE, May 9, 2007, http://www. chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en /990-The-environment-needs-freedom-of-information. "These regulations - the first departmental rules relating to the release of state information - are a milestone on the path to guaranteeing the public's right to access environmental information."
215. See Measures for the Disclosure of Environmental Infonnation (for Trial Implementation) (promulgated by State Envtl. Prot. Admin., Apr. 11, 2007, effective May 1, 2008) art. 4, LAWINFOCHINA(last visited Oct. 21, 2007) (P.R.C.).
216. Press Release, State Envtl. Prot. Admin., Shou bu huan jing xin xi gong kai ban fa chu tai qiang zhi huan bao bu men he wu ran qi ye gong kai huan jing xin xi pan yue hu yu yi gong zhong shen du can yu tui dong wu ran jian pai [Introducing Mandatory Environmental Information Disclosure Law, Pan Yue Urges Environmental Protection Departments and Enterprises to Disclose Information to Promote Public Participation in Pollution Abatement] (Apr. 25, 2007), available at http://www.zhb.gov.cn/ xcjy/zwhb/200704/t20070425_103120.htm ("Yin ci, gong can yu jiu bu neng ting liu zai zhi shu zhong cao he qing Ii la ji de jie duan, er ying gai wang geng shen ceng ci fa zhan, ji chong fen li yong xian fa fu yu de zhi qing quan, biao da quan, can yu quan, jian du quan, jian du qi ye de huan bao xing wei, can yu zheng fu de huan jing jue ce.") (statement by then SEPA deputy director Pan Yue) ("Therefore, public participation will not be able to stay at the stage of planting trees and grass, and cleaning up litter, it should develop to a deeper level, make full use of the right to information given by the constitution, the right to expression, the right to participate, supervision, monitoring corporate environmental conduct, and participate in the government's environmental policy making.").
217. Id. art. 11.
218. Id. art. 20.
219. Id.
220. Id. art. 21.
221. Id. art. 28.
222. Id. arts. 5, 11.
223. Id. art. 13.
224. Id. art. 26, 27.
225. Regulation on the Inspection and Verification of Environmental Protection of Corporations Applying for Listing and Listed Corporations Applying for Refinancing (promulgated by State Envtl. Prot. Admin., June 16, 2003, effective June 16, 2003), LAWINFOCHINA(last visited Oct. 21, 2008) (P.R.C.). This Regulation has been updated by SEPA guidance materials twice in 2007.
226. STATE ENVTL. PROT. ADMIN., GUAN YU JIN YI BU GUI FAN ZHONG WU RAN XING YE SHENG CHAN JING YING GONG SISHEN QING SHANG SHI HUO ZAI RONG ZI HUAN JING BAO HU HE CHA GONG ZUO DE TONG ZHI [FURTHER STANDARDIZATION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION VERIFICATION FOR LISTING OR REFINANCING OF HEAVILY POLLUTING INDUSTRIES](Aug. 13, 2007), http://www.sepa. gov.cn/info/gw/huanban/200708/t20070816_107999.htm;
227. STATE ENVTL. PROT. ADMIN., SHOU CI SHEN QING SHANG SHI HUO ZAI RONG ZI DE SHANG SHI GONG SI HUAN JING BAO HU HE CHA GONG ZHOU ZI NAN [ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION VERIFICATION GUIDE FOR FIRST TIME LISTING OR REFINANCING COMPANIES](Sept. 27, 2007), http://www.zhb.gov.cn/cont/ gywrfz/200709/t20070927_109609.htm. The thrust of the regulation, however, effectively remains the same: to prevent environmental risks by requiring enterprises from certain heavily-polluting industrial sectors to meet minimum compliance standards before listing on a stock exchange or obtaining refinancing. Enterprises applying to SEPA for environmental inspection still must send applications and technical documentation to provincial Environmental Protection Bureaus, which in turn file reports with SEPA and CSRC.
