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Volumn 144, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 1341-1351

Auctions with almost homogeneous bidders

Author keywords

Asymmetry; Auctions; Differentiability; First price auction; Independent private value model; Revenue Equivalence Theorem; Second price auction

Indexed keywords


EID: 64049111575     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.11.013     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (10)

References (14)
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  • 2
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  • 3
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  • 4
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    • Les Cahiers de Recherche du GREEN (working paper series) 97-03, Université Laval, 1997. Available at
    • Lebrun B. First-price auctions in the asymmetric N bidder case. Les Cahiers de Recherche du GREEN (working paper series) 97-03, Université Laval, 1997. Available at. http://dept.econ.yorku.ca/~blebrun/FPANB-DP97.pdf
    • First-price auctions in the asymmetric N bidder case
    • Lebrun, B.1
  • 5
    • 0041852124 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • First-price auctions in the asymmetric N bidder case
    • Lebrun B. First-price auctions in the asymmetric N bidder case. Internat. Econom. Rev. 40 1 (1999) 125-142
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  • 6
    • 33644918885 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Discussion Paper, Department of Economics, York University, 2004. Available at
    • Lebrun B. Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions. Discussion Paper, Department of Economics, York University, 2004. Available at. http://dept.econ.yorku.ca/~blebrun/lebrunb-u.pdf
    • Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions
    • Lebrun, B.1
  • 7
    • 33644901748 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions
    • Lebrun B. Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions. Games Econom. Behav. 55 (2006) 131-151
    • (2006) Games Econom. Behav. , vol.55 , pp. 131-151
    • Lebrun, B.1
  • 8
    • 64049095468 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Discussion Paper, Department of Economics, York University, 2006. Available at
    • Lebrun B. Auctions with almost homogeneous bidders. Discussion Paper, Department of Economics, York University, 2006. Available at. http://dept.econ.yorku.ca/~blebrun/auctalmhombid-wp-lebrun.pdf
    • Auctions with almost homogeneous bidders
    • Lebrun, B.1
  • 12
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    • Optimal auction design
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  • 13
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    • Disincentives for cost-reducing investment
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  • 14
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    • Asymmetric private value auctions with applications to joint bidding and mergers
    • Waehrer K. Asymmetric private value auctions with applications to joint bidding and mergers. Internat. J. Industrial Organ. 17 (1999) 437-452
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.