228. Regulation on the Inspection and Verification of Environmental Protection of Corporations Applying for Listing and the [sic] Listed Corporations Applying for Refinancing (promulgated by State Envtl. Prot. Admin., June 16, 2003, effective June 16, 2003), LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 21, 2008) (P.R.C.). The regulation applies to the following industries: "metallurgy, chemical industry, petrochemistry, coal, thermal power, building material, paper making, brewage, pharmaceutical, fermenting, spinning and weaving, tanning and mining."
229. Id. para. 1.
230. Id. para. 2, 3. The reporting requirements are extensive, but most importantly enterprises must demonstrate compliance with state and local pollutant discharge standards and with permit or license requirements.
231. Id. para. 2.
232. Id. para. 3.
233. The CSRC constitutes the lead national agency enforcing disclosure obligations through self-promulgating regulations and enforcement of the Securities and Company Laws. For an in-depth discussion of CSRC regulatory oversight of corporate disclosures, see generally Daniel M. Anderson, Taking Stock in China: Company Disclosure and Information in China's Stock Markets, 88 GEO. L.J.1919 (2000).
234. Measures for the Administration of Initial Public Offering and Listing of Stocks (promulgated by the China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, May 17, 2006, effective May 18, 2006) art. 25(2), LAWINFOCHINA(last visited Oct. 21, 2008) (P.R.C.).
235. Id. art. 40.
236. Shanghai Stock Exchange, Gong kai fa xing zheng quan de gong si xin xi pi lu nei rong yu ge shi zhun di jiu hao shou qi gong kai fa xing gu piao bing shang shi shen qing wen jian [Public Offering of Securities Companies to Disclose Information Content and Format of the Guidelines on the 9th - Initial Public Offerings of Stock and Listing Application Documents] (May 18, 2006), http://www.sse.com.cn/ps/zhs/fwzc/ xxpljg.shtml (last visited Nov. 16, 2007).
237. Id.
238. Securities Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006) arts. 63-72, LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 21, 2008) (P.R.C.).
239. Id. art. 65.
240. Id. art. 67. It should be noted, however, that the CSRC has generally not specified the content that needs to be contained in a major event report.
241. Anderson, supra note 174, at 1929.
242. Securities Law art. 67 (P.R.C.).
243. Id. art. 70.
244. See Chi Guotai et al., supra note 151, at 3. Chi explains: The construction of Chinese market transparency is going along orderly, and the market transparency is steadily improving.... The Chinese capital market is a typical new and transitional market. There are many nonstandard problems with the size and quality of listed companies, the controlling level and the development of rules and laws. These factors lead to a low-level of transparency, but Chinese market transparency is marching towards transparence [sic] step by step.
245. Id.
246. Zhou Yihong & Sun Xiaoyan, The Positive Analysis of Environmental Disclosure of Listed Companies in China, 3 J. NANJING AUDIT UNIV. 23 (Nov. 2006).
247. Id.
248. Guo Peiyuan, supra note 83, at 31 tbl.12.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 32 tbl.14.
253. Id. at 33.
254. Id. at 35-37.
255. Chi Guotai et al., supra note 151, at 2.
256. Id. at 2-3.
257. See supra Part III.
258. See Alex Wang, The Role of Law in Environmental Protection in China: Recent Developments, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L.195, 203 (2007) ("It is now generally accepted that China's environmental laws are relatively complete and that enforcement is now the real problem.").
259. Id. at 203.
260. Wang Canfa, supra note 2, at 164 (citing generally Wang Canfa, On Limitations of Legislation on Environmental Administration Mechanism of China and the Ways of Perfecting It, 21 J. CHINA UNI. POL. SCI. & L.(Aug. 2003)).
261. See, e.g., id. at 166 (citing generally Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims ("CLAPV"), Jiao hua an jian dao ju min qu "zheng fun xing wei" shi shou hai zhe zou shi nian guan si lu [Coking Plant to be Built in Neighborhood: Government Acts After Citizens File Suit a Decade Ago], Oct. 19, 2005 [hereinafter CLAPV Report], http://www.clapv.org/new/show.php?id=1111 (describing construction violations of a coke plant where agency official doctored the actual distance between the proposed plan and a residential district from 20 meters to 400 meters)).
262. Id. at 167.
263. Id. (citing CLAPV Report, supra note 200). China's SEPA only has a full-time staff of less than 300, as compared to the U.S. EPA, which has over 17,000 employees.
264. John Warburton & Leo Horn, China's Crisis: A Development Perspective (Part One), CHINA-DIALOGUE, Oct. 25, 2007, http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/ 1418-China-s-crisis-a-development-perspective-part-one.
265. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
266. See Ying Zhao, A Survey of Environmental Law and Enforcement Authorities in China, in FOURTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT903, 908-09, 911-12 (1996), available at http://www.inece.org/4thvol2/zhao.pdf. Yet at least some scholars have noted that the polluter pays principle, penalties, and criminal sanctions may not be entirely effective under the current Chinese enforcement scheme.
267. See William P. Alford & Yuanyuan Shen, Limits of the Law in Addressing China's Environmental Dilemma, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 125, 136 (1997). The effort to align Chinese environmental law more closely with stated national economic objectives and the call for more serious punishment for those who wantonly harm the environment are laudable, but both present problems. Adherence to the "polluter pays" principle and the establishment of a workable system of tradable discharge permits presume more in the way of market mechanisms overseen by independent regulatory authorities than is now available in China or likely to be in the foreseeable future. Severe criminal sanctions are no substitute for such circumstances, as China has learned from its attempts to use criminal law to instill fundamental civic virtue and define appropriate market behavior in its rapidly changing economy.
268. Id. (footnote omitted).
269. Cf. Guo Peiyuan, supra note 83, at 48.
270. See Sitaraman, supra note 13, at 295-300 (detailing the recent historical expansion of Chinese environmental laws and enforcement).
271. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
272. Beyond SEPA, there are purported to be over 2500 environmental protection departments in China with a combined staffing level exceeding 100,000 people who work in "environmental protection, monitoring, inspection, data collection, basic research, education, and publicity." Sitaraman, supra note 13, at 299 (citing ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., CHINA IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 498 (2005)).
273. Id. at 303.
274. See id. Sitaraman goes on to say:
275. The enormous emphasis placed on economic growth and the assurance of a well-off society (xiaokang) has led to lax enforcement of environmental laws and regulations by the local EPBs [Environmental Protection Boards], which answer to provincial and district leaders. Regrettably, under the present pollution enforcement situation, state-owned industrial enterprises and mines are both the principal polluters and the regulators because most of the polluting industries are state-owned enterprises and Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs), which are controlled and run by the local governments. Increasingly, the local governments and EPBs are finding it very difficult to regulate the industries closely tied to the local governments that are more interested in sustaining industrial and agricultural production rather than controlling environmental externalities.
276. Id. (footnotes omitted). Ultimately, the conflicting interests between local regulators and enterprises are subsumed into a far more complicated and dangerous turf war between local and national environmental agencies, where often local governments will intentionally exploit regulatory "loopholes" in national laws to avoid enforcing them against local polluting industries.
277. See id. at 309-11 (discussing the conflicting interests between local and national governments relative to environmental compliance enforcement).
278. See supra Part IV.A.4.b.
279. Guo Peiyuan, supra note 83, at 26.
280. Anderson, supra note 174, at 1920. In fact, enterprises - particularly state-owned enterprises - "often disclose false figures of profits or even forge financial reports" when presenting an initial public offering. Jiangyu Wang, Dancing with Wolves: Regulation and Deregulation of Foreign Investment in China's Stock Market, 5 ASIAN-PACIFIC L. & POL'Y J. I, 39 (2004) (citing QINGLIAN HE, XIAN DAI HUA DE XIAN JING - ZHONG GUO ZHI WEN TI [THE TRAP OF MODERATION - CHINA'S PROBLEMS]24 (1998)).
281. For instance, the SEC offers a website that provides filing forms and instructions, which are available free to the public. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Filings & Forms (EDGAR), http://www.sec.gov /edgar.shtml (last visited Oct. 22, 2008). Similarly, EPA offers a website, again free for the public, that serves as a nexus compiling regulatory guidance materials. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Significant Guidance Documents by Environmental Topic, http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs /guidance/bytopic.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2008).
282. Presently, Mainland Chinese stock exchanges are responsible for overseeing information disclosures released by listed enterprises, but "lack real power to investigate and punish information disclosure malpractice," which authority is ultimately vested with the CSRC. Chenxia Shi, Protecting Investors in China Through Multiple Regulatory Mechanisms and Effective Enforcement, 24 ARIZ. J. INTL & COMP. L.451, 470 (2007) (citation omitted).
283. Chi Guotai et al., supra note 151, at 2-3.
284. See Jiangyu Wang, supra note 213, at 43-44 (discussing the absence of judicial protection for investors alleging securities law violations against listed enterprises).
285. Id. at 56. Jiangyu Wang notes that a "well -functioning stock market" will require the reformation of state-owned enterprises so as to ensure "good corporate governance" by enterprise elites wholly willing to honestly participate in the market place, which includes accurate information disclosures.
286. Id. Yet, even with corporate reforms, existing rules promulgated under China's Securities Laws provide that "no private securities litigation can be adjudicated by a Chinese court unless an administrative penalty . . . or a criminal penalty has already been imposed."
287. Walter Hutchens, Private Securities Litigation in China: Material Disclosure About China's Legal System?, 24 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.599, 634-35 (2003).
288. Thus, even when claims are based on bad disclosure and thus are within the scope of the PSL [Private Security Litigation] Rules, investors may not seek relief without enabling government action. This requirement has no basis in the PRC Securities Law and it strips investors of the fight to sue for disclosure fraud explicitly provided for in the Securities Law. The requirement effectively puts the threat of private securities litigation under government leash. It substantially removes the "private" aspect of private securities litigation; under the PSL Rules, the government must sanction all "private" litigation. This significantly dilutes the potential of private securities litigation to create incentives for compliance with China's disclosure laws. No army of private attorneys general will be unleashed without specific government sanction in each instance. Just as stock markets exist in China without privatization of ownership, private securities litigation exists in China without fundamental privatization of the cause of action.
289. Id. at 635-36 (referencing generally Guanyu shenli zhengquan shichang yin xujia chenshu yinfade minshi peichang anjian de ruogan guiding [Several Regulations Concerning the Adjudication of Civil Compensation Securities Cases Based upon Misrepresentation] (Sup. People's Ct., Jan. 9, 2003), available at http://www.people.com. cn/GB/jinji/35/159/20030110/905268.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2008)) (footnotes omitted).
290. See, e.g., Wang Canfa, supra note 2, at 176-77 (discussing the need to establish a more independent and "vertically" aligned judiciary in China);
291. Alex Wang, supra note 197, at 207-12 (detailing the framework and judicial limitations facing plaintiffs raising "pollution compensation cases" i "wuran sunhai peichang anjian"]);
292. Patti Goldman, Public Interest Environmental Litigation in China: Lessons Learned from the U.S. Experience, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 251, 258-73 (outlining, in broad strokes, the need for greater public access to Chinese courts to prevent environmental harm).
293. Environmental Protection Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 26, 1989, effective Dec. 26, 1989) art. 6, LAWINFOCHINA(last visited Oct. 21, 2008) (P.R.C.).
294. Li Zhiping, supra note 7, at 393.
295. U.S.C. § 552 (2006). The idea of implementing a scheme like FOIA in China is not new, although some scholars question whether it is feasible.
296. See, e.g., Randall Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency and the Limits of Law: Administrative Law Reform and Rule of Law in the People's Republic of China, 19 BERKELEY J. INT'L L.161, 262 (2001) ("China is not likely to pass a freedom of information act in the foreseeable future."). But other scholars offer more hopeful prospects, recognizing that Chinese law has made some progress toward developing legal hooks upon which citizens can hang claims against the government.
297. See Wu Changhua, Improving the Legal and Policy Foundation for Public Access to Environmental Information in China, 24 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH, & ENVTL. L.291, 292 (2005) ("China has started a fundamental reform, developing legislation and policies to fill gaps in the legislative framework on the basis of such principles as openness, transparency, justice, and fairness. Such reform is similar to that in the United States during the mid-twentieth century with the enactment of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), when Congress realized that, 'although the theory of an informed electorate is vital to the proper operation of a democracy, there is nowhere in our present law a statute which affirmatively provides for the information,' and set out to bring into the open 'the hundreds of departments, branches, and agencies" of government.') (citing S. REP.No. 89-813, at 3 (1965));
298. John Ohnesorge, Chinese Administrative Law in the Northeast Asian Mirror, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.103, 145-46 (2006) ("A second gap exists with respect to citizen access to government-held information, which is not now facilitated by an information disclosure law along the lines of the Freedom of Information Act .... China is experimenting with a loosening of restrictions on information and publicity, with information disclosure systems being created at the provincial level, and with public hearings being held prior to certain types of regulatory decisions. This may have gone furthest with respect to environmental decisions, where international norms favor extensive interaction with affected citizens." (footnotes ornitted)).
299. Specifically, FOIA permits federal district courts to hear citizen challenges to efforts on behalf of the government to withhold information pursuant to a valid FOIA request. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). The law places the burden of proof upon the government to demonstrate why the information should be withheld.
300. Id. Perhaps more importantly, if a citizen "substantially prevails" in a FOIA action, then the court may assess attorneys' fees and litigation expenses for the citizen against the government.
301. Id. § 552(a)(4)(E). Finally, in the most egregious of circumstances, where a government officer "arbitrarily or capriciously" withholds information, FOIA requires the appointment of a Special Counsel to conduct an investigation and propose recommendations dealing specifically with the offending government official.
302. Id. § 552(a)(4)(F).
303. China "officially" adopted the International Standards Organization's 14000 series environmental management systems protocol in 1997. Christine Mikulich, ISO 14000-14001, The Developing World's Perspective, 17 TUL. ENVTL. L.J.117, 142 (2003) (citing ISO 14000 Series to Be Adopted April 1 as State Policy in China, 20 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 198 (Mar. 5, 1997)).
304. China's support for ISO 14000 indicates an attempt to use market mechanisms to compensate for otherwise insufficient regulatory enforcement. Paulette L. Stenzel, Can the ISO 14000 Series Environmental Management Standards Provide a Viable Alternative to Government Regulation?, 37 AM. BUS. L.J.237, 277 (2000). Yet, many Chinese enterprises, particularly the most heavily polluting state-owned enterprises, are not ISO 14000 participants.
305. See Yuhong Zhao, Trade and Environment: Challenges After China's WTO Accession, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.41, 89 (2007) ("However, most Chinese enterprises have not fully realized the significance of the certification. For the first half of 2001, only about 500 China-based enterprises had obtained certificates, and most of these were foreign or Sinoforeign companies." (footnote omitted)).
306. Li Zhiping, supra note 7, at 390.
307. See id. at 389-90 (discussing the improvement of enforcement in China through cooperation and incentives in addition to traditional compliance enforcement obligations).
308. Id. at 390 (citing CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARKELL, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT & THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 69 (2003)).
309. Dennis D. Hirsch, Symposium Introduction, Second Generation Policy and the New Economy, 29 CAP. U. L. REV.1, 7 (2001).
310. Id.
311. Id. at 13.
312. Id.
313. Stephen Robert Geisler, Commentary, Voluntary Disclosure of Corporate Violations of Federal Law, 51 ALA. L. REV.375, 376 (1999). Examples of such programs include the Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol," which concerns the disclosure of wrongdoing with respect to federal heath care programs, the U.S. Department of Defense "Voluntary Disclosure Program," addressing procurement fraud, and several disclosure initiatives within the U.S. Department of Justice.
314. Id. at 376-77.
315. Id. at 379-84.
316. Ronnie P. Hawks, Comment, Environmental Self-Audit Privilege and Immunity: Aid to Enforcement or Polluter Protection?, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J.235, 272 (1998).
317. Id.
318. Brooks M. Beard, The New Environmental Federalism: Can the EPA's Voluntary Audit Policy Survive?, 17 VA. ENVTL. L.J.1, 2 (1998).
319. Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618 (Apr. 11, 2000) [hereinafter EPA Audit Policy], available at http://www.epa.gov/ compliance/resources/policies/incentives/auditing/auditpolicy51100.pdf. For the definition of "environmental audit,"
320. see Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,004, 25,004 (July 9, 1986).
321. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA's Audit Policy, http://www.epa.gov/ compliance/incentives/auditing/auditpolicy.html (last visited Sep. 25, 2008).
322. Id.
323. Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. at 25,004.
324. Allison F. Gardner, Beyond Compliance: Regulatory Incentives to Implement Environmental Management Systems, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 662, 676 (2003) (citing Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. at 25,007).
325. Id. at 676-77 (citing David Sorenson, The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Recent Environmental Auditing Policy and Potential Conflict with State-Created Environmental Audit Privileges, 9 TUL. ENVTL. L.J.483, 486 (1996);
326. Miri Berlin, Note, Environmental Auditing: Entering the Eco-Information Highway, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.618, 623 (1998)).
327. Voluntary Environmental Self-Policing and Self-Disclosure Interim Policy Statement, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,875 (Apr. 3, 1995) [hereinafter 1995 Interim Policy].
328. Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations, Final Policy Statement, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706 (Dec. 22, 1995) [hereinafter 1995 Final Policy].
329. Beard, supra note 236, at 6-7 (citing 1995 Interim Policy, 60 Fed. Reg. at 16,875-76).
330. Id. at 8 (citing 1995 Final Policy, 60 Fed. Reg. at 66,706-07).
331. EPA Audit Policy, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618 (Apr. 11, 2000).
332. Id. at 19,618. Within the Audit Policy, EPA distinguishes between the economic and gravity-based components of civil penalties: In general, civil penalties that EPA assesses are comprised of two elements: the economic benefit component and the gravity-based component. The economic benefit component reflects the economic gain derived from a violator's illegal competitive advantage. Gravity-based penalties are that portion of the penalty over and above the economic benefit. They reflect the egregiousness of the violator's behavior and constitute the punitive portion of the penalty.
333. Id. at 19,620.
334. For further discussion, see Calculation of the Economic Benefit of Noncompliance in EPA's Civil Penalty Enforcement Cases, 64 Fed. Reg. 32,948 (June 18, 1999) and U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, A FRAMEWORK FOR STATUTE-SPECIFIC APPROACHES TO PENALTY ASSESSMENTS(1984), available at http://www.wildlaw.org/Eco-Laws /civ-pen.htm#on%20Civil% 20Penalties.
335. EPA Audit Policy, 65 Fed. Reg. at 19,621-23. Similar to the 1995 policy, the current policy also includes the following two incentives: (1) no recommendations for criminal prosecution; and (2) no routine requests for audit reports. Id. at 19,620.
336. The Audit Policy defines an "environmental audit" as a "systematic, documented, periodic and objective review by regulated entities of facility operations and practices related to meeting environmental requirements." EPA Audit Policy, 65 Fed. Reg. at 19,625. A "compliance management system" is also a "systematic effort" that includes comprehensive policies and procedures to ensure employees and agents understand how to comply with all applicable environmental laws; assignment of compliance responsibilities; mechanisms to ensure compliance; appropriate communication protocols; and incentives to encourage internal implementation of the program. Id.
337. EPA Audit Policy, 65 Fed. Reg. at 19,626.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 19,619.
340. Id. at 19,622.
341. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Corporate Audit Agreements, http://www.epa.gov/ compliance/incentives/auditing/auditagree.html (last visited Sep. 26, 2008).
342. Gardner, supra note 241, at 680-81 (citing Evaluation of "Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations" Policy Statement, Proposed Revisions and Request for Public Comment, 64 Fed. Reg. 26,745, 26,747 (May 17, 1999) [hereinafter EPA 1999 Evaluation]).
343. Id. at 681 (citing EPA 1999 Evaluation, at 26,751).
344. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, AUDIT POLICY USER'S SURVEY RESULTS4 (Dec. 22, 1998), http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/ incentives/auditing/auditresults1298.pdf.
345. Guo Peiyuan, supra note 83, at 10 (explaining that this provision requires enterprises to report the use, amount, and management programs for pollutants used to the government).
346. Id. at 34.
347. To show the mounting social pressure exerted by the public on Chinese corporations, Guo Peiyuan references a 2004 survey that shows "that 89% of Chinese CEOs agree that corporate reputation is very important" and "a relatively high 57% said that they sponsored environmental activities." Id. at 34 (citing HILL & KNOWLTON AND THE ECONOMIC OBSERVER, 2004 CORPORATE REPUTATION WATCH (CHINA), SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 11, 24 (2004), http://www2. hillandknowlton.com/crw/download.asp?filename=2004 China CRW Survey (English).pdf [hereinafter HILL2004 SURVEY]).
348. Guo Peiyuan also references a 2003 Shenzhen Stock Exchange study that reveals a positive upward trend in corporate voluntary disclosure. Id. at 34-35 (citing ZHANG ZONGXIN ET AL., STUDY OF THE VALIDITY OF VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE OF LISTED COMPANIES(2003)).
349. Id. at 34.
350. It is also interesting to note that in some instances, there is a synergy combining media and governmental influence on domestic Chinese enterprises. For instance, since 1993 the Propaganda Department of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and other state agencies have implemented an annual environmental reporting campaign, which provides information to media reporters about environmental laws and regulations. Zhong hua huan bao shi ji xing jie shao [China Trans-century Environmental Protection Inspection Campaign], http://www.ccep.org.cn/ intro/index.htm. The purpose of the campaign is to use the media to compel local governments and enterprises to address environmental concerns in Mainland China more aggressively. Id.
351. Since its inception, over 80,000 individuals and reporters have participated, who have in turn written hundreds of thousands of news stories and reports. Id.
352. See Guo Peiyuan, supra note 83, at 35. Peiyuan explains: Corporate environmental reporting and disclosure in China is still at a stage of being pressure oriented. In other words, companies are often reluctant to release environmental information if they are not asked to do so and nobody puts much pressure on them. Companies usually want to disclose as little information as possible, partly because they see this process as costly.
353. Id.
354. HILL2004 SURVEY, supra note 261, at 39.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. The top scoring categories for Chinese enterprises were "industry leader status" (50%), followed by "product/service" (48%). Id.
358. Id. at 46. Yet an astute researcher can find examples of Chinese enterprises that have picked up the gauntlet of developing corporate environmental programs and disclosing environmental performance information to the public. For instance, Baosteel Group, an unlisted massive state-owned industrial enterprise, issues annual business reports that include an analysis of environmental concerns regarding domestic steel production operations.
359. See BAOSTEEL GROUP CORP., 2006 ANNUAL REPORT40-43 (2006), available at http://tv.baosteel.com/web/group/pdf/group2006e.pdf (discussing Baosteel's need to modify business models and growth strategies in response to increasing environmental regulatory pressure and limited natural resources, along with other factors, including increased market competition). Baosteeel's 2006 annual report references a publicly-available 2005 "Sustainability Report," touted as the first of its kind in China, which in addition to the enterprise's "environmental reports," chronicles business-wide environmental and conservation activities designed to enhance overall corporate environmental performance.
360. Id. at 40. Additionally, Haier Group, a Hong Kong listed Chinese enterprise incorporated in Bermuda, also issues annual environmental reports available directly to the Chinese people that provides a comprehensive listing of environmental management programs and sustainability-driven initiatives.
361. See, e.g., HALER GROUP, 2005 ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT OF HALER, available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/data/ ungc_cops_ resources/65172937-1044-4B5D-BAA2-35CA065EFB68/COP.pdf.
362. Measures for the Disclosure of Environmental Information (for Trial Implementation) (promulgated by State Envtl. Prot. Admin., Apr. 11, 2007, effective May 1, 2008), LAWINFOCHINA(last visited Oct. 21, 2008) (P.R.C.). For a general discussion of DEID involuntary requirements, see supra Part IV.A.3.a.
363. Measures for the Disclosure of Environmental Information (for Trial Implementation) (promulgated by State Envtl. Prot. Admin., Apr. 11, 2007, effective May 1, 2008) art. 19, LAWINFOCHINA(last visited Oct. 21, 2008) (P.R.C.).
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id. art. 22.
367. Id. art. 23.
368. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
369. Administrative Measures for the Disclosure of Information of Listed Companies (promulgated by the China Securities Reg. Comm'n, Jan. 30, 2007, effective Jan. 30, 2007) art. 30, LAWINFOCHINA(last visited Oct. 21, 2008) (P.R.C.).
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. See discussion supra Part III.A.
373. Wanxin Li, supra note 60, at 128.
374. Id. For a discussion of "green" product labeling in China, see Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Twenty-First Century, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J.1 (2007) ("Now that environmental protection has become an urgent priority of the Chinese government, China has not hesitated to import into its environmental laws regulatory policy innovations from other countries, such as emissions trading, effluent charges, green labeling, and environmental performance grading."
375. (citing Gary McNeil & David Hathaway, Green Labeling and Energy Efficiency in China, 7 CHINA ENV'T SERIES72 (2005);
376. Hua Wang et al., supra note 64;
377. Yuhong Zhao, supra note 39, at 87-88 (describing the recent history of China's eco-labeling efforts))).
378. See HILL 2004 SURVEY, supra note 261, at 17 (reporting that when asked which threats most concern Chinese enterprises, 55% of surveyed executive officers said "unethical corporate behavior;" followed by 53% regarding "media criticism" and 40% for "customer criticism," and only 10% related to "litigation judgments").
379. See supra Part IV.A.4.b.
380. See Gardner, supra note 241, at 677-79.
381. See supra Part IV.A.4.
382. See supra Part IV.B.2.
383. Cong. Executive Comm'n on China, China's Constitutional Framework, http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/gov/stateconst.php (last modified June 3, 2004).
384. XIAN FAart. 2 (1982) (P.R.C.) (emphasis added).
385. Id. art. 9 (emphasis added).
386. Id. art. 26.
387. Environmental Protection Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 26, 1989, effective Dec. 26, 1989) art. 6, LAWINFOCHINA(last visited Oct. 21, 2008) (P.R.C.).
388. Id. art. 11.
389. See Hua Wang et al., supra note 64, at 7 ("Similar provisions appear in China's Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law, Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law, Marine Environment Protection Law, and Environmental Noise Prevention and Control Law.").
390. See, e.g., notes 60-63.
391. Measures for the Disclosure of Environmental Information (for Trial Implementation) (promulgated by State Envtl. Prot. Admin., Apr. 11, 2007, effective May 1, 2008) LAWINFOCHINA(last visited Oct. 21, 2008) (P.R.C.).
392. For a general discussion of DEID involuntary requirements, see supra Part IV.A.3.a, and for voluntary programs,
393. see supra Part IV.B.3. It is interesting to note that within three months of implementation, it was reported that DEID has encouraged the Chinese government to be more forthcoming with information, even though there have been incidents where citizens cannot always obtain specifically-requested information.
394. Tang Hao, New Challenges to Environmental Transparency, CHINA-DIALOGUE, Aug. 20, 2008, http://www.chinadialogue.net/ article/show/single/en/2321-New-challenges-to-environmental-transparency.
395. See discussion supra Part III.
396. See discussion supra Part IV.A.3.
397. See discussion supra Part IV.A.4.c.
398. See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.
399. See discussion supra Part IV.A.4.c.
400. Id.
401. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3.
402. See discussion supra Part IV.B.4